The time and space of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe, 1923-1939 by Thorpe, Benjamin J.
  
 
 
The time and space of 
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
Pan-Europe, 1923-1939 
 
 
Benjamin James Thorpe, BA. MA. 
 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
July 2018  
ii 
 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates the historical geographies of the Pan-European Union, and its founder and 
leader Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, focusing in the main on the period from 1923 to 1939. A 
mixed-race Austrian aristocrat, philosopher and writer who made it his life’s mission to see Europe 
politically united, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s was a singular life, which he used to his advantage by 
weaving his life story into his political campaigning. The thesis opens by investigating the 
relationship between a life lived and a life told, and about the consequences for researchers attempting 
to recover his biography. 
 
The bulk of the thesis looks at the ways in which Pan-Europeanism both responded and itself 
contributed to shaping three broad sets of spatial and temporal ideas, each revolving around the notion 
of a supranational European polity. First, it confronts the way history was invoked both to bring into 
being a ‘literature’ that would add prestige to its arguments, and to craft a narrative arc that would 
add the force of apparent inevitability to its arguments. Second, it looks at the way in which Pan-
Europeanism employed a form of spatial reasoning that shared many points of reference with the 
German school of geopolitik, despite a fundamentally incompatible view of international politics. 
And third, it analyses the Pan-European invention of ‘Eurafrica’ as a neo-colonial system that would 
offer a ‘third path’ internationalism that fell between the imperialism of the British Empire, and the 
Mandate-based theory of international governance advocated by the League. Each of these sets of 
ideas, I argue, persisted both outside the bounds of the Pan-European Union, and after its eventual 
marginalisation. 
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Introduction 
 
Ideas are born as sparks fly upwards. … Among innumerable sparks that flash and fade away, 
there now and again gleams one that lights up not only the immediate scene, but the whole 
world. 
 …So when the idea of “The United States of Europe” drifted off upon the wind and 
came in contact with the immense accumulation of muddle, waste, particularism and prejudice 
which had long lain piled up in the European garden, it became quite evident that a new series 
of events had opened. 
Winston Churchill, 19301 
 
 
When I started this PhD in 2013, the political unity of Europe was a given, Britain’s place within it 
secure. The previous autumn, the EU had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, cited ‘for over six 
decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in 
Europe’.2 Accepting the prize on the EU’s behalf, the President of the European Council Herman Van 
Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso gave a joint lecture under 
the title “From War to Peace”.3 My goal at the time was to extend the ‘six decades’ timeframe, pushing 
it back into the interwar period. I would explore the contribution towards European integration of the 
Pan-European Union (PEU), a private organisation founded in 1923 by Count Richard Coudenhove-
Kalergi, a man who had published a whole book on European integration entitled From War to Peace,4 
and who had also been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. The PEU had in the 
interwar years pioneered a number of familiar facets of European integration, from the European 
                                               
1 W.S. Churchill, "United States of Europe", Saturday Evening Post, 15 February 1930, p. 25, 48. This article was 
syndicated internationally, to numerous publications. Hereafter, I refer to the printed manuscript in CAC, CHAR 
8/303, 4-12. 
2 https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/eu-facts.html (last accessed 28 Sep 2017) 
3 European Union, "Nobel Lecture: "From War to Peace: A European Tale"" (10 December 2012) 
4 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, From War To Peace (London: Jonathan Cape; 1959) 
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passport5 to the adoption of Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” movement of his 9th Symphony as a European 
anthem.6 In more general terms, it played an important role in establishing ‘Europe’ as a scale at 
which modern politics could and should take place (see chapter I). And yet Coudenhove-Kalergi 
never won his Nobel prize. As the institutions that became the EU slowly took shape, Coudenhove-
Kalergi found himself written out of a narrative of European integration that took 1945 as its zero-
hour, and Jean Monnet et al as visionaries operating in an intellectual vacuum. This thesis would be 
a corrective to that lacuna. 
 As I conclude the PhD, in 2017, Britain is negotiating its exit from the EU, and the future of 
Europe is more uncertain than at any point since the war. Reading the surfeit of attempts to analyse 
what ‘Brexit’ might mean for both Britain and Europe, it is clear that there are as many different 
courses as there are pundits, and public debate on this issue seems at present to be generating rather 
more heat than light. This, I contend, is partly because Brexit represents a fundamental challenge not 
just to the functionality and self-image of the EU as a political entity, but to the progressivist narrative 
that sustains it, a narrative until now continually bolstered by the steady accretion of new members 
and deepening of their union. Europhiles remain committed to a view that, implicitly or explicitly, 
portrays a united Europe as the future, and divided nations as the past. Take, for instance, a 2016 
artwork designed as a contribution to the ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ referendum campaign by the 
Berlin-based British artist Tacita Dean, in which a simple chalk message is scrawled on a blackboard: 
‘vote for a future/not a past/vote to stay in Europe’ (see fig. 1). 
In defying this logic, Brexit not only challenges the internal calculation of whether Britain 
might be better off out of the EU, but fundamentally subverts the master-narrative of the European 
                                               
5 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Zum Europäischen Pass", Paneuropa 3.7 (1927) 20-22 
6 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Paneuropa-Hymne", Paneuropa 5.9 (1929) 23. On Coudenhove-Kalergi’s suggestion 
that the anthem be used by the Council of Europe, see Coudenhove-Kalergi to P.M.G. Levy, 3 Aug 1955, CoE 
webdocs, European Anthem, https://rm.coe.int/16806a9ae7 (last accessed 28 Sep 2017) 
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project. It forces us to answer the question posed by Mark Gilbert in 2008: 
‘what would happen to general narratives of European integration if the EU were to lose its 
aura of progressivism: if it were to be seen in a negative light; as a failure, or obstacle, rather 
than as a model to imitate’7 
Of course, the narrative and its object are intimately linked, and we might equally ask whether it is 
precisely because the general narrative of European integration no longer holds sway that, in the eyes 
of 52% of the British public, the EU has lost this aura. Either way, ‘European integration’ presents 
itself as more than a means of organising politics, more than this or that political innovation, more 
than a series of events at which history turned one way or another. It is a meta-narrative with both 
spatial and temporal dimensions. A way of speaking about time and space, through which European 
integration is produced as both desirable and inevitable. 
 Where did this meta-narrative come from? The answer is a long one, and will take up the 
                                               
7 M. Gilbert, "Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration", JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 46.3 (2008) 641-662, 642 
Figure 1: Tacita Dean, "Vote for a Future" (2016). Source: Britain Stronger In Europe, 
http://www.strongerin.co.uk/art (last accessed 29 September 2017) 
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remainder of this thesis. But a word must be said first about the crucial role of the Pan-European 
Union, and why it remains the perfect lens through which to view this story. In the early twentieth 
century, Enlightenment progressivism of the sort that assured citizens that the world would inevitably 
become ever more civilised was undermined by counter-suggestions that Western civilisation was 
entering a period of decadence, and ruptured by the blunt shock of the First World War. The idea that 
the nation was the natural locus of politics had seemingly been enshrined by Woodrow Wilson’s 
policy of ‘self-determination’, as enacted upon the defeated powers in Europe. The same post-war 
negotiations had determined that these nations would meet in a League of Nations, a universal model 
of internationalism in which the exigencies of geography were, in theory at least, to be set aside. Pan-
Europeanism would challenge each of these notions. It reasserted a sense of progressivism, robustly 
countered the monopoly of the nation-state upon politics, and advanced a thoroughly territorialised 
version of what we might today call supra-national politics, and by its advocates was simply known 
as Pan-European politics. 
 
 
 
Narratives are built on literatures, and the question of the curation of literatures runs through the core 
of this thesis. They are living things, constantly remade, and throughout I prod at received 
understandings that too often become rigid through repetition. Nowhere is this plainer than in 
chapter II, in which I examine the genealogy of what we today think of as the literature of the idea of 
Europe, but do so contextually, with continued reference to how and for what purposes one could 
speak of a literature at all. In chapter III, I argue for the value in reading geopolitik not through the 
lens of Hitler, but through the lens of Pan-Europe, and look at how this opens up a new vista of rarely 
considered influences, a ‘literature’ today balkanised or otherwise lost from view. Chapter IV looks 
at the specific genealogy of ‘Eurafrica’, a term invented for the Pan-European cause, but which 
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ultimately ran loose, taken up by other literatures. Throughout these accounts, reference to present-
day debates is allowed to bubble under the surface, occasionally breaking through but never seizing 
the focus from the story being told. It would be senseless to surgically remove such discussion to sit 
lifeless on its own. Nor would the diverse natures of the respective chapters allow for such a treatment. 
Rather, these issues are folded into the stories that each chapter tells, before being drawn together in 
the conclusion. 
 Though each chapter follows its own tone, structure and style, they are designed to be 
complementary. Thus, the first chapter, while following its own argument about the nature of 
biography and its entanglement with history, also serves as an introduction to Coudenhove-Kalergi 
and the Pan-European movement, and a rumination upon the methodology that underpins the rest of 
the thesis. The second chapter is broadly an investigation into the role of time in Pan-Europeanism, 
while the third looks at the role of space within the movement. Closing matters, the fourth chapter 
works through one particular spatial conception, carrying the narrative forward to discuss the ways 
in which elements of Pan-Europeanism spread beyond the confines of the movement. What links 
these various parts is an approach that continually seeks to explore the genealogy of political 
imaginaries from a geographical perspective. That is: it seeks to limn the development of certain 
spatio-temporal imaginaries, not seeking their origins, but rather tracing their mutation.8 
This method is resource-heavy, and has been facilitated on one hand by extensive archival 
work, and on the other hand by heavy library usage, allied with exploitation of the exponentially 
increasing quantity of literature hosted online. While I count my blessings to have access to such 
riches, it is not without a lingering regret at those pages that remain unturned, and in this regard the 
following can only ever be regarded as a work in progress.9 Alongside such abundance, many of the 
                                               
8 C.f. M. Foucault, "Nietzsche, genealogy, history", in D.F. Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-memory, Practice: 
Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; 1977) 139-164 
9 See J. Hodder, "On absence and abundance: biography as method in archival research", Area 49.4 (2017) 452-459 
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sources I have used are not easily accessed, and even published sources can be difficult to track down. 
(Special mention must be given to the Paneuropa journal, a crucial source for research on the PEU, 
one of the few complete collections of which is held at the ACV in Lausanne.)10 Meanwhile, the 
transnational nature of the topic has also involved a substantial amount of work in languages (mostly 
French and German) in which I am only too aware of my limitations. No doubt an equally substantial 
quantity of information written in other languages remains outside my range. In this regard too, then, 
the thesis is necessarily incomplete, perhaps best seen as a jumping-off point for further research on 
the time and space of Pan-Europe.  
 
 
 
The multilingual nature of the work has also posed a set of questions regarding citation practice. I 
have had to strike a balance between respecting original texts, recognising the importance of 
translation to their circulation, accounting for this while ensuring my own footnotes remain 
digestable, and writing for the benefit of a presumed anglophone reader. Briefly, the practice that I 
settled on is as follows. 
 In the main text, original-language titles are retained, augmented where helpful with 
alternative titles that translations may have been published under. In the footnotes, I have cited 
English-language translations, where available. When no such translation is available, and for the 
instances in which I prefer to use my own translation of the original-language source, translations are 
my own. Where a translation in a secondary text is used, credit is given both to the secondary text 
and to the original-language publication. Square brackets refer to the date of first publication of the 
same text in the same language; where the date of publication in the original language is important to 
the point at hand, this is given in the prose of the main text. And lastly, when there is a good reason 
                                               
10 ACV, PP 1000, 217 
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to depart from this set of practices, I have done so, though such instances are rare and are explained 
as and when they crop up. 
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I. The Lives of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi: Biography and Method 
 
All history is but a mosaic, composed by myriads of individual lives, each a symbol of its 
time and civilization. For the story of mankind is but the story of human individuals, of their 
lives, their struggles and their dreams – and every biography is a living key to history. 
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 194311 
 
 
Count Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s was a remarkable life, doubly indivisible from 
the Pan-European movement. On one level, he maintained an iron grip on the organisation he 
founded, and served as president for the remainder of his life, whose programme and philosophy he 
expounded in numerous books, and whose journal he both edited and was the chief contributor for. 
On a deeper level, it was immediately obvious, both to his contemporaries and to those who have 
studied him in the years since, that he embodied the very pan-Europeanism that he campaigned for. 
He was simultaneously a mixed-race cosmopolitan, a living relic of the old transnational connections 
of the European aristocracy, a fixture in the new transnational connections of European culture and 
politics, and an Austrian whom the political upheavals of the Versailles settlement had suddenly 
rendered ‘out-of-place’. Taken together, it is clear that it would be an impossible task to dissociate an 
analysis of the Pan-European movement from a biographical account of the life of Richard 
Coudenhove-Kalergi. 
Such an approach would be familiar to geographers, who are becoming increasingly 
comfortable with both the act and terminology of ‘biography’ as a research method. Of course, there 
                                               
11 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe: Autobiography of a Man and a Movement (New York: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons; 1943), 8 
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is nothing new about geographers’ interest in lifeworlds,12 life-paths13 and life-histories,14 each of 
which dealt in their own way with the dialectic of balancing life and context, individuality and society. 
Nevertheless, even as the practice of using a life to frame geographical analysis became more 
common in the 1990s and 2000s, many remained reticent about terming such work biography.15 The 
suspicion was that biography as a genre suffered from a privileging of ‘great men’ as movers of 
history, the artificial application of a ‘fixed arc’ or otherwise linear narrative to a life, an 
overconfidence that it could access ‘lived experience’, the privileging of an uncritical notion of 
‘authenticity’, the imposition or imputation of consistency of subjecthood, an overly tight focus on 
person/agency to detriment of context/structure (the so-called ‘spotlight’ approach),16 or conversely 
the press-ganging of a subject into speaking for a larger issue or body. While these remain serious 
accusations, they rather overlooked more critical notions of how biography might be done, informed 
by modernism,17 postmodernism18 and feminism,19 which had by the 1990s encouraged the 
emergence of ‘new biography’ that told marginalised stories, decentred or disturbed the notion of a 
                                               
12 A. Buttimer, "Grasping the dynamism of lifeworld", Annals of the Association of American Geographers 66.2 
(1976) 277-292; A. Buttimer, The practice of geography (London & New York: Longman; 1983) 
13 T. Hägerstrand, "Survival and arena: on the life-history of individuals in relation to their geographical 
environment", in Tommy Carlstein, Don Parkes, and Nigel J.  Thrift (eds.), Timing space and spacing time, III vols., 
vol. II: Human activity and time geography (New York: Wiley; 1978) 122-143; A. Pred, "The Choreography of 
Existence: Comments on Hägerstrand's Time-Geography and Its Usefulness", Economic Geography 53.2 (1977) 
207-221; A. Pred, "The Academic Past Through a Time-Geographic Looking Glass", Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 69.1 (1979) 175-180 
14 N.J. Thrift, "On the determination of social action in space and time", Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 1.1 (1983) 23-57; M. Miles and J. Crush, "Personal Narratives as Interactive Texts: Collecting and 
Interpreting Migrant Life-Histories", The Professional Geographer 45.1 (1993) 84-94 
15 See, for example, the biographical-in-all-but-name approaches in A. Blunt, Travel, gender, and imperialism: Mary 
Kingsley and West Africa, Mappings (New York & London: The Guilford Press; 1994); N. Smith, American empire: 
Roosevelt's geographer and the prelude to globalization, California Studies in Critical Human Geography 
(Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press; 2003) 
16 L. Stanley, The auto/biographical I (Manchester: Manchester University Press; 1992), 214. Within geography, 
similar critiques were made (from different perspectives) in Thrift, "On the determination of social action in space 
and time"; F. Driver, "Henry Morton Stanley and His Critics: Geography, Exploration and Empire", Past & Present 
133 (1991) 134-166 
17 L. Strachey, Eminent Victorians: Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr. Arnold, General Gordon (London: 
Chatto and Windus; 1918); V. Woolf, "The Art of Biography", The Death of the Moth, and Other Essays (London: 
Hogarth Press; 1942) 119-126 
18 J. Clifford, "‘Hanging up looking glasses at odd corners’: ethnobiographical prospects", in Daniel Aaron (ed.), 
Studies in Biography (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press; 1978) 41-56 
19 Stanley, The auto/biographical I 
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unitary subject, and often opened the frame onto the biographer’s struggles to understand their 
subject.20 Encouraged by this growing trend, in the last decade or so geographers have become more 
comfortable with use of the term biography, and have in recent years produced a wealth of work that 
takes a biographical approach, often finding it better captures and affords expression to the 
marginality, mobility and multiplicity of their subjects.21 
 In the first part of this chapter, I draw upon this approach, sketching the conjoined lives of 
Coudenhove-Kalergi and his Pan-European movement. This forms the biographical base from which 
subsequent chapters will develop their arguments about the role of the PEU in reshaping the spatio-
temporal understanding of Europe as political entity. 
In the second part, I take a step back, and cast a more sceptical eye upon a story that, from 
some angles, appears too pat, the narrative arc too strong, the moral too easy to pick out. The reason 
is clear: it was largely authored by Coudenhove-Kalergi himself, whose autobiographies have, in their 
narrative thrust, largely gone unchallenged. Nicolaas Rupke, in his ‘metabiography’ of Alexander von 
Humboldt, dealt with a subject whose ‘master narrative’ of his own life was only partially accepted, 
finding ‘little acknowledgement’ in his home country.22 The situation here is the reverse, since 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s master narrative was not only largely accepted without question, but was a 
crucial tool in his own campaigning. I therefore conduct a rather different sort of metabiography here, 
one which the focus is not on the distance between a life and its various retellings, but on the 
suffocating closeness of a life and its telling, the way in which the story does not just represent the 
                                               
20 M. Rhiel and D. Suchoff (eds.), The seductions of biography (Abingdon: Routledge; 1996); K.J. Winkler, "The New 
Biographers", The Chronicle of Higher Education 40.10 (27 October 1993) A6 
21 See, for example, S. Daniels and C. Nash, "Lifepaths: geography and biography", Journal of Historical Geography 
30.3 (2004) 449-458; D. Lambert and A. Lester, "Imperial spaces, imperial subjects", in David Lambert and Alan 
Lester (eds.), Colonial Lives Across the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2006) 1-31; S. 
Naylor, "Historical geography: geographies and historiographies", Progress in Human Geography 32.2 (2008) 265-
274; S. Legg, "Ambivalent improvements: biography, biopolitics, and colonial Delhi", Environment and Planning 
A: Economy and Space 40.1 (2008) 37-56; C. McGeachan, I. Forsyth, and W. Hasty, "Certain Subjects? Working 
with Biography and Life-Writing in Historical Geography", Historical Geography 40 (2012) 169-185; C. 
McGeachan, "Historical geography II: Traces remain", Progress in Human Geography  (2016); Hodder, "On 
absence and abundance: biography as method in archival research" 
22 N. Rupke, Alexander von Humboldt: a metabiography (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press; 2008), 20 
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life, but plays an active role in shaping its course. This section therefore asks how Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s biography was mobilised in the service of Pan-Europeanism, and how the two – life and 
story – were folded into one another. 
 One of the reasons that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s presentation of his own life remains, in the 
main, the dominant scholarly narrative is that the principle means through which his life might be re-
read, his archive, lies out of easy reach. Indeed, Coudenhove-Kalergi had believed that the central 
archive of his interwar work had been destroyed when Germany seized the Pan-European offices in 
1938. Over half a century later, it turned out that their fate had been much stranger, and that – 
miraculously – not only had they not been destroyed, they had been remarkably preserved, their pages 
untouched by the violence outside. However, they had been propelled far from home, and were found 
held in Moscow as part of the ‘special archive’ of records seized by Soviet forces from previously 
Nazi-occupied territories during the Second World War, whose existence had remained a state secret 
until the glasnost days of 1990. Both the central archive of the PEU and that of the German branch 
remain in Moscow today, among the ‘last prisoners of World War II’.23  This story constitutes the 
third section of this chapter, and it carries two distinct messages. First, a methodological message 
about how the investigations that form the underbelly of this thesis, in Marc Bloch’s terms a 
confessional answer to the question ‘how can I know what I am about to say?’24 And second, a 
symbolic message about how the archive of a supranational endeavour gets trapped and suppressed 
within largely hidden contemporary forces that still impresses upon it the grid of the international.  
 
 
                                               
23 P.K. Grimsted, "Introduction", International Journal of Cultural Property 17.2 (2010) 139–146, 142; P.K. 
Grimsted, "Pan-European Displaced Archives in the Russian Federation: Still Prisoners of War on the 70th 
Anniversary of V-E Day", in James Lowry (ed.), Displaced Archives (London & New York: Routledge; 2017) 130-
157. This phrase, though disputed by the Russian state, actually has a Russian provenance, as Grimsted notes, first 
‘used by Russian Minister of Culture Evgenii Sidorov in October 1995, when he opened the exhibition of the long-
hidden Master Drawings from the Koenigs Collection at the Pushkin Museum in Moscow, as symbolizing “a 
liberation of the last prisoners of war—cultural valuables.”’ (Grimsted, "Introduction", 145n8) 
24 M. Bloch, The Historian's Craft, trans. Peter Putnam (Manchester: Manchester University Press; 1954), 71 
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A life lived 
Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi was born in Tokyo, Japan on 17 November 1894, the 
second son born to the Austrian diplomat, scholar and renowned polyglot Heinrich von Coudenhove-
Kalergi and the Japanese woman he had married in 1892, Mitsuko Aoyama. Heinrich was the Austrian 
chargé d’affaires in Japan and Mitsuko was the young daughter of a local oil and antiques merchant, 
a union which caused no small degree of scandal and had to be ratified by the Austrian Emperor Franz 
Joseph, by the Church, and by the Japanese Mikado. When the family came to Europe in 1896, 
Richard (known familiarly as ‘Dicky’) was brought up in the Coudenhove-Kalergi family estate, the 
seat of which was a castle in the small German-speaking town of Ronsperg in south-west Bohemia; 
it is known today by its Czech name, Poběžovice. There he learned about his transnational aristocratic 
heritage on his father’s side, the Coudenhoves who had come from the Netherlands to Belgium and 
then to Austria, and the Kalergis who had come from Crete via Russia and France before uniting with 
the Coudenhoves in the nineteenth century. His father, whom he worshipped, died suddenly in 1906, 
leaving the children and estate to be managed by Mitsuko. Richard sought solace in his father’s 
library, developing a passion for philosophy. His admiration for his father would be expressed in later 
life by Richard’s re-publication of Heinrich’s critique of antisemitism, Das Wesen des Antisemitismus 
(‘The Essence of Antisemitism’), first published in 1901. 
From 1908, Richard was educated at the prestigious Theresianum Academy in imperial 
Vienna, before studying philosophy and modern history at the University of Vienna. It was in the 
capital that he met the famous Austrian-Jewish actress Ida Roland, whom he married in 1916.25 Like 
his parents’, this coupling was the cause of some controversy, both public and private. Mitsuko 
disapproved of the union, partly because of Ida’s occupation, partly because she was non-noble and 
a divorcée, and partly because she was thirteen years Richard’s senior. However, the marriage also 
                                               
25 Though often reported as 1915, their marriage certificate is dated 31 August 1916. See ACV, PP 1000/36/1 
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brought him a certain amount of celebrity, and opened the doors onto a new cultural milieu. Though 
Richard had disliked the Viennese high society into which he had been thrust, he relished the 
cosmopolitan theatrical world, accompanying his wife on all her theatrical tours and meeting the stars 
of the literary world, including future allies like Heinrich Mann. 
Though Coudenhove-Kalergi was excused from military service due to a lung affliction, he 
was appalled by the ‘chauvinistic’ nationalism and anti-Semitism that the outbreak of the First World 
War had only intensified. In a letter to his then-fiancée shortly after the outbreak of war,   he wrote: 
‘I do not consider the terrible murders and cruelties now raging in all parts of the world the 
most tragic elements of the World War. What is more terrifying than anything, perhaps for 
centuries to come, is the awakening of the aggressive tendency of nationalism which is 
nothing but the apparently vanishing religious fanaticism, reappearing under a new 
form. …the guilt for all this lies with scholars like Gobineau and Chamberlain rather than 
with war-minded statesmen.’26 
Coudenhove-Kalergi embraced the American entry into the war under Woodrow Wilson (and Russian 
exit from it), which he saw as ideologically transforming it from a war between competing 
imperialisms, to a war against militarist imperialism. Coudenhove-Kalergi later wrote that ‘I became 
passionately Wilsonian, though Wilson was fighting on the other side of the fence’.27 He was 
particularly sold on the prospect of a League of Nations: 
‘On the ruins of this old world a new world seemed to rise: democratic, republican, 
socialist and pacifist. … my thoughts were fixated on this new world, on the glorious 
vision of a League of Nations uniting all nations and continents of the world in peaceful 
collaboration. A League that would replace international anarchy by order, arms by 
arguments, aggression by justice, revenge by understanding. Could anything more 
beautiful be imagined?’28 
The end of the war and subsequent peace settlement brought the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, rendered Ronsperg part of the new state of Czechoslovakia, and made Coudenhove-Kalergi 
a Czechoslovak citizen. More specifically, Ronsperg was now part of the Sudetenland, a new name 
                                               
26 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to I. Roland (31 August 1914), ACV, PP 1000/75/1; quoted and translated in 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 54-55 
27 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World (London: Hutchinson; 1953), 65 
28 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 67 
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given to the lands in which the German-speaking population, a minority within the new state, 
constituted a local majority. 
Meanwhile, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s enthusiastic Wilsonianism swiftly soured into 
disillusionment, as first the perceived victory of European nationalism in deciding the Paris Peace 
Treaties,29 and then the American failure to ratify the League of Nations, fatally undermined the 
envisioned ‘rebirth of the world under the impulse of new and generous ideals’.30 He was highly 
critical of the organisation that the League of Nations would become, damned both by its real failures 
and its failure to live up to its Wilsonian ideals: 
‘Instead of an international parliament, the League of Nations has become a rump 
parliament. It has no title to function as representing mankind; for it represents merely a 
fortuitous collection of states which use it in the interest of schemes devised for their own 
aggrandizement. If the League of Nations should dare to tamper with the interests of any 
World Power among its members—say, in Indian or Korean affairs—that World Power 
would forthwith announce its withdrawal: and no one could prevent it from doing so. … 
Thus the Geneva League of Nations has gravely compromised itself; it has become, on 
the one hand, an impotent wielder of power, and, on the other, an unjust dispenser of 
justice.’31 
A ‘frustrated Wilsonian’,32 Coudenhove-Kalergi resolved to construct his own system by which the 
League’s abandoned ideals could be fulfilled. Influenced by the pacifist Alfred Fried’s 1910 book 
Pan-Amerika,33 as well as the idea of Pan-Islam (see chapter III), Coudenhove-Kalergi began to 
formulate the idea of a Pan-European organisation, which would be a natural complement to the Pan-
American Union, and therefore sit alongside it in a truly global reformulation of the League of Nations 
(see fig. 2). After being gently rebuffed by his attempt in spring 1921 to persuade the new President 
                                               
29 Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that ‘Wilson’s opposite numbers in Europe, Clemenceau and Lloyd George, forced so 
many concessions on him and led to compromise on so many matters that the final text of the Peace Treaty turned 
out to be a mere caricature of the famous Fourteen Points.’ Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 69 
30 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 68 
31 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1926), 88 
32 R. White, "The Europeanism of Coudenhove-Kalergi", in Peter M.R. Stirk (ed.), European Unity in Context: The 
Interwar Period (London & New York: Pinter; 1989) 23-40, 28 
33 A.H. Fried, Pan-Amerika. Entwicklung, Umfang und Bedeutung der pan-amerikanischen Bewegung (1810—1910) 
(Berlin: Maritima; 1910) 
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Figure 2: Pan-European world map. Source: Archivní kolekce Coudenhove-Kalergi, Muzeum Chodska, 
Domažlice, Czech Republic. 
of Czechoslovakia Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk to lead the movement,34 Coudenhove-Kalergi decided 
to seize the mantle himself, starting with an article on “The European Question” published in summer 
1922 in the Berlin Vossische Zeitung and the Vienna Neue Freie Presse (the leading liberal dailies in 
Germany and Austria respectively). After appealing to the new Italian leader Benito Mussolini in an 
open letter published in Neue Freie Presse (unanswered),35 Coudenhove-Kalergi set about writing 
                                               
34 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 74-76 (This meeting was wrongly dated as 1920 in Coudenhove-
Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 87). Masaryk, whose own version of The New Europe bore many 
consonances with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s, and Coudenhove-Kalergi saw Masaryk’s ‘Little Entente’ as a potential 
‘future point of crystallization’ for Pan-Europe. Moreover, Masaryk’s position as a neutral made him palatable to 
both French and German audiences. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 130, c.f. T.G. Masaryk, The New Europe 
(The Slav Standpoint) (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode; 1918) 
35 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Offener Brief an Benito Mussolini", Neue Freie Presse, 21 February 1923, p. 2. For an 
English translation, see Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 92-94 
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what would become his programmatic book for the new movement. Pan-Europe36 was published by 
the movement’s own house, the Paneuropa-Verlag in October 1923, with each copy sold or sent to 
men of influence containing a card inviting the recipient to become a member of his new ‘Pan-
European Union’.37 While Pan-Europe as a term had a longer provenance that Coudenhove-Kalergi 
gave it credit for – certainly, Fried had already explicitly called for a Pan-European Bureau and/or 
Union38 – it was at least true that as an organisation, Pan-Europe ‘began with the appearance of this 
book’.39 The Austrian Chancellor Ignaz Seipel looked favourably upon this new organisation, and 
granted it the considerable prestige of offices in the imperial Hofburg Palace in Vienna. 
 Pan-Europe both sold well and received a great deal of attention, including a front-page 
review in the Neue Freie Presse.40 By 1926 it had sold 16 000 copies, and by 1928 it had been 
translated into most major European languages.41 Contemporaneous accounts of its tremendous 
influence abound; as Alfred Bingham wrote in 1940, Pan-Europe ‘did more to make Europe think of 
its own unity than any other one book’.42 In addition to receipts from this book, the organisation was 
given a considerable financial boost from the donation of 60 000 German gold-marks by the financier 
Max Warburg, to cover operational costs for the first three years of the organisation’s existence. In 
April 1924 the movement launched its official organ, the German-language journal Paneuropa – 
occasional French issues were also published – which was to continue regular publication (ten issues 
                                               
36 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa (Vienna: Pan-Europa-Verlag; 1923). To avoid confusion, here and hereafter I 
refer to the 1923 book by its English language title Pan-Europe, and the journal that ran from 1924 to 1938 as 
Paneuropa. 
37 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 98 
38 A.H. Fried, The Restoration of Europe, trans. Lewis Stiles Gannett (New York: Macmillan; 1916), 142. For more on 
Fried’s plans, and his relationship with Coudenhove-Kalergi, see K. Sorrels, Cosmopolitan Outsiders: Imperial 
Inclusion, National Exclusion, and the Pan-European Idea, 1900-1930 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2016) 
39 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 82n* 
40 H. Müller, "Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa", Neue Freie Presse, 2 December 1923, p. 1-2 
41 Namely: English, French, Croatian, Spanish, Greek, Hungarian, Latvian, Dutch, Polish and Czech (L. Jílek, Pan-
Europe (1923) et le mouvement paneuropéen. Richard N. de Coudenhove-Kalergi entre l'Empire d'Autriche-
Hongrie et une Europe gaullienne. Guide de recherche (Geneva: Fondation Archives Européennes; 1994), 36) 
42 A.M. Bingham, The United States of Europe (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce; 1940), 53 
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yearly) until 1938.43 In these early years, political signs too were encouraging, especially when 
filtered through Coudenhove-Kalergi’s rose-tinted lens: 
‘This book [Pan-Europe] appeared in 1923, the year of the Ruhr occupation, the darkest 
and most discouraging year that Europe had known since the World War. 
 The following year, 1924, passed under the sign of the French May elections, of the 
Dawes Plan, and of the London Conference. The road was opened to a European 
understanding. 
 The year 1925 was the year of Locarno, which led to the first practical step toward 
European understanding and unification. 
 Thus Pan-Europe was a utopia in 1923, a problem in 1924, and a program in 1925.’44 
 
 
 
The Pan-European movement continued to grow in popularity through the 1920s, and began to attract 
the attention of the political and cultural elite. Coudenhove-Kalergi received unofficial 
encouragement from two key political figures: the foreign ministers of Czechoslovakia, Edvard 
Beneš, and Germany, Gustav Stresemann. Others openly signed up to the movement, including in 
Germany the president of the Reichstag Paul Löbe and the banker and politician Hjalmar Schacht, in 
France the ex- and future-prime ministers Joseph Caillaux, Paul Painlevé, Édouard Herriot and, most 
significantly of all, Aristide Briand. A tour of England earned him allies in the erstwhile editor of the 
Times, Wickham Steed, and the Colonial Secretary Leo Amery. Among cultural figures, the 
membership of the PEU included Fridtjof Nansen, Sigmund Freud, Albert Einstein, Paul Valéry, 
Heinrich and Thomas Mann, Gerhard Hauptmann, Stefan Zweig, Bronisław Huberman and Richard 
Strauss. At the invitation of the Foreign Policy Association, Coudenhove-Kalergi toured the US in 
the winter of 1925-26 with the Norwegian pacifist Christian Lange, and while there formed an 
American Committee headed by the director of the ‘Institute of International Education’ Stephen 
                                               
43  A complete collection is to be found at ACV, PP 1000, 217 (German editions), 218 (French editions) 
44 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 197 
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Duggan,45 with backers including Felix and Paul Warburg (brothers of Max). 
In addition to the ideas he propounded, Coudenhove-Kalergi won followers through his 
undeniable charisma. In both speech and writing, and in a number of languages, Coudenhove-Kalergi 
made his arguments with great clarity.46 In person, he could be charming, and was certainly at home 
within elite society, whether that be political, cultural or academic. Salvador de Madariaga spoke of 
his ‘exceptional’ charm, noting that his ‘gift for exposition and his ability to handle human beings – 
not by the thousand, but in small groups – were so remarkable that his ideas made considerable 
progress’.47 Coudenhove-Kalergi’s character was often wrapped up in descriptions of his appearance 
(see fig. 3), perhaps most vividly described by Thomas Mann: 
‘Coudenhove, the little red-and-gold symbol of Pan-Europe in his buttonhole, is one of the 
most curious and, incidentally, one of the best-looking persons I ever met. Half Japanese, half 
mixed from the breed of Europe’s international nobility, he really represents, as one knows, a 
Eurasiatic type of noble cosmopolite, exceedingly fascinating and giving an average German 
the feeling of being somewhat provincial.’48 
Certainly, Coudenhove-Kalergi cut a striking figure among his interwar contemporaries. First, he was 
at least a generation younger than most of his political contemporaries, and he was frequently referred 
to as ‘the young count’. Second, his difference was racialised: his mother had been rumoured to be 
the first Japanese person in Bohemia, and was certainly the first in Austrian high society. References 
to his mixed-race background were evident in descriptions of him by Leo Amery as ‘rather like a 
                                               
45 See C. Brooks, "The apostle of internationalism: Stephen Duggan and the geopolitics of international education", 
Political Geography 49.Supplement C (2015) 64-73 
46 Viscount Chilston, the British Ambassador to Austria, was impressed with Coudenhove-Kalergi at 1926 PEU 
Congress: ‘Count Coudenhove’s speech by its sincerity and conviction, as well as by the clarity and beauty of its 
style – he is one of the few who can employ effectively with complete precision and economy the cumbrous 
German language – made a deep impression on his hearers and explained to an onlooker the wonderful success his 
ambitious campaign has already achieved’ (Viscount Chilston, “Despatch No. 260” (6 October 1926), TNA, FO 
371/11246, 132-136, 134). Likewise, Madariaga said that Coudenhove-Kalergi was ‘one of the few who can lend 
spring, speed and sprightliness to the heavy German language’ (S.d. Madariaga, Morning Without Noon. Memoirs 
(Farnborough: Saxon House; 1974), 335) 
47 Madariaga, Morning Without Noon. Memoirs, 335 
48 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 124. Mann’s original text may be found in T. Mann, "Pariser 
Rechenschaft", Reden und Aufsätze 3 (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag; 1974 [1926]), 46 
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young Buddha in appearance and outlook’,49 and by Louise Weiss as ‘l’étrange et charmant bâtard 
gréco-autrichien métissé de japonais’ (‘the strange and charming Greek-Austrian-Japanese 
mongrel’).50 Though these were compliments, they were not so far from the anti-Semitic caricature 
Figure 3: Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1936). Source: RGVA, 771/1/299, 2. Also used as 
frontispiece to Europe Must Unite (Glaris: Paneuropa Editions Ltd; 1939) 
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of the Jewish cosmopolitan, an equally racialized figure that was also applied to Coudenhove-Kalergi. 
And third, he was an aristocrat, and moreover one who had not succumbed to the temptation to 
become ‘nationalised’,51 but instead embraced his transnational heritage.52 Indeed, in his 
philosophical writings he advocated for a ‘new nobility’, a fusion of the noble ‘aristocracy of birth’ 
and the intellectual ‘aristocracy of mind’.53 
This curious mixture was perhaps best captured in a caricature by the Hungarian cartoonist Alois 
Derso (see fig. 4), the highest possible honour for an interwar political figure, which hung in the 
famous Bavaria brasserie in Geneva, the favourite haunt of the international diplomats and journalists 
connected to the League of Nations.54 Derso satirised not just Coudenhove-Kalergi’s distinctive, 
almost other-worldly appearance, but also the idealism and dogmatism of his sermonising. The 
cartoon was punningly titled ‘Sermon on the Mount (Salève)’, after the mountain overlooking 
Geneva, and the spoken caption ran: ‘Blessed are the simple-minded, for theirs is the Kingdom of 
Heaven (Pan-Europe)!’55 This resonated with a common charge to be laid at the feet of Coudenhove-
Kalergi: his surfeit of idealism, or utopianism. The British Ambassador in Vienna, Viscount Chilston, 
reported an impression along these lines: 
‘This wild dream of a theorist provokes at first only a smile. I must confess that I have found 
some difficulty in taking Count Coudenhove’s proposals seriously. He is known to me and 
members of my staff. He appears to be deeply in earnest and his genuine and fanatic 
                                               
49 L.S. Amery to E. Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax (26 February 1941), CAC, AMEL 2/2/5, File 2 
50 L. Weiss, Mémoires d'une européenne, Tome II (1919-1934) (Paris: Payot; 1969), 258 
51 E. Glassheim, Noble Nationalists: The Transformation of the Bohemian Aristocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press; 2005) 
52 D. Gusejnova, "Noble Continent? German-speaking nobles as theorists of European identity in the interwar period", 
in Mark Hewitson and Matthew D'auria (eds.), Europe in Crisis. Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917-1957 
(New York & Oxford: Berghahn; 2012) 111 - 133; D. Gusejnova, European Elites and Ideas of Empire, 1917-1957 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2016) 
53 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Adel (Leipzig: Verlag der Neue Geist; 1922). For the unpublished English translation, 
see Coudenhove-Kalergi, n.d., The New Nobility (trans. Herman George Scheffauer), RGVA, 554k/5/53, 3-43 
54 On the Bavaria, see its frequent (fictional) appearances in F. Moorhouse, Grand Days (London: Picador; 1993) 
55 A. Derso, 1929, “Discours sur la Montagne (Salève)”, Documents prêtés par Madame Marie-Paule Burrus, 
provenant de l’ex-brasserie Bavaria à Genève, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Lausanne. The original 
French, ‘Heureux sont les simples d’esprit, car le royaume des cieux (Paneurope) leur appartient!’ is a pun on 
Matthew 5:3, which is rendered in the Louis Segond Bible [1880/1910]) as ‘Heureux les pauvres en esprit, car le 
Royaume des Cieux est à eux’. 
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Figure 4: Alois Derso, "Discours sur la Montagne (Salève)" (1929) © Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, 
Lausanne. Documents prêtés par Madame Marie-Paule Burrus, provenant de l’ex-brasserie Bavaria à Genève 
22 
 
enthusiasm seems likely to convince more people than I should have expected.’56 
This was taken to heart at the Foreign Office in London, where the cover of the file on the Pan-
European movement was annotated with a note from the Permanent Under-Secretary, William Tyrrell, 
which read: ‘I know Count Coudenhove: he is a thoroughly impractical theorist’.57 This accusation 
of idealism was repeated, in a more forgiving tone, by Winston Churchill in a 1930 article for the 
American magazine the Saturday Evening Post: ‘The form of Count Kalergi’s theme may be crude, 
erroneous and impracticable, but the impulse and the inspiration are true’.58 Coudenhove-Kalergi was 
flattered enough by the reference to later use it as the introduction to his 1953 autobiography.59 
Its membership, organised according to national chapters, was remarkable for being relatively 
gender-balanced. Rebecca Shriver has calculated that in the German branch of the PEU in 1927, 
approximately 29% of its members were female, a proportion that exceed that of other pacifist 
organisations and political groups.60 This was reflected in both financial contributions61 and in the 
prominence of some of the women involved, particularly in the German branch. For instance, 
Constanze Hallgarten, the women’s rights activist, pacifist, and the director of the Munich group of 
‘Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom’ (WILPF), whose Munich house, next door 
to Thomas Mann’s, was an intellectual hub that Coudenhove-Kalergi attended on occasion.62 Or the 
novelist Annette Kolb, whose pacifism and advocacy for Franco-German relations earned her a letter- 
and travel-ban during the First World War. Or women’s rights activist and politician Marie-Elisabeth 
Lüders, the co-founder and president of the German Federation of University Women (Deutsche 
Akademikerinnenbund). The most visible female presence within the organisation, however, was 
                                               
56 Viscount Chilston, “Despatch No. 250” (22 September 1926), TNA, FO 371/11246, 123-125, 124, p.2) 
57 W. Tyrrell, note of 2 Oct 1926, in TNA, FO 371/11246, 122 
58 Churchill, United States of Europe, CAC, CHAR 8/303, 4-12, 8. 
59 W.S. Churchill, "Introduction", in Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (ed.), An Idea Conquers The World (London: 
Hutchinson; 1953) ix-x 
60 R.R. Shriver, "Women, Pacifism, and the Pan-European Union: Searching for Support in Weimar Political Culture", 
in Isabel Valente (ed.), Pela Paz! Pour la Paix! For Peace! (Brussels: Peter Lang; 2014) 289-306 
61 Shriver, "Women, Pacifism, and the Pan-European Union" 
62 T. Mann, Briefe 1889-1936, ed. Erika Mann (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag; 1961), 496 
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Coudenhove-Kalergi’s wife, Ida Roland, who performed at a number of Pan-European Congresses. 
Though it is more the exception than the rule, she was even credited on first page of 1932 Basle 
Congress pamphlet as co-founder of the Pan-European movement. 
The case should not be overstated: the most important meetings of the Pan-European Union 
were invariably dominated if not entirely represented by men. Nearly all positions of influence within 
the organisation were filled by men, and however much credit Coudenhove-Kalergi paid his wife for 
her support, the organisation was very much his organisation. Nevertheless, the relatively high 
proportion of female members was both celebrated and actively encouraged by Coudenhove-
Kalergi.63 One on hand, this reflected his sincerely held belief that the political sphere was one that 
women could inhabit, and indeed needed to inhabit for the good of humanity. He was a product of his 
time insofar as he strongly believed in essentialised gender characteristics, but rather than using this 
to justify excluding women from politics, he argued instead that the masculinism of politics – both 
its imperialism and its Machiavellianism – was hurting humanity.64 Thus, Coudenhove-Kalergi 
reasoned, ‘a radical change in Europe towards peace policy is not to be expected from men’s insight, 
but only from the growing political influence of women’.65 On the other hand, one can read this as a 
more calculated strategy to tap into the strength of feminist support for pacifist groups,66 and co-opt 
it for his own ends.67 Though Coudenhove-Kalergi often mentioned women’s ‘natural’ inclination 
toward peace, he was critical of pacifism per se, and tried to present Pan-Europeanism as a productive 
fusion of pacifist ideals and political realism, a combination he termed ‘realpolitical pacifism’ 
[realpolitischer Pazifismus].68 Thus, for example, he proclaimed Joan of Arc a hero ‘despite the 
                                               
63 See, for example, the explicit appeal to ‘the women of Europe’ at the first Pan-European Congress in R.N. 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Manifest des Kongresses", Paneuropa 2.13/14 (1926) 1-2, 2 
64 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Jeanne D'Arc", Paneuropa 5.5 (1929) 1-9, 2 
65 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa ohne Elend (Paris/Vienna/Zurich: Paneuropa Verlag; 1936), 46 
66 C.f., for example, L.J. Rupp, Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; 1997) 
67 On Coudenhove-Kalergi’s co-option of pacifism, see Sorrels, Cosmopolitan Outsiders 
68 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa ohne Elend, 51 
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opposition of our pacifist friends’,69 a view that chimed with the Suffragettes’ adoption of Joan as a 
feminist icon.70  
 
 
 
In July 1925, Coudenhove-Kalergi sent the League Secretariat a ‘memorandum’71 he had written 
entitled ‘World Organisation and Pan-Europe’. If it was not already clear enough that this document 
was targeted specifically at the League, it carried the subtitle ‘A Memorial to the League of Nations’, 
and contained a set of proposals for a proposed re-organisation of the League along continental lines.72 
The memorandum was also distributed more widely, both privately to a broad range of prominent 
political figures73 and publicly via the London-based Review of Reviews,74 its New York-based 
affiliate The American Review of Reviews75 and the PEU’s own Paneuropa magazine.76 If this 
memorandum was blunt in its criticisms of the League’s structure, it was incisive enough to attract 
interest within the League, with Arthur Salter offering a particularly flattering assessment of its 
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merits: 
‘This memo, which I had already read in the Review of Reviews, is extremely able and 
illuminating. It is packed with ideas, which deserve my careful study & some of which 
are likely to prove of great importance. I recommend everyone whom this reaches to read 
it. It is one of the best pieces of condensed argument I’ve ever seen.’77 
 On the strength of this endorsement, the League Secretary-General Eric Drummond was 
recommended to respond positively to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s invitation to send a League 
representative along to the first Pan-European Congress the following year, albeit with the explicit 
caveat that ‘the usual stipulation that the representative of the Secretariat should do no more than give 
information concerning the work of the League should perhaps be observed with particular care in 
this case’.78 The Congress was held in Vienna from 3rd to 6th October 1926, and attracted more than 
2 000 participants,79 and international press coverage. In Britain, where Coudenhove-Kalergi had 
recently taken his campaign to London in spring 1925, in the process convincing the Colonial 
Secretary Leo Amery to send the Congress a friendly message, the Manchester Guardian reported on 
the Congress in glowing terms, writing that ‘The United States of Europe is no longer a dream; it has 
entered on the world of realities’.80 
 The man sent by Drummond to be the League’s representative, H.R. Cummings, reported 
back from the Congress that: 
‘Count Coudenhove-Kalergi … is a remarkable young individual and in the present stage 
of the Pan-European Union a good deal depends on his personality. I consider that he is 
honest in his purpose, with no political arrière pensée, but that he is vain and extremely 
ambitious though confessedly without any knowledge whatever of economic affairs, with 
which I believe the movement will be mainly concerned, and without any political 
experience. I think that he has felt and probably still feels, despite his utterances, that 
there is a certain rivalry with the League but some of his closer collaborators have frankly 
told him that any development of the movement in the terms of hostility to the League 
would be hope less and he seems to have acquiesced. I am convinced that his only interest 
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in having a representative present from the League Secretariat was to secure that amount 
of recognition, for although my presence was emphasised in the press there was evident 
reluctance to have any close collaboration during the Congress’81 
Cummings went on to describe the contribution of the Greek representative to the League of Nations 
Nikolaos Politis, whose speech at the Congress attempted to smooth relations between the League 
and PEU, which Politis argued could be mutually strengthening: not ‘rivals’ but ‘intimate 
collaborators’.82 Cummings felt that Politis gave too much ground on the matter, writing that his 
speech ‘surprised a good many who understood the work of the League and it certainly did the League 
a good deal of damage’;83 upon reading Cummings’ report, Eric Drummond shared this feeling, 
noting: 
‘I agree with Mr. Cummings’ estimate of Monsieur Politis’s speech. We should note the 
line he now takes; to my mind it shews that we should not consider Monsieur Politis as a 
good choice for any important speech on League affairs.’84 
Nevertheless, despite these reservations, Cummings concludes by recommending the maintenance of 
close relations between the two organisations, writing that the Pan-European Union: 
‘may have considerable political importance spiritually, so to speak, and may become, if 
anything, a valuable aid to creating a public opinion for League tasks, especially in the 
economic field. The Secretariat certainly should keep in touch and I discussed this with 
Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. I told him that I thought it extremely unlikely that it would 
be possible to set up a Pan-European Section in the Secretariat in view of the way in 
which the Secretariat and the League were organised, that in any case it would require a 
definite decision by the Council and budgetary appropriation, but I said that what 
probably could be done without any trouble would be to designate a member of the 
Secretariat to keep in touch with the organisation, to keep him informed of relevant 
League work and in turn be kept informed of all the developments of the Pan-European 
Union. He seemed to be quite satisfied with this’85 
Drummond endorsed this sentiment, noting that ‘The line taken by Mr Cummings … with regard to 
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possible future liaison with the Secretariat seems to me to have been very wise’ and that ‘It certainly 
is desirable that the movement should be followed somewhat closely’.86 
Although relations between the two organisations would cool significantly in the 1930s, these 
early interactions give a good sense of a relationship in which the PEU was taken seriously by 
important figures in the League as both a potential ally and a source of ideas, as well as a serious 
enough rival to blacklist a figure like Politis simply for failing to assert the League’s position 
sufficiently strongly. Though Cummings’ report betrays scepticism on the part of the League, calling 
the PEU’s programme ‘ambitious’ and ‘of doubtful realisation’, it concedes that this programme ‘at 
any rate gives it a goal’, and that ‘there is no doubt that it makes an appeal to the imagination, to 
interests and, in its emphasis on the necessity of European entente, to common sense’.87 
Coudenhove-Kalergi was delighted to have been taken seriously by the national and 
international political establishment, and in an article on “The Results of the Pan-European Congress” 
in the Neue Freie Presse, Coudenhove-Kalergi claimed that ‘The fact alone that both the League of 
Nations and a number of Governments were officially represented at this Congress shows that Pan-
Europe has definitely left behind it its first phase of not being taken seriously’.88 Having 
enthusiastically welcomed the cordial relations established at the Congress within the Pan-European 
movement and with these outside representatives, Coudenhove-Kalergi celebrated that ‘the first Pan-
Europe Congress has definitely raised the thought of Pan-Europe from the subconsciousness to the 
consciousness of our part of the world’.89 
 Though the Congress was a success, Coudenhove-Kalergi knew that further progress had to 
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be made to win over people with real political influence. His primary target in this respect was the 
French multiple-term Prime Minister and long-term Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, whom he had 
met earlier in 1926, and who was known to harbour his own plans for a United States of Europe. Each 
saw in the other a useful ally, and an agent for the advancement of their own ideas.90 This partnership 
was publicised in May 1927 at the second formal session of the Central Council of the Paneuropean 
Union in Paris, days before all eyes would be turned to Geneva for the very first World Economic 
Conference, as Briand accepted Coudenhove-Kalergi’s offer to become honorary president of the 
Pan-European Union.91 A year later, their partnership was renewed, as towards the end of 1928 Briand 
informed Coudenhove-Kalergi of his ‘decision to submit the project of Pan-Europe to the next 
Assembly of the League [of Nations]’,92 which was scheduled for the following September. Briand 
was then at the height of his powers and fame, having been elected Prime Minister (for the final time) 
in July 1929, and he brought unprecedented publicity to the idea of a federal Europe.93 
Briand spoke to the League on Thursday, 5 September 1929, with Coudenhove-Kalergi sat in 
the diplomatic gallery. He admitted the utopian aspect of a united Europe, ‘an idea that is politely 
described as magnanimous – perhaps in order to avoid terming it rash’.94 While admitting the 
difficulties of the venture, and being careful to stress it would be ‘primarily economic’ in nature, 
Briand made the case to the gathered Assembly that ‘among peoples constituting geographical groups 
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like the peoples of Europe, there should be some kind of federal bond’.95 His address was met with 
‘a storm of applause’, though Coudenhove-Kalergi confessed in his account of the event that ‘no one 
was quite sure whether this was meant for Briand the orator, or for Briand the statesman’.96 The 
message was reinforced the following Monday, 9 September. In the morning’s plenary meeting, the 
German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann spoke in support of Briand’s proposal, disavowing the 
pessimism of those who thought it utopian, and instead quoting Goethe: ‘Every great idea seems mad 
at first’.97 In the same session, Briand and Stresemann’s Czechoslovak counterpart Edvard Beneš also 
lent his support to the idea, arguing that while the League’s first decade had seen the return of 
‘economic nationalism’ to stabilise Europe’s post-war economies, now the League was entering upon 
a ‘new phase of its existence’ in which attention could switch from the liquidation of war to economic 
integration.98 Each of these addresses was published in the following issue of Paneuropa, under the 
title ‘Pan-Europe in Geneva’.99 However, perhaps the most important event occurred just after the 
morning session at which Stresemann and Beneš spoke, at a luncheon convened by Briand at the 
Hôtel des Bergues. This special meeting, involving representatives of all 27 European members of 
the League, concluded by deciding that Briand would draft a memorandum setting out the projected 
organization.100 Though Coudenhove-Kalergi was not present at this meeting, his looming spirit was 
                                               
95 A. Briand, in “Records of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly. Plenary Meetings. Text of the Debates” 
League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement 75 (Geneva; 1929), p.52; LoN, Records of Tenth Assembly, 
Plenary Meetings and Committees 
96 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 156 
97 Translation given in G. Stresemann, in “Records of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly. Plenary Meetings. 
Text of the Debates” League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement 75 (Geneva; 1929), p.70; LoN, 
Records of Tenth Assembly, Plenary Meetings and Committees. The German version given by Stresemann, ‘Ein 
grosser Einfall scheint am Anfang toll’, is a slight misquotation of that spoken by the scientist Wagner in Goethe’s 
Faust, Part Two: ‘Ein großer Vorsatz scheint im Anfang toll’ (J.W.v. Goethe, Goethe’s Werke vol. XLI: Faust. Der 
Tragödie zweyter Theil in fünf Acten (Stuttgart und Tübingen: J.G. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung; 1832), 105) 
98 E. Beneš in “Records of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly. Plenary Meetings. Text of the Debates” 
League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement 75 (Geneva; 1929), p.74, 73; LoN, Records of Tenth 
Assembly, Plenary Meetings and Committees 
99 A. Briand, G. Stresemann, and E. Beneš, "Paneuropa in Genf", Paneuropa 8.5 (1929) 1-4 
100 "The United States of Europe", The Round Table 20.77 (1929) 79-99, 80; A. Salter, The United States of Europe 
and other papers, ed. W. Arnold-Foster (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock; 1933), 83; O. Keller and L. Jílek (eds.), 
Le Plan Briand d'union fédérale européenne: Documents (Geneva: Fondation Archives Européenne; 1991); C. 
 
30 
 
certainly felt both inside and outside the hotel, with Salvador de Madariaga reporting that ‘The story 
ran in Geneva, with more than the usual assurance, that on the eve of the historic luncheon the French 
Prime Minister asked Count Koudenhove-Calergi [sic] to put a few ideas on paper’.101 
 Despite these advances, between September 1929 and May 1930 several key events changed 
the course of the Pan-Europe movement. As Coudenhove-Kalergi would later ruefully note, 
‘The political wind, which had blown fair for the Pan-European movement since the 1924 
elections in France, now began to veer in the opposite direction at the very moment when 
the idea was about to become practical.’102 
First, the untimely death of Briand’s German counterpart and crucial ally Gustav Stresemann in 
October left Briand politically isolated; Stresemann’s successor Julius Curtius, while similarly 
minded to endorse plans for European cooperation, had none of Stresemann’s authority or diplomatic 
skill. Second, the Wall Street Crash, also in October 1929, which had a double-effect: its shock waves 
reached across the Atlantic, triggering a global economic crisis and raising grave doubts over the 
benefits of global economic interconnectedness, which in turn sparked a protectionist response from 
governments seeking to insulate themselves from the volatility. Quickly, ‘autarky’ became the 
watchword of the day, and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s message of economic integration was an 
impossible sell. Third, the collapse of Hermann Müller’s Grand Coalition in Germany, and his 
replacement as Chancellor by Heinrich Brüning in March 1930, robbed Pan-Europe of official 
German support: as Mark Hewitson notes, that Curtius hesitated despite his new Chancellor’s 
opposition to Briand’s memorandum indicates the high degree of popularity Pan-Europe had obtained 
in Germany at that time.103 Fourth, and more positively, British scepticism about Pan-Europe seemed 
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to be waning, with the publication of an influential article by Winston Churchill in February 1930 
advocating a (non-British) United States of Europe, and explicitly name-checking Coudenhove-
Kalergi.104 However, the sympathetic Churchill and Leo Amery, Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
Colonial Secretary respectively in the Conservative government that had recently lost the 1929 
general election, were no longer in a position to influence British policy, while the new Labour 
government reacted coolly to the Briand memorandum, arguing that ‘We ought surely to make it clear 
that we only accept the introduction of political influences in so far as they help to promote economic 
union, that we can’t encourage any ideas of political union’.105 A Pan-European discussion group was 
held in the House of Commons in March 1931, though it came to nought as, in Amery’s evaluation, 
‘most of the people there were strong League of Nations enthusiasts inclined to be suspicious of the 
Pan-European movement’.106 
Briand’s memorandum was eventually launched on 17 May 1930, a date that had been 
arranged in communication with Coudenhove-Kalergi to coincide with the opening of the second 
Pan-European Congress in Berlin.107 Coudenhove-Kalergi declared that to honour this synergy 17 
May would hereafter be Pan-Europe Day.108 However, the responses of the various European states 
to Briand’s memorandum was ambivalent, and by September when the matter was officially 
discussed at Geneva it was clear that Briand’s plan was dead in the water. This was only confirmed 
when in the middle of the talks news came of the German election results, in which Adolf Hitler’s 
Nazi Party had increased its strength tenfold; European political union was now out of the question. 
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As Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘No Frenchman wanted closer ties with Germany so long as there was 
any danger of Hitler becoming Chancellor in Berlin’.109 The impression of a new mood in Germany 
that ruled out multilateral political cooperation was confirmed in March 1931 with the announcement 
of a secret Austro-German protocol for the creation of a bilateral customs union that would unite the 
two states in Anschluss, sparking protest and suspicion elsewhere in Europe. Though in the 1920s 
Coudenhove-Kalergi had tried to channel German-Austrian attempts at unification into the pacifist 
concept of a European community, Hitler’s rise had severed this possibility and forced Coudenhove-
Kalergi to change tack. Instead, he now gave his unequivocal support to Austrian independence, and 
stressed that the peace of Europe (and the cause of European unity) depended upon preserving it.110 
 Recognising the importance of gaining German support for his plans and combating the rise 
of an ultra-nationalism that explicitly rejected the notion of European brotherhood, Coudenhove-
Kalergi redoubled his campaigning in Germany,111 making ever-greater compromises in order to turn 
the tide. At the 3rd Pan-European Congress, held in the predominantly German-speaking Swiss town 
of Basel in October 1932, he relaxed his opposition the concept of a Pan-European dress code, 
allowing the Pan-European Youth organisation to adopt the blue shirt (adorned with the Pan-European 
emblem) as its uniform. A German journalist, Wilhelm Grottkopp, caustically noted the allusion: 
‘In Basle the new [Pan-Europe] party already presented itself in its new robes, which had 
been designed in the light of Mussolini’s and Hitler’s examples. The party’s young forces 
wore blue shirts and blouses, the honourable gentlemen the uniform Pan-European tie. 
The new party’s “storm troopers” greeted their leader enthusiastically. However, the 
fascist salutation does not seem to have been copied yet.’112 
However, Hitler’s rise was not to be stopped, and the respective trajectories of the Nazi and 
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Pan-European movements were perfectly illustrated by an uncannily symbolic crossing of paths. On 
30 January 1933, the day of Hitler’s swearing in as the new Chancellor of Germany, Coudenhove-
Kalergi gave a long-awaited talk in the Hotel Kaiserhof in Berlin. Hitler too was staying in the 
Kaiserhof; the front entrance of the hotel was therefore reserved for Hitler and the members of the 
new government, while Coudenhove-Kalergi and his audience were advised to use a side door.113 
Though apparently in the discussion following Coudenhove-Kalergi’s talk ‘the doctrine of National 
Socialism came under heavy fire’, the torches, jackboots and singing outside the hall told a different 
story (see fig. 5); Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that ‘Thoughout the assembled company, there was a 
deep awareness of the historical significance of that day’s events’.114 Nor was the symbolism lost on 
the Nazis, for whom Coudenhove-Kalergi had long been a thorn in the side (Hitler’s unpublished 
1928 Zweites Buch had described him as ‘that everybody’s bastard’),115 with the Nazi historian and 
ideologue Karl Richard Ganzer writing that one ‘rising [National Socialism] and one sinking political 
world [Pan-Europe], the latter a true child of the Weimar and Versailles systems, stood together at the 
same place and time under the critical gaze of History’.116 More materially, Hitler’s appointment as 
Chancellor meant the dissolution and prohibition of the German branch of the Pan-European Union, 
the destruction of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s books in Germany, and as Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler notes 
‘the loss of the most important financier of Pan-Europe: German industry’.117 As Coudenhove-Kalergi 
would later claim, ‘The worst blow which befell the [Pan-European] movement was not Briand’s 
failure, but the abandonment of Paneuropa by Germany when the Third Reich was established’.118 
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 Nevertheless, the movement continued, with a 4th Pan-European Congress held in May 1935 
in Vienna, following by other events which sidelined talk of political union in favour of economic 
and cultural union: in May 1936 the first Pan-European Agricultural Conference, and in 1937 the first 
Pan-European School Conference (on the latter, see chapter III). Meanwhile Coudenhove-Kalergi 
diverted his political efforts into securing a European alliance that could isolate Hitler, first renewing 
his efforts to win over Mussolini to the concept of a Franco-Italian partnership, and then in late 1936 
when Mussolini had decided to instead ally with Germany, making a last desperate effort to save the 
project of Pan-Europe by securing British involvement. Previously happy to assume that Britain’s 
future lay in its empire, Coudenhove-Kalergi now stressed that Britain was ‘daily more and more 
closely involved in the common fate of Europe’.119 The necessity of this change in tack was confirmed 
by the German annexation of Austria in March 1938, with Coudenhove-Kalergi fleeing Vienna on the 
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night of invasion in dramatic circumstances. His subsequent British charm offensive included: the 
reappearance of the Pan-Europe journal (March 1938 had been its last issue before its Vienna offices 
were seized by the Nazis),120 retitled European Letters and published in English as well as German 
and French;121 the 1939 English publication of Europe Must Unite with a preface by Leo Amery,122 
two lectures at the Royal Institute of International Affairs,123 and the inaugural meeting of the British 
Pan-European Committee in the House of Commons.124 Though the ultimate aims of Pan-Europe 
remained pacifist, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s new British allies were interventionists dissatisfied with 
Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement. The goal of Pan-Europe had drifted from the prevention of a 
European war to a means of ensuring that the coming war would be Europe’s last. This engagement 
with the Anglophone world, solidified during a politically active wartime exile in New York from 
1940 to 1946,125 was to profoundly influence post-war plans for European unity, but by then the 
Young Count had become a ‘grand seigneur’, and had sidelined the PEU in favour of a new venture: 
the European Parliamentary Union.126 Pan-Europe’s last hurrah would be Churchill’s September 1946 
speech on European unity at Zurich University, in which he explicitly paid tribute to ‘the exertions of 
                                               
120 The Pan-European Union central office in the Hofburg Palace was immediately seized by the Nazi Chancellor (and 
subsequent Governor of the newly-named Ostmark [i.e. Austria] province) Arthur Seyss-Inquart for his personal 
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The English editions are lost, though mention is made of the 1 May 1940 edition in “A Spectator’s Notebook”, The 
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Kalergi, "Europe To-Morrow", International Affairs 18.5 (1939) 623-640 
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Stephen King-Hall, Sir Walter Layton, Sir George Clerk, Rennie Smith and Sir Evelyn Wrench were included. See 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europe Must Unite, 72-73; Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 219 
125 See W. Lipgens, "Plans of Other Transnational Groups for European Union", in Walter Lipgens (ed.), Documents on 
the history of European integration. Vol. 2: Plans for European union in Great Britain and in exile 1939-1945 
(Berlin: de Gruyter; 1986) 786-824 
126 Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, "Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi", 106. Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer argues that 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s activities with the EPU robbed Pan-Europa of momentum at a crucial juncture 
(Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, "Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi", 105). 
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the Pan-European Union which owes so much to Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’.127 
 
 
A life told 
When the League’s representative at the first Pan-European Congress, H.R. Cummings, had reported 
that ‘a good deal depends on his personality’,128 he was not only talking about Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
charisma. Cummings was also referring quite literally to the Count’s person, his seeming embodiment 
of the Pan-European cause in his own life and situation. Along with other outside representatives and 
members of the press in attendance, he was supplied with a ‘biographical sketch’ of Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s cosmopolitan-aristocratic heritage and life story.129 After summarising it in his report, 
Cummings noted that ‘This personal allusion may seem irrelevant, but so long as he remains the soul 
of the movement it is necessary to have some understanding of his exceptional character’.130 
Coudenhove-Kalergi was well aware of this dynamic, and happy to play into it, folding his own life 
story into his political campaigning by presenting it as ‘a life born and educated for 
internationalism’.131 His own biography was therefore not incidental to, but a self-conscious and 
integral part of the Pan-European story, and while we might take the obvious resonances between his 
life and the politics he espoused at face value, we must also consider the ways in which this biography 
was cultivated precisely for this purpose. 
This weaving of his own life into that of his movement is perhaps most apparent in his 
autobiographies, the first of which, Europa erwacht! (‘Europe awakens!’), he published in 1934, the 
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128 H.R. Cummings, 1926, “Notes on the First Pan-European Congress”, LoN, 39/45485/45485, p.3-4 
129 “Biographical Sketch of Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi” (received in registry 16 October 1926), LoN, 
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year of his 40th birthday. New versions would appear at regular intervals throughout his life: in 1943, 
Crusade for Pan-Europe: Autobiography of a Man and a Crusade; in 1949, Kampf um Europa: aus 
meinem Leben (published in English as An Idea Conquers the World, 1953); and in 1958 Eine Idee 
erobert Europa: meine Lebenserinnerungen (‘An idea conquers Europe: my life memories’; an 
expanded and updated edition was published in 1966).132 These were supplemented by innumerable 
biographical sketches such as that given out at the Pan-European Congress, remarkable not for their 
content so much as for their ubiquity. 
Coudenhove-Kalergi justified this sharing of his own life story as a journalistic device to add 
some human interest to a political message, in his own words as ‘an attempt to spread my ideas 
without boring my readers by presenting them in a dry political volume’.133 Read only slightly more 
cynically, we might see it as an attempt to humanise his rather otherworldly image. Or rather, to 
ground his critique of nationalism in terms other than those of the ‘rootless’ cosmopolitan. This 
stereotype was not just held by nationalists and anti-Semites, as might be demonstrated by Alfred 
Zimmern’s eloquent expression of it: 
‘“A man without a city”, said Aristotle, “is either a god or a beast”. No one can render true 
service in the cause of international co-operation if he has not first thoroughly absorbed in his 
own mind and soul the meaning and value of nationality. … Too often, indeed, has the 
advocate of international co-operation been identified with the déraciné. In reality the two are 
at opposite poles. The déraciné may sometimes render good service in other fields of human 
achievement. In the sphere of politics he is not only useless but mischievous, for he is 
constitutionally incapable of entering into that which is the deepest element in all political and 
social experience—the attachment of a people to its home, its traditions, and its 
institutions.’134 
By spelling out Coudenhove-Kalergi’s background, the story of his attachment to ‘home’, the various 
ways in which he too was ‘rooted’, it was hoped that his autobiographies would qualify him in these 
                                               
132  Coudenhove-Kalergi, autobiog refs 
133 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 301; he was speaking about R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa 
erwacht! (Zurich/Vienna/Leipzig: Paneuropa Verlag; 1934) 
134 A.E. Zimmern, Learning and leadership: a study of the needs and possibilities of international intellectual co-
operation, 2nd edn. (London: Humphrey Milford/Oxford University Press; 1930), 30 
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terms to enter the sphere of politics. As Dina Gusejnova has argued, aristocratic intellectuals like 
Coudenhove-Kalergi used their biography to give ‘a personal face to elusive abstractions like 
“Europe”’.135 
However, the connection between life and narrative ran deeper than this, for the story he told 
reflected the politics he espoused in important ways. It was no accident that the metaphors provided 
by his own story – the cosmopolitan left without a nation after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire; the young, modern aristocrat in a new, democratic world; the fusion of Orient and Occident, 
the product of the Old World at home in the New – all resonated with the message he was telling. In 
short, his narrative cultivated the impression that he embodied Pan-Europe. One can detect this not 
only in his texts, but in the paratextual use of his own image.136 Unafraid to reproduce Thomas Mann’s 
description of him as ‘one of the best-looking persons I ever met’,137 he was not shy to use his own 
portrait as a frontispiece in his publications (see fig. 3). Indeed, the level of care taken is indicated by 
a 1927 letter sent by the German Pan-European Baron Friedrich von Lupin to the printing engineer 
at the Pan-European Press, worrying that a certain image of Coudenhove-Kalergi made him look 
more like an ‘aesthete’ than a ‘political leader’.138 In this regard, it is telling that while his political 
works were illustrated with photographic portraits of himself, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 1931 aphoristic 
philosophical work Gebote des Lebens (‘Commandments of life’) was illustrated with a sparse line 
drawing by the Norwegian artist Olaf Gulbransson (fig. 6). Story and image were crafted with equal 
care to mesh with the goals of the movement. 
 This same fusion of Pan-Europeanism with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own person even lurks 
beneath the surface of the PEU’s consistent visual symbology, what we might today call branding. 
Central to this branding was the PEU symbol, the Sonnenkreuz (‘Solar Cross’), which was described  
                                               
135 Gusejnova, European Elites and Ideas of Empire, 1917-1957, xliii 
136 C.f. G. Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; 1997) 
137 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 124 
138 F. von Lupin to Klausner, 24 Feb 1927; HAEU, PAN/EU 1, 554/4/7, 309 
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Figure 6: Olaf Gulbransson, Portrait of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1931). Source: R.N. 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Gebote des Lebens (Leipzig/Vienna: Paneuropa Verlag; 1931), frontispiece 
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at the outset of the movement, in the last lines of his 1923 Pan-Europe: 
‘The emblem under which the Pan-Europeans of all states will unite, is the Solar Cross 
[das Sonnenkreuz]: the red cross on a golden sun, the symbols of Humanity and of 
Reason. 
 This banner of love and of the spirit will wave one day, from Poland to Portugal, 
above a united World Empire of Peace and Freedom!’139 
In the second issue of the Paneuropa magazine, he expanded upon the symbology: 
‘The Solar Cross connects the two primordial symbols of European culture; Christian 
ethics and pagan beauty; international humanitarianism and modern education; heart and 
mind; Man and cosmos.’140 
This new symbol was given pride of place on the front cover of the Paneuropa journal, where it would 
remain until the very last issue. It also played a starring role at the first Pan-European Congress in 
1926, where a Bach fugue accompanied the unfurling of an enormous Pan-European flag, containing 
the additional element of 26 rays emanating from the central symbol, symbolising the 28 states of 
Europe.141 Indeed, so committed was Coudenhove-Kalergi to this flag that after 1945, it became the 
centre of an acrimonious dispute (Coudenhove-Kalergi dubbed it the ‘flag conflict’)142 with Duncan 
Sandys, who preferred his own design: a red (later green) letter “E” on a white background. Sandys 
won the battle, with his flag adorning the Congress of Europe at The Hague in 1948, but lost the war 
as this flag quickly fell from favour, becoming known as ‘Sandys’s Pants’ due to its resemblance to 
white underpants against a red (or green) background.143 A subsequent effort by Coudenhove-Kalergi 
to suggest that the Council of Europe adopt the Pan-European flag was less bitter, but no more 
successful, vetoed by Turkey and the UK who both objected to its inclusion of the Christian symbol 
of the cross.144 
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The red-and-gold colour scheme was repeated in the stylised block-borders that would frame 
not just every issue of Paneuropa, but every official PEU publication145 until Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
death (compare figs. 7 & 8, from 1924 and 1957 respectively). This remarkable consistency served 
both to make the PEU’s works instantly recognisable, and to imply a stability of purpose throughout 
its history. However, lurking behind Coudenhove-Kalergi’s rationalisation of the symbolism is the 
rarely-considered yet remarkably strong resemblance to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own heraldic badge: 
a red diagonal wave across a golden shield. This was no trivial symbol, but rather a motif that was 
repeated throughout his family’s portraiture, property and presentation (see figs 9, 10, 11 & 12).146 
Likewise, the cross too was often prominently featured in the Coudenhove-Kalergi family portraiture. 
Indeed, portraiture was another medium through which this symbolism was reinforced, woven back 
into the family history through new portraits of the medieval relation Gerolfus Ide Coudenhove and 
Richard’s great uncle Heinrich Coudenhove, commisioned from the Austrian painter Alfred Offner, 
in which both the Coudenhove heraldic badge and the cross were foregrounded (see figs. 9 & 10).147 
Needless to say, when the colours of the wave are combined with the form of the cross, the result is 
the Sonnenkreuz. Indeed, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s incorporation of the symbolism and colours of his 
family into that of the PEU mirrored his wider investiture of self into the movement he ran. If it helped 
him internalise the movement’s goals, it also led to a defensiveness and unwillingness to compromise 
on the issue of symbology. 
                                               
braucht eine Fahre”; ACV, PP 1000/75/5. On the Council of Europe’s decision-making, see P.M.G. Levy, 
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146 C.f. T. Kleisner, "Medaile Hrabat Coudenhove", Acta Musei Nationalis Pragae. Series C – Historia Litterarum 
57.1-2 (2012) 150-155, 186 
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in Ronsperg castle. Regimental records show that Offner died at the castle in 1947 (see “Offner Alfréd”, 
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As his use of biography, autobiography, portraiture and symbology all amply demonstrate, 
and as Coudenhove-Kalergi himself acknowledged, ‘This single life, this dream, this fight are 
inextricably interwoven’.148 However, the ultimate reward for such an investment of self into his 
cause was the one that eluded him: the Nobel Peace Prize. This was not in fact such an outlandish 
ambition. In contrast to today’s broader emphasis on human rights, during Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
lifetime the criteria for the Nobel Peace Prize more tightly followed a literal reading of Alfred Nobel’s 
will, which decreed that the prize be awarded to: 
‘the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, 
for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of 
peace congresses.’149 
                                               
148 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 8 
149 “Full text of Alfred Nobel’s Will”, http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/will/will-full.html (last accessed 26 Apr 
2015) 
Figure 7: Cover of Paneuropa, Volume 1, Issue 6 
(1924) 
Figure 8: Cover of Coudenhove-Kalergi, Krieg 
oder Frieden? (1957). Source: ACV, PP 
1000/219 
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Figure 9: Alfred Offner, portrait of 
Gerolfus Ide Coudenhove (c.1930). 
Horšovský Týn Castle, Horšovský Týn, 
Czech Republic 
Figure 10: Alfred Offner, portrait of 
Heinrich Coudenhove (c.1930). 
Horšovský Týn Castle, Horšovský Týn, 
Czech Republic 
Figure 11: Family crest, Ronsperg 
castle, main building. Photo: 
author’s own 
Figure 12: Crest of Franz Karl Coudenhove, 
Richard's grandfather. Horšovský Týn Castle, 
Horšovský Týn, Czech Republic 
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Accordingly, many of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s contemporaries were recipients of the prize, from those 
who directly influenced him (Alfred Fried won in 1911, and Woodrow Wilson in 1919) to the 
politicians he worked with (Briand and Stresemann won in 1926) to his immediate peers (Christian 
Lange, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s lecture tour companion in the US, won in 1921)150 to signed-up PEU 
members and supporters (Fridtjof Nansen won in 1922, Nathan Söderblom in 1930, Nicholas Murray 
Butler in 1931 and Carl von Ossietzky in 1935). Coudenhove-Kalergi was in fact nominated many 
times: 54 times between his first nomination for the 1931 prize and the current 50-year cut-off for 
publication of the nomination database in 1967.151 Many of his nominees made no secret of it: Harold 
Nicolson,152 Leo Amery,153 Fernando de los Rios,154 Jose de Aguirre155 and Arnold Zurcher156 all 
wrote to Coudenhove-Kalergi to inform him of their nominations. And nor did Coudenhove-Kalergi 
shy away from publicising his nominations, releasing press releases that lobbied for his receipt of the 
award by boasting of his nominations by Edvard Beneš and Erich Koch-Weser in 1931,157 and Paul-
Henri Spaak in 1953.158 Given his contemporaries’ successes, and his own weight of nominations, it 
is perhaps not impertinent to instead ask (as no doubt Coudenhove-Kalergi himself did) what 
accounted for his failure to sway the Nobel Prize Committee. Of course, there is a danger in over-
analysing such non-decisions, but surely it points towards a reluctance on the part of the Nobel 
Committee to endorse the PEU as part of the story of European pacifism and integration, and by 
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extension a reluctance to buy into the mythos that Coudenhove-Kalergi liked to promote. 
 
 
 
Coudenhove-Kalergi has by no means been forgotten. Indeed, after decades punctuated by an 
occasional, idiosyncratic title taking the Pan-European movement as its focus,159 Coudenhove-
Kalergi began to be rediscovered towards the end of the twentieth century, first with Carl Pegg’s 1983 
Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932, which allotted a fair amount of space to Coudenhove-
Kalergi,160 and then with Peter Stirk’s edited collection on European unity in the interwar period, 
containing a chapter by Ralph White on “The Europeanism of Coudenhove-Kalergi”.161 Relying 
almost solely on Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 1943 autobiography and the 1926 English translation of Pan-
Europe, White’s analysis came to typify treatments of the PEU that were unable to access archival 
material (justifiably, as we shall see in the following section). Alongside these, we might file the 
innumerable titles of the history of European integration, which pay Coudenhove-Kalergi and the 
Pan-European Union a perfunctory sentence or two. 
The millennium has seen an upsurge in studies of Coudenhove-Kalergi and the PEU. Most 
significant among these has been Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler’s 2004 Botschafter Europas 
(‘Ambassador of Europe’),162 though other valuable scholarly works include monographs (and related 
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chapters and articles) by Anne-Marie Saint-Gille in 2003,163 Verena Schöberl164 and Christian 
Pernhorst in 2008165 and Walter Göhring in 2016,166 slender biographies by Hanne Dézsy in 2001167 
and Vanessa Conze in 2004,168 and theses by Katiana Orluc in 2005169 and Anne-Isabelle Richard in 
2010.170 Meanwhile, a number of works dealing with European unity in the interwar years have dealt 
skilfully with the PEU’s place in this narrative.171 Among scholars of the political and intellectual 
history of the interwar period, then, there is a rising swell of academic scholarship on Coudenhove-
Kalergi and the PEU, although a notable gap remains between their significant presence in German 
and French scholarship and their relative absence in English scholarship.172 Katharine Sorrels’ 
Cosmopolitan Outsiders, in which Coudenhove-Kalergi shares the limelight with Alfred Fried, 
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remains the only English-language monograph to take Pan-Europeanism as a primary focus. 
And yet, for all this swell, it is hard to escape from the feeling that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
own presentation of his life still forms the dominant narrative. Biographical sections invariably 
reproduce passages from his autobiographies, in the order that he set them out. It is difficult to say 
whether this is testament to the quality of his prose, whether it is simply the case that the recollections, 
context and incidental detail of an autobiography will inevitably better conjure a life than a mélange 
of archival traces that the researcher can assemble, whether it is a matter of archival access, or whether 
there are simply only so many ways one can tell the story of a life. Whatever the cause, the effect is 
a blurring of the lines that separate biography from autobiography. 
 
 
Records of a life 
On the morning of Friday 11 March 1938, Alwine Dolfuss, widow of the assassinated Austrian 
chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, was visiting the Coudenhove-Kalergis at their Vienna residence, 
relaying Mussolini’s private advice to her that she should seek safety in Switzerland. Unfazed by this, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi and his wife stayed put: after all, they had guests for dinner that evening. 
However, shortly after their guests’ arrival, the phone rang, with news that the Austrian Chancellor 
Kurt Schuschnigg had resigned, and the Germans were invading. Now the dinner guests were sent 
home, and Coudenhove-Kalergi fled with his wife and their two dogs (a white Pekingese called Pai-
Chouan and a Russian sheep-dog called Sascha) first to the Swiss Legation, and then, pistol in hand, 
across the border into Czechoslovakia. When a few days later they arrived in Switzerland, where they 
had a summer-house near Gstaad, Coudenhove-Kalergi discovered two things: firstly what a narrow 
escape they had had, with many of their friends and acquaintances back in Vienna rounded up and 
arrested on the night they had escaped, and secondly that the Pan-European Union offices in the 
Hofburg palace had been seized for use as the private residence of the new Nazi ‘Governor’ of Austria, 
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Arthur Seyss-Inquart.173 Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 1943 autobiography, in which he tells this story, ends 
by lamenting that ‘One of his [Seyss-Inquart’s] first actions had been to destroy forty-thousand 
volumes published by the Pan-Europe Editions as well as all our archives and correspondence’.174 
However, on this last point, Coudenhove-Kalergi was mistaken, though he wouldn’t discover 
it during his lifetime. Today, we know that the Nazi operations on the night of 11 March 1938, ahead 
of the military invasion the following day, were twofold. On one hand, Heinrich Himmler and his SS 
staff had flown to Vienna to round up ‘political undesirables’ who were then taken to camps at Dachau 
and, later, Mauthausen concentration camps.175 Meanwhile, in the material complement to this human 
operation, Adolf Eichmann had been dispatched to Vienna to head the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) 
Hauptamt operation to seize various pieces of property belonging to such undesirables and oversee 
their transferral to the Reich.176 While it was true that the PEU’s offices in the Hofburg palace were 
commandeered for use by Seyss-Inquart, their archives had not been destroyed, but instead were 
seized by Eichmann’s SD Hauptamt. Joining the PEU archives on the journey to Berlin were the 
archives of Masonic lodges, Jews who had fled or been deported, and other opponents of the regime. 
This set of confiscations were by no means a one-off, but rather constituted an early foray into what 
would become under the Nazi regime an archive-hunting operation of unprecedented scale. In autumn 
1939 the SD Hauptamt was consolidated with Gestapo archive-hunting operations under the new 
umbrella of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) organisation.177 From 1940, these units were 
                                               
173 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 195. More properly, following two day as Austrian Chancellor, in 
which he had ‘invited’ the German invasion on the evening of 11 March, Seyss-Inquart was made Governor 
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174 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 212 
175 L.H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe's Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War 
(London: Macmillan; 1994), 38 
176 P.K. Grimsted, "From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution", in Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, F.J. Hoogewoud, and 
Eric Ketelaar (eds.), Returned from Russia: Nazi archival plunder in Western Europe and recent restitution issues 
(Builth Wells: Institute of Art and Law; 2007) 3-132, 49; citing L. Hachmeister, Der Gegnerforscher: Die Karriere 
des SS-Führers Franz Alfred Six (Munich: C.H. Beck; 1998), 192-193 
177 Grimsted, "From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution", 47 
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complemented by Alfred Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR), whose mission was 
to to seize ‘cultural assets’ from conquered territories, including archives.178 Together, these 
operations formed what Patricia Kennedy Grimsted has described as ‘a vast network of pseudo-
scholarly and propaganda forces – often competing with one another – mobilized in occupied areas 
subordinate to and providing intellectual support for the Nazi regime’.179 
Once in Berlin, the PEU archives were housed in Emser Strasse 12/13 and Eisenacherstrasse 
11/13, properties that had themselves been seized from the Freemasons, where they were joined by 
an array of other so-called ‘trophy’ archives after the general outbreak of war in 1939.180 In spring 
1943, as Allied bombing of Germany intensified, these trophy archives were evacuated for their own 
protection to a variety of castles, manor houses and mines in Saxony, Bohemia and Silesia (see 
fig. 13). The first stop for the PEU archives was the imposing hilltop castle of Fürstenstein (present-
day Książ), around 8km north of Waldenburg (Wałbrzych).181 Later on that year, Fürstenstein was 
taken over by other Nazi agencies (including the railroad administration), with a secret underground 
railway tunnel built for Hitler’s occasional visits,182 and the archives were forced to move again. 
Finally, in April 1944 the RSHA leased the remote Silesian village castle of Wölfelsdorf (Wilkanów), 
near Habelschwerdt (Bystrzyca Kłodzka), moving the PEU and other archives there in May 1944.183 
 They remained hidden there until ‘liberated’ by the Red Army in July 1945. Their recovery, 
however, was no accident: both the US and the Soviet Union had their own dedicated teams of 
                                               
178  P.K. Grimsted, "Reconstructing the Record of Nazi Cultural Plunder: A Survey of the Dispersed Archives of the 
Einsatzstab Reicheleiter Rosenberg (ERR)", IISH Research Papers (2011). The ERR would earn its infamy by 
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Grimsted, "Twice plundered or "twice saved"? Identifying Russia's "trophy" archives and the loot of the 
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179 P.K. Grimsted, "The Odyssey of the Smolensk Archive: Plundered Communist Records for the Service of Anti-
Communism", The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies 1201 (September 1995), 13 
180 Grimsted, "From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution", 47-48 
181 Grimsted, "Twice plundered or 'twice saved'", 202 
182 Grimsted, "From Nazi plunder to Russian restitution", 57; this is the site being currently explored in the hunt for the 
legendary ‘Nazi gold train’ 
183 Grimsted, "Twice plundered or 'twice saved'", 204; P.K. Grimsted, "Why do captured archives go home? Restitution 
achievements under the Russian law", International Journal of Cultural Property 17.2 (2010) 291-333, 300 
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archive-hunters, who successfully re-plundered vast quantities of archival material.184 Konstantin 
Akinsha and Grigorii Kozlov called this Soviet theft at the end of WWII ‘the most prodigious secret 
removal of looted cultural property in human history, carefully organised and carried out by the Red 
Army and the Soviet military administration’.185 It was also hastily organised, after the February 1945 
Yalta Conference, as teams of experts were assembled and disguised in military uniform, and then 
SMERSH (an abbreviation of Smert’ shpionam, or ‘Death to Spies!’), the three counter-intelligence 
                                               
184 Grimsted, "Twice plundered or 'twice saved'"; A.M. Eckert, The Struggle for the Files: The Western Allies and the 
Return of German Archives after the Second World War, trans. Dona Geyer, Publications of the German Historical 
Institute (Cambridge: German Historical Institute ; Cambridge University Press; 2012); K. Akinsha and G. Kozlov, 
Stolen Treasure: The Hunt for the World's Lost Masterpieces (Weidenfeld & Nicolson; 1995) 
185 Akinsha and Kozlov, Stolen Treasure, xix 
 
Figure 13: Map showing Nazi archival depositories. Source: P.K. Grimsted Returned from Russia: Nazi 
archival plunder in Western Europe and recent restitution issues (Builth Wells: Institute of Art and Law; 
2007), p.32 
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agencies embedded in the Red Army, became involved in the operation. 
 As Grimsted reports, ‘A Red Army counter-intelligence SMERSH unit of the Second 
Ukrainian Front was apparently the first to uncover the Wölfelsdorf treasures, but a Moscow historian 
discovered the Masonic deposits in a nearby abandoned brewery’;186 it is not clear whether the PEU 
archives were found in the brewery or the castle.187 What is clear is that from October to November 
1945 they were then transferred from Wölfelsdorf back to Moscow, 28 freight-car loads of archives 
in all.188 Once in Moscow, they were placed (in common with the majority of the trophy archives 
‘recovered’ by the Soviet Union at the end of the war) in the top-secret ‘Central State Special Archive’ 
(Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi osobyi arkhiv, TsGOA, hereafter [in line with common usage] simply 
‘Special Archive’) newly established in March 1946 for precisely this purpose.189 It was not at all 
obvious that these archives would be kept: according to one Soviet archival director, 
‘Our government might declare some of the other materials as our property, but … clearly 
the government cannot consider fonds such as those brought from Czechoslovakia, for 
example, as part of the State Archival Fond of the USSR. And there are more than a few 
such fonds. We have a right to them only until such time when questions of an 
international character are regulated. Such temporary rights until that time we need to use 
for the processing of those materials and to arrange their appropriate storage. … In any 
case the archive would probably exist for only three, four, or maybe at most five years.’190 
 However, there the PEU archives remained, almost entirely untouched191 and unknown in the 
West, believed destroyed, throughout the entirety of the Cold War. After five years at the Main 
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Archival Administration (GAU) premises on ulitsa Bol’shaia Pirogovskaia 17, the Special Archive 
was transferred to ulitsa Vyborgskaia 3, where it would remain for the next 64 years. The first hint of 
their existence was the sensational series of articles by the Russian journalist Ella Maksimova entitled 
‘Five Days in the Special Archive’, published in Izvestiia from 18-22 February 1990.192 Amid the 
heady rush of the glasnost days of 1990 and 1991, the contents of the Special Archive finally emerged, 
including ‘Fond 554: The Pan-European Union, Vienna’.193 In January 1991, a small team of Swiss 
researchers (working with the support of the Moscow State University’s Institute of Universal 
History) became the first Westerners to see the PEU archive since its move to Moscow.194 Returning 
in October 1991, shortly after the failed August Putsch, this Swiss team made extensive photocopies, 
and harboured hopes of concluding a swift restitution of the PEU archive to Europe, where it might 
join the post-1938 archives of the PEU, then held at the Coppet castle in Geneva.195 George Browder 
encapsulated this mood of optimistic expectancy in his 1991 assertion that ‘The improved 
international atmosphere has led the Russians to consider returning to Germany (and perhaps other 
appropriate countries of origin) those documents not originating in the territory of the former Soviet 
Union’, confident of total restitution, eventually.196 Change was afoot: in 1992 the Special Archive 
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was renamed197 and opened more widely to researchers for access. 
 However, these hopes were soon dashed, as by 1993 it had become clear that there was little 
appetite for restitution on the Russian side. In 1999 the Special Archive was incorporated into the 
larger Russian State Military Archive (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvenni Voennyi Arkhiv, RGVA); as 
Grimsted notes ‘yet another symbol of their [the trophy archives’] wartime fate and ill-defined 
status’.198 (In 2015, this institutional transferral would be made physical, as the archive was moved 
next door to the RGVA building on ulitsa Admirala Makarova 29). In 1995, Russia’s failure to resolve 
questions of restitution of cultural property became a sticking point in negotiations for membership 
of the Council of Europe. Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby Russia signed a ‘statement 
of intent’ which promised: 
‘to settle rapidly all issues related to the return of property claimed by Council of Europe 
member states, in particular the archives transferred to Moscow in 1945.’199 
Not only was this promise roundly ignored, but just a few months later, ‘in the heat of the 1996 
Russian presidential campaign, a week after Victory Day (9 May), the Duma passed a first reading of 
the proposed law nationalizing the spoils of war’.200 In 1998, this law was eventually passed, and 
though president Boris Yeltsin (who had actively protested the law) forced a formal appeal in the 
Constitutional Court, a revised version was signed into law by the Vladimir Putin, just days after his 
inauguration as president in May 2000.201 This ‘Federal Law on Cultural Valuables Displaced to the 
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USSR as a Result of the Second World War’ simultaneously legally bolstered Russia’s legal claim on 
these trophy archives, while allowing for their ‘restitution’202 in exceptional circumstances, and for a 
price.203 It is true that since the fall of the Soviet Union, ‘archival restitution…has been much more 
successful than the return of trophy art or library books’,204 but these things are both relative (speaking 
to the almost complete refusal to restitute books or art) and contextual (depending on the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ under which restitution might be countenanced). One important factor mandated by 
the new law is that ‘claims from abroad for cultural valuables must be presented through diplomatic 
channels of the country involved, negotiated on a state-to-state basis’.205 Thus, many of the Masonic 
files that have been successfully restituted (or are in the midst of such a process) have indeed been 
negotiated on such a basis, although such processes have proven long, fraught and uncertain to the 
last.206 However, in the case of the PEU archives, which are not merely non-state but which abrogate 
the very logic of such classification, this clause presents a serious obstacle to restitution. 
 Nevertheless, there is one case of the restitution of a private archive from Russia outside of 
state-scale diplomatic channels: that of the Vienna Rothschild archives, which were in 2001 returned 
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to The Rothschild Archive in London.207 The historical-geographic trajectory of the Vienna 
Rothschild archive shares much with the PEU archive, having travelled together ever since their initial 
seizure in Vienna. However, after years of negotiation, the Rothschild restitution was eventually 
enabled by the agreement of a return ‘gift’ of a collection of letters between Tsar Alexander II and his 
morganatic wife Catherine Dolgorukov, bought by the Rothschild Archive for a princely sum at 
auction with this trade in mind.208 Quid pro quo in hand, the restitution was approved not under the 
1998/2000 ‘Federal Law on Cultural Valuables’, but instead under the normal Civil Code of the 
Russian Federation on the import and export of cultural valuables, which meant that neither an inter-
governmental agreement nor state approval from the Duma were required.209 The Rothschilds’ 
success was therefore a result of negotiating a set of complex and somewhat mercurial geopolitical, 
legal and financial conditions. While the geopolitical and legal conditions for the restitution of the 
PEU archive remain debatable, it seems clear that the present version of the PEU lacks the funds it 
would take to come to a similar arrangement. 
 
 
 
From the point of view of the expediency of conducting research into the PEU today, the story of its 
archives bears on the researcher in two opposing ways: first, insofar as it conspired to preserve the 
archives, in the midst of immense destruction and despite the open hostility of its keepers; and second, 
insofar as its presence in Moscow makes archival research arduous, time-consuming and expensive. 
However, my contention here is that by interrogating this story further, we can stand to deepen our 
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understanding of the PEU, of the regimes responsible for the double-theft of its archives, and of the 
nature of archives in general. Specifically, the question we must start with is: what made the archives 
of the PEU valuable enough for two successive superpowers to decide to spend the significant 
amounts of time, energy and resources necessary in order to seize, protect and indefinitely store them? 
In short, why did the PEU archives move? How do we read this archival mobility? And what historico-
geographical implications can we draw from their travels and travails? 
 The first, partial cut on this question is to interpret the Soviet seizures at the end of WWII as 
motivated by revenge for German seizures of Soviet archives earlier in the war, during the German 
advances of 1941 and 1942 under the direction of the Russian-born, Moscow-educated Alfred 
Rosenberg.210 German looting during the war was no secret, and widely felt within Soviet society 
(see fig. 14). In response to this indignity, detailed ‘wish-lists’ were drawn up of potential trophies to 
be brought back from Nazi-occupied territories as compensation, a ‘restitution in kind’ justified via 
the use of complex formulas designed by Soviet art historians to determine the respective values of 
the property looted by the Nazis and the treasures that might replace them.211 The communist system 
both confounded the calculation of such values, and led to a disregard of the distinction between state-
owned and private collections when it came to drawing up targets for ‘restitution in kind’.212 However, 
in the event such difficulties were dwarfed by the chaos of war, and the efforts by trophy-hunting 
brigades to get trophies before the regular soldiers had a chance to loot them first. As Konstantin 
Akinsha writes, ‘by the second part of 1945 the necessity to compensate for Soviet cultural losses by 
equally important artifacts from specific named German collections was forgotten and replaced by 
                                               
210 L. Barnickel, "Spoils of war: the fate of European records during World War II", Archival Issues 24.1 (1999) 7-20; 
Nicholas, The Rape of Europa, 185-202. Rosenberg was born in Reval (now Tallinn), then part of the Russian 
Empire; he fled to Germany after the Revolution. 
211 K. Akinsha, "Stalin's decrees and Soviet trophy brigades: compensation, restitution in kind, or 'trophies' of war?", 
International Journal of Cultural Property 17.2 (2010) 195-216 
212 Akinsha, "Stalin's decrees and Soviet trophy brigades" 
57 
 
the conception of total removal of cultural property from the Soviet-occupied territories’.213 
Nevertheless, the justification of ‘restitution in kind’ remained pervasive: the seizure and 
transportation to the Soviet Union of nine freight cars full of archives, including vast medieval 
Hanseatic records, was justified by Soviet officials as possible ‘compensation for the losses wrought 
by the German occupiers on scholarly and cultural institutions in the Soviet Union’.214 Between the 
emotional response of eye-for-an-eye revenge archival theft to be levied against the Germans, and the 
rationalisations of restitution in kind to offset those Soviet losses that could not be recovered, we 
might therefore begin to uncover the Soviet motives for the theft of the PEU archives as 
compensation, broadly conceived. This helps shed some light on post-1990 Russian demands for 
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Figure 14: Russian cartoon showing Leo Tolstoy looking on as Adolf Hitler loots Soviet cultural treasures. 
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‘compensation’ in order to restitute trophy archives, notwithstanding that the logic of such 
compensation claims tends to focus on the costs of Russian ‘stewardship’ since the war. These 
archives were (in part) taken for their exchange value, so it should not surprise us that they still 
possess exchange value. 
 This said, they were not taken only for their exchange value, and this line of argument does 
not help us at all in explaining the PEU archive’s original removal to Germany. To take a second cut 
on the explanation for their double-theft, we need to consider the use value of the PEU archive. For 
the Nazis, this can be reduced still further, to what Linda Barnickel calls intelligence value: ‘A 
document can have intelligence value, not only for the military, but also for personal enemies 
(blackmail); for business rivals (trade secrets); for political enemies (scandals); and for others’.215 As 
previously noted, the Nazis kept the PEU archives alongside other archives of ‘politically suspicious 
groups’. This designation reflects the PEU’s status as outspoken critics of the Nazi regime. As such, 
the PEU archive would clearly contain valuable information (and incriminating evidence) on other 
opponents of the regime. Some suspicions could be confirmed, and others could spread, for what 
could be more suspicious than associating with known opponents of the regime? 
 In the case of the Soviet seizure of the PEU archives, we can also see indications of their 
perceived ‘intelligence value’. Here we must remind ourselves that whereas much of the Soviet 
looting of Axis art and libraries was accomplished by teams of archive-hunters appointed by various 
Soviet academic institutions, it was the SMERSH units that were responsible for looting archives. 
While the former tended to justify the seizure of property as compensation, the latter justified it ‘for 
the purposes of intelligence utilization and political control’. Indeed, the instructions for the seizure 
of archives, as recommended from Deputy NKVD Commissar Sergei Kruglov to the Head of the 
NKVD Lavrentiy Beria, and from Beria to Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, 
commanded SMERSH units 
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‘to search thoroughly through all German archives and libraries to effect means of 
preservation and bring to the Soviet Union materials, including printed editions, that have 
scientific-historical and operational significance for our country.’216 
If the ‘scientific-historical’ significance was a catch-all by which the plunder of prized cultural 
artefacts could be justified,217 ‘operational significance’ was a direct reference to the intelligence 
value of archives. Perhaps the capacity of special agents scanning enormous troves of papers of 
unknown provenance pulled from mines and castles (in languages they may not be familiar with) to 
make snap decisions on the ‘operational significance’ of archives should not be over-analysed. 
Perhaps the fact that the Nazis considered them valuable enough to hide them in the first place was 
recommendation enough. Nevertheless, their potential to possess intelligence value certainly played 
a large part in their seizure, their relocation to Moscow, and the secrecy they were held in once they 
got there.218 Once part of the Special Archive, it is unclear how much usable intelligence they could 
have contained for the Soviet authorities. However, outside the realms of ‘intelligence’, the PEU 
archives were catalogued between 1949 and 1965,219 and were accessed by at least one Soviet 
researcher for academic purposes. This man, Vsevolod Borisovich Kniazhinskii, drew extensively on 
the PEU archives for his 1958 book on the history of ‘imperialist’ plans for European unification in 
the interwar period, a hot topic at the time given the 1957 signature of the Treaty of Rome.220 And 
repeated reference to Pan-Europe in contemporary Russian political discourse suggests that the 
presence of the PEU archives within the RGVA in Moscow somehow continues to legitimate the idea 
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of Russia as an important actor in the political history of ‘Europe’, despite present geopolitical 
tensions.221 Thus, on one level it is possible to read the Russian reluctance to restitute the PEU archive 
in terms of contemporary geopolitics; certainly, it would be remiss to consider the fate of the archive 
without making reference to its contents. 
 What connects these two notions, the contents of the archive and its external existence as a 
trophy of war – or, the archive-as-source and the archive-as-subject – is an essential transcendence of 
the nation-state. Quite aside from the PEU’s anti-Nazi campaigning, it both recorded and represented 
an idea of politics antithetical to the Blut und Boden of Nazi ideology. As we have seen, the Nazi 
persecution of the PEU ran deeper than mere political opposition: it was based on Hitler’s personal 
animosity towards Coudenhove-Kalergi, an animosity borne of his embodiment of cosmopolitanism 
and interraciality. Neither Coudenhove-Kalergi nor his organisation fitted into a world in which 
politics was state business, and the state was tied to a (racially defined) nation. The PEU archive, 
being that of a private organization that was both operationally and aspirationally transnational, broke 
both of these norms, making it deeply and essentially transgressive. 
 There is a growing body of work in the archival literature that focuses on how non-state and 
transnational organizations are obscured by the state-based ‘archival grain’. Transnational stories, this 
literature tells us, are rendered extraordinary, exilic, and difficult to follow: they do not obey the logic 
of the archive, and so their records are either split across multiple locations, dealt with in anomalous 
or ‘special’ series, or otherwise obscured.222 As Tony Ballantyne notes, the ‘profound disjunction’ 
between records of transnational stories (even those that were not fragmented) and the highly national 
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‘instituting imaginary’ of the institutions that housed them has often served to marginalise those 
collections in subsequent research.223 However, in the case of the PEU archives, its abnormal 
transnationality served not to obscure it, but rather to highlight it as something of interest. Today, as 
we have seen, its transnationalism remains one of the obstacles standing in the way of the archives’ 
restitution, since the entire framework within which restitution might take place is both de facto and 
de jure one of nation-state diplomacy. It seems that the price for contravening the state’s natural 
monopoly on the assembly and possession of archives is to fall outside the grid within which the 
transference and re-possession of archives can take place. If the PEU archive’s dissonance with the 
statist idea of politics was what marked it out as suspicious and threatening, worthy of the 
extraordinary measures necessary to drive its movements from Vienna to Moscow, it is now also the 
very quality that prevents its movement. 
 The final cut I want to take on the mobility of the PEU archive is to consider the symbolic 
value of its custody. We have already seen something of how for the Nazis, the PEU archive stood 
for something larger: a world order entirely incommensurate with their own. Accordingly, the archive 
was ghettoised: it was kept in isolation where it could be monitored, and if necessary accessed, but 
could not infect society at large. Control of the archive symbolised control of these undesirable 
elements, the prevention of their metastasising into the body politic. However, in the case of the 
Russian inheritance of Soviet custody of the PEU archives, almost the reverse is the case. The archives 
have been so thoroughly incorporated into the body politic that their removal is an unthinkable affront. 
Possession of the PEU archive (and the other trophy archives) has come to stand (in part) for the 
nation’s war dead. Thus, the ex-Soviet Minister of Culture Nikolai Gubenko argued that the 1998 law 
aimed at regularising Russia’s legal claim upon these archives should be signed in the name of ‘the 
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27 million who perished [during World War II] and the graves on the Volga’, and that even a token 
restitution would be like ‘spitting on those graves’.224 Logics of scientific-historical interest and 
operational significance are overshadowed by a more existential symbolism based not on the contents 
of the archive but on its simple presence. 
 If thus far we have been concerned with why the PEU archive moved when it did, this 
interpretation offers an insight into why it didn’t move when it could have, in the heady days of 
glasnost and perestroika. That the expected wave of restitution never broke says as much about early-
90s Western complacency as it does about Russian intransigence; a geopolitical bellwether every bit 
as eloquent as its double-theft in 1938 and 1945. Likewise, the European insistence on inserting a 
clause demanding that Russia initiate restitution proceedings as a condition of admittance to the 
Council of Europe225 said as much about the symbolic importance of these archives as the subsequent 
Russian disregard for this clause.226 If Nazi custody symbolized control, Russian custody symbolises 
something more intimate. This case speaks to a larger truth, for archival loss is often expressed via 
bodily metaphors: archives reveal ‘the most intimate facets of a nation’,227 their exposure is 
‘humiliating’,228 their theft unnatural and destabilising,229 even akin to rape.230 In some way, then, to 
read archival mobility is to analyse the body politic, and thereby to critically interrogate the all-too-
often assumed relationship between archive and nation. 
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 
 
As far as the story of the original documents that constitute the central Pan-European Union archive 
goes, that’s it: the Pan-European Union archives are still in the RGVA in Moscow. However, when it 
comes to doing research on the Pan-European Union, this does not tell the whole story. If we want to 
give a more complete account of the mobility of the Pan-European Union archive, we need to retrace 
our steps, and return to the point in the story in October 1991 when the Swiss researchers were 
permitted to make photocopies of the newly opened Special Archive in Moscow. 
These researchers were from the University Institute of European Studies (L’Institut 
universitaire d’études européennes), an institute linked to the University of Geneva that had been set 
up by the historian of European integration Denis de Rougemont in 1963. In 1984 the European 
Archive Foundation (Fondation Archives européennes) had been established there, thanks to support 
both from de Rougemont himself, and also from Vittorio Pons, then Secretary General of the still-
existing Pan-European Union. Pons’s involvement meant that there was already in Geneva a good 
deal of residual interest in, and a trove of post-1938 documents from, the Pan-European Union. 
Furthermore, there was also already an awareness of the riches that were secreted away in Moscow. 
Vittorio Pons’s son, Marco Pons, had known of Vsevolod Kniazhinskii’s work that drew on the 
supposedly destroyed archival material, and communicated with him in 1978. Kniazhinskii told him 
that although the Pan-European Union archive existed, he did not know where. This inside knowledge 
in fact allowed the Swiss team to bring back a small number of documents from the Pan-European 
Union archive in 1989, before the existence of the Special Archive was ‘revealed’, and before the 
more substantial 1991 missions.231 
In sum, these Swiss missions brought back 3 boxes, or 96 envelopes, of copied material from 
the Russian archive. However, at that moment, the Institute was in a period of crisis, and was in fact 
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closed that year, to be reopened in 1992 as the European Institute of the University of Geneva (Institut 
européen de l’université de Genève). Prompted in part by this new material, in November 1994 the 
Fondation Archives européennes released a comprehensive research guide to the published and 
unpublished work relating to Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European movement; this remains a 
valuable resource.232 Another institutional reshuffle in 2002, this time in happier circumstances, saw 
the archives of the European Institute moved to the new ‘European Centre’ (Centre européen) at the 
Coppet château just outside Geneva city limits. 
However, here the story gets another twist, as in 2001 a PhD student named Katiana Orluc 
instigated another collection of copies from the Pan-European Union archive. Orluc was studying at 
the European University Institute in Florence, an institution funded by the EU, signed into being in 
1972 and opened in 1976, who mission was ‘to foster the advancement of learning in fields which are 
of particular interest for the development of Europe’. In 1984, the European University Institute 
signed an agreement to house the new ‘historical archives of the European Economic Community 
and the European Atomic Energy Community’, now known by the slightly snappier title of the 
‘Historical Archives of the European Union’ (HAEU). In 1986, these archives were opened in 
Florence. Orluc, whose PhD on the Pan-European movement was in the Department of History and 
Civilization under the supervision of Bo Stråth,233 visited Geneva and Moscow, and brought back 
photocopies from both, which she deposited at the Historical Archives of the European Union, where 
they remain open to researchers. In 2012, the archive moved from Villa Il Poggiolo to Villa Salviati, 
which is where I found them in 2014. 
Back in Switzerland, in 2011 the European Centre at the Coppet in Geneva closed, and the 
archives it housed were moved, first to a furniture depository (gardemeubles) in the Geneva suburbs, 
and then in 2013 to the Archives of the Canton of Vaud (Archives Cantonales Vaudoises, or ACV) in 
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Lausanne. Here they are located on the campus of the University of Lausanne, a stone’s throw from 
the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, established in Lausanne in 1978, another institution 
aiming to ‘organise the archival heritage’ of Europe. The Pan-European Union archives were re-
catalogued, and opened to researchers on 17 November 2014. Visiting in January 2015, I was 
therefore among the first to make use of this re-catalogued collection in its new Lausanne home. 
The Pan-European collections held by the ACV and HAEU constitute two independent but 
interlinked troves of material from the twice-stolen Pan-European Union archive, which have at 
various points been housed in three cities keen to establish themselves as the keepers of European 
history. Or, at least, the keepers of the archives of European history. Each of the cities boasts a unique 
claim to a particular version of Europeanness. First, Geneva, where in an 1867 pacifist Congress the 
call to constitute the United States of Europe went out, fusing the pacifist and federalist movements 
for decades to come; and where after the First World War the League of Nations was set up, making 
it a cosmopolitan city that symbolised interwar internationalism. Second, Lausanne, which shared 
with Geneva the Swiss heritage of federalism, and which has given a home to the records of many of 
the post-World War II efforts at European integration. And third, Florence, which in addition to its 
cultural claims as one of the epicentres of the Renaissance that defined European civilisation, is the 
home to the archives of the EU’s specific institutional iteration of European integration. 
This second take on the mobility of the Pan-European Union archive, the movement of 
photocopies, sheds light on a quite different historical geography. If the first version was a story of 
the isolation and quarantine of the Pan-European Union’s specific form of transnationalism, this 
second version is a story of the appropriation of this transnationalism. In both cases, what marks the 
Pan-European Union archive out is the way in which it defies the norms that locate politics at the 
scale of the nation-state. It does so both in terms of its internal content (archive as source) and in 
terms of its external history (archive as subject). However, while in the first version of the story this 
transnationalism cast suspicion upon the archive, in the second version of the story it lent it prestige. 
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Curiously, in both versions, the Pan-European Union archive is something of a trophy, albeit for 
wildly divergent reasons. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered three rather different takes on a life, each resting on a different understanding 
of what we might call the epistemology of biography. First, an attempt to get close to the subject, to 
give an impression of a life by way of the familiar litany of geographical metaphors we measure lives 
by: its contours, its points of references, its turning points, its course. For the reader, this section 
constitutes an introduction to Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European Union, upon which 
the subsequent chapters depend. Second, an attempt to see the subject at a stage remove, a 
metabiography that seeks to expose and describe the scaffolding holding up the Potemkin façade of 
a life story. This is by no means a matter of questioning the authenticity of the telling, and while it 
challenges the notion of a singular life story, I have not dwelt on this point. Rather, it is about asking 
how and to what ends this story is created, what its effects are, and how story loops back into life. 
And third, a story of archival afterlife, of the rupture between a life and its ‘trace’, and the strange 
ways in which this trace on one hand symbolically refracts the story of a life, and on the other hand 
materially constrains its telling. 
 It is thus both a fractured methodology and a methodology of fracture. By taking this multi-
pronged approach to biography, it seeks to gain a sense of what James Clifford called the ‘myth of 
personal coherence’,234 exploring both the content of this myth, how it was built and circulated, and 
its material moorings. It is worth noting, however, that this scepticism of a unitary notion of selfhood 
was not alien to Coudenhove-Kalergi, a philosopher after all. Recalling his mother’s change in 
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temperament following the death of his father, from submissive and ‘childlike’ wife to ‘despotic’ and 
‘distrustful’ countess and mother, he speculated on ‘how a change as radical as hers was possible’, 
theorising it with a political analogy: 
‘An individual character is far from being a homogeneous unit. It is a composite being 
which may be compared to a parliament where many individuals and factions strive for 
power but end by expressing the will of the majority. The human character too is split into 
divergent factions ruled by impulses that originate in various individual and background 
elements.’235 
This metaphor hints at a malleability of subjecthood rarely admitted to elsewhere, though of course 
it ultimately seeks to rationalise it, to tell a meta-story that explains the ruptures of the story. 
 What the present discussion has contributed is the flipside to Clifford’s notion of the myth at 
the heart of conventional biography. It is not just a matter of crafting a story to give a sense of unity 
to a life, but of crafting a life to give a sense of unity to a story. Coudenhove-Kalergi lived his story. 
The leadership of the Pan-European movement was not merely a position but a permanent and 
immersive role. The narrative arc of his life was not a post-hoc invention, but a live weapon, one to 
which he knowingly tied his fate. This predicament was incisively described by Leo Amery, who told 
Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1950: 
‘I am always interested in the fertility of resources with which you are able to adapt the 
essential purpose of your life’s work to the inevitable changes which come about in the 
European situation.’236 
Amery’s words can be read in two ways. On one hand, they might be read as an acerbic comment on 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s whole-hearted subsumption of self into his political goals, from Amery’s very 
British perspective a muddying of the boundaries between public and private spheres. The subtext 
being: how can you possibly claim something so grand as a life’s purpose, when like all of us you 
must work within the ever-shifting limits of political context? On the other hand, we might take 
Amery at face value, and read his words as genuine admiration of how Coudenhove-Kalergi 
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negotiated a perilous three-way balancing act between self, narrative and context. The subtext here is 
one of heightened stakes: to risk political defeat is an occupational hazard, but to stake one’s life’s 
purpose is an altogether more dizzying gamble. 
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II. A New Europe 
 
 
Introduction 
In May 1948, Winston Churchill was at the apogee of his career as a European unifier, as ‘the 
intellectual prophet of the European idea’.237 His famous 19 September 1946 speech at Zurich 
University in which he had positioned himself at the head of those calling for a United States of 
Europe (and paid tribute to the work of Coudenhove-Kalergi and the PEU)238 had won widespread 
acclaim, and his 14 May 1947 speech at the Albert Hall in London had seen the formal inauguration 
of the new United Europe Movement that Churchill set up with Duncan Sandys to pursue this goal.239 
It was as both figurehead and leader that Churchill was to give the opening speech at (and preside 
over) the 7-10 May 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague, which attracted high-profile political 
figures from across the continent; Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi sailed back from New York to 
attend.240 The primary objective at The Hague was to bring together of all the various groups 
petitioning to unite Europe, including Churchill and Sandys’s United Europe movement and 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s European Parliamentary Union, in order to agree upon the institutional form 
that this unity ought to take.241 (The agreement ultimately reached was for the creation of the Council 
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of Europe, which was indeed founded the following year.) Keenly aware of the disagreements and 
rivalries that had to be overcome first, in his opening speech Churchill sought to dampen dispute over 
the ownership of the idea of European unity, saying: 
‘We need not waste our time in disputes about who originated this idea of United Europe. 
There are many valid modern patents. There are many famous names associated with the 
revival and presentation of this idea, but we may all, I think, yield our pretensions to Henry 
of Navarre, King of France, [and] his great Minister Sully’242 
Churchill proceeded to briefly elaborate Henry and Sully’s 17th century ‘Grand Design’ for a united 
Europe, concluding that ‘After this long passage of time we are the servants of the Grand Design’. 243 
 After Churchill’s speech, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi took to the podium, and in his own 
(shorter) speech took the opposite tack, attempting to reassert the primacy of his own organisation 
over and above the new post-war groups campaigning for European unity. He did so by 
contextualising the Congress in a very different historical frame: 
‘Our Congress, my friends, marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Pan-European 
movement. Twenty-five years of struggle for Europe, its peace and its liberty is little in the 
course of history but it is much in a human generation.’244 
However, a month or so after the Congress had concluded he changed tack once more, writing to 
Churchill on 24 June to directly take issue with Churchill’s allusion to Henry IV of France, and to 
extend the historical framing for the idea of European political unity: 
‘In this speech you gave the credit for having first proposed the organisation of a united 
Europe to Henry of Navarra. But most modern historians who have studied this question, 
including Edouard Herriot, have come to the conclusion that Henry of Navarra had nothing to 
do with the Grand Design. They believe that it was exclusively Sully’s brainchild … 
 But even if the Grand Design should have originated in confidential conversations 
between Henry and Sully, it can by no means be considered the first blueprint for a united 
Europe.’245 
Coudenhove-Kalergi proceeded to lecture Churchill on Pierre Dubois’s fourteenth-century and 
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George of Poděbrady’s fifteenth-century schemes for a united Europe. Churchill, wishing to retain 
good relations with Coudenhove-Kalergi, replied by telegram to thank him for his ‘deeply interesting 
letter’.246 
 It is tempting to read this exchange simply as evidence of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s capacity to 
be both prickly and pedantic. While this interpretation has some truth, it misses the deeper point: that 
these historical points were important enough to Coudenhove-Kalergi for him to feel compelled to 
puncture, or at least compromise in some way, what he himself described as Churchill’s ‘personal 
triumph’ at the Hague,247 and furthermore to jeopardise relations with the man who then seemed most 
likely and able to bring about the united Europe that Coudenhove-Kalergi sought. Analysed at this 
deeper level, this exchange illustrates the two crucial aspects of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s concern with 
historicity, which I shall develop over the course of this chapter. 
 First, that history mattered. That is, that Coudenhove-Kalergi believed in the intrinsic value 
of providing (and getting right) historical perspective as part of his political campaign. This may seem 
like an obvious point, but it must be placed in the context of an interwar literature of internationalism 
which was remarkable for its eschewing of the past. Even limiting the scope of enquiry to those works 
promoting some kind of united Europe, it is clear that whether in the fields of politics,248 
economics,249 law250 or philosophy,251 interwar writers preferred to treat their subject in a ‘scientific’ 
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manner that focused on the conditions of the present rather than those of the past. Perhaps most 
emblematic of this trend was the trope of a ‘New Europe’, which was claimed by multiple projects in 
the interwar period:252 by the British historian R.W. Seton-Watson and the Czechoslovak statesman 
T.G. Masaryk (The New Europe was used as the title of both the journal Seton-Watson edited from 
1916-1920, and Masaryk’s book of 1918);253 by the German geopolitically-inclined historian Walther 
Vogel, whose Das neue Europa went through three editions within four years of its publication in 
1921;254 by the Danish physician and political activist C.F. Heerfordt;255 and by the London-based 
New Europe Group founded by the Yugoslav philosopher Dimitrije Mitrinović in 1931.256 
 This orientation towards the present and the new was motivated by two broad factors. First, a 
general sense that time was speeding up; that the past was becoming more and more distant from the 
concerns of the present.257 While this feeling has been analysed with reference to the ‘hostility toward 
the historical consciousness’ exhibited in early twentieth-century fiction,258 it is also referred to quite 
directly in the literature of internationalism, most often framed in terms of a time-space compression 
that was rendering modern life simply incommensurable with what had gone before. This was 
complemented by a more specific belief that since the old ways of doing things had led to the horrific 
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catastrophe of the Great War, Europe needed instead to break with the past and try something new. 
That is: it was not just that the lessons from history were irrelevant, but that they had been shown to 
be malign, and if scholars were at all interested in a peaceful future, they needed to focus instead on 
present realities. 
 Both of these senses are certainly present in the writings of Coudenhove-Kalergi, and he was 
liable to flashes of the anti-historicism that pervaded this literature. He began Pan-Europe, for 
example, with the assertion that ‘The eyes of Europe are turned backwards instead of forwards’,259 
which was not a compliment but a damning indictment of a failure to move with the times. Yet he 
combined this with an insistence that history did matter, and accordingly set about providing that 
history. As we shall see, in doing so he would play a major role in the curation of a canon of European 
integration, a historiography that is still with us today, largely unchanged. If perhaps Coudenhove-
Kalergi picked the wrong target in scolding Churchill for his apparent ignorance of this history,260 it 
was a battle he was well used to fighting, and a war that by the end of his life he could well claim to 
have won. 
 After examining how Coudenhove-Kalergi conducted this process of curation, I step back to 
ask how he reconciled the apparently paradoxical combination of futurism and historicism. The 
solution, I argue, lay in a second key aspect of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s historicity: that it was not 
merely that he retained an interest in history, but that he retained an interest in a certain shape of 
history. Namely, he retained a clear directionality to his history that paid a clear debt to progressivism. 
Moreover, he did so at a time when progressivism was being dislodged from its previous dominance, 
with contemporaries questioning firstly whether history did indeed lead in a positive direction, and 
                                               
259 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, xii 
260 Churchill had long emphasised its historical pedigree, writing in 1930 that: ‘this idea of European unity so novel to 
untutored ears is no more in fact than a reversion to the old foundation of Europe. Why should it appear startling to 
its inhabitants?’ (Churchill, United States of Europe, CAC, CHAR 8/303, 4-12, 6) Indeed, in a draft of this article, 
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visions of Europe expressed by the Catholic church, the Holy Roman Empire, and Napoleon (Churchill, n.d. [1930], 
“The U.S.E.”, CAC, CHAR 8/279A-B, 5-26, 6-8) 
 
74 
 
secondly whether history had a direction at all. Coudenhove-Kalergi not only retained the 
progressivist notion of an arc of history, but made this notion a central element of his argument. He 
also spatialised it, giving a dynamic reading of political geography in which polities were being 
progressively scaled up, driven by the time-space compression than new communications 
technologies were delivering. The present moment, he argued, was one in which the leap was being 
made from state-scale politics to continental-scale politics, and European politics needed to change 
with the times rather than regressing into a nationalised, balkanised system that would doom Europe 
to failure and decline. 
 In addition to bolstering the weight of the argument that Europe needed to federate in order 
to survive, the line of progress that Coudenhove-Kalergi drew passed very explicitly through the Pan-
European Union. This was to become a crucial point in the post-WWII wrangling amongst those 
calling for European federation, as it formed the grounds upon which Coudenhove-Kalergi could 
assert both his authority over and authorship of the European idea. Regarding the upcoming 1948 
Congress of Europe at the Hague, he wrote to Leo Amery that ‘I could not come to the Hague simply 
as one of the Delegates, … but only if invited to address the Assembly as the founder of the Pan-
European Movement, the root and source of all the post-war organizations sponsoring the Hague 
Congress’.261 
 On this point, Duncan Sandys (who was organising the conference) acquiesced; as we have 
seen, at The Hague Coudenhove-Kalergi was given the prime slot directly after Churchill’s keynote 
address. Indeed, he shared with Churchill a curious dual-role: he thought of himself as an author of 
history, in two senses, both a historical actor and a historian. By considering the ways in which 
Coudenhove-Kalergi both curated history into a canon that gave his arguments historical perspective, 
and sculpted history into a shape that used this perspective to assert teleological force, this chapter 
                                               
261 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to L.S. Amery (25 March 1948), CAC, AMEL, 1/7/40, File 2. To be specific, he would 
have been a delegate of the E.P.U. (European Parliamentary Union), the organisation he had devoted his efforts to 
since the end of WWII. 
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shows how these contrasting versions of authorship (that is, of events and of narrative) became deeply 
entangled in one another. 
 
 
The arcs and gaps of history 
Interwar silences 
Today, the history of the idea of Europe is a well-rehearsed stroll through a series of figures who 
wrote, more or less seriously, more or less idealistically, more or less approvingly, of a political 
arrangement in which Europe would or could be united. We have already mentioned Pierre Dubois, 
George of Poděbrady and the Duc de Sully; it is my purpose neither to provide an exhaustive list nor 
to evaluate these claim, but see Table 1 for an indication of the figures commonly cited as providing 
some form of precedent for the idea of a politically united Europe.262 An indication of the familiarity 
of this list might be given by F.H. Hinsley’s 1963 complaint about the way in which these figures 
were summoned: 
‘People often study history less for what they might learn than for what they want to prove. 
This is one reason why so much is known about internationalist theories since the end of the 
Middle Ages. Vast efforts have been made, innumerable books have flowed, from the wish to 
cite Dubois or Dante, Crucé or Sully, as forerunners of the League of Nations or United Europe 
or the United Nations experiment – and from the even more curious supposition that it was 
necessary to study these early writings for guidance in creating, improving or saving these 
twentieth-century projects.’263 
It was true that since the end of WWII, there had been a rush to uncover the genealogy of the ‘idea of  
  
                                               
262 Many such accounts exist; for a deserved classic, see F.H. Hinsley, Power and the pursuit of peace: theory and 
practice in the history of relations between states (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1963). Modern 
accounts are most remarkable for how little they alter the accepted story; see, for example, R. Johansson, "Ideas on 
Europe – Europe as an Idea. An Intellectual History of European Unity and Cooperation", in Sven Tägil (ed.), 
Europe: The Return of History, trans. Jasmine Aimaq (Lund: Nordic Academic Press; 2001) 43-101; P. Pasture, 
Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015) 
263 Hinsley, Power and the pursuit of peace, 13 
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Table I: Totems of a politically united Europe 
 
Charlemagne (742/747/748-814) 
Pierre Dubois (c.1255-after 1321) 
Dante (1265-1321) 
George of Podebrady (1420-1471) 
Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536) 
Henry IV of Navarre (1553–1610) 
Duc de Sully (1560-1641) 
Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) 
Émeric Crucé (c.1590–1648) 
John Amos Comenius (1592–1670) 
William Penn (1644–1718) 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) 
John Bellers (1654–1725) 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) 
Montesquieu (1689–1755) 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) 
Voltaire (1694–1778) 
 
 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) 
Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821) 
Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) 
Friedrich von Gentz (1764-1832) 
François-René de Chateaubriand (1768–1848) 
Napoleon (1769–1821) 
Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861) 
Novalis (1772–1801) 
Alexander I of Russia (1777–1825) 
Victor Hugo (1802–1885) 
Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) 
Charles Lemonnier (c.1808–1891) 
Johann Kaspar Bluntschli (1808–1881) 
Elihu Burritt (1810–1879) 
Charles Sumner (1811–1874) 
James Lorimer (1818–1890) 
John Robert Seeley (1834-1895) 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) 
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Europe’ among historians across Europe.264 As Hinsley said, these histories were often plainly 
instrumental; indeed, one of the key figures in this new wave, Denis de Rougemont, was quite open 
that to ‘search for Europe is to build Europe! In other words, it is the search that creates her.’265 In 
this field, then, the ‘politics of canonicity’ – that is, the notion that the historiography is not simply 
given, but actively constructed, and that this construction is a political process – has long been 
acknowledged.266 However, beyond this admission, the ‘search’ itself is rarely put in the spotlight, 
and too often today it is assumed that the post-war historians of the idea of Europe (i.e. de Rougemont 
et al) were the first to undertake it. 
 There are good reasons why we might make such an assumption. First and foremost, that in 
the interwar period, those who we might expect to have discussed historical ideas of European 
political unity simply did not do so. As we have seen, much of the political, economic, legal and 
philosophical literature advocating European union eschewed historical perspective in favour of a 
forward-facing stance that was only interested in factors in the present. As might be expected, this 
tendency was severely criticised by the historians of the day, most harshly by those, like Christopher 
                                               
264 See, for example, F. Chabod, "L’Idea di Europa", La Rassegna d’Italia 2.4, 5 (1947) 3-17, 25-37; O. Halecki, The 
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might also mention two lecture series that would prove influential: Lucien Febvre’s 1944-45 lectures at the Collège 
de France on ‘L’Europe. Genèse d’une civilisation’, and Federico Chabod’s lectures of 1943-44 at Università 
statale di Milano on ‘L’idea d’Europa’ (S. Woolf, "Reading Federico Chabod's Storia dell'idea d'Europa half a 
century later", Journal of Modern Italian Studies 7.2 (2002) 269-292, see also Chabod’s later lecture series of 1947-
48 and 1958-59 at Università di Roma) 
265 D.d. Rougemont, The meaning of Europe, trans. Alan Braley (London: Sidgwick and Jackson; 1965), 23; for a later 
though more sustained reflection, see also D. Hay, "Europe revisited: 1979", History of European Ideas 1.1 (1980) 
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266 R.J. Mayhew, "Enlightening choices: a century of Anglophone canons of the geographical tradition", Journal of 
Historical Geography 49 (2015) 9-20, 9 
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Dawson, who shared a Europeanist politics. Internationalists, Dawson wrote in 1932, 
‘with few exceptions are as oblivious of the European tradition as their opponents [i.e. 
nationalists]. They put their faith in an abstract internationalism which has no historic 
foundation, and consequently they provoke a fresh outburst of nationalist sentiment which is 
in some respects more excessive than anything the nineteenth century experienced.’267 
The task of the historian, Dawson argued, was to provide this historical foundation while overcoming 
the methodological nationalism that they saw as having marked the great histories of the nineteenth 
century: 
‘modern history has usually been written from the nationalist point of view. Some of the 
greatest of the nineteenth-century historians were also apostles of the cult of nationalism, and 
their histories are often manuals of nationalist propaganda. … We must rewrite our history 
from the European point of view and take as much trouble to understand the unity of our 
common civilisation as we have given hitherto to the study of our national individuality.’268 
These sentiments were shared by many historians across Europe,269 as was attested by a number of 
significant works aimed at revealing a common European history (and therefore identity). 
What we might not expect is that these very works also largely overlooked the figures that 
would later form the backbone of the canon of European integration. H.A.L. Fisher’s monumental 
1936 tome A History of Europe mentions George of Poděbrady and Giuseppe Mazzini without 
mentioning their contributions to the idea of Europe as a political project, while Benedetto Croce’s 
1932 History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century briefly mentions Mazzini’s campaign for a United 
States of Europe.270 Edward Eyre’s yet more monumental 7-volume edited collection European 
Civilization: Its Origin and Development (1934-1939) made similarly few references to these figures, 
                                               
267 C. Dawson, The Making of Europe: An Introduction to the History of European Unity (London: Sheed & Ward; 
1946 [1932]), xxiv-xxv 
268 Dawson, The Making of Europe, xxiv, xxvi 
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Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore (eds.), Writing National Histories. Western Europe since 1800, 
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though Richard O’Sullivan’s 1937 chapter on “Internationalism” did mention Hugo Grotius’s 
proposal to James I ‘that a conference should be summoned and should be charged with the duty of 
effecting the reunion of Christendom’, and the Duc de Sully’s Grand Design, while other figures were 
acknowledged in a footnote.271 Paul Hazard’s 1935 Crise de la conscience européenne (1680-1715) 
mentions the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and his correspondence with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, though 
Hazard downplayed the Abbé’s significance.272 Neither Henri Pirenne’s 1936 A History of Europe 
nor Christopher Dawson’s 1932 The Making of Europe make any reference to these figures at all. 
 However, their low profile was certainly not due to obscurity. Rather, they were consciously 
sidelined. For instance, Albert Pollard explained in his 1918 The League of Nations: An Historical 
Argument that he decided to omit ‘the schemes fathered on Sully’ on the basis that ‘codes and 
contracts are worthless without the will to maintain them’.273 The feeling was that these dreams of a 
united Europe were just that, utopian curiosities dreamt up by idiosyncratic figures, and were 
undeserving of serious scholarship. Rather than look at schemes for political unity that never 
materialised, interwar historians instead devoted their energies to uncovering the apparently more real 
phenomena of socio-cultural and religious unity, which they tended to find in medieval and early-
modern Europe. It is worth noting that both Dawson and Eyre’s European histories were overtly 
Catholic, seeking to reassert Europe’s shared Christian heritage. On one hand, this was a response to 
decline-of-civilisation narratives that had broken out into the mainstream, about which more later. On 
the other hand, it tapped into an early nineteenth-century literature that purported to rediscover 
mediaeval unity of Europe-as-Christendom, itself a reactionary backlash against late eighteenth-
                                               
271 R. O'Sullivan, "Internationalism", in Edward Eyre (ed.), European Civilization: Its Origin and Development, VII 
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century expressions of revolutionary secularism. Building on Johann Gottfried Herder’s sympathetic 
treatment of the Middle Ages,274 Romanticist works like François-René de Chateaubriand’s Génie du 
christianisme (1802) and Novalis’ Die Christenheit oder Europa (written 1799, but not published 
until 1826) had found in mediaeval Europe the brotherhood and enchantment of life that they felt so 
desperately lacking in the overly mechanistic, governmental modern states.275 However, while the 
Romanticists’ arguments had obvious resonance for interwar thinkers seeking to make similar points, 
they were not themselves cited, as the gaze of analysis continued to be thrown back to the Middle 
Age. Ironically, it would be left to other, less ideologically-aligned histories to raise Chateaubriand 
and Novalis to the pantheon of Europeanists. 
 
 
Mobilising history 
If Coudenhove-Kalergi’s work to establish a new form of historiography was grounded in a belief 
that history mattered, its fusion with the futurism of the day was grounded in a belief that the shape 
of this history mattered. That is, a belief that history had a structure, that certain dynamic narratives 
determined its flow. History was not formless, but proceeded along certain arcs, which one could 
detect through study of the past and which gave an indication of the way things were moving. This 
                                               
274 Herder was arguing against the linear progressivism of the philosophes, which will be dealt with more fully later in 
this chapter. He wrote: 
 ‘All the books of our Voltaires, Humes, Robertsons and [Isaak] Iselins are, to the delight of their contemporaries, 
full of beautiful accounts of how the enlightenment and improvement of the world, philosophy and order, emerged 
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Barnard (ed.), J.G. Herder on social and political culture, trans. F. M. Barnard (Cambridge University Press; 1969), 
191-2) 
275 See A.O. Lovejoy, "The meaning of romanticism for the historian of ideas", Journal of the History of Ideas 2.3 
(June 1941) 257-278 
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was not simple fatalism, since as we shall see, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that was a very real (and 
very grave) danger that Europe would fail to follow the arc of history. Nor was Coudenhove-Kalergi 
particularly concerned with the end-point of this arc, though he did occasionally gesture towards an 
eventual world-state that lay beyond the horizon. Rather, he was concerned with the direction of 
history, a dynamic framing that positioned the study of the past as an important guide to a future that 
was very much in sight. 
 In presenting a history that had such a clear shape and direction to it, Coudenhove-Kalergi 
owed a great intellectual debt to progressivism, that school of thought that held that history was 
marked by a linear pattern of continual change that was both welcome (since it brought improvement) 
and inexorable. This belief had dominated since the Enlightenment, when thinkers like Turgot, Smith 
and Condorcet systematised ideas of amelioration directed by providence into a broadly secular 
theory of stadial progress directed by political and economic factors. Though this progressivism was 
informed by transformation of the geography of the present (the barbaric ‘new world’ was contrasted 
with the civilized ‘old world’) into a historical model, its invocation of a direction of history made it 
inherently future-oriented. It is no coincidence that it was around this time (1770) that Louis-
Sébastien Mercier wrote L’An 2440, the first Utopia to be located not in a remote place, but in (the 
Paris of) the future. Indeed, the idea of progress oriented toward an indefinite future, rather than an 
apocalyptic end-time, had been broached even before the philosophes, with Leibniz writing in his 
1697 work On the Ultimate Origin of Things that ‘progress never comes to an end’.276 This future-
orientation was foregrounded by J.B. Bury in his 1920 study of The Idea of Progress, in which he 
claimed that the establishment of belief in progress was intimately tied to the displacement of ‘the 
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afterlife’ by ‘the future’ as the animating force behind society, the object that mankind believed it 
ought to work towards.277 A progressivist interpretation of the past does not just enable futurism, it 
demands it. 
 However, the context Coudenhove-Kalergi was working in was one in which progressivism 
was beginning to be seriously challenged. A new wave of literature offered a pessimistic view, taking 
up progressivism’s concern with civilisation, but questioning whether things were indeed getting 
better, and downcast about Europe’s future prospects. These doubts themselves had a long history, 
from the rich variety of terms and metaphors for ‘decline’ bequeathed by the pre-Enlightenment 
society for whom ‘change was usually considered to be change for the worse’;278 via significant 
Enlightenment figures whose work was key in the development of a non-providential view of history 
that proceeded along grand arcs, yet who gave accounts of civilizational decline rather than progress 
(Montesquieu, Gibbon, Rousseau); to the late nineteenth-century Decadent movement within art and 
literature that rejected the ‘progress’ of modernity (Baudelaire, Huysmans, Wilde). Max Nordau’s 
1892 bestseller Degeneration [Entartung] had attacked the Decadent movement, but re-cast it in 
civilizational terms as evidence of societal decline.279 The horrors of the First World War gave such 
theses new force, most famously expressed by Oswald Spengler in his 1918-1922 The Decline of the 
West [Der Untergang des Abendlandes],280 but also in a raft of other significant works on the 
decadence of Europe published in the decade following the Great War.281 As Christopher Dawson 
argued in 1932, 
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‘To-day our illusions have disappeared and there is a danger that a pessimistic fatalism will 
take the place of the old optimistic faith in the inevitability of progress.’282 
In short, doubts over progress had always been the flip-side to faith in progress, yet by the early part 
of the twentieth century, the sceptics and pessimists were gaining the upper hand. 
 Alongside this, a more fundamental critique was beginning to emerge that transcended the 
debate over which direction civilization was heading by arguing against the very idea that history had 
a direction at all. J.B. Bury’s The Idea of Progress had in 1920 suggested that rather than being an 
underlying truth of history, progress was itself a historical artefact, which might someday fall out of 
favour. This scepticism was expressed far more strongly by Herbert Butterfield in his 1931 The Whig 
Interpretation of History, in which he attacked what he called ‘whig historians’ for their propensity 
to ‘draw lines through certain events’, since ‘if he [the historian] is not careful he begins to forget that 
this line is merely a mental trick of his; he comes to imagine that it represents something like a line 
of causation’.283 History, Butterfield argued, ‘is a story that cannot be told in dry lines, and its meaning 
cannot be conveyed in a species of geometry’.284 Likewise, it was in the early 1930s that Karl Popper 
was developing his attack on The Poverty of Historicism, whose ‘main outline’ was completed in 
1935 (although it would not be published until 1944-45 in journal form, and 1957 in book form).285 
‘Historicism’, for Popper, was ‘an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical 
prediction is their principal aim and which assumes this aim is attainable by discovering the 
“rhythms” or the “patterns”, the “laws” or the “trends” that underlie the evolution of history’.286 For 
Bury, Butterfield and Popper, the drawing of grand arcs through history was a dangerous fallacy. If 
those interwar advocates of a united Europe who neglected history did so because they believed that 
there was – or ought to be – a caesura between past and present, many of those who were inclined to 
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284 Butterfield, Whig Interpretation of History, 68 
285 K.R. Popper, The poverty of historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; 1957), ix 
286 Popper, The poverty of historicism, 3 
84 
 
pay attention to history either saw it pointing toward decline, or doubted that it could point at all.  
 
 
Curating the canon 
Construction of the canon in the canon 
If in the interwar period more political writers eschewed historical visions of European unity, and 
more historical writers eschewed political visions of European unity, where did the canon of 
‘European peace league’ proposals come from? The first step to answering this is to acknowledge that 
there is a degree to which it was self-selecting, insofar as each new proposal for a politically united 
Europe tended to cite previous proposals in order to make its case. However, the manner in which 
they did so deserves closer scrutiny. 
The Duc de Sully, the man Churchill credited with being the first to speak of uniting Europe, 
prefaced his seventeenth-century plans for a ‘Grand Design’ of a united Europe (which he ascribed 
to his patron, Henry IV of France) with an extended discourse upon the rulers of the Kingdom of 
France, particularly lauding the first four kings of the Capetian dynasty, whose rule stretched from 
987 to 1108.287 Sully argued that their practice of consultative kingship had helped to secure France 
peaceful relations with her neighbours, rather than (as later kings would) pursue either the subjection 
                                               
287 M.d.B. Sully, Duc de, Memoirs of Maximilian de Bethune, Duke of Sully, Prime Minister to Henry the Great. 
Containing The History of the Life and Reign of that Monarch, And his own Administration under Him. Translated 
from the French. To which is added, The Tryal of Ravaillac for the Murder of Henry the Great, III vols., vol. III 
(London: Charlotte Lennox; 1756 [1638/1662]), 321-322. Continuing Sully’s penchant for misdirection, the first 2 
volumes of his Memoirs, labelled as being printed in Amsterdam in 1638, were actually printed in his home, the 
Château de Sully-sur-Loire, from 1639-40, while the 3rd and 4th volumes (in one binding) were published after his 
death, by Jean Le Laboureur in 1662. A significant addition was made by the Abbé Pierre-Mathurin de L’Écluse des 
Loges, who in 1745 published a new edition of Sully’s Memoirs in which all the scattered passages relating to the 
Grand Design were collated together at the end as ‘Book XXX’. This chapter formed the basis for subsequent 
publications of the ‘Grand Design’ and, as Ogg later recognised, ‘elevated [it] to the level of a philosophical 
system’ (D. Ogg, "Introduction", in Maximilien De Béthune Sully, Duc De (ed.), Sully's Grand Design of Henry IV. 
from the Memoirs of Maximilien de Béthune, Duc de Sully (1559-1641) (London: Sweet and Maxwell; 1921) 3-13, 
9,10) 
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of Europe or the ‘too considerably augmenting’ of their territory, which had brought almost perpetual 
war upon the peoples of Europe.288 When it came to describing how his own system would work, 
Sully again invoked history, writing that ‘The model of this general council of Europe had been 
formed on that of the antient Amphyctions of Greece, with such alterations only as rendered it suitable 
to our customs, climate, and policy’.289 Both the style and form of Sully’s suggested mode of 
governance were thus justified by way of historical precedent. 
 Meanwhile, Sully’s near-contemporary Émeric Crucé suffused the argument in his 1623 Le 
Nouveau Cynée with historical examples, including the Greek Amphictyonies (‘never was a council 
so august, nor assembly so honorable’), and also made reference to political theorists like Jean 
Bodin.290 And for the writers that followed, Sully himself (via Henry IV) proved a common 
touchstone. The English Quaker William Penn concluded his 1693 proposal by humbly citing his 
forebears: 
‘For this Great King’s Example [i.e. Henry IV’s] tells us it is fit to be done; and Sr. W. 
[William] Temple’s History shews us, by a Surpassing Instance, that it may be done; and 
Europe, by her incomparable Miseries, makes it necessary to be done’291 
His compatriot John Bellers not only mentioned ‘the Model of Henry the Fourth’ in his 1710 Some 
Reasons for an European State, but included his own ‘Abstract’ of Sully’s plans, while also directing 
the reader to Penn’s proposal.292 Likewise, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre wrote in the Preface to his 
                                               
288 Sully, Memoirs of the Duke of Sully [1756], III, bk. XXX, p.325 
289 Sully, Memoirs of the Duke of Sully [1756], III, bk.XXX, p.343 
290 É. Crucé, Le Nouveau Cynée - The New Cyneas, ed. Thomas Willing Balch, trans. Thomas Willing Balch 
(Philadelphia: Allen, Lane and Scott; 1909), 120, 112 
291 W. Penn, An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe, by the Establishment of an European Dyet, 
Parliament, Or Estates (London; 1693), 67, italics in original 
292 Bellers shows himself ignorant of Crucé, writing that ‘I have seen nothing upon this subject, but what that Author 
[i.e. Hardouin de Péréfixe, whose 1661 Histoire du Roy Henry Le Grand incorporated Sully’s account of Henry’s 
Grand Design] saith; and what hath been Writ by the Eminent and Accomplished Gentleman, William Penn Esq; 
Governour of Pensilvania.’ However, Bellers does allow that precedents and like minds may exist, continuing: ‘But 
if any Gentleman, knows of any other Authors on this subject: A publick Advertisement of them, would tend the 
more to Illustrate this great Design, and stir up many Worthies in the several Kindoms and States, of Europe, that 
would contribute their assistance, towards such a happy Day in Europe.’ (J. Bellers, Some Reasons for an European 
State (London; 1710), 20) 
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influential 1712 Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe: 
‘what greatly persuaded me that this Project was no Chimera, was the Information I received 
from one of my Friends, soon after I had shewn him the first Sketch of this Work: He told me 
that Henry IV. had form’d a Project, which, in the main, was much the same; and so I found 
in the Memoirs of the Duke of Sully, his Prime Minister; and in Monsieur de Perefixe’s History 
of his Reign: Nay more, I found that this Project had been even agreed to by a great many 
Princes, in the Beginning of the last Century: This gave me Occasion from thence to draw 
some Inferences, to prove that the Thing was far from being impracticable’293 
Indeed, when Saint-Pierre’s plans were translated into English, just over a year after their initial 
publication, the full title began A Project For Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe. First Proposed 
by Henry IV. of France, and approved of by Queen Elizabeth, and most of the then Princes of 
Europe… In the text itself, meanwhile, Saint-Pierre discussed both Sully’s Grand Design and the so-
called ‘Germanick Society’ or ‘Germanick Union’ at length,294 and also made reference to the 
‘Assembly of the Amphictyones’.295 References to antiquity and to the plans of Sully/Henry IV 
functioned as evidence both that the plans could be done, and that they were wise. 
 The writings on a united Europe produced during the following century intensified this 
citation of precedent by being framed overtly as being in communication with these plans. This was 
most clear in the example of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who really was in personal communication 
with the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, who had sent Leibniz his 1712 text. Leibniz’s direct thoughts on the 
idea of a united Europe, which took the form of a set of written up Observations sur le projet de 
                                               
293 C.-I.C. Saint-Pierre, abbé de, A Project For Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe. First Proposed by Henry IV. of 
France, and approved of by Queen Elizabeth, and most of the then Princes of Europe, and now discussed at large, 
and made practicable by the Abbot St. Pierre, of the French Academy (London: J.W.; 1714), iv-v, italics in original. 
Original: ‘ce qui m’aida beaucoup à me persuader que ce Projet n’estoit point une chimere: ce fut l’avis que me 
donna bien-tôt après un de mes amis, lorsque je luy montray la premiere ebauche de cet Ouvrage dans ma Province: 
il me dit que Henry IV avoit formé un Projet tout semblable pour le fond, je le trouvay effectivement dans les 
Memoires du Duc de Sully son premier Ministre, & dans l’Histoire de son Regne par Mr de Perefixe: je trouvay 
même que ce Projet avoit déja esté agréé & approuvé par un grand nombre de Souverains au commencement du 
siecle passé: cela me donna occasion d’en tirer quelques consequences pour montrer que la chose n’estoit rien 
moins qu’impraticable’ (C.-I.C. Saint-Pierre, abbé de, Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe, II vols., 
vol. I (1712), 7-8) 
294 As Riley notes, the Abbé was guilty of ‘an utterly erroneous analysis of the nature of the 17th-century German 
Empire as a federal system’ (P. Riley, "The Abbé de St. Pierre and Voltaire on perpetual peace in Europe", World 
Affairs 137.3 (1974) 186-194, 186) 
295 Saint-Pierre, Project For Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe, 23-56, 45 
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l’Abbé de Saint Pierre (1715, published 1720) and letters he wrote concerning the scheme (including 
to Saint-Pierre himself), are thus recorded entirely in relation to the Abbé’s scheme.296 However, more 
than this, they are triangulated through two other schemes. On one hand, Leibniz was sceptical that 
political conditions were as ripe as they had been in the time of Sully, writing in a 1715 letter to the 
Abbé that ‘it would be necessary that another Henry IV, together with some great princes of his time, 
favor your project’.297 On the other hand, his Observations gently redirected the reader to two extant 
schemes: Émeric Crucé’s Nouveau Cynée, and the unpublished writings of Leibniz’s friend Ernst von 
Hesse-Rheinfels.298 In a letter of 1712 to Jean-Léonor Le Gallois de Grimarest, Leibniz had put this 
references in a starker light, writing that ‘I do not know whether M. l’Abbé de St Pierre will have 
[read] a book entitled Nouveau Cynée’ and concluding, in a pointed dig at Saint-Pierre that referred 
doubly to both these earlier schemes and the days of the papal respublica Christiana, ‘since it is 
permitted to write romances, why should we find bad the fiction which would recall the age of gold 
to us?’299 
 Though of a different generation, Jean-Jacques Rousseau also expressed his thoughts on such 
a scheme through the lens of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, whom he had met at the salon of Mme Dupin 
when Saint-Pierre was at the end of his life, and Rousseau was still an unknown.300 Like Leibniz, 
                                               
296 For accounts of Leibniz’s thoughts on European unity that bring in consideration of his other political writings, see 
L.K. Sosoe, "Leibniz and European cosmopolitanism", Re-Thinking Europe 2 (2015) 4-22; S. Elden, The Birth of 
Territory (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press; 2013), 315 - 321  
297 G.W. Leibniz, "On the works of the Abbé de St Pierre", in Patrick Riley (ed.), The Political Writings of Leibniz, 
trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1972) 176-184, 177. Original: ‘il faudroit qu’un autre 
Henri IV, avec quelques grands Princes de son tems, goutât votre Projet.’ (G.W. Leibniz, "Lettre de M. Leibniz a M. 
l'Abbe de S. Pierre", in Louis Dutens (ed.), Opera omnia, nunc primum collecta, in classes distributa, 
præfationibus &amp; indicibus exornata, studio Ludovici Dutens., 6 vols., vol. 5, Dutens edn. (Geneva: Fratres de 
Tournes; 1768 [1715]) 61-62, 61) 
298 G.W. Leibniz, "Observations sur le projet d'une paix perpétuelle de M. l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre [1715]", in Pierre Des 
Maizeaux (ed.), Recueil de diverses pièces sur la philosophie, la religion naturelle, l'histoire, les mathématiques, 
&c, II vols., vol. II (Amsterdam: Duvillard et Changuion; 1720) 173-184 For English translation, see Leibniz, "On 
the works of the Abbé de St Pierre" 
299 Leibniz, "On the works of the Abbé de St Pierre", 184 
300 G.R. Havens, "Voltaire’s Comments on Rousseau’s Extrait du Projet de Paix perpétuelle de M. l’Abbé de Saint-
Pierre", Voltaire’s Marginalia on the Pages of Rousseau: A Comparative Study of Ideas (New York: Haskell House; 
1966) 29-38, 29 
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Rousseau’s direct verdict on the Abbé’s plans (the Jugement sur la paix perpétuelle, written in 1756) 
was posthumously published (in 1782, as part of his collected works).301 In it, the example of 
Sully/Henry IV served not as a reminder of the changed political context, but rather as evidence that, 
despite the Abbé’s rather naïve reasoning, his plans were indeed plausible: 
‘To prove that the project of the Christian Commonwealth is not utopian, I need do no more 
than name its original author. For no one will say that Henry IV was a madman, or Sully a 
dreamer. The Abbé de Saint Pierre took refuge behind these great names, to revive their 
policy.’302 
The collapsing of past precedent into Rousseau’s own thought was even more pronounced in another 
text: Rousseau’s rather free reworking and condensation of the Abbé’s plans, like the Jugement 
written in 1756 but published in 1761 as his Abstract of Monsieur the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s Plan 
for Perpetual Peace.303 Just as Sully had presented his own plans through the lens of the dynastic 
ambitions and geopolitical negotiations of Henry IV, so Rousseau expressed his vision through the 
lens of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s scheme.304 One part of the Abstract which was entirely Rousseau’s 
own hand was a section dedicated to the historical and geographical contexts for the political unity 
                                               
301 J.-J. Rousseau, Collection complète des œuvres, vol. XII (Geneva; 1782) 
302 J.-J. Rousseau, A Lasting Peace Through The Federation Of Europe and The State Of War, trans. C.E. Vaughan 
(London: Constable and Company; 1917), 102 
303 J.-J. Rousseau, Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l'abbé de Saint-Pierre ([Paris]; 1761) 
304 As Rousseau later recalled, ‘not being confined to the functions of a translator, I was at liberty sometimes to think 
for myself; and I had it in my power to give such a form to my work, that many important truths would pass in it 
under the name of the Abbé de Saint Pierre, much more safely than under mine’ (J.-J. Rousseau, The Confessions of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, IV vols., vol. III (London: Gibbings & Company; 1901), bk.IX, p.97). Original: ‘en ne me 
bornant pas à la fonction de traducteur, il ne m’étoit pas défendu de penser quelquefois par moi-même, & je 
pouvois donner telle forme à mon ouvrage, que bien d’importantes vérités y passeroient sous le manteau de l’abbé 
de St. Pierre, encore plus heureusement que sous le mien.’ (J.-J. Rousseau, Seconde Partie des Confessions de J.J. 
Rousseau, Citoyen de Geneve. Édition enrichie d'un nouveau recueil de ses Lettres, IV vols., vol. III (Neuchatel: L. 
Fauche-Borel; 1790 [1789]), bk.IX, p.206). Though Rousseau went on to claim to have separated his own views (in 
the Jugement) from those of Saint-Pierre (in the Extrait) (Rousseau, Confessions, III, bk.IX, pp.338-342; Rousseau, 
The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, III, bk.IX, pp.120-123), the content of the Extrait shows this to be an 
oversimplification. 
 
89 
 
of Europe,305 which expanded greatly upon Saint-Pierre’s brief mention of antiquity:306  
‘Such a form of Government [i.e. federation] is to some extent a novelty, and its principles 
have been fully understood only by the moderns. But it was not unknown among the ancients. 
The Greeks had their Amphictyons and the Etruscans their Lucumonies; the Latins had their 
feriæ and the Gauls their city-leagues; the Achaean League gave lustre to the death-struggles 
of Greece.’307 
In highlighting Rousseau’s ‘improvements’, we can see the concerns he had with Saint-Pierre’s text: 
namely, that in order to dodge the charge of utopianism, it needed to be moored to a better and more 
complete invocation of historical precedent. Moreover, the very fact that he was choosing to speak 
through the Abbé de Saint-Pierre invoked a chain of intellectual precedent, a chain recognised (albeit 
mockingly) by Voltaire in his immediate response to Rousseau’s Abstract, in which Voltaire adopted 
the persona of the Chinese emperor: 
‘We have attentively read the pamphlet of our beloved Jean-Jacques, citizen of Geneva, in 
which Jean-Jacques has written the abstract of a Plan of Perpetual Peace by the bonze Saint-
Pierre, which bonze Saint-Pierre had abstracted from a clerk of the mandarin Marquis De 
Rosny, Duc de Sully, an excellent economist, who had abstracted it from the depth of his 
brain.’308 
                                               
305 Rousseau, Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, pp.21-56; J.-J. Rousseau, "Statement 
of St. Pierre's Project", A Lasting Peace Through The Federation Of Europe and The State Of War, trans. C.E. 
Vaughan (London: Constable and Company; 1917) 36-91, pp.39-59; J.-J. Rousseau, "Abstract of Monsieur the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre's Plan for Perpetual Peace", in Christopher Kelly (ed.), The Plan for Perpetual Peace, On the 
Government of Poland, and Other Writings on History and Politics, trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith Bush 
(Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College Press; 2005) 38-56, pp.40-46 
306 All too brief for Rousseau, one of whose complaints of the Abbé was his overly high opinion of the Moderns vis-à-
vis the Ancients: ‘The high opinion he [the Abbé de Saint-Pierre] had of the knowledge of the moderns had made 
him adopt this false principle of perfected reason, the basis of all the institutions he proposed, and the source of his 
political sophisms’ (Rousseau, The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, III, bk.IX, p.120-121) 
307 Original: ‘Quoique cette forme paroisse nouvelle à certains égards, & qu’elle n’ait en effet été bien entendue que 
par les Modernes, les Anciens ne l’ont pas ignorée. Les Grecs eurent leurs Amphictions, les Etrusques leurs 
Lucumonies, les Latins leurs Fériés, les Gaules leurs Cités, & les derniers soupirs de la Grece devinrent encore 
illustres dans la Ligue Achéenne.’ (Rousseau, Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, 21) 
308 Translation adapted from that in Voltaire, "Rescript of the Emperor of China on the Occasion of the Plan for 
Perpetual Peace [1761]", in Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Christopher Kelly (eds.), The Plan for Perpetual Peace, On 
the Government of Poland, and Other Writings on History and Politics, trans. Christopher Kelly and Judith Bush 
(Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College Press; 2005) 57-58, 57. Original: ‘Nous avons lu attentivement la 
brochure de notre amé Jean-Jacques, citoyen de Genève, lequel Jean-Jacques a extrait un Projet de paix perpétuelle 
du bonze Saint-Pierre, lequel bonze Saint-Pierre l’avait extrait d’un clerc du mandarin mar-quis de Rosni, duc de 
Sulli, excellent économe, lequel l’avait extrait du creux de son cerveau.’ (Voltaire, "Rescrit de l'empereur de la 
Chine, à l'occasion du Projet de paix perpétuelle", in Adrien-Jean-Quentin Beuchot (ed.), Œuvres de Voltaire, 
LXXII vols., vol. XL (Paris: Firmin Didot frères & Werdet et Lequien fils; 1830 [1761]) 307-311, 307-308) 
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Voltaire’s cynical (and entirely correct) suggestion that Henry IV’s Grand Design was a figment of 
Sully’s imagination309 both cemented its status as utopia divorced from historical reality, and 
ironically bolstered the idea that suggestions for a Plan of Perpetual Peace among the states of Europe 
constituted not idiosyncratic musings, but a literature unto itself.310 
 It was not until Immanuel Kant’s 1795 Zum ewigen Frieden (‘Towards Perpetual Peace’) that 
a coyness around citing historical precedent emerges, a symptom partly of the scorn that these figures 
had accrued, and partly of a tension beginning to be felt between historicity and futurism. Far from 
being couched in the terms of others, Kant did not make any explicit reference in this text to previous 
schemes to secure perpetual peace. Nevertheless, it is clear that he is familiar with them, not least 
because he referred to them in other works. In his 1784 Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose, Kant accompanied mention of a ‘great federation’ [‘großen Völkerbund’] 
with the hybrid Latin-Greek term ‘Fœdus Amphictyonum’ [Amphictyonic League] in parentheses, 
and wrote that ‘However wild and fanciful this idea may appear – and it has been ridiculed as such 
when put forward by the Abbé St Pierre and Rousseau… – it is nonetheless the inevitable outcome of 
the distress in which men involve one another’.311 And in a 1793 essay, Kant explicitly defended the 
                                               
309 A suggestion that would not be accepted, or even countenanced, until the nineteenth century. Two exceptions shared 
Voltaire’s scepticism: Vittorio Siri, who called Sully’s Memoirs ‘sparse di chimere, e inverisimili [sic]’ (‘strewn 
with chimeras, and improbable’), and Saint-Simon (V. Siri, Memorie Recondite, Dall' Anno 1601 sino al 1640, VIII 
vols., vol. I (Ronco; 1677), 29, printed marginalia; C.H.d.R. Saint-Simon, comte de, Écrits inédits de Saint-Simon, 
publiés sur les manuscrits conservés au dépot des affaires étrangères, ed. Prosper Faugère, VIII vols., vol. I: 
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noting that earlier in his career, Voltaire had edited Sully out of the picture: in his 1723 epic poem La Ligue ou 
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confidante; when the poem was republished as La Henriade in 1728, Sully had been replaced in the role by Du-
Plessis Mornay (Voltaire, The Henriade, An Epic Poem, in Ten Cantos (London: Burton and Co.; 1797), 23-24n15; 
see also O.R. Taylor, "Voltaire’s apprenticeship as a historian: La Henriade", in W.H. Barber et al. (eds.), The Age 
of the Enlightenment: Studies presented to Theodore Besterman (Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd; 1967) 1-
14). 
310 To which Voltaire added his own De la paix perpétuelle in 1769, albeit under the satirical pseudonym ‘Docteur 
Goodheart’ (Voltaire, De la paix perpétuelle, par le Docteur Goodheart ([Amsterdam]: [M.-M. Rey.]; 1769); 
reprinted in D. Adams et al. (eds.), Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, ed. Nicholas Cronk, vol. 70B: Writings of 1769 
(IIB) (2016) 
311 I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", in H.S. Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings, 
trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1970), 47-48 
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Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau, arguing that contrary to the cliché that utopias were good in 
theory but not in practice, in fact ‘whatever reason shows to be valid in theory, is also valid in 
practice’.312 Finally, the opening lines (and very title) of Zum ewigen Frieden contained a veiled 
reference. In these lines, Kant wrote of the slogan Zum ewigen Frieden appearing on ‘a Dutch 
innkeeper’s signboard above the picture of a churchyard’.313 This story is simply lifted from one 
Leibniz had told in the opening lines of his 1693 Codex Iuris Gentium: 
‘a fashionable joker in Holland, after he had attached to the façade of his house, according to 
the local custom, a sign which read ‘perpetual peace’, had placed under this fine slogan a 
picture of a cemetery – since there death does bring about peace.’314 
Moreover, the context Kant used this visual joke in was to hint that it gently satirised ‘the philosophers 
who cherish the sweet dream of perpetual peace’.315 Leibniz too had made this allusion, referring to 
one such philosopher in particular: 
‘I have seen something of M. de St. Pierre’s plan for maintaining perpetual peace in Europe. 
It reminds me of an inscription outside of a churchyard, which ran Pax Perpetua. For the dead, 
it is true, fight no more. But the living are of another mind, and the mightiest among them 
have little respect for tribunals.’316 
The key difference between the two philosophers was that whereas Leibniz embraced precedents in 
order to accrue intellectual cachet and to be able to express himself more freely, for Kant they were a 
burden, albeit one he used creatively to argue in favour of utopian thinking. 
 Kant’s contemporaries shared this sense of tension between on one hand the desire to wake 
Europe, by emphasising the historical depth of the unity of Europe, and on the other hand the desire 
to make Europe, by finding a modern, enlightened, progressivist solution to the perpetual violence 
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that had besmirched her history thus far, and highlighting how the present cosmopolitanism was 
bringing a new unity. This was the context in which Chateaubriand and Novalis were to call for a 
‘return’ to an idealised version of medieval unity,317 arguing for ‘a new stirring of Europe that had 
hitherto been asleep’.318 However, the most influential voice to argue along these lines was Henri de 
Saint-Simon, who coloured in their sketch of a Europe united in respublica Christiana in his 1814 
On the Reorganisation of European Society.319 However, Saint-Simon tempered this nostalgia by also 
appealing to the revolutionary spirit and Enlightenment values of the present age: 
‘Of course, I do not suggest that that old organization, which still encumbers Europe with its 
useless ruins, should be raised from the dust: the nineteenth century is too far removed from 
the thirteenth. A constitution, strong in itself, grounded in natural principles and free from 
ephemeral beliefs and opinions is what Europe needs and this is what I am now proposing.  
 When the revolutions in empires are caused by the advance of enlightenment, they 
will always lead to a better state of affairs; in the same way the political crisis which has 
broken up the great European body is paving the way for a more perfect organization for 
Europe.’320 
Unlike Chateaubriand and Novalis, Saint-Simon did engage with the literature on European peace 
leagues, devoting a chapter to such schemes in a “Review of Perpetual Peace”.321 This focused on 
two figures: 
‘Two men alone saw evil and approached the remedy, Henry IV and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre; 
but one died before he had achieved his design, which was forgotten after him; the other was 
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treated as a dreamer for having promised more than he could give.’322 
Saint-Simon found the Abbé’s scheme ridiculous, but nevertheless praised its intentions, writing that 
‘The Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s book has hardly been read, and little is known of it but the title, and the 
dream of a good man, who named it thus’.323 For Saint-Simon, the familiar European peace league 
totems were not figures of embarrassment, but of regret: they neither proved the viability (by their 
precedent) nor the impracticability (by their failure) of such a league; indeed, the example of the 
respublica Christiana was for Saint-Simon proof enough of the merits of European unity.324 The 
problem, according to Saint-Simon, was one of visibility: due to various circumstances, these figures 
had been ‘forgotten’ (Henry IV/Sully) or ‘hardly read’ (Saint-Pierre), and thus Saint-Simon’s 
objective was to reach a new audience, specifically the princes then gathered at the Congress of 
Vienna.325 
Meanwhile, the man whose actions were both the cause and subject of the Congress, Napoleon 
Bonaparte, was about to invoke the same literature in quite different circumstances. Namely, while 
detained on St Helena, Napoleon attempted to negotiate his place in history by reinterpreting his 
imperialist conquering (in conversation with his biographers) as efforts made towards securing 
European unity. To this end, Las Cases’s version of Napoleon’s story recalled both the Greek 
Amphictyonies and the United States of America,326 while Montholon’s telling recalled the Abbé de 
                                               
322 Saint-Simon and Thierry, De la réorganisation de la société européenne, 25-26. Original: ‘Deux hommes seuls ont 
vu le mal et ont approché du remède, ce furent Henri IV et l’abbé de Saint-Pierre; mais l’un mourut avant d’avoir 
achevé son dessein qui fut oublié après lui; l’autre, pour avoir promis plus qu’il ne pouvait donner, fut traité de 
visionnaire.’  
323 Saint-Simon and Thierry, De la réorganisation de la société européenne, 26. Original: ‘Le livre de l’abbé de Saint-
Pierre a été peu lu, on n’en connaît guère que le titre, et le nom de rêve d’un homme de bien, par lequel on le 
désigne.’ 
324 ‘The idea to link all the European peoples in one political institution is certainly not a dream, since for six centuries 
such an order of things existed, and during those six centuries wars were more rare and less terrible’ (Saint-Simon 
and Thierry, De la réorganisation de la société européenne, 26). Original: ‘Certes, ce n’est pas une vision que l’idée 
de lier tous les peuples européens par une institution politique, puisque pendant six siècles un pareil ordre de choses 
a existé, et que pendant six siécles les guerres furent plus rares et moins terribles.’  
325 F.E. Manuel, The new world of Henri Saint-Simon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1956), 172. Manuel 
points out that Saint-Simon & Thierry were far from alone in producing unsolicited counsel in this direction. 
326 ‘One of my great plans was the re-uniting, the concentration, of those same geographical nations which have been 
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Saint-Pierre.327 In Napoleon just as in Saint-Simon there was a tension between Enlightenment and 
Romantic visions of European unity, between nostalgia and progressivism. This tension spoke to an 
essential and pervasive ambivalence as to whether a united Europe was revolutionary or counter-
revolutionary; whether it was a new innovation, or soaked in history, or both. 
Three points stand out from this potted history of the developing historiography within the 
European peace league literature from Sully to Saint-Simon. Firstly, that the idea that a politically 
united Europe was necessarily new and future-oriented a) took a long time to emerge, b) was the 
product of a specific set of circumstances (Enlightenment, progressivism, secularism and revolution), 
c) even when it did emerge, it was itself contested and contradictory, and d) it inspired – indeed, it 
was mutually constituted by – its inverse (i.e. the idea that European unity was necessarily backward 
looking, for better or worse). Of course, it would be wrong to kick too far against this proposition: I 
do not mean to suggest that these utopian visions were entirely nostalgic, but merely that they had 
some form of historicity, and it was through this historicity and citational practices that the outlines 
of a canon began to emerge. 
The second point to make is that these citational practices were often incredibly complex, with 
authors not just citing texts (both openly and tacitly), but speaking to texts and speaking through texts 
in ways that blur the lines of authorship, let alone citation. This is further complicated by the 
publication histories and geographies of the texts themselves, which tend to get misleadingly flattened 
into a single data point (plotting the date of original publication). Texts were not simply published 
                                               
separated and parcelled out by revolution and policy. … it was my intention to incorporate these people each into 
one nation. … Then, perhaps, by the help of the universal diffusion of knowledge, one might have thought of 
attempting, in the great European family, the application of the American Congress, or the Amphictyons of Greece; 
and then what a perspective of power, greatness, happiness, and prosperity! What a grand, what a magnificent, 
spectacle!’ (E.-A.-D.-J. Las Cases, comte de, Memoirs of the life, exile and conversations, of the Emperor 
Napoleon, IV vols., vol. IV (London: Henry Colburn; 1836), 104) 
327 ‘It would be a magnificent field for speculation, to estimate what would have been the destinies of France and of 
Europe, had England satisfied herself with denouncing the murder of Louis XVI., … kings would not have shaken 
on their thrones, but their states would have all, more or less, passed through a revolutionary process, and the whole 
of Europe, without a convulsion, would have become constitutional and free, without jealousy and without 
ambition. The fancy of the Abbé de St. Pierre would have been realized.’ (C.T. Montholon, marquis de, History of 
the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena, II vols., vol. II (London: Henry Colburn; 1846), 13) 
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once and for all, but were republished at certain times, in certain places, translated into certain 
languages, to serve certain needs. At each stage they could be revised, abridged, re-ordered, 
republished in juxtaposition with other texts or wrenched from their context and published alone, with 
each of these decisions tending to involve more actors than just the author. And the circulation of 
texts often bypassed the publishing industry altogether, circulating instead as private correspondence, 
papers, and archives. 
The third and final point is that the historiography within the European peace league literature 
itself has a dynamic historical geography. At the risk of wildly overgeneralising, there is a broad 
pendulum swing from the tendency to cite notional examples of unions, whether Greek, Roman or 
Germanic, to an eighteenth-century tendency to cite authors who have advocated for such schemes, 
and back to an early nineteenth-century re-evaluation of the respublica Christiana as the prime 
example of a politically united Europe. Likewise, we can track the changes in how this historical 
perspective is seen, which broadly move from unproblematically positive political capital, to positive 
intellectual capital, to a gradually growing sense of scepticism and even ridicule, to the early 
nineteenth-century position in which this history is neither clearly positive nor negative, but highly 
dependent upon the context in which it is called forth. 
 
 
A literature of pacifism 
While each new iteration may have been to some extent historicised, and connected into these 
complex citational networks, by the nineteenth century there was still no systematic attempt to group 
together or survey these schemes; in short, there was no sense in which the various schemes for a 
European peace league constituted a literature. This would begin to change throughout the nineteenth 
century, as new proposals for European unity became more rigorous and systematic in their discussion 
of precedent. However, these expression of a new, shared canon were most fully developed among 
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those for whom European union was not an end but a means. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, two such schools of thought inducted the historic 
promoters of political European union into new literatures devoted to their own cause. The first such 
cause was that of pacifism, particularly as institutionalised in Quaker peace societies, notably the 
British-based ‘Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace’ (commonly known as 
simply the ‘Peace Society’) founded in 1816, and the ‘American Peace Society’ formed from the 
amalgamation of state and local peace societies in 1828. William Ladd, the first president of the 
American Peace Society, wrote two pieces in relation to a competition the Society ran to attract essays 
the subject of a ‘Congress of Nations’: the first an entry under the pseudonym ‘Philanthropos’,328 and 
the second a purported survey comprising material from the papers rejected from the final shortlist of 
five.329 In each, Ladd undertook a historical survey both of instances of real-world precedent for a 
Congress of Nations, from the Greek Amphictyons via the Hanseatic League and Swiss Confederacy 
to the 1826 Congress of Panama, and of schemes that remained as mere proposals, comprising Sully, 
William Penn, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Rousseau, as well as the petitions of the British and 
American peace societies. Though not particularly complimentary about these works and ignorant of 
any other schemes,330 Ladd’s essays, widely circulated among the Society’s members, thus subtly 
instigated the interpretation of European peace league in an internationalist vein,331 playing down 
their civilisational ties to ‘Europe’, and instead focusing on their pacifist aims. 
                                               
328 Philanthropos [William Ladd], A Dissertation on a Congress of Nations (James Loring; 1832) 
329 W. Ladd, "Essay on a Congress of Nations for the adjustment of international disputes, and for the promotion of 
universal peace, without resort to arms", in William Ladd and Geo. C. Beckwith (eds.), Prize Essays on a Congress 
of Nations for the adjustment of international disputes, and for the promotion of universal peace without resort to 
arms. Together with a sixth essay, comprising the substance of the rejected essays (Boston: Whipple & Damrell; 
1840) 509-638 
330 Ladd wrote: ‘When the American Peace Society first entered on this work, there were only two Essays in the whole 
world on the subject, viz., Penn’s and St. Pierre’s, both very meagre, crude and undigested. Beside these, we had 
only what could be gathered from Sully’s account of the Great Scheme of Henry IV.’ (Ladd, "Essay on a Congress 
of Nations", 637) 
331 That is, in the universalist sense of internationalism derived from Bentham, a significant influence upon Ladd and 
the peace societies (see Hinsley, Power and the pursuit of peace, 92-100) 
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The pacifist campaign for a congress of nations recovered its explicit connection to Europe 
with the invention of the idea of a ‘United States of Europe’ in the middle of the century, variously 
promoted between 1848 and 1851 by the Scottish poet Charles Mackay,332 the American editor and 
publisher Eliakim Littell,333 the Italian philosopher and writer Carlo Cattaneo,334 his friend, the Italian 
pro-unification political activist Giuseppe Mazzini,335 and most famously of all, the French poet and 
novelist Victor Hugo in his presidential address at the 1849 Paris Peace Congress.336 However, these 
calls were all made in a revolutionary spirit that invoked the past only in order to call forth a 
progressivist teleology. It was only in a second wave of calls for a United States of Europe, instigated 
by the 1867 inaugural congress of the Ligue internationale de la paix et de la liberté (‘International 
League of Peace and Freedom’) in Geneva, that a literature of pacifist-federalist thought began to be 
invoked. At the congress itself, the charismatic Russian activist and future anarchist Mikhail Bakunin 
delivered a speech in which he described a genealogy of European federation that was built upon the 
proto-socialism of the French political philosophers François-Noël Babeuf, Henri de Saint-Simon, 
Charles Fourier and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.337 Though accepted by the Central Committee, 
                                               
332 C. Mackay, "The United States of Europe", The Manchester Examiner, Saturday 8 April 1848, sec. Supplement to 
the Manchester Examiner, p. 2; Mackay, "The United States of Europe" 
333 Littell, in "The London Times Praising America", Littell's Living Age 17.209 (13 May 1848 1848) 322-324, 324 
334 Writing in French, he wrote: ‘We will have peace, and we can enjoy peace, when we have the United States of 
Europe [les Etats-Unis d’Europe]’ (C. Cattaneo, "L’insurrection de Milan en 1848 [1848]", in Luigi Ambrosoli 
(ed.), Tutte le opere, V vols., vol. IV: Scritti dal 1848 (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori; 1967), 316 cf. 451). The phrase 
was no accident: in the subsequent Italian edition it also appears: ‘We will have peace only when we have the 
United States of Europe [Stati Uniti d’Europa]’ (Cattaneo, "Dell’ insurrezione di Milano nel 1848 e della successiva 
guerra [1849]", 715). Both are quoted, in original language, in L. Bruyning, "The United States of Europe: An 
Italian Invention?", Yearbook of European studies = Annuaire d'études européenes 3: Italy-Europe (1990) 55-66, 62 
335 Mazzini wrote: ‘We do not simply strive to create Europe; our goal is to create the United States of Europe.’ (G. 
Mazzini, "From a Revolutionary Alliance to the United States of Europe (1850)", in Stefano Recchia and Nadia 
Urbinati (eds.), A cosmopolitanism of nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's writings on democracy, nation building, and 
international relations, trans. Stefano Recchia (Princeton University Press; 2009) 132-135, 135) 
336 V. Hugo, The United States of Europe. Presidential address at the International Peace Congress, Paris, August 22, 
1849, 1913-1914 World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series (Boston: World Peace Foundation; 1914) 
337 Bakunin’s address does not survive, though he attempted to reproduce it in Ligue internationale de la paix et de la 
liberté (ed.), Annales du Congrès de Genève (9-12 Septembre 1867). Préliminaries - Les quatre Séances - 
Appendice (Geneva: Vérésoff & Garrigues; 1868), 186-191. For the longer thesis that he submitted to the Central 
Committee, later given the subtitle ‘Reasoned Proposal to the Central Committee of the League for Peace and 
Freedom’, see M. Bakunin, "Federalism, Socialism, Anti-Theologism", in Sam Dolgoff (ed.), Bakunin on Anarchy, 
trans. Sam Dolgoff (New York: Vintage Books; 1971) 102-147 
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Bakunin’s suggestions ultimately proved too radical for the congress, and he resigned the following 
year.338 Instead, the League chose as their leader the French philosopher and barrister Charles 
Lemonnier, a fellow admirer of Saint-Simon but for whom the social question was secondary to the 
pacifist-federalist cause. Lemonnier both co-edited the League’s bilingual monthly journal, les États-
Unis d’Europe — Die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa,339 and in 1872 published a book of the same 
name, in which he celebrated as pioneers of European federation the duc de Sully, the Abbé de Saint-
Pierre, Kant, Saint-Simon, and Mazzini and Hugo.340 Indeed, Lemonnier retrospectively placed 
Hugo’s revolutionary rhetoric within this historical frame, crediting him with the invention of the 
term ‘United States of Europe’, proclaiming that ‘In three words Victor Hugo had summarized 
Kant!’341 
Lemonnier’s historical perspective on a United States of Europe was mirrored by two other 
contemporary figures. In England, the newly appointed Regius Professor of Modern History at 
Cambridge, John Robert Seeley, gave a lecture in 1871 before the Peace Society with the title ‘The 
United States of Europe’, in which he embraced political union as the best means of abolishing war.342 
As a professional historian, Seeley concerned himself only with those precedents of federalism that 
had been tested; of these, he argued that the Amphictyonic league of ancient Greece, the Holy Roman 
Empire, the German Confederation and the pre-1789 American Confederation were all unsuccessful, 
and that only the closer post-1789 United States of America offered a successful model for 
federation.343 Across the Atlantic, the American Unitarian minister Edward Everett Hale agreed that 
                                               
338 Along with several of his followers, including Élisée Reclus. See E.H. Carr, Michael Bakunin (London & 
Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press; 1975 [1937]), 327-344 
339 Lemonnier’s co-editor was Amand Goegg, the German democrat and former member of the provisional 
revolutionary government in Baden. See F. Spoltore, "Charles Lemonnier", The Federalist: a political review 45.2 
(2003) 114-126 
340 C. Lemonnier, Les États-Unis d’Europe (Paris: Libraire de la Bibliothèque Démocratique; 1872) 
341 Lemonnier, Les États-Unis d’Europe, 117 
342 J.R. Seeley, "United States of Europe: a lecture delivered before the Peace Society", Macmillan's Magazine 23 
(1871 1871) 436-448 
343 Seeley, "United States of Europe", 442 
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the US was a living proof of the potential hardiness of a federal system, but also emphasised the 
imagined precedents for European union, discussing at length Sully’s ‘Great Design’, and mentioning 
too the contributions of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham, and Joseph 
de Maistre.344 Hale justified the discussion of these totems of peace as a corrective to the warlike bias 
of conventional history, writing that ‘We are constantly misled in this matter, because we go to school, 
and study the histories of mere families, – of Bourbons, of Tudors, of Hapsburgs, – and their wars’.345 
His point was that if peace was to be achieved, history would needed to be rewritten to valorise 
peacekeeping and the wellbeing of citizens rather than victory in war and the expansion of borders. 
Though the pacifist movement grew from strength to strength into the start of the twentieth 
century, the idea of a League for Peace became rather more ambiguous, and oscillated between visions 
of global and European federation. In terms of the literature invoked in support of such a league, two 
developments must be mentioned. First, the historiography grew as new prophets of a peace league 
were unearthed, and as this literature was cross-fertilised with a parallel movement in support of 
international law (about which more below). Thus, Andrew Carnegie’s 1905 rectoral address to the 
students at the University of St Andrews, published under the title A League of Peace, discussed 
Émeric Crucé along with Henry IV, while also mentioning on one hand the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, the 
Due de Lorraine, Penn, Bentham, Kant and J.S. Mill,346 and on the other hand the legal theorists Hugo 
Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, Cornelius van Bynkershoek and Emer de Vattel.347 The vice-
president of the American Peace Society Edwin D. Mead, who was one of those engaged in hunting 
for historical peace leagues – he claimed to have found in a letter of Erasmus reference to a sixteenth-
                                               
344 E.E. Hale, "The United States of Europe", Old and New 3.3 (March 1871) 260-267, 262-265, 260  
345 Hale, "The United States of Europe", 265 
346 A. Carnegie, A Rectorial Address delivered to the Students in the University of St. Andrews 17th October, 1905 
(Boston: Published for The International Union by Ginn & Company; 1906), 20 
347 Carnegie, Rectorial Address, 14-15 
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century ‘Grand Design’ by William of Ciervia, John Sylvagius and Erasmus himself348 – in 1909 
published a pamphlet containing a survey of ‘The Literature of the Peace Movement’.349 In it, Mead 
recalled the lectures he had given on ‘Men who have Worked to Organize the World’, which he had 
organised around the totems of Dante, Henry IV, Grotius, Penn, Kant, Charles Sumner, and the Hague 
Peace Conference,350 while also making mention of more recent American contributions to this 
literature, including William Ladd and Edward Everett Hale.351 
The second development is betrayed by the context in which Mead compiled his ‘Literature 
of the Peace Movement’: as part of an effort to educate the public about this history by physically 
distributing its core texts. Mead’s article was originally published in the Chautauquan, the monthly 
journal of the adult-education Chautauqua Institution, with the following ‘editor’s note’: 
‘All publications, books and pamphlets mentioned in this article may be obtained from The 
Chautauqua Press, Chautauqua, N.Y., to which orders, subscriptions, and requests should be 
sent. … This article was written at our request, not only for its bird’s-eye view of the 
movement, but for the very practical purpose of indicating the most available supplementary 
material for readers, circles, libraries, etc’352 
Meanwhile, Mead himself served as editor of the publisher and philanthropist Edwin Ginn’s 
‘International Library’, whose mission was to publish and re-publish peace literature ‘at a price low 
enough for the general public to afford’.353 Mead’s article made repeated reference to texts printed in 
this series, and the article itself would be reprinted in pamphlet form by Ginn and Mead’s new 
                                               
348 Edwin D. Mead’s “An Early Scheme to organize the World”, published in the Independent (29 August 1907), 
republished as E.D. Mead, "An Early Scheme to Organize the World", The Advocate of Peace 70 (January 1908) 
18-19 and adapted for E.D. Mead, "Introduction", in Maximilien De Béthune Sully and Edward Everett Hale (eds.), 
The great design of Henry IV from the memoirs of the Duke of Sully and The united states of Europe (Boston, 
Massachusetts: Ginn and Company, for the International School of Peace; 1909) vii-xxi 
349 E.D. Mead, "The Literature of the Peace Movement", The Chautauquan 54.3 (May 1909) 337-350 
350 This course of lectures was given to the Boston teachers at the Old South Meetinghouse. See Mead, "The Literature 
of the Peace Movement", 342 
351 Mead, "The Literature of the Peace Movement", 339. In this connection, see also his wife Lucia Ames Mead’s 1905 
A Primer of the Peace Movement, whose brief list of ‘famous workers for peace’ gave equal billing to Henry IV, 
Grotius, Penn, Kant, William Ellery Channing, Sumner, Elihu Burritt and Andrew Carnegie (L. Ames Mead, A 
Primer of the Peace Movement (Boston: American Peace Society; 1905), n.p.) 
352 Mead, "The Literature of the Peace Movement", 337n* 
353 P. Filene, "The World Peace Foundation and Progressivism: 1910-1918", The New England Quarterly 36.4 (1963) 
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venture, the ‘International School of Peace’, soon to become the ‘World Peace Foundation’, which in 
its first full year circulated 300 000 contemporary and historic pacifist texts in pamphlet form.354 
Mead also referred to ‘Old South Leaflets’, another Boston-based publishing venture to distribute 
(abridged) historical texts for a nominal fee, including such pacifist-federalist texts as Dante’s 
Monarchia, Grotius’s Rights of War and Peace, William Perm’s Plan for the Peace of Europe, Elihu 
Burritt’s Address on a Congress of Nations, and The Hague Arbitration Convention of 1899.355 
 The constitution of a pacifist-federalist literature through re-publication (and, where 
necessary, translation) in the early twentieth century extended to full books too, often annotated and 
with substantial introductions added to place the work within the context of a pacifist canon. An 
incomplete overview would include Mary Campbell Smith’s 1903 translation of Kant’s Perpetual 
Peace,356  Thomas Willing Balch’s 1909 translation of Émeric Crucé as Le Nouveau Cynée - The New 
Cyneas (in a bilingual format that also reproduced the original French text),357 C.E. Vaughan’s 1917 
translation and re-edit of Rousseau’s Abstract and Judgement under the new title A Lasting Peace,358 
and Elizabeth York’s 1919 Leagues of Nations which contained extracts of Penn, Saint-Pierre and 
Rousseau.359 William Penn’s The Peace of Europe was republished in 1896 in American Peace 
Society’s Advocate of Peace journal, in 1912 as a standalone pamphlet by the American Peace 
Society, in 1914 by the late pacifist John Bellows’ publishing house in Gloucester, and around the 
same time by the British publisher J.M. Dent’s cheap-print Everyman Library.360 Sully too saw 
                                               
354 E.D. Mead, The Literature of the Peace Movement (Boston: International School of Peace; 1909); E.D. Mead, "The 
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355 Mead, "The Literature of the Peace Movement", 342 
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358 Rousseau, A Lasting Peace Through The Federation Of Europe and The State Of War 
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360 The Advocate of Peace, "William Penn’s Essay towards the Peace of Europe" (58 1896), 245–246; W. Penn, "An 
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multiple editions, first in a joint volume with Hale’s United States of Europe, published in 1909 by 
Ginn’s International School of Peace and introduced by Mead, and second in 1921 by the Grotius 
Society with an introduction by the historian David Ogg.361 The latter was part of a series that also 
included works by Erasmus, Grotius, Saint-Pierre, Bentham and Kant, and a compilation of Quakers 
and Peace. What made this wave of republications remarkable was that many of these texts had 
previously been long out of print, forgotten about, and badly or un-translated. The pacifist movement 
both brought them together into a cohesive ‘literature’, expounding a history in which peace was 
afforded the same weight as war, and made a real commitment to making this literature accessible to 
all. 
 
  
A literature of international law, arbitration and organisation 
While the pacifists placed the stress of the European peace leagues on ‘peace’, a related but distinct 
literature was being assembled that would put the stress on ‘league’. This was the post-Benthamite 
field of international law, which interpreted earlier centuries’ utopian plans for a united Europe as 
precedents for the nineteenth-century idea that arbitration could at least partially replace violence as 
a means of resolving disagreement between states. 
 The American lawyer, jurist and diplomat Henry Wheaton, who had in 1836 published one of 
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the first comprehensive overviews of international law,362 in 1838 expanded his historical introduction 
to that work, reformulating it as a Mémoire in answer to the prize question set by the Academy of 
Moral and Political Sciences at the Institut de France: ‘What progress has been made by the law of 
nations in Europe since the Peace of Westphalia?’363 This Mémoire was published in its original 
French364 and then translated into English and enlarged as the 1845 History of the Law of Nations in 
Europe and America.365 Wheaton gave a detailed and systematic account of ‘international law’ from 
antiquity to the present day, in which he blended statutes and proposals, history and ideas, law and 
theory. Thus political-legal theorists like Grotius, Pufendorf, Leibniz, Cornelius van Bynkershoek 
and Emer de Vattel were placed in the same narrative as historical federations like the Greek 
Amphyctionies and the Swiss Confederation, as well as the federal schemes of the Abbé de Saint-
Pierre, Rousseau, Bentham and Kant.366 Wheaton believed that the improvement of international law 
had ‘sensibly mitigated’ the practice of war between ‘civilized nations’, yet did not go so far as to 
suggest it could prevent war.367 
 Wheaton was not alone in arguing that the Abbé de Saint-Pierre ought to be taken seriously. 
In 1857, the Belgian free-tradist political economist Gustave de Molinari published the 
hagiographical L’Abbé de Saint-Pierre, which sought to reinterpret its subject not as a ‘benevolent 
and sincere dreamer’, but instead as a practical theorist whose ideas anticipated many of those who 
would follow.368 For Molinari, the Abbé was a Bentham who merely lacked a Bowring (Bentham’s 
                                               
362 H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law; with a sketch of the history of the science, 2 vols. (London: B. 
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literary executor) to curate his work.369 Molinari did not limit himself to the Abbé, but instead allowed 
his pen to stray into other peace league writers, who by association ought also to be remembered as 
useful rather than utopian. This scope was made clear by the book’s full title, which continued: ‘…his 
life and works, preceded by an appreciation and a historical summary of the idea of perpetual peace, 
followed by Rousseau’s judgment on the project of perpetual peace and the Polysynody as well as 
the project attributed to Henry IV, and the plan of Immanuel Kant to bring about universal peace, etc., 
etc’. Though Molinari did not engage with international law in his history of perpetual peace, his 
secular economism was far closer in tone to the lawyers than it was to the Anglo-American pacifists. 
 This tension was also reflected in the division between Lemonnier’s pacifist-federalist Ligue 
internationale de la paix et de la liberté, and the French economist Frédéric Passy’s Ligue 
internationale et permanente de la paix, established the same year, 1867. Passy’s group thought of 
itself as more pragmatic and less ‘political’, and therefore more inclined to look to international law. 
As the Belgian lawyer Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns said in an explicit attack on Lemonnier’s group, 
‘We believe the time has come to move on to something more tangible than vaguely worded wishes 
and diatribes against warfare’.370 What Rolin-Jaequemyns had in mind was the group he founded in 
1873 with the Swiss jurist Gustave Moynier (himself a founding member of Passy’s Ligue), the 
Institut de Droit International (‘Institute of International Law’), whose founding members included 
many of the most renowned practitioners of international law of the day, two of whom are of particular 
note here: James Lorimer and Johann Kaspar Bluntschli. 
 Lorimer, Regius Professor of Public Law at the University of Edinburgh, had in 1867 asserted 
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at the Royal Society of Edinburgh that the central problem of international jurisprudence was the 
establishment ‘of a self-supporting and self-vindicating international legislature and executive’.371 He 
regretted that social and political philosophy had been relatively neglected in the Society, and argued 
that rather than such study being necessarily airy and unscientific, a ‘Political Methodology’ that 
embraced (but was not limited to) historical study had the potential to enable its practitioners ‘to 
distinguish between the difficult and the impossible,—between schemes which ought never to be 
relinquished, and schemes which ought never to have been entertained’.372 Having defended his 
methodology, he then invoked a history that was comprised of both the efforts of ‘statesmen and 
diplomatists’, and of ‘speculative politicians’,373 and gestured towards the figures he had in mind: 
‘Those which received the sanction of diplomacy are embodied in the treaties which have 
followed all our great wars, and belong to general history; and I shall probably recall the 
general character of the other class sufficiently to your recollection when I mention the well-
known names of their authors, St Pierre, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham, Cobden, and of one, the 
latter phases of whose much-contested policy seem to combine the practical sagacity of the 
statesman with the dispassionate thoughtfulness of the philosopher—I mean the Emperor 
Napoleon III.’374 
Although Lorimer did not have time for a ‘satisfactory criticism’ of these schemes,375 he returned to 
the topic ten years later in a paper published in the journal Rolin-Jaequemyns had co-founded, the 
Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée,376 expanded and translated into English as 
Book V of his landmark 1884 The Institutes of the Law of Nations.377 Citing the British politician and 
man-of-letters George Cornewall Lewis378 and, most frequently of all, Wheaton’s History in his 
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analysis, Lorimer gave a historical overview of the ideas of Henry IV, Leibniz, Penn, Cardinal 
Alberoni, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham and ‘the Author of The Mission of 
Sovereigns’ (that is, the French occultist Alexandre Saint-Yves d’Alveydre).379 Each of these Lorimer 
interpreted as failures whose flaws, correctly analysed, might point the way to a version of 
international organisation that might succeed. 
Lorimer developed his plan in dialogue with, and against, the Swiss jurist Bluntschli. 
Bluntschli similarly advocated for an international legislature of government delegates, though his 
proposal was remarkable for being heavily weighted in favour of the six Grossmächte of Europe.380 
Bluntschli too thought it important to include a retelling of the history of the idea of a united Europe, 
which had been thought of as ‘by no means chimerical’.381 Thus, in the 1878 paper in which he most 
fully developed his proposal, he began with Henry IV, and walked through the ideas of Napoleon, the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Voltaire, Leibniz and Kant, as well as those of Lorimer. In contrast 
to Lorimer’s methodological self-consciousness, Bluntschli simply assumed these figures to be 
objects of serious study, though in both cases, their association and familiarity were breezily taken 
for granted. 
In the 1880s, the international law societies increasingly became specifically directed towards 
international ‘arbitration’ as an ultimate goal, with Passy’s society merging in 1889 with the Comité 
de Paris de la Fédération internationale de l’arbitrage et de la paix to became the Société française 
pour l’arbitrage entre nations. Meanwhile in London, Lewis Appleton, until recently associated with 
the Peace Society, in 1880 founded the ‘International Arbitration and Peace Association’.382 As well 
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as a tighter focus on arbitration, these organisations continued to differentiate themselves from the 
peace movement in their secular style, their refusal to rule out war entirely, and their acceptance of 
the present state system (rather than its transcendence) as the basis for a solution, while Appleton’s 
association made the significant step of allowing women on its executive committee (which they were 
denied by the Peace Society).383 Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the secretary of Passy’s society, 
Henry Bellaire, in a speech immediately following that of Passy at an 1872 congress,384 the ‘historical 
study of arbitration in international conflict’ still invoked the peace leagues of Henry IV and the Abbé 
de Saint-Pierre as crucial historical precedents.385 
Perhaps the most comprehensive body of work to fold the European peace league theorists 
into the canon of international law was produced across the turn of the century by the Belgian 
magistrate and professor of international law Ernest Nys, also a member of the Institut de Droit 
International. Throughout his career, Nys explored the history of international law over the course of 
his more-than-200 publications, including a monograph on Tommaso Campanella,386 bibliographical 
articles on Bentham,387 Saint-Pierre388 and a multitude of others, and translations of the contemporary 
English legal scholars Lorimer389 and John Westlake.390 This scholarship, for which Nys invented the 
term ‘literary history of international law’,391 involved extensive archival work, particularly in the 
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collections of the British Museum. This frequently resulted in new discoveries to add to the canon; it 
was Nys, for instance, who discovered the true name of Émeric Crucé,392 while elsewhere he 
advocated for the inclusion in the ‘intellectual family’ from Sully to Bluntschli of four sixteenth-
century figures: John Colet, Thomas More, Erasmus and Juan Luis Vives.393 The best single 
compilation of this work was Nys’s 1894 Les origines du droit international (‘The Origins of 
International Law’), dedicated ‘to the imperishable memory of James Lorimer’, in which Nys 
approached the subject systematically, dividing the canon of international law by subject.394 The 
peace league theorists Nys grouped together as ‘Irenists’, a term he borrowed from Saint-Pierre 
himself, and which he used in preference to ‘utopians’ because ‘the utopian believes in something 
imaginary’.395 Nys’s scholarship served both to cement the place of such figures in the serious 
business of international law, and transform a rather one-dimensional roll-call of names into a deep, 
fertile and constantly expanding field of inquiry. Some indication of this exponential increase in 
extent is given by his colleague and countryman Henri La Fontaine’s 1904 Bibliographie de la paix 
et de l’arbitrage international, the first volume of which, concerning the ‘pacifist movement’, ran to 
2 222 entries.396 
                                               
Caserte", Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 16 (1884) 283-284 
392 Balch’s 1899 biography and 1909 republication and translation of Crucé were both dedicated to Nys, and in his 
“Introduction” to the latter Balch published a letter from Nys recounting the tale of discovery. See T.W. Balch, 
"Introduction", in Émeric Crucé and Thomas Willing Balch (eds.), Le Nouveau Cynée - The New Cyneas, trans. 
Thomas Willing Balch (Philadelphia: Allen, Lane and Scott; 1909) iii-xxxi, vi-vii; E. Nys, "Histoire littéraire du 
droit international. - A propos de la Paix perpétuelle de l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, Eméric Crucé et Ernest, landgrave de 
Hesse-Rheinfels", Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 22 (1890) 371-384; E. Nys, "Émeric 
Crucé, l'auteur du "Nouveau Cynée"", Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 11 (2ème série) 
(1909) 594-599 
393 E. Nys, "Quatre utopistes au XVIe siècle", Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 21 (1889) 65-76 
394 E. Nys, Les origines du droit international (Brussels / Paris: A. Castaigne / Thorin & fils; 1894) 
395 Nys, Les origines du droit international, 388n1; citing Saint-Pierre to H. Sloane, British Library, Sloane MS 4043, 
ff. 246, 249 Charles Irenée Castel de St. Pierre, Abbé: Letters to Sir H. Sloane: 1714; this letter is reprinted in full in 
Nys, "Les ouvrages de politique et deux lettres inédites de Charles Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre". The term is not 
derived from the Abbé’s Christian name (Charles-Irénée), but from the theological-philosophical term ‘Irénisme’ 
(‘irenicism’ in English), itself derived from the Greek ειρήνη (eiríni), meaning peace. 
396 H. La Fontaine, Bibliographie de la paix et de l'arbitrage international, vol. I: Mouvement pacifique (Monaco: 
Institut International de la Paix; 1904). On La Fontaine, and the Institut International de Bibliographie of which 
this was a part, see D. Laqua, "Transnational endeavours and the 'totality of knowledge': Paul Otlet and Henri La 
Fontaine as 'integral internationalists' in fin-de-siècle Europe", in Grace Brockington (ed.), Internationalism and the 
 
109 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, pacifist and legal traditions began to merge as 
proponents of international law started embracing the populist tactics of the peace societies, and 
attempted to repackage these histories for a more general readership. One of the most famous of these 
endeavours was International Tribunals by Revd William Evans Darby, who himself straddled these 
traditions as long-term term secretary of the Peace Society (from 1885 to 1915) and vice-president of 
the International Law Association. First published (jointly by both organisations) in 1897, 
International Tribunals was initially intended as a readable precis of historical schemes, from which 
delegates might develop a putative new ‘International Court of Arbitration’.397 However, while Darby 
boasted that it was ‘the only contribution … specifically acknowledged in the Official Report of The 
Hague Conference as having been of service in its deliberations’,398 over the course of multiple new 
editions, each significantly enlarged,399 the text became something else: a compendium of silently 
abridged and freely translated standalone abstracts of the various schemes for international 
government in general. While neither possessing nor aspiring to Nys’s scholarship, Darby’s approach 
– narrative-free, at once unapologetically technical and accessibly concise – was to prove the most 
popular as a reference for a new generation of writers, with the pacifist Elizabeth York crediting it as 
‘of great assistance to me’400 and the political scientist Lindsay Rogers recommending it as ‘an 
inaccurate but useful work’.401 
Darby bridged traditions in more ways than one. As we have seen, he marked the confluence 
of the traditions of pacifism and international law, while the evolution of International Tribunals is 
representative of a wider shift in focus from arbitration (that is, resolving political disputes without 
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recourse to war) to a more general impetus towards what became known as ‘international 
organisation’. The historical consciousness of international organisation developed along two 
different paths. On one hand, Darby’s opening up of the Peace Society to women was both response 
and encouragement to the growing involvement of women in the pacifist movement,402 and in Britain 
and the US presaged a wave of historic overviews of the literature of international organisation written 
by women, intended for a general readership. These included the previously mentioned Elizabeth 
York’s Leagues of Nations403 and Mary Campbell Smith’s comprehensive introduction to her 
translation of Kant’s Perpetual Peace,404 as well as the economic and medieval historian Eileen 
Power, who contributed a concluding chapter on ‘The Teaching of History and World Peace’ to F.S. 
Marvin’s historical introduction to the League of Nations.405 This trend was perhaps best exemplified 
by the Australian classicist (and active member of the League of Nations Union) Melian Stawell’s 
1929 pocket book The Growth of International Thought.406 It is telling that while her more academic 
1923 tome The Making of the Western Mind (written with F.S. Marvin) was a supra-national history 
that made scant reference to European peace leagues, The Growth of International Thought, produced 
for the popular ‘Home University Library of Modern Knowledge’, was devoted to just such a 
narrative stroll through the totems of international organisation. 
On the other hand, in continental Europe the trend hewed closer to the traditions of 
international law, with these same totems appearing in lengthy, often quite technical works, among 
which four deserve brief mention. First, Alfred Fried, the Austrian pacifist from whom Coudenhove-
Kalergi borrowed the term ‘Pan-Europe’, whose 1905 Handbuch der Friedensbewegung (‘Handbook 
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of the Peace Movement’, revised and considerably expanded in the 1911-13 two-volume second 
edition) contained a long chapter on the ‘History of the Peace Movement’, albeit one in which a long 
and inclusive roll-call of apparent internationalists was outweighed by an even longer analysis of the 
past century’s congresses and international legislation. Second, the German politician and professor 
of international law Walther Schücking, who in the years leading up to WWI was one of the leading 
publicists for ‘international organisation’.407  Schücking argued that international law needed to take 
the pacifist movement seriously, especially in Germany where the two camps had remained 
divided.408 He also had a keen historical sensibility,409 and like Nys collected past historic projects of 
international organisation; Darby credited Schücking for ‘unearthing’ George of Poděbrady for the 
literature of international law,410 and it was via his student Ernst Heinrich Meyer that Pierre Dubois 
was added to it.411 Third, the Dutch pacifist and historian Jacob Ter Meulen, who was librarian of the 
Peace Palace at The Hague from 1924 to 1952, and whose three-volume Der Gedanke der 
internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung (‘The idea of the international organization in its 
development’) became the standard work in which this canon was enshrined.412 And fourth, the 
Norwegian historian and political scientist Christian L. Lange, with whom Coudenhove-Kalergi 
undertook a lecture tour of the US in the winter of 1925-26, organised by the Foreign Policy 
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Association, upon which they became (in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s account) ‘inseparable travelling 
companions and close friends’.413 Lange, from 1909 the secretary-general of Passy’s 
Interparliamentary Union, made it his life’s project to compile the multi-volume Histoire de 
l’internationalisme. Although only the first volume (taking the narrative up to the 1648 Peace of 
Westphalia)414 was published in his lifetime,415 this work was to prove highly influential: in Melian 
Stawell’s bibliography, Lange’s Histoire is one of very few non-primary texts she lists, and is the 
only text she annotates with a comment: ‘an invaluable book for the student’.416 For all their 
differences, what Fried, Schücking, Ter Meulen and Lange shared was a bulk that spoke to a 
gluttonous attitude to history. Whereas earlier writers had invoked historical precedents as buoys by 
which to map out their own position on the water, these early twentieth century figures saw history 
as an entire seabed of submerged features that needed to be explored. 
 
 
A literature of European integration 
We have seen how a canon was assembled, first as texts were refracted in complex ways through 
existing texts, and then as they were invoked as a ‘literature’ by two nineteenth-century streams of 
thought that gradually converged: pacifism and international law. Along the way, the essential 
meaning of this canon has itself shifted, and I have attempted to trace it across the coordinates formed 
by the general term ‘European peace league’. Though the imposition of any such general analytical 
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categories risks losing contextual nuance, it serves to indicate the way in which the meaning of the 
canon, the thread connecting its various constituent parts, was definitively shifted towards ‘peace’ 
and ‘league’ and away from ‘Europe’. While the former pair were the interdependent ends sought by 
the pacifists and international lawyers respectively, ‘Europe’ was at best a means, which perhaps 
explains why among internationalists, Europeanism was progressively sidelined in favour of the 
universalist dream of international organisation. 
 It was against this seemingly inauspicious context that we see the emergence of a reading of 
this literature that swung back towards the foregrounding of ‘Europe’ as the true linking thread; that 
is, one in which this literature was taken out of the hands of pacifists and international lawyers, and 
repackaged as the history of European integration. This reading would chime with the twentieth-
century rejection of methodological nationalism begun by Alfred Stern’s 10-volume Geschichte 
Europas (1894-1925),417 a rejoinder to the nationalist historiography of Treitschke, and further 
developed in the interwar Histories of Europe of Dawson, Fisher, Croce, Eyre, Hazard and Pirenne. 
However, its content was for the most part simply lifted from the pacifist-legalist canon that had been 
developed over the previous century. 
 The first significant such re-reading was that of the English historian Walter Alison Phillips 
in his 1914 The Confederation of Europe. Phillips readily admitted that he risked being ‘condemned 
as “journalistic” by the straiter sect of historians’,418 and that despite being based on lectures given in 
the Faculty of History, his book’s ‘object and scope … are not purely historical’.419 He meant by this 
that he was taking a methodological stance intended ‘not only to throw light on the problems of the 
                                               
417 N. Schmitz, Alfred Stern (1846 - 1936); ein europäischer Historiker gegen den Strom der nationalen 
Geschichtsschreibung (Hannover: Wehrhahn; 2009) 
418 W.A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe. A study of the European Alliance, 1813-1823 as an experiment in the 
international organization of peace, 2nd edn. (London: Longmans, Green & Co.; 1920), vi 
419 W.A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe. A study of the European Alliance, 1813-1823 as an experiment in the 
international organization of peace. Six Lectures delivered In the University Schools, Oxford, at the invitation of the 
Delegates of the Common University Fund, Trinity Term, 1913, 1st edn. (London: Longmans, Green & Co.; 1914), 
v 
 
114 
 
past, but more especially to show what light these can reflect upon the problems of the present’.420 
Phillips aimed to bring a historian’s ‘exact scholarship’ and ‘clearness of narrative’ to a subject ‘too 
often discussed from a standpoint wholly out of touch with the realities of life’, by which he meant 
both pacifists and lawyers.421  He thought the former to be lacking in realism, later recalling how 
‘During a prolonged visit to the United States in 1911 I had been impressed with the danger likely to 
arise from the shallow and uniformed idealism of the pacifist movement … and my object was to 
counter this by an appeal to the relevant facts of history’.422 Regarding international law, he shared 
Albert Sorel’s cynical bon mot that it was ‘only known through the declamations of publicists and its 
violation by the Governments’,423 an attitude that would soon be confirmed in the eyes of many by 
the German Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg’s infamous dismissal of the treaty preserving 
Belgium’s neutrality as a mere ‘scrap of paper’. Phillips’s insight was that even if the legalist-pacifist 
vision of European unity was but a fiction, this fiction mattered; he argued that ‘it is precisely such 
“legends” and “imaginary memories” that have been the impelling forces of nearly all great human 
movements’.424 The unity of Europe may be phantasmal, but ‘we do not quite realize the part played 
in the world by phantoms’.425 To emphasise the point, Phillips gave Part I of his book, in which he 
analysed the familiar canon of European peace leagues,426 as its epigraph Francis Bacon’s famous 
anti-utopian lines: 
‘As for the philosophers, they make imaginary Lawes for imaginary common-wealths, & their 
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423 A. Sorel, L’Europe et la révolution française, VIII vols., vol. VIII: La coalition, les traités de 1815, 1812-1815 
(Paris: Librairie Plon; 1904), 65. Quoted (and translated) in Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, 1st edn., 8 (n.b. 
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424 Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, 1st edn., 8 
425 Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, 1st edn., 17, quoting an unnamed 'French writer', possibly Georges Blondel 
426 Phillips mentioned Sully, Crucé, Grotius, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Alexander I, Napoleon, Voltaire, Kant, and the 
modern peace societies. He claimed to be the first to also consider Emperor Alexander I’s ‘Instructions to 
Novosiltsov’, countersigned by the Polish statesman Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski. In the 1920 2nd edition, 
Phillips pushed back the start of his narrative to include the eleventh-century ‘Truce of God’, and also included 
discussion of political philosophers like Emer de Vattel and Freidrich von Gentz. 
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discourses are as the Stars, which give little light because they are so high’427 
Phillips accepted the logic but inverted the sentiment of those lines in his text, writing that ‘The 
discourses of philosophers may give as little light as the stars; but, like the stars, they may win 
reverence by their mystery, and be held to influence the destinies of men’.428 By suggesting that the 
idea of a united Europe was as important as its accomplishment, Phillips thereby created a new, more 
robust justification for its study. However, the rather modern tone of detached scepticism with which 
Phillips wrote prevented his shifting of the frame of study to the specifically European from spilling 
over into active promotion of European confederation. While Phillips was happy to claim that 
‘modern peace propaganda’ closely paralleled the debates surrounding the Holy Alliance, and was 
sympathetic to its demands, he did not believe that a new confederation of Europe was likely to be 
any more durable than the peace of 1815. 
 After the war, as we have seen, this insistence upon the historicity of peace leagues was largely 
dropped by the majority of political writers looking to create a League of Nations that would 
definitively break from the violence of the past. In the preface to the 1920 second edition of The 
Confederation of Europe, Phillips wrote that: 
‘Of the innumerable books and brochures advocating a League of Nations which have 
been issued since the beginning of the war I do not think it necessary to speak. I have read 
many of them, and they have left my own standpoint unchanged.’429 
One exception was the British historian-turned-politician John Marriott, who in 1918 published an 
essay collection, The European Commonwealth: Problems Historical and Diplomatic, in which like 
Phillips he sought to ‘make some modest contribution’ to problems traditionally addressed by ‘the 
political philosopher or the international jurist’: namely, whether a new form of political organisation 
                                               
427 F. Bacon, The Two Bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the proficience and advancement of Learning, divine and humane 
(London: Henry Tomes; 1604), 106v-107r 
428 Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, 1st edn., 14 
429 Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, 2nd edn., vii 
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might take the place of the ‘States-system’.430 However, while Marriott reinforced the idea that a 
study of peace projects could complement more traditional diplomatic history, the latter field rather 
blinkered his analysis of the former. Moreover, despite their chosen titles, both Phillips and Marriott 
slid easily between European and global forms of organisation, and neither broached the crucial 
question of what a European confederation or commonwealth might mean in terms of relations with 
the extra-European world. 
 
 
A literature of Pan-Europe 
It was into this void that Coudenhove-Kalergi confidently strode. What Phillips and Marriott had 
hinted at noncommittally, Coudenhove-Kalergi stridently asserted: that the lesson offered by the 
canon of peace leagues was above all else one of European unity. His own account of the Pan-
European movement emphasised this literature at the very point of its inception: 
‘I cast about for an organization which might have studied or promoted a Pan-European union 
at an earlier date. There was none. This lack of any organization for a closer union of Europe 
was still more amazing in view of the fact that for centuries outstanding Europeans had 
suggested a European union. This was done by men like Pierre Dubois in the early fourteenth 
century, Sully, the chancellor of the French King Henry IV, or the Quaker William Penn, who 
had not only conceived the idea of a United States of America but given years of his life to 
the idea of a United States of Europe.’431 
This account, characteristically, attempted to portray this mission as at once new and old, 
unprecedented yet proven by its precedents. Yet it was written after the fact, in 1942 when from his 
New York exile Coudenhove-Kalergi had the benefit of a closed bracket on interwar history, and thus 
a sense of historical perspective on his own actions. One might say the same about later lectures he 
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gave on the topic of the idea of Europe.432 In each case, Coudenhove-Kalergi the author was looking 
back on the role of Coudenhove-Kalergi the actor. But in what sense was Coudenhove-Kalergi the 
actor actively trying to craft his own history in the moment, as part of his the act of promoting Pan-
Europe? 
 In fact, this invocation of historical precedent for Pan-Europe can be detected in one of the 
very earliest announcements of the Pan-European mission. In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 20 February 
1923 ‘Open Letter to Benito Mussolini’, first published in the Neue Freie Presse, he flattered the then 
prime minister of Italy that he was ‘the successor of [Gaius] Marius and [Julius] Cæsar’, and appealed 
to him that: ‘As a good Italian you must also be a good European, just as the greatest Italian of the 
past century, Giuseppe Mazzini, was the greatest European’.433 However, when Pan-Europe was 
published later that year, it omitted any such sense of historicity, instead falling in line with the norm 
set by political writing in support of the League, and limiting itself to a forward-looking view that 
focused upon factors that could be detected in the present. 
 The first embrace of a canon of Pan-European precedents might be dated to the first Pan-
European Congress, held from 3 to 6 October 1926 at the opulent Konzerthaus in Vienna. As befit its 
venue, the spectacle of the congress had been carefully thought out, and succeeded in making an 
impression upon its delegates, with H.R. Cummings reporting back to the League that: 
‘The Congress was well staged. All the arts of lighting effect were employed, with a Bach 
fugue at the same time on the organ, during the solemn unfurling of the Pan-European flag at 
the back of the platform, which was surrounded with portraits of exemplary and kindred Pan-
European spirits such as Napoleon and the Abbe St. Pierre, Nietzsche and Mazzini, Kant and 
Victor Hugo, and others.’434 
                                               
432 See, for example, R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, ‘La Crise de l’Idee Europeenne’, summary of a press conference held 
at Hôtel George V, Paris (28 April 1955), CAC, AMEL 2/2/5, File 1; R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “L’évolution de 
l’idée Européenne” lecture given at Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Paris (25 Apr 1960), ACV, PP 
1000/72/4 
433 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "An Open Letter to Benito Mussolini", The Living Age, 31 March 1923, p. 779-780, 
779; orig. pub. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Offener Brief an Benito Mussolini", 2. See also his publication of P. 
Kuranda, "Giuseppe Mazzini", Paneuropa 11.5 (1935) 145-148 
434 H.R. Cummings, “Note on the First Pan-European Congress” (12 Oct 1926); LoN, 39/45485/45485, p.1. For other 
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These ‘monumental images of the great predecessors of Pan-European thought’, as they were 
described in Paneuropa, had been commissioned from the Austrian-Jewish painter Fritz Schwarz-
Waldegg.435 Kant, ‘the creator of the first Pan-European constitution’, was placed centrally, while the 
other giant portraits were hung between the marble pillars of the hall (see fig. 15).436 Each were cited 
in terms that made clear their contribution not just to peace or the development of international 
organisation, but rather to the specific cause of European unification. Thus, Napoleon’s ‘political 
testament called for the federation of Europe’, Nietzsche was ‘the great European and fierce enemy 
of European parochialism’, John Amos Comenius ‘the Czech thinker who in an earlier and darker 
time believed in the unification of Europe and advocated for it’, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre ‘spent his 
entire life in the service of European integration’, Mazzini was ‘the great champion and prophet of 
European unity on the basis of the nation and freedom’, and Victor Hugo ‘the seer of the United States 
of Europe, to which he lent the work and enthusiasm of his twilight years’.437 That Coudenhove-
Kalergi was fully aware of the purpose of such iconography may be judged by his awareness that 
‘When Napoleon united Europe for the first time in modern times, he constantly referred to both his 
forerunners, Julius Cæsar, and Charlemagne’.438 
 Each of these totems were individually celebrated for their contributions to pan-Europeanism 
at various points in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s stewardship of the PEU. To stay with the theme of 
conference spectacle, Victor Hugo’s 21 August 1849 speech at the Paris Peace Congress in which 
Hugo called for a United States of Europe was published in Paneuropa in 1929,439 and performed 
onstage at PEU events on multiple occasions. Hugo’s speech was performed by Ida Roland in 1930 
                                               
descriptions, see also Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 126; Pegg, Evolution of the European 
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435 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Kongressbericht", 7 
436 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Kongressbericht", 7-8 
437 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Kongressbericht", 7-8 
438 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europe Must Unite, 84 
439 V. Hugo, "Victor Hugos Friedensrede", Paneuropa 5.4 (1929) 22-29 
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at the second Pan-European Congress in Berlin,440 a performance that was reprised in 1934 at a 
‘Europe Day’ rally in the Assembly Hall of the Austrian Parliament.441 It was also quoted at length in 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s speech at the memorial service to Aristide Briand in New York on 28 March 
1942.442 These figures were also given attention in Pan-European literature, whether in individual 
articles in Paneuropa devoted to Napoleon,443 Hugo,444 Mazzini445 or the Abbé de Saint-Pierre,446 or 
taken together in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s monographs. In the 1934 Europa Erwacht, for instance, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi devoted a chapter to figures ranging from Pierre Dubois and Dante via George 
                                               
440 "Berliner Paneuropa-Tagung", Paneuropa 6.6/7 (1930) 201-271 
441 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 200 
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Figure 15: First Pan-European Congress, Konzerthaus, Vienna (1926). Source: R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
Europa erwacht! (Zurich/Vienna/Leipzig: Paneuropa Verlag; 1934), p.101 
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of Poděbrady, the Duc de Sully and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre to Napoleon, Mazzini and Hugo, along 
with full-page portraits of each to emphasise their significance.447 In the same work, he also 
highlighted the historicity of a united Europe cartographically, by printing simple, clear maps of the 
Roman & Napoleonic empires.448 This selection reflected the list of maps kept at the Pan-European 
head office in Vienna, which in addition to this pair included maps of ‘The European Empire of 
Charlemagne’, of ‘The European Catholic Empire of the Middle Ages’ and of ‘Europe when she was 
not the governess of the world (1490)’.449 
 When it came to precisely how these figures were invoked, Coudenhove-Kalergi paid more 
attention to the geography of this historiography than most of the writers before him. Aware that the 
figures he cited would be refracted through the lens of modern nationalism and present-day tensions, 
he made sure to aim for a sense of geographical balance in his citation. As he wrote in 1929, 
‘The pan-European idea itself is rooted as much in Germany as in France. While France refers 
to the preliminary work of Sully and Saint-Pierre, Rousseau and Napoleon, Saint-Simon and 
Victor Hugo, Germany can include Leibniz and Kant, [Christoph Martin] Wieland and 
Novalis, Friedrich List and Werner von Siemens, and above all Nietzsche, among the 
predecessors of Pan-Europe. 
The common historical symbol of Pan-Europe, however, will be the Franco-German 
Emperor of Europe, Charlemagne.’450 
Likewise, he also sought political balance, writing in 1939 of the ‘three serious enterprises designed 
to unify Europe’ that were undertaken in the nineteenth century: ‘the imperial attempt of Napoleon, 
the conservative attempt of the Holy Alliance, and the revolutionary attempt of Young Europe’.451 In 
seeking to appease those from the entirety of the political spectrum, Coudenhove-Kalergi also set 
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himself apart from the pacifist-legalist tradition, within which the inclusion of imperialists like 
Napoleon would have been nonsensical. Their inclusion in the canon, and the exclusion of nineteenth-
century Anglo-American pacifist groups from it, spoke both to the ideological ambivalence of Pan-
Europeanism, as well as a deliberate strategy of courting a mainstream audience. 
 Lastly, it is important to note how, like the pacifists and international lawyers before him, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s histories were designed to climax in the movement he helmed. The vision of 
history that Coudenhove-Kalergi offered was not merely pan-European in a general sense, but 
specifically Pan-European, and was labelled as such. It is telling that one of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
first significant general histories of European integration, from Julius Caesar on, was published as 
“The History of Paneuropa”;452 the Pan-European Union was always presented in genealogical terms 
as the inheritor, heir or descendant of these earlier proposals for European unification. Simultaneously 
inverting and complementing this trend, later histories of the organisation alone – in which the role 
of his organisation was mythologised every bit as much as he mythologised his own life elsewhere – 
were occasionally given much more general titles, as in the case of “The European Movement at 
Thirty Years”.453 Likewise, Coudenhove-Kalergi was all too happy to provide a chronicle of the 
PEU’s history for the exhibition organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe for the 
inauguration of the Maison de l’Europe in 1950.454 These examples demonstrate that just as 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s autobiographical accounts of his life bled into the political history of his 
organisation, so the latter bled into the general history of European integration. The intended effect 
of this conflation was twofold: to corral the force of history behind his own organisation, and 
reciprocally to imply its ownership of the movement to unite Europe. While, as we have seen, this 
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would come to the fore in the post-WWII jockeying for position among competing groups seeking 
European unity, including those led by Sandys and Churchill, even in the interwar period this 
imperative was strong. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This winding journey through a series of figures seemingly far removed from the Pan-European 
movement may have been rather a long way round. Yet there is value in delving into these twists and 
turns, historicising the very idea of a literature of Europe rather than simply plotting the points it 
refers to, and inferring some general sweep. This has been the error of current scholarship, which if 
it was tired when Hinsley wrote in 1963, must be positively exhausted by now. 
 Furthermore, it is only when the historiography is carefully unpicked that the contributions of 
the Pan-European movement become clear. First, they did not invent, but rather subtly 
recontextualised a pantheon that had before their intervention been a signifier of pacifism and 
international law. There were certainly enough synergies between these movements for such a move 
to bear fruit, and its success may be judged by the fact that the interpretation of these figures as 
emblems of European unity remains with us today. 
 Second, Coudenhove-Kalergi also played a significant part in redeeming the Enlightenment 
ideal of progressivism. This is perhaps more commonly associated with post-war modernism, and 
perhaps exemplified by Walt Rostow’s 1960 ‘stages of growth’ theory. However, this high-point of 
faith in progressivism must be seen in light of what came before, and the early twentieth century saw 
a tremendous challenge both to the direction of the arc of history and the very notion that history 
might have a shape. This was the context in which Coudenhove-Kalergi spelled out his radically 
reactionary version of history, a defiantly progressivist narrative in which European integration was 
presented as both logical and inevitable, the product of undergirding meta-historical logics that 
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posited the continuously increasing scale of polities. Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that while it was 
true that this trend spelled doom for Europe’s divided nations, a supranational structure could see 
Europe surf this wave rather than be smashed in the breakers. By invoking such an arc of history, he 
found that he could play the roles both of dispassionate observer of historical trends, and of 
campaigner-propagandist. As E.H. Carr said, 
‘It is this sense of direction in history which alone enables us to order and interpret the events 
of the past – the task of the historian – and to liberate and organize human energies in the 
present with a view to the future – the task of the statesman, the economist, and the social 
reformer.’455 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s genius was in marrying these two roles seamlessly. In the following chapter, 
we will explore the spatial implications of this arc of history in more detail.  
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III. ‘Thinking in Continents’: Pan-Europe and Geopolitik 
 
In the latter part of 1919 I found myself wistfully inspecting a map of the world. … 
 Presently I noticed the north-south line which in Europe divides the democracies of 
the West from the territory of the Soviet Union and which, beyond the Mediterranean, 
corresponds to the boundary between British Africa and the colonial territories of 
continental Europe. To the east of this African boundary, the British Empire extends in a 
gigantic arc round the Indian Ocean, all the way from Capetown to Sydney. 
 This observation gave me the clue to a possible division of the world into five huge 
regions… 
 Three of these regions were already in an advanced stage of organization: Pan-
America; the northern part of the Old World, where the Soviet Union was predominant; and 
the southern part of the Old World, which was the preserve of the British Empire. In the Far 
East, Japan was attempting to organize a Mongolian bloc incorporating China. Only the fifth 
region, Pan-Europe, lacked all organization, notwithstanding the fact that it forms a clear-cut 
geographical unit between the Petsamo-Katanga line and the Atlantic Ocean and that it is 
based on a common civilization, a common history and common traditions. 
 Could these twenty-six European democracies not be merged into one large union, 
modelled on that of Pan-America? 
Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi456 
 
To-day we think in continents, and it is only our philosophers and historians who have not 
realized that we do so. 
Oswald Spengler, 1918457 
 
 
Introduction 
At first blush, it seems counterintuitive to be talking about Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s interwar 
Pan-Europe movement and geopolitik458 in the same breath. On one hand, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
books studiously avoided much of the theoretical terminology of geopolitics in favour of a more 
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common-sensical style of argument.459 On the other hand, geopolitics as a discipline is (rightly) 
inextricably bound up in the racist and imperialist politics of Nazi Germany, which was ideologically 
opposed to the broadly liberal Pan-Europe movement, shutting their offices, banning (and indeed 
burning) their books, and denouncing their ideas. However, as the epigraph above suggests, there is 
much in Pan-Europe that is curiously consonant with geopolitics: the analysis of international affairs 
through the lens of space and territory,460 the insistence that political space is dynamic rather than 
fixed, the frequent use of organic metaphors to describe the requirements and interrelationships of 
polities,461 and a commitment to thinking big: that is, adopting a broad-brush approach that sought to 
consider politics within an explicitly global perspective. If interwar internationalism tends to be 
remembered today for its deterritorialised visions of universal law and governance,462 the story of the 
relationship of Pan-Europeanism to geopolitics offers a radically different take on the imagination of 
political space in the interwar period. 
 Specifically, both Coudenhove-Kalergi and the geopolitikers shared the belief that the 
Versailles settlement’s reorganisation of Europe into a raft of new nation-states had effectively 
imposed a set of artificial borders that were economically and politically suffocating the continent; 
and that in a world dominated by the ascendant superpowers of the US and Soviet Union, Europe’s 
survival depended on it uniting into a continental power. The overlap between Coudenhove-Kalergi 
                                               
459 T. Botz-Bernstein, "European Transfigurations—Eurafrica and Eurasia: Coudenhove and Trubetzkoy Revisited", 
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and the geopolitikers’ idea of a world carved up between global superpowers is plain to see in 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own map (fig. 2),463 which was reprinted – with attribution – by Karl 
Haushofer in his own work (fig. 16). Not only did Coudenhove-Kalergi’s pan-regions broadly accord 
with Haushofer’s Panideen, by which the world was split into various regional blocs under the 
influence of a hegemonic power, but Haushofer acknowledged the Pan-European world map as a 
prime example of an ‘object of geopolitics’, which occupied the same discursive terrain as his own 
‘science of space’.464 These consonances are even more suprising when one considers that Haushofer 
continued to use this map at late as 1935, two years after Coudenhove-Kalergi had become persona 
non grata in Germany.465 In fact, this only scratches the surface of what, as we shall see, was a friendly 
relationship of mutual influence between the two men. 
The question of whether Haushofer’s infamy is deserved or not continues to be debated 
today.466 However, important though it undoubtedly is, this debate has had the unfortunate side-effect 
of implying an overly linear intellectual history of interwar geopolitik, interpreting it solely through 
the prism of Haushofer’s relationship with Hitler. Whether carried out with the purpose of 
rehabilitating geopolitics as a legitimate mode of study,467 or of indicting it as irredeemably complicit 
in Nazi crimes,468 such accounts tend to analyse geopolitik solely in terms of how it was used (or 
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abused) to justify Nazi geostrategy. Though I do not wish to diminish Haushofer’s centrality, a 
nuanced understanding of the role of geopolitics can only be achieved by treating it as a complex and 
diffuse network of ideas, plugged into wider intellectual and institutional contexts in which academic 
geography played a significant role.469 Furthermore, it was a body of work marked by multiplicity, 
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an arms-length qualifier – most popularly ‘critical’ – be applied to indicate the intellectual breaks being made from 
this tradition (See, for example, G. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (London: Routledge; 1996))  
469 See H. Heske, "Political geographers of the past III. German geographical research in the Nazi period: a content 
analysis of the major geography journals, 1925-1945", Political Geography Quarterly 5.3 (1986) 267-281; G. 
Sandner, "The Germania triumphans syndrome and Passarge’s Erdkundliche Weltanschauung: The roots and effects 
of German political geography beyond Geopolitik", Political Geography Quarterly 8.4 (1989) 341-351; M. 
Fahlbusch, M. Rössler, and D. Siegrist, "Conservatism, ideology and geography in Germany 1920-1950", Political 
Geography Quarterly 8.4 (1989) 353-367; Murphy, Heroic Earth; M. Heffernan, "Fin de siècle? Fin du monde? On 
the origins of European geopolitics, 1890–1920", in Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson (eds.), Geopolitical 
 
Figure 16: Karl Haushofer's usage of Coudenhove-Kalergi's world map. From K. Haushofer, Geopolitik 
der Pan-Ideen (Berlin: Zentral-Verlag; 1931), p.9. See also K. Haushofer, Weltpolitik von Heute (Berlin: 
Verlag und Vertriebs-Gesellschaft Zeitgeschichte; 1935), p.95 
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insofar as it was invoked, expressed and interpreted in many different ways.470 Thus, I follow 
Geoffrey Parker in tracing an ‘alternative geopolitics’, in which geopolitical thinking led in other 
directions than Nazi geostrategy, other even than German expansionist imperialism.471 This is not 
necessarily to cleanse geopolitics of its imperialist or racist reputation, but it is to claim that it is not 
reducible to these qualities, and moreover than culpability for them ought not to be confined to the 
rather narrow limits of those who defined themselves as geopolitikers. 
 The intersection of Pan-Europeanism and geopolitik can be approached from three distinct 
perspectives, by which this chapter is organized. First, through a contextual analysis of their shared 
intellectual heritage, and the cross-pollination of their respective influences. This includes those who 
are familiar from the typical narrative of geopolitik: the geographers Friedrich Ratzel and Halford 
Mackinder and the political scientist Rudolf Kjellén. Each of these figures offer much more rounded 
and ambivalent contributions and inspirations than their view through the lens of the Haushofer-Hitler 
relationship allows; in each case, analysing the role they played in the development of Pan-
Europeanism helps to flesh out their significance to interwar geopolitical thought. However, contrary 
to the impression given by much of today’s geopolitical literature, a geopolitical mode of thinking 
was not invented from thin air by Ratzel in his 1897 Politische Geographie.472 Rather, it was 
                                               
Traditions: A Century of Political Thought (London: Routledge; 2000) 27-51; C. Abrahamsson, "On the genealogy 
of Lebensraum", Geographica Helvetica 68 (2013) 37-44. For a contemporaneous overview, see R. Hartshorne, 
"Recent Developments in Political Geography, I", The American Political Science Review 29.5 (1935) 785-804; R. 
Hartshorne, "Recent Developments in Political Geography, II", The American Political Science Review 29.6 (1935) 
943-966 
470 C.f. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, 15; D. Atkinson and K. Dodds, "Introduction. Geopolitical traditions: a 
century of geopolitical thought", in Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson (eds.), Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of 
Political Thought (London: Routledge; 2000) 1-24, 9. Bassin emphasises the disjuncture and suspicion between 
geopolitik and Nazi ideology in M. Bassin, "Race contra space: the conflict between German Geopolitik and 
National Socialism", Political Geography Quarterly 6.2 (1987) 115-134 
471 G. Parker, "Ratzel, the French School and the birth of Alternative Geopolitics", Political Geography 19.8 (2000) 
957-969 
472 Though this is the dominant impression, it is by no means universal. Other accounts of the birth of geopolitics that 
look beyond Ratzel, Mackinder and Kjellén include: K.-G. Faber, "Zur Vorgeschichte der Geopolitik. Staat, Nation 
und Lebensraum im Denken deutscher Geographen vor 1914", in Heinz Dollinger, Horst Gründer, and Alwin 
Hanschmidt (eds.), Weltpolitik, Europagedanke, Regionalismus: Festschrift für Heinz Gollwitzer zum 65. 
Geburtstag am 30. Januar 1982 (Münster: Aschendorff; 1982) 389-406; R. Strausz-Hupé, Geopolitics: The 
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developed by a range of nineteenth-century political economists and geographers, many of whom 
advocated for the creation of a Mitteleuropean union, and whose work throws yet more light on to 
the consonance between Pan-European and geopolitical forms of argument.473 While a 
comprehensive account of the roots of geopolitical thought is beyond the scope of this chapter, a focus 
on those thinkers who were to prove important to pan-Europeanism and the cause of European 
federation more generally casts a light on the roles played by the economic integration of Friedrich 
List, the Weltpolitik of Constantin Frantz, and the Mitteleuropa of Joseph Partsch and Friedrich 
Naumann. Lastly, although pan-Germanism is often mentioned in the context of the aggressive 
German expansionist imperialism of the geopolitikers, it is rarely connected up to the wider context 
of pan-regionalism of which it was a part. In 1951, Hannah Arendt argued in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism that ‘Nazism and Bolshevism owe more to Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism 
(respectively) than to any other ideology or political movement’, and that Nazi and Bolshevik 
geostrategy was directly indebted to that of ‘the pan-movements before and during the first World 
War’.474 However, these claims have rarely been followed up, let alone pursued for what it may tell 
us about the consonances of Nazism and Pan-Europeanism.475 
 The second perspective on the relationship between geopolitics and pan-Europeanism focuses 
                                               
Struggle for Space and Power (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons; 1943); M. Heffernan, The Meaning of Europe: 
Geography and Geopolitics (London: Arnold; 1998); Heffernan, "Fin de siècle? Fin du monde? On the origins of 
European geopolitics, 1890–1920"; F. Farinelli, "Friedrich Ratzel and the nature of (political) geography", Political 
Geography 19.8 (2000) 943-955; C. GoGwilt, The Fiction of Geopolitics: Afterimages of Culture, from Wilkie 
Collins to Alfred Hitchcock (Stanford: Stanford University Press; 2000) 288, 17-56; J.A. Agnew and L. Muscarà, 
Making Political Geography, 2nd edn. (Lanham, MD et al: Rowman & Littlefield; 2012), 61-72 
473 For accounts of these thinkers insofar as they relate to the Mitteleuropa idea, see H.C. Meyer, "Mitteleuropa in 
German Political Geography", Annals of the Association of American Geographers 36.3 (1946) 178-194; H.C. 
Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815-1945 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; 1955); K.A. 
Sinnhuber, "Central Europe – Mitteleuropa – Europe Centrale: An Analysis of a Geographical Term", Transactions 
and Papers (Institute of British Geographers) 20.15-39 (1954); J. Droz, L’Europe centrale. Evolution historique de 
l’idée de «Mitteleuropa» (Paris: Payot; 1960); H.-D. Schultz, "Fantasies of Mitte: Mittellage and Mitteleuropa in 
German geographical discussion in the 19th and 20th centuries", Political Geography Quarterly 8.4 (1989) 315-
339; H.-D. Schultz and W. Natter, "Imagining Mitteleuropa: Conceptualisations of ‘Its’ Space In and Outside 
German Geography", European Review of History—Revue européenne d'Histoire, 10.2 (2003) 273-292 
474 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; 1973 [1951]), 222 
475 An exception is J. O'Loughlin and H. van der Wusten, "Political Geography of Panregions", Geographical Review 
80.1 (1990) 1-20. On pan-movements, see also L.L. Snyder, Macro-nationalisms: A History of the Pan-movements 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 1984); M. Younis, "‘United by blood’: race and transnationalism during the Belle 
Époque", Nations and Nationalism 23.3 (2017) 484–504 
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on the direct links between the PEU and the interwar geopolitikers themselves. As we have seen, the 
most significant connection was that between Coudenhove-Kalergi and Karl Haushofer, the self-
appointed leaders of their respective movements. However, these links stretch further, as many 
geopolitikers either actively supported or engaged with the ideas of the PEU, and many participated 
in PEU events, including Adolf Grabowsky, Gudmund Hatt and Otto Maull. By discussing the nature 
of these links, we might temper the tendency to see either Pan-Europeanism or geopolitik as 
monolithic or uncontested.  
 The third cut examines the geopolitics of Pan-Europe. That is, the spatial reasoning that lay at 
the heart of the arguments put forward by the PEU in their propaganda. This may be separated into 
two distinct categories: a theorisation of the nature and location of the limits of political space and a 
dynamic, progressivist conception of the scale of politics. In both, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s texts are 
connected up with the contexts of the geopolitical imaginaries that he invokes. Coudenhove-Kalergi 
may have been reluctant to cite influences, but his recognition of the role of academic geography in 
determining the geopolitics of Europe may be judged by his repeated canvassing of the opinion of 
geographers in surveys, particularly on the question of the borders of Europe. The chapter concludes 
by asking, given all the consonances and shared elements, how the spatial imaginaries of the PEU 
differed from those of its contemporaries, and suggesting that while it is rarely thought of in 
geopolitical terms, the European political geography that the PEU helped to sketch was to prove 
hugely influential in the decades that followed. 
 
 
Shared intellectual heritage 
Pan-regionalism 
One of the few intellectual influences that Coudenhove-Kalergi cited, and the only one acknowledged 
in the pages of his 1923 Pan-Europe, was that of pan-regionalism. Specifically, Coudenhove-Kalergi 
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drew on the Austrian pacifist Alfred Fried’s 1910 book Pan-Amerika, reproducing Fried’s rather 
inflated account of the significance of the Pan-American Union, which Coudenhove-Kalergi called 
‘the political model for Pan-Europe’s development’.476 However, he glossed over Fried’s own 
argument for the creation of a Pan-European Union,477 instead claiming that Pan-Europeanism ‘began 
with the appearance of this book [Pan-Europe]’.478 Later, Coudenhove-Kalergi admitted that the first 
pan-movement he had been exposed to was in fact Pan-Islamism, when the founder of the Pan-Islamic 
Society of London, Abdullah Al-Mamun Suhrawardy, stayed as a house guest of his father’s at 
Ronsperg when Coudenhove-Kalergi was a child. He recalled that 
‘listening to Suhraworthy [Suhrawardy] …, I learned for the first time the conception of a 
Pan-movement, of a group of divergent countries and people banding together in common 
cause to defeat the barriers the world had placed around their existence. From then on I saw 
world problems through different eyes.’479 
However, neither Fried nor Suhrawardy had invented the concept of a pan-movement; rather, they, 
like Coudenhove-Kalergi after them, merely contributed to their vogue in the early twentieth century. 
Conspicuous by their absence in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s account are the two oldest pan-movements, 
which had by WWI become indelibly associated with aggressive imperialism: Pan-Slavism and Pan-
Germanism. Since these would have been the immediately obvious reference points for Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s readers, their development demands greater attention; moreover, as we shall see, it is 
intimately associated with the development of geopolitical thinking in general. 
                                               
476 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 74. Coudenhove-Kalergi was in fact criticised at the time for relying too heavily 
on Fried, with Quincy Wright suggesting in his review of Pan-Europe that ‘the author supplement the information 
he has gained from Alfred H. Fried's Pan-America by a dose of F. Garcia Calderon, Manuel Ugarte or Samuel Guy 
Inman’ (Q. Wright, "Pan-Europe. By Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi", Poltical Science Quarterly 42.4 (1927) 
633-636, 634) 
477 Fried, Pan-Amerika, passim, esp iv-v, 298-299. Coudenhove-Kalergi did acknowledge that ‘Fried, in his work 
entitled “The Pan-American Union,” asserts that in the year 1914 the existence of a Pan-European Bureau would 
unquestionably have prevented the outbreak of the World War—which is very likely true.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
Pan-Europe, 83; the text of Fried’s that he is referring to is unclear). For an excellent analysis of the Fried-
Coudenhove-Kalergi relationship, see Sorrels, Cosmopolitan Outsiders 
478 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 82n* 
479 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 19 
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The emergence of the ‘pan-region’ as a conceptual category may be traced back to debates 
around ‘Pan-Slavism’, which first appeared in print in the Slovak philologist Ján Herkel’s 1826 
Elementa Universalis Linguae Slavicae (Elements of a Universal Slavonic Language).480 As his title 
suggests, Herkel’s Pan-Slavism was purely literary, and as a programme was limited to the advocacy 
of a common Slavic alphabet.481 This movement grew stronger through the 1830s, attracting 
influential figures (mostly poets and philologists) like Herkel’s fellow Slovaks Pavel Jozef Šafárik, 
Ján Kollár and Ľudovít Štúr, and the Czech Josef Dobrovský. Influenced by German Romanticism, 
their support for a wider Slavic identity was tempered by an urge to retain national specificity, and 
their propositions for orthographic reform made few concessions to include any Russian Cyrillic 
script. This was perhaps unsurprising given that the brutal Russian suppression of the Polish 
November uprising in 1830-31 was still relatively fresh in the memory. 
 Indeed, it was a London-based exile of this uprising, the Polish Count Walerian Krasiński, 
who was among the first to convert this literary notion into a geopolitical one in his Panslavism and 
Germanism, written in English and hurriedly published to capitalise on the revolutionary unrest of 
1848.482 It was a move he made no attempt to elide: 
‘Panslavism … was originally intended only as a literary connexion between all the Slavonic 
nations. But was it possible that this originally purely intellectual movement, should not 
assume a political tendency! And was it not a natural consequence, that the different nations 
of the same race, striving to raise their literary significance, by uniting their separate efforts, 
should not arrive, by a common process of reasoning, to the idea and desire of acquiring a 
political importance by uniting their whole race into one powerful empire or confederation, 
which would insure to the Slavonians a decided preponderance over the affairs of Europe!’483 
                                               
480 A. Maxwell, "Walerjan Krasiński’s Panslavism and Germanism (1848): Polish Goals in a Pan-Slav Context", New 
Zealand Slavonic Journal 42 (2008) 101-120 
481 Maxwell, "Walerjan Krasiński’s Panslavism and Germanism", 107. Herkel was not in fact the first to make this 
argument: the Slovene Jernej Kopitar had in 1808 called for Slavs to adopt ‘one and the same alphabet, one and the 
same orthography!’ (Maxwell, "Walerjan Krasiński’s Panslavism and Germanism", 107; quoting B.J. Kopitar, 
Grammatik der slavischen Sprache in Krain, Kärten und Steyermark (Ljubljana: Wilhelm Heinrich Korn; 1808), 
iv,xi,xx-xxi) 
482 W. Krasiński, Panslavism and Germanism (London: Thomas Cautley Newby; 1848), n.p. (“Preface”, front matter) 
483 Krasiński, Panslavism and Germanism, 111-112 Krasiński was writing in English. 
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Krasiński, whose ultimate goal was the restoration of Poland,484 was caught between the celebration 
of Pan-Slavic unity and the denunciation of German oppression, of whom he demanded: ‘how will 
you be able to contend with the united Slavonic race with whom your press and your politicians so 
wantonly provoke a war of race against race?’485 Specifically, the provocation that loomed largest in 
Krasiński’s mind was the 1848 Frankfurt Assembly, which had sought to include Bohemia as an 
integral part of the Großdeutsche Lösung (Greater German Solution) to the formation of a new 
German state;486 it was in response to this Assembly too that the Czech nationalist historian (and close 
friend of Dobrovský) František Palacký487 convened the first Pan-Slav Congress in Prague from 2nd 
to 12th June 1848. One notable attendee at this conference was the Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, 
who shortly afterwards published his Appeal to the Slavs (1848) in which he ‘rejected the absurd 
claims of the Frankfurt [parliament], which has now become the laughing-stock of Europe, which 
had wanted to make Germans of us all’, and advocated for a ‘vast democratic State’ for the Slav 
peoples as a first step towards ‘as the last result, the Universal Federation of European Republics’.488 
The need for such a solution was only confirmed when the young Austrian emperor, Franz 
Joseph I, proceeded to ignore the demands of the Slavic national councils, thus ending the more 
                                               
484 In the opening pages he sets out the terms of his enquiry: ‘We do not entertain a doubt that Poland will be soon 
restored to a national existence, but it is impossible to foresee in what form and under what circumstances this now 
unavoidable event will be accomplished; whether it will resume its station amongst the independent countries of 
Europe, or become an important part of a great Slavonic state! whether her future destiny shall be to form a barrier 
between Russia and the rest of Europe, or a vanguard of the united Slavonians against that same Europe!’ 
(Krasiński, Panslavism and Germanism, 4) 
485 Krasiński, Panslavism and Germanism, 249 
486 Krasiński explicitly complained that ‘the public voice of your country [Germany], represented by your periodical 
press, as well as the opinions expressed by many influential orators, almost universally demand that the Bohemians 
should be compelled to become an integral part of the German state’ (Krasiński, Panslavism and Germanism, 246) 
487 It is perhaps telling that at this stage, Palacký’s Panslavism blended into Habsburgism, hence his famous line: 
‘Truly, if the Austrian Empire had not already existed for a long time, the interests of Europe would demand its 
speedy creation.’ (quoted in R.A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the 
Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918, II vols., vol. II: Empire Reform (New York: Octagon Books; 1964), 139; quoted 
in P.M.R. Stirk, "The Idea of Mitteleuropa", in Peter M.R. Stirk (ed.), Mitteleuropa: History and Prospects 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; 1994) 1-35, 5) 
488 M. Bakunin, "Appeal to the Slavs", in Sam Dolgoff (ed.), Bakunin on Anarchy: Selected Works by the Activist-
Founder of World Anarchism, trans. Sam Dolgoff (New York: Vintage Books; 1971) 63-68, 67-68. He would repeat 
this call in 1867, this time for a ‘United States of Europe’ (Bakunin, "Federalism, Socialism, Anti-Theologism") 
 
134 
 
moderate aspirations of ‘Austro-slavism’. Instead, Pan-Slavists like Ľudovít Štúr began looking to 
Russia for geopolitical patronage, conceiving it as the power that could support a sovereign ‘Pan-
Slavic Union’.489 The publication of Štúr’s Slavdom and the world of the future (translated into 
Russian) in time for the 1867 2nd Pan-Slav Congress in Moscow, at which specially printed copies of 
Štúr’s book were distributed, ‘broke the ice’ for the idea of a Russian-led Pan-Slavic Union at a time 
when Russia was treating foreign policy cautiously following its diplomatic isolation and defeat in 
the Crimean War.490 Once the Slovak Štúr had let this genie out of the bottle, Russian authors were 
able to follow, and the following years saw hugely influential works by the Russians Nikolai 
Danilevsky (Russia and Europe: an Inquiry into the Cultural and Political Relations of the Slavic to 
the Germano-Latin World, 1869) and Rostislav Fadeyev (Opinion on the Eastern question, 1870), 
each of which helped to push Pan-Slavism firmly into the orbit of Russian imperialism.491 
 In circular fashion, the popularity of Pan-Slavism prompted the revolutionary movement for 
the formation of a unified German state to start being called ‘Pan-German’, its Greek stem translated 
into German to form the calque ‘Alldeutsch’.492 Pan-Germanism’s debt to German Romanticism was 
                                               
489 Ľ. Štúr, Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft (Bratislava: Učená společnost Šafaříkova v Bratislavě; 1931 
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490 Petrovich, "Ľudovít Štúr and Russian Panslavism", 2 
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movement did not assert itself in Russia until the Crimean War and the beginning of Alexander II’s reign in 1855’ 
(M.B. Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870 (New York: Columbia University Press; 1956), 
3; quoted in Kohn, "The Impact of Pan-Slavism on Central Europe", 323n2). Danilevsky’s Russia and Europe was 
published first (in 1869) as a series of articles in the magazine Zaria [Dawn], and then (first in 1871) as a book 
(Rossiia i Europa: uzgliad na kul'turnyia i politicheskiia otnosheniia slavianskago mira k germano-romanskomu, St 
Petersburg). For English translations, see R.A. Fadeev, Opinion on the Eastern Question, trans. Thomas Mitchell 
(London: Edward Stanford; 1871); N.I. Danilevskii, Russia and Europe: the Slavic world's political and cultural 
relations with the Germanic-Roman West, trans. Stephen M. Woodburn (Bloomington, IN: Slavica; 2013) 
492 This is not to say that there was not independent precedent for the term alldeutsch. Its coining was variously 
attributed to the Geneva schoolmaster and Pan-German supporter August Diedrichs (date not specified; see W.O. 
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even more clearly drawn, particularly to Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s 1806 Reden an die deutsche Nation, 
in which he had spoken of a (superior) German nation [Nation] or people [Volk] defined both by their 
common language, and by their Teutonic descent.493 Any ambiguity over the connection of linguistics, 
ethnography and race was glossed in the mid-century scientific racism of Arthur de Gobineau, who 
combined these elements in the idea of an Aryan master race, which he argued was the governing 
factor that lay behind human history.494 However, in aspiring to unify the Teutonic peoples in a single 
state, Pan-Germanism was simply a variant of German nationalism. It was only after Otto von 
Bismarck’s 1871 victory in the Franco-Prussian War had ensured that his Prussian-based unification 
(that is, the Kleindeutsche Lösung or Lesser German Solution) won out, that Pan-Germanism acquired 
its more specific meaning as an umbrella term for those who had argued for a Großdeutsche Lösung, 
and who still wished to forge this ‘lost’ German unity.495 The leading voice in pushing this agenda 
(until his death in 1891) was that of the German orientalist Paul de Lagarde, who wrote widely and 
prolifically on the topic. His programme included the creation of a national religion, German 
colonisation of (Slavic) land to the East (the Drang nach Osten), and a necessarily imminent war to 
secure this land; these arguments were explicitly anti-Russian and violently anti-Semitic.496 
                                               
Henderson, "The Pan-German Movement", History NS 26 (1941) 188-198, 194n2) and the German nationalist poet 
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Swiss-French”), in which the repeated refrain was ‘To the Rhine! over the Rhine! / All-Deutschland into France!’ 
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495 H. Kohn, "Pan-Movements", in Edwin R.A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (eds.), Encyclopaedia of the social 
sciences, XV vols., vol. XI (New York: Macmillan; 1933) 544-554, 547-548 
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New Europe, 4). See A.G. Whiteside, The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-
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 In Germany, this movement was formalised with Ernst Hasse’s 1891 establishment of the 
Allgemeiner Deutscher Verband (General German League), from 1894 renamed the Alldeutscher 
Verband (Pan-German League). This organization formed an effective tool to systematise, publicise 
and lobby for a nationalist, expansionist-imperialist foreign policy informed by scientific racism and 
anti-Semitism; in concrete terms, their demand was the expansion of the Bismarckian state to 
encompass all extant German-speaking lands, as well as the pursuit of overseas colonies to create 
new German lands.497 However, in Austria Pan-Germanism acquired a more radical edge, as under 
the influence of Georg Ritter von Schönerer it emphasised not just a greater Germany, but the 
destruction of Austria-Hungary. Schönerer shared Lagarde’s virulent anti-Semitism,498 and added to 
it an antipathy to political Catholicism and Habsburg parliamentarianism, neither of which were seen 
as sufficiently connected to the nation, and a willingness to embrace violence, chaos and 
authoritarianism. He aspired not just to the unity of German peoples, but to the ethnic domination of 
the ‘lesser’ nations of the Habsburg Empire.499 Though Schönerer was displaced as the voice of 
German nationalism in Vienna by his political rival Karl Lueger, who served as mayor of Vienna from 
1897 to 1910, Lueger married Schönerer’s anti-Semitic rhetoric to an appeal for Catholic political 
unity. Such was the extremist Pan-Germanism rife in fin de siècle Vienna, the milieu in which both 
Adolf Hitler (who acknowledged the influence of Lagarde, Schönerer and Lueger in Mein Kampf)500 
and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi would form their respective politics. Coudenhove-Kalergi would 
                                               
497 On Pan-Germanism in Germany, see R. Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-
German League, 1886-1914 (Boston: George Allen & Unwin; 1984) 
498 It is worth noting in passing Arendt’s thesis that Pan-Germanism’s embrace of anti-Semitism was integral to its 
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499 On Pan-Germanism in Austria, see Whiteside, Socialism of Fools 
500 See also the Nazi propaganda film Wien 1910 (dir. E.W. Emo; 1943), which portrayed Schönerer and Lueger as, 
respectively, the ideological and demagogic forebears of National Socialism. See R. Geehr, J. Heineman, and G. 
Herman, "Wien 1910: An Example of Nazi Anti-Semitism", Film & History: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Film 
and Television Studies 15.3 (1985) 50-64 
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later describe Vienna in these years as ‘definitely international only at its top and at its base’, while 
the middle classes were swept up in a mania of aggressive nationalism and Pan-Germanism.501 
However, the imperalist and racist ethno-centrism that characterised Pan-Germanism, and 
which Pan-Slavism increasingly tended towards, was not necessarily copied by other Pan-
movements, which borrowed the pan- prefix, but tied it to either civic-minded, federal enterprises, or 
else more diffuse projects based upon a cause rather than a prospective state. Rather, the common 
denominator was an aspiration to up-scale politics to the level of the continent. First among these 
movements to adopt the pan-regional label was the Pan-American movement, whose supporters were 
keen to retroactively claim Simon Bolívar’s attempts to unite the New World as América,502 
culminating in the 1826 Congress of Panama, as the birth of Pan-Americanism. While Bolívar did 
not use this term,503 it is easy to see how his continentalist view chimed with later activists: in his 
famous Carta de Jamaica, Bolívar had written: 
‘Would to God that some day we-might enjoy the happiness of having there an august 
Congress of representatives of the republics, kingdoms and empires of America to deal with 
the high interests of peace and of war with the nations of the other three parts of the world’504 
However, this sentiment only began to appear under the moniker of Pan-Americanism in the late 
1880s,505 as the US Secretary of State James G. Blaine pushed for, and eventually in 1889-90 
convened, the First International Conference of American States, widely known in the media of the 
                                               
501 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 48, 48-52 
502 S. Castro-Klarén, "Framing Pan-Americanism: Simón Bolívar's Findings", The New Centennial Review 3.1 (2003) 
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503 Indeed Bastert, dissenting from the popular wisdom that Bolívar was the progenitor of Pan-Americanism, argues 
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Libertador (Caracas, Venezuela), Portada de sitio, 7) Período (19 May al 19 Dic 1815) Correspondencia Oficial, 
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time as the First Pan-American Congress.506 Just as the growth of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism 
had been fuelled by mutual suspicion, so Pan-Americanism was to the spectre of Europeanism. 
Certainly, one of Blaine’s primary goals was to head off the possibility of European intervention to 
quell unrest in South America. Likewise, the prospect of a Pan-American commercial and diplomatic 
union was met with concern in Europe.507 Nevertheless, while ‘Europe’ as a geopolitical entity 
remained a spectre, Pan-America acquired from 1890 a permanent secretariat based in Washington 
DC, and from 1910 a purpose-built, million-dollar headquarters in that city for the newly renamed 
‘Pan American Union’.508 The notion had even gathered enough goodwill to be used as the theme for 
a 1901 World’s Fair, the ‘Pan-American Exposition’ held in Buffalo, NY, which would earn infamy 
as the event at which President William McKinley was assassinated. As these locations suggest, 
although Pan-American sentiment was avowedly egalitarian among all the states of the Americas, in 
practice it tacitly accepted US hegemony.509 
 Perhaps encouraged by the pace of developments, perhaps by wishful thinking, and perhaps 
from a journalist’s zeal for exaggeration in the name of publicity, in 1910 the Austrian pacifist Alfred 
Fried published Pan-Amerika, an account of the Pan-American Union that dramatically over-stated 
                                               
506 Wilgus, "James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement", passim 
507 Concern which travelled back to the US, with Harper’s Weekly reporting: ‘the assembly has been regarded with 
much more interest and even curious anticipation in Europe than in this country. It seems to be the European 
apprehension that there will be a commercial Union of the [//] North and South American states which will 
practically exclude other countries.’ (Harper’s Weekly, 12 October 1889; quoted in Wilgus, "James G. Blaine and 
the Pan American Movement", 693-694) 
508 The secretariat, from 1890 known as the ‘Commercial Bureau of the American Republics’ and from 1902 the 
‘International Commercial Bureau’, was at the Fourth International Conference of American States (held in Buenos 
Aires in 1910) renamed the ‘Pan American Union’. See "The International Bureau and Its Building", Bulletin of the 
International Bureau of the American Republics 30.5 (1910) 714-730; "The Fourth Pan American Conference", 
Bulletin of the Pan American Union 31.5 (1910) 793-818 
509 Indeed, there had been a series of multinational conferences between 1824 and 1889 to which the US was not 
invited; despite being scarcely less effective than Bolívar’s 1824 Congress (to which the US was invited), they were 
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its significance and power.510 Fried came from the same Viennese milieu,511 though as a Jewish 
pacifist he occupied the opposite end of the political spectrum to the Pan-Germanists. Rather, his was 
the Vienna of Bertha von Suttner, with whom he collaborated closely, and who had in 1891 founded 
the ‘Society for the Defense against Anti-Semitism’ (Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus).512 Fried 
was a committed internationalist, who was convinced that war could not simply be outlawed, as it 
was but ‘the symptom of a condition, that of international anarchy’.513 Therefore, he reasoned, ‘If we 
wish to substitute for war the settlement of disputes by justice, we must first substitute for the 
condition of international anarchy a condition of international order’.514 Naturally, it was the potential 
implications of a Pan-American Union upon the fabric of the international political system that Fried 
chose to dwell on, and that in 1923 Coudenhove-Kalergi reproduced. Summarising the story of its 
development from Bolívar onwards, Coudenhove-Kalergi optimistically concluded: ‘These practical 
successes of the Pan-American movement are supplemented by the ideal values which it releases. 
Under its influence a Pan-American consciousness, a Pan-American sense of solidarity, a Pan-
American public opinion, have been formed.’515 
 While Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism and Pan-Americanism516 each promoted the regional 
                                               
510 On Fried, see Sorrels, Cosmopolitan Outsiders. Fried wasn’t the only one to offer such an analysis- see also E. 
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hegemony of an established imperial power, others used the pan- moniker to oppose these powers. 
The first of these began in the 1880s as local resistance to European imperialism in Muslim lands 
started to adopt the banner of Pan-Islamism, primarily under the guidance of the movement’s prophet 
and philosopher Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghānī.517 Together with the Egyptian Islamic jurist Muhammed 
Abduh, al-Afghānī founded the anti-British Arabic newspaper al-’Urwat al-Wuthqa [‘The 
Indissoluble Link’] in 1884 in Paris, with the purposes of campaigning for ‘the unity of all Muslim 
peoples and states against Western aggression and domination’.518 By al-Afghānī’s death in 1897, 
Pan-Islamic centres had been established as far afield as Java, Tunis and Shanghai. Indeed, it was one 
of his followers, Abdullah Al-Mamun Suhrawardy, who in 1903 – on the back on a six-month stay at 
the Ronsperg estate of Heinrich Coudenhove-Kalergi – founded the Pan-Islamic Society of London, 
and established the Society’s journal, entitled simply Pan-Islam.519 
However, Pan-Islamism’s monopoly on Muslim allegiance was challenged by a swelling Pan-
Turkist movement, which called instead for the political union of Russian, Ottoman and Central Asian 
Turks,520 explicitly rejecting Pan-Islamism on the contradictory grounds that Pan-Turkism was both 
more modern (in that it was more tied to the idea of the ‘nation’) and more ancient (in that Turkic 
peoples pre-dated the founding of Islam).521 Pan-Turkism was both informed by and reacted against 
                                               
First Encounters with Pan-Asianism Ideology in the Early 1880s", The Review of Korean Studies 5.2 (2002) 195–
232) 
517 G. Young, "Pan-Islamism", in Edwin R.A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (eds.), Encyclopaedia of the social 
sciences, XV vols., vol. XI (New York: Macmillan; 1933) 542-544, 542. Regarding the various claims upon the first 
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in the 1870s’ (D.E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism", The American Historical Review 47.2 (1942) 278-287, 
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518 Snyder, Macro-nationalisms, 135 
519 Young, "Pan-Islamism", 542. Suhrawardy was credited by M.H. Kidwai as the first to use the term ‘Pan-Islamism’ 
‘in its true and correct sense’ (M.H. Kidwai, Pan-Islamism (London: Lusac & Co.; 1908), 1) 
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Russian Pan-Slavism, which had itself been exhibiting rising anti-Turkism.522 Like Pan-Islam, it too 
was embedded in the imperial power in significant ways, since it had been founded in Russia by the 
Crimean Tatar political activist Ismail Bey Gaspıralı, and the journal he edited, the Tercüman, was 
based in the Crimean Tatar city of Bahçesaray and had to be published alongside a Russian 
translation.523 Simultaneously, others in the Islamic world promoted the cause of Pan-Turanism 
(which itself varied from being synonymous with Pan-Turkism, to encompassing Finns, Hungarians 
and Japanese),524 Pan-Arabism525 and Pan-Africanism;526 as with other pan-movements, the rivalry 
tended to be rooted in academic debates about how the group in question was to be defined, which 
all too often depended on its purported racial-linguistic origins.527 This anti-colonial mirroring of 
colonial ideology extended to the spatial terms being invoked, for instance in the Cambridge-based 
Ottoman Pan-Islamist Halil Hadid’s 1907 The Crescent versus the Cross, which described a global 
‘encirclement’ of the Islamic world by the Christian world.528 This, of course, was a product as much 
of the embedding of key anti-colonial figures within imperial powers as it was of the way that 
imperialism itself created the very networks that gave oxygen to anti-colonial movements; while this 
has been well studied in relation to national liberation movements, it is equally true of anti-colonial 
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pan-movements.529 
 By the early twentieth century, pan-regional movements were in vogue, such that the 
American writer Sinclair Kennedy in 1914 recast British imperialism in terms of the unity of English-
speaking peoples (including the US), whom he called The Pan-Angles.530 Kennedy’s overly keen 
interest in race, as well as his apocalyptic tone – arguing that ‘no co-operation short of unity of 
government will form an effective means of safeguarding the Pan-Angle Civilization’531 – render him 
little more than a caricature of more significant movements elsewhere. Also in 1914, the German 
geographer Emil Deckert, despairing at the blood being shed in the name of the nationality principle, 
developed a scheme whereby Europe be reorganised into three parts, in order to reflect the ‘wider 
tribal consciousness’ represented by the Pan-Latin, Pan-Slav and Pan-Teutonic factions.532 The 
existence of such pan-regionalist claims as Kennedy’s and Deckert’s flag up the important fact that 
far from having invented the idea of a pan-movement, or even borrowing it from Fried, Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s ‘Pan-Europe’ was working within a geopolitical genre; furthermore, it was a genre freighted 
with an extraordinary amount of ideological baggage. Pan-movements were at best intimately tied to 
scientific racism, at worst to the most virulent forms of anti-Semitism. They were at best dependent 
on an ideal that tacitly collapsed state, ethnicity, race and language into a unitary whole; at worst 
complicit in aggressively expansionist and exclusionary imperialism. Coudenhove-Kalergi knew this 
well, and often portrayed WWI in terms of an inevitable clash between the expansionist forces of 
Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism.533 By contrast, while Coudenhove-Kalergi would not exactly 
exclude race and imperialism from Pan-Europeanism, he recoiled from either overt racism or war-
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mongering, instead presenting Pan-Europe as a voluntary, defensive alliance. So why did he choose 
to work within this genre? 
First and foremost, pan-regionalism to Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested a territoriality of 
politics. While this may seem self-evident today, at a time when the orthodox interpretation of 
internationalism was the League’s determinedly deterritorial universalism, the notion of 
supranational territoriality needed a name. We see this in the very first iteration of his theories, in his 
1922 article in the Neue Freie Presse, in which he embraced the terminology whole-heartedly, and 
branded the other five political world-regions [Weltteile] Pan-America, Pan-Britain, Pan-Russia and 
Pan-Mongolia.534 (By the following year, he had begun referring to the latter three regions using the 
less idiosyncratic terms British Empire, Russian Empire and East Asia.)535 While it was true that 
Pangermanism and Panslavism had merely amplified the tensions of nationalism by couching them 
in the terms of race, the examples that Coudenhove-Kalergi chose to cite were evidence that pan-
regionalism was not necessarily racial-national: both Fried’s Pan-Americanism and Suhrawardy’s 
Pan-Islamism were explicitly civic, non-national constructions. In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s eyes, what 
connected pan-regionalisms was not any similarity in the causes they promoted, but rather a shared a 
way of thinking and talking about the spatiality of politics. In order to account for this fundamental 
commonality, I will now take a step back, and place these pan-movements in their rightful context, 
as part and parcel of the development of the language and conceptual arsenal of geopolitics. 
 
 
Mitteleuropa, Weltpolitik, Metapolitik 
The efforts to campaign for pan-regions are inseparable from the intellectual history of the various 
attempts made to theorise the spatiality of international politics, theoretical developments that would 
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climax in the ‘invention’ of geopolitics at the beginning of the twentieth century. This proto-
geopolitical literature was primarily Germanic, and despite a consistent interest in politics that 
transcended the state, was largely distinct from (and even hostile to) the nineteenth-century Anglo-
French free-tradist internationalism and pacifist plans for a United States of Europe. While 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s explicit invocation of the pan- moniker flagged up the influence of 
panregionalism, the influence of Germanic proto-geopolitical theory remained for the most part 
implicit in his work, although no less obvious to his readers. In order to understand the subtleties of 
how Coudenhove-Kalergi made his argument, we must first understand the intellectual context within 
which he did so: which concepts he adopted, which he adapted, and which he kicked against. By 
doing so, we can fulfil three broad goals. First, we can recover the complexity of a literature that is 
too often seen only through the lens of the interwar German nationalists that invoked it for their own 
ends. Second, we can better understand exactly what was novel about Pan-Europe and what was 
borrowed. And third, we can begin to get a sense of the points of difference and commality between 
geopolitical and Pan-European schools of thought. 
 One of the first and most influential writers to combine the idealist abstractions of political 
economy with a ‘scientific’ appreciation of space and geography was the German economic theorist 
and publicist Friedrich List. Confronted by the byzantine mess of tariffs between the German states 
in the wake of the 1806 dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, List initially played a leading role in 
campaigning for, in the words of the 1819 petition he presented to the Federal Assembly, the ‘removal 
of all custom-duties and tolls in the interior of Germany, and the establishment of a universal German 
system founded on the principle of retaliation against foreign states’.536 During a spell abroad in the 
US in the 1820s he developed his argument further, advocating protectionism there. In the Outlines 
of American Political Economy (1827), List attacked Adam Smith’s notion of the beneficial effects 
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of free trade for describing ‘a more perfect but entirely imaginary state of the human race’ that wilfully 
ignored the question of what was in the national interest; he mocked Smith (as Herder had mocked 
the French philosophes half a century prior) for providing not a political economy, but a 
cosmopolitical economy.537 Having returned to Germany, List drew upon his first-hand experiences 
in America in his magnum opus, Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie (‘National System 
of Political Economy’, 1841), in which he expounded ‘a system which … is not founded on 
bottomless cosmopolitanism, but on the nature of things, on the lessons of history, and on the 
requirements of the nations’.538 List argued that not only was the cosmopolitan case for free trade 
premised upon a perpetually peaceful universal federation in the vein of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, it 
also disguised the fact that free trade would only serve to benefit the most developed economy, that 
of Britain.539 Furthermore, it was not free, since as the dominant maritime power, Britain in fact 
controlled trade. Once the nations of the world had attained a similar degree of industry, List reasoned, 
a truly free trade might well bring mutual benefit; until that day, it constituted a ‘chimerical 
cosmopolitanism’ that actually served British interests.540 
 List’s compromise between the theory of free trade and the practice of having to look after 
the national interest was a German Customs Union (deutsche Handels-Union), which would act as a 
unified economic unit. Although he spoke in terms of the nation, he did not mean by this the 
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exclusionary ethnic Volk of Fichte, and the Union he envisaged stretched from Holland and Belgium 
to Switzerland and the Black Sea.541 It was this that would see List universally proclaimed as the 
earliest prophet of Mitteleuropa by a later generation.542 What is important for present purposes is 
that List’s proposed union brought together three key geographical arguments. First, that a disunited 
Germany upset the European balance of power: ‘Nothing,’ List wrote, ‘so greatly impedes a closer 
union of the continent of Europe as the fact that the centre of it still never takes the position for which 
it is naturally fitted. Instead of being a mediator between the east and the west of that continent, … 
for which it is qualified by its geographical position, … this central part of Europe constitutes at 
present the apple of discord for which the east and the west contend’.543 Second, building on 
Montesquieu’s theory that the environment was a key influence upon human development,544 List 
inserted real-world geography back into Smith’s abstract globe, differentiating between the ‘countries 
of the temperate zone’ which were ‘especially fit for the development of manufacturing industry’ and 
the ‘countries of the torrid zone’ which possessed ‘the natural monopoly of many precious 
commodities which the inhabitants of temperate climates greatly prize’.545 This international division 
of labour split the world into core and periphery areas, or rather, into spheres of influence since the 
US, Britain and France each had their ‘torrid’ colonies or hinterlands. Germany’s natural hinterland, 
List argued, was south-eastern Europe; this was where German emigration ought to be directed.546 
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Third, and most groundbreaking, having been impressed by (and himself invested in) the railroad 
during his spell in the US, he argued that the economic integration of the proposed German Customs 
Union relied upon the construction of railroad infrastructure (at the time, Germany had none).547 
Commerce was the lifeblood of the nation, and the railroad made commerce more efficient. Indeed, 
List was one of the first to imagine a railway network as a network: that is, as a life-giving circulatory 
system for the nation (see fig. 17). In this way, List attached the eighteenth-century physiocrats’ 
celebration of the circulation of trade to a new technological driver, albeit while at the same time 
insisting on political limits within which such a system could work. Precisely this formula, supported 
by a very similar strategy of simultaneously campaigning in the press and via letters, pamphlets and 
petitions to prominent political figures, would later be adopted by Coudenhove-Kalergi.548 
 In the 1850s and 1860s, a variety of schemes for a Central European customs union, or 
expansion of the German Zollverein, were proposed, primarily from Austrian-affiliated supporters of 
a Großdeutsche Lösung who sought to reconcile German unification with the ethno-national 
complexity of the Austrian Empire (and beyond). From 1849 to 1859, the Austrian Karl Ludwig von 
Bruck published a series of pamphlets arguing for an enlarged customs union that would include, and 
thereby preserve, the Austrian Empire.549 Similarly, two German political economists, each later to 
                                               
547 List said: ‘In the midst of the wild Blue Mountain country [in Pennsylvania] I dreamt of a German railway system. 
It was evident to me that only through such means could the Commercial Union attain full efficiency.’ (F. List, 
Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Ludwig Häusser, III vols., vol. I: Friedrich List's Leben. Aus seinem Nachlasse (Stuttgart 
& Tübingen: J.G. Cotta'sche Verlag; 1850), 165, quoted in & translated by M.E. Hirst, Life of Friedrich List and 
Selections from his Writings (London: Smith, Elder & Co.; 1909), 58). See F. List, Ueber ein sächsisches 
Eisenbahn-System als Grundlage eines allgemeinen deutschen Eisenbahn-Systemes, und insbesondere über die 
Anlegung einer Eisenbahn von Leipzig nach Dresden (Leipzig: A.G. Liebeskind; 1833) (‘Thoughts on a Railway 
System for Saxony, as the Foundation of a System for the whole of Germany, and in particular on the building of a 
Line from Leipzig to Dresden’) 
548 This point is made by Stråth, who writes that ‘In those political entretiens to promote his ideas he [List] was the 
predecessor of later entrepreneurs for European economic cooperation such as Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and 
Jean Monnet’ (B. Stråth, "Mitteleuropa: From List to Naumann", European Journal of Social Theory 11.2 (2008) 
171–183, 178) 
549 See Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 16-18 Von Bruck was rediscovered during WWI with the 
publication of R. Charmatz, Minister Freiherr von Bruck, der Vorkämpfer Mitteleuropas; sein lebensgang und seine 
denkschriften (Leipzig: S. Hirzel; 1916) 
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gain fame as sociologists, moved to Vienna and promoted großdeutsch political projects: Lorenz von 
Stein and Albert Schäffle. While Stein’s logic leaned on balance-of-power arguments that emphasised 
the ‘geographical form of the European body’, and the significance of the centrality of Mitteleuropa 
Figure 17: Friedrich List's imagined German railway system, 1833. Source: F. List, Ueber ein 
sachsisches Eisenbahn-System als Grundlage eines allgemeinen deutschen Eisenbahn-Systems und 
insbesondere über die Anlegung einer Eisenbahn von Leipzig nach Dresden (Leipzig: H.G. Liebeskind; 
1833), front matter. See http://digital.slub-dresden.de/id394165640/6 (last accessed 29 September 
2017) 
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as a natural mediator between Western and Eastern Europe,550 Schäffle’s was a more Manichean 
vision in which a Central Europe that included France and was allied to Britain was necessary in order 
to counter the growing politico-economic threat of Russia.551 These proposals for a Mitteleuropean 
union, whether political or economic, were reactionary in their rejection of nationality as the defining 
principle of politics – Schäffle, for instance, viewed kleindeutsch liberal-nationalism as ‘an 
instrument for French hegemony in Europe’552 – but there was never any doubt that at heart, 
Mitteleuropa was Germanic. It was also highly geographical: as Hans-Dietrich Schultz and Wolfgang 
Natter have noted, in these projects ‘Seas, coastlines, river networks, mouth areas, mountains and 
plains were ascribed a role legitimising territorial divisions and zones of influence, permitting the 
differentiation between nations with “normal” and “crippled” bodies’.553 Stein, for example, 
explained that Europe’s shape was unique since on other continents river basins ran parallel, thus 
limiting the opportunities for trade to coastal ports at the mouth of the river, while territories not 
blessed with rivers or sea-coast were destined to stagnate in perpetuity.554 Efforts to divide Europe 
into homogeneous natural regions were balanced by efforts to explain Europe’s (or Germany’s) 
superiority through its diversity of natural landscapes. 
Despite this clear geographical emphasis, most academic geographers preferred to leave the 
matter of state systems to political economists.555 Nevertheless, three figures with a geographical 
background, each of whom spent significant periods in the US, did engage with these questions in the 
                                               
550 ‘geographischen Gestalt des europäischen Körpers’, L.v. Stein, Oesterreich und der Frieden (Vienna: Wilhelm 
Braumüller; 1856), 6; see also L.v. Stein, Die Grundlagen und Aufgaben des künftigen Friedens (Vienna: Verlag 
von Eduard Hügel; 1856) 
551 R.J. Gentry, "Organic Social Thought and Mitteleuropa: Albert Schäffle's Response to Modernization in Central 
Europe", Austrian History Yearbook 17 (1981) 57-79; Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 25 
552 Gentry, "Organic Social Thought and Mitteleuropa", 66 
553 Schultz and Natter, "Imagining Mitteleuropa", 278 
554 Stein, Oesterreich und der Frieden, 6 
555 While the nineteenth-century academic geography did include a human element, this was generally limited to 
speaking in general terms of the interactions of man and nature, occasionally of ‘nations’, but very rarely of 
political formations. For an influential work than exemplifies this approach, see Ritter’s 1852 Einleitung zur 
allgemeinen vergleichenden geographie, translated as C. Ritter, Geographical Studies by the late Professor Carl 
Ritter of Berlin, trans. William Leonhard Gage (Boston: Gould and Lincoln; 1863) 
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second half of the nineteenth century. First, Johann Georg Kohl, a pioneering transportation and urban 
geographer, who before his own American sojourn had argued for the unity of the Danube basin as 
the key to a healthy and productive German territory, though this argument was made in the context 
of a warning of a Russian-Turkish plot to seize the Danube delta, and thereby ‘cut the throat’ of this 
territorial unity.556 Significantly, Kohl used ‘Mitteleuropa’ in a political sense to describe ‘the entirety 
of all German and Austrian states along with their smaller neighbouring states of Switzerland, 
Belgium, Holland, and Denmark’, whereas the physical region whose borders were admittedly vague 
he termed ‘Central Europe’.557 Second, Julius Fröbel, a German geologist and political activist who 
was one of the leaders of the democrats during the 1848 revolutions, and a member of the Frankfurt 
Parliament. Fröbel argued that ‘the circumstances of our era dictate the creation of a confederation 
comprising all Germany, Poland, and Hungary plus the South Slav and Wallachian areas, united under 
a constitution similar to that of the United States, with Vienna as its federal capital’.558 After the 
dissolution of the Parliament in 1849, he went in exile to the US, before returing to Germany in 1857 
and on to Vienna in 1863, where like Stein and Schäffle he again campaigned for a großdeutsch union. 
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Ritter follower Ernst Kapp, who like Fröbel was forced to 
leave Germany after the revolutions of 1848, and with Fröbel joined the Freidenker community 
established in Sisterdale, Texas, of whose society Kapp was elected president.559 
With regard to his promotion of großdeutsch politics, most prominently in the 1845 
                                               
556 J.G. Kohl, "Die streitenden Interessen Oesterreichs und Deutschlands auf der einen und Rußlands auf der andern 
Seite an den Donaumündungen und am schwarzen Meere", Deutsche Vierteljahrs Schrift 1.1 (1849) 99-132 (“The 
conflicting interests of Austria and Germany on the one hand, and Russia on the other, concerning the banks of the 
Danube and the Black Sea”); Schultz and Natter, "Imagining Mitteleuropa", 280 
557 Schultz and Natter, "Imagining Mitteleuropa", 281; no citation given 
558 J. Fröbel, Wien, Deutschland und Europa (Vienna: Joseph Keck & Sohn; 1848), 13; quoted in (& translated by) 
Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 21 
559 See R.L. Biesele, The History of the German Settlements in Texas: 1831-1861 (Austin, TX: Von Boeckmann-Jones 
Company; 1930), 171-173; E.E. Scharf, "‘Freethinkers’ Of the Early Texas Hill Country", Freethought Today (April 
1998); G.E. Lich, "Sisterdale, TX", Handbook of Texas Online (Austin, TX: Texas State Historical Association; 
2010) 
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Philosophische oder vergleichende allgemeine Erdkunde (‘Philosophical or Comparative Universal 
Geography’), Kapp was important in three regards. First, like others, Kapp emphasised its central 
position [Mittellage], though for Kapp this went beyond geostrategic considerations and encompassed 
physical and metaphysical unity, harmony and balance, which gave Germany ‘an all-surpassing 
standpoint’,560 and therefore bestowed upon it the task of determining the fate of the world.561 
Second, combining the influences of Hegel and Ritter, Kapp viewed the German 
Confederation both dynamically and organically, calling it ‘a new and promising form’,562 a 
‘prototype’ or ‘model’ of an ‘organic confederation’ or ‘state-organism’ that would soon spread across 
Europe and the world.563 It was not an end-point, but an evolutionary process,564 and one which 
possessed a spatial dimension: 
‘The German Zollverein is the core, which is surrounded by tendencies ever larger and ever 
wider, the core and surely the first prototype of a great oceanic trade policy, which, in 
accordance with its gradual expansion though ever-new unions, first of course of all the 
German states and then of all the neighbouring states, must destroy one customs barrier after 
another.’565 
The mention of an oceanic trade policy connected this into a grand progressivist theory of Kapp’s 
that civilisations pass through three aquatically-defined ‘stages of political geography’: a prehistoric 
                                               
560 ‘einem alle überragenden Standpunct’, E. Kapp, Philosophische oder vergleichende allgemeine Erdkunde als 
wissenschaftliche Darstellung der Erdverhältnisse und des Menschenlebens nach ihrem inneren Zusammenhang, II 
vols., vol. II (Braunschweig: George Westermann; 1845), 298. Physically, Germany was said to contain ‘the 
greatest variety of harmonically ordered natural forms’ in Europe (‘die größte Abwechslung harmonisch geordneter 
Naturformen’; Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, II, 332) 
561 Schultz, "Fantasies of Mitte", 319. Kapp wrote that ‘as the body’s centre of life [Lebenspunct] is the heartbeat, so 
the whole world’s geographical and historical centre of unity [Einheitspunct] is Germany.’ (‘der ganzen Welt, wie 
der Körper im Herzschlag seinen Lebenspunct hat, in Deutschland ihr geographischer und historischer 
Einheitspunct gegeben sei.’ Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, II, 300) 
562 ‘eine neue zukunftreiche Gestalt.’ Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, II, 328 
563 Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, II, 332 
564 On the development of evolutionary thinking in the mid-nineteenth century, see J.W. Burrow, Evolution and 
Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1966); T. Ingold, Evolution 
and Social Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1986) 
565 ‘Der deutsche Zollverein ist der Kern, welcher sich rings durch neue Ansätze immer mehr vergrößern und erweitern 
wird, der Kern und das freilich erst werdende Musterbild einer großartigen oceanischen Handelspolitik, welche in 
Uebereinstimmung mit seiner allmäligen Ausdehnung durch immer neues Anschluß, erst natürlich aller deutschen 
und dann der Nachbarstaaten, ein Zollschranke nach der andern vernichten muß.’ (Kapp, Philosophische der 
Erdkunde, II, 336) 
 
152 
 
‘potamian’ culture centred on rivers, a classical ‘thalassic’ era centred on closed seas, and an 
expansionist ‘oceanic’ era.566 Whereas the thalassic era favoured the ‘Romance states’ on the 
‘Mediterranean side of Europe’, Kapp argued that the oceanic era favoured the ‘Germanic states’ on 
the ‘oceanic side of Europe’; in other words, politics was both up-scaling, and being recentred on 
Germany. 
Kapp’s third contribution to the theorisation of großdeutsch politics came a little later. After 
returning to Europe following the American Civil War, Kapp re-entered academic life, though like 
List his American experiences had made him profoundly interested in technology. The central thesis 
of his 1877 Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik (‘Principles of a Philosophy of Technology’) 
was that ‘humans unconsciously transfer form, function and the normal proportions of their body to 
the works of their hands’, which ran from simple tools to complex machines and even political 
systems.567 Thus, he devoted a chapter to analysing how the railway system imitated the structure of 
the circulatory system, and another to how the form of the state replicated that of a biological 
organism.568 Kapp’s argument was not simply that politics was unconsciously designed according to 
an organic model; it was that an organic model was necessary to best serve humanity, and that a more 
self-conscious, machine-like, technical-rational design would prove deathly.569 Crucially, what Kapp 
was providing was a justification for treating the state as an organism. This spoke to the growing trend 
                                               
566 Kapp, Philosophische der Erdkunde, v. I (potamian and thalassic stages) & II (oceanic stage) 
567 E. Kapp, Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik. Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Cultur aus neuen 
Gesichtspunkten (Braunschweig: George Westermann; 1877), v-vi; quoted in and translated by P. Brey, "Theories of 
technology as extension of human faculties", in Carl Mitcham (ed.), Metaphysics, epistemology, and technology 
(London: Elsevier/JAI Press; 2000) 
568 Kapp, Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik, Ch.7, “Dampfmaschine und Schienenweg” (“Steam engine and 
railroad”), pp.126-138; Ch. 13, “Der Staat”, pp.307-351. The latter metaphor was by no means new, and is perhaps 
best seen as a nineteenth-century adaptation of the ancient metaphor of the body politic. For the legal, theological 
and philosophal complexity and implications of this metaphor in the mediaeval period, see E.H. Kantorowicz, The 
King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1957) 
569 For Kapp, a state ‘remains an organism and is never a machine’ ‘bleibt Organismus und ist nie eine Maschine’ 
(Kapp, Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik, 344); see also Brey, "Theories of technology as extension of 
human faculties" 
 
153 
 
for treating society as an organism, sparked by Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer,570 and elaborated 
most fully by the advocate of Mitteleuropa Schäffle in his 1875-1878 work Bau und Leben des Soziale 
Körpers (‘Structure and Life of the Social Body’), in which Schäffle undertook a forensic 
examination of the ‘biology’ of the ‘social body’.571 
 Though Bismarck’s 1871 unification of the kleindeutsch German Empire pushed 
Mitteleuropean schemes out of mainstream political discussion,572 in the work of the Prussian 
political theorist Constantin Frantz this exclusion merely served to sharpen his political theorisations 
of an anti-Bismarckian, multinational großdeutsch polity. Like Schäffle, he opposed the adoption of 
political theory based on the French idealisation of the nation-state, which he argued was unjustified 
in – and detrimental to – the ethnically mixed central European lands.573 As a Young Hegelian 
(alongside Kapp), Frantz too argued that politics was dynamic, and that it was absurd to become 
‘obsessed with narrow nationalism’ at a time when ‘the astonishingly increased means of 
communication, and the resulting movement of goods and persons, together with the circulation of 
capital and ideas, demand, as a matter of course, universal association and co-operation’; Germany 
was thus acting ‘in patently obvious contradiction to the real conditions of development of our age’.574 
Like List, he saw this development as being driven by technology, chiefly the rapidly expanding 
                                               
570 H. Spencer, "The Social Organism [1860]", Essays: scientific, political, and speculative (Second series) (London 
and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate; 1863) 143-184. First published in The Westminster Review for January 1860 
571 A.E.F. Schäffle, Bau und Leben des Soziale Körpers, IV vols. (Tübingen: H. Laupp'schen; 1875-1878); S.A. 
Reinert, "Darwin and the Body Politic: A Note on Schäffle, Veblen and the Shift of Biological Metaphor in 
Economics", in Jürgen G. Backhaus (ed.), Albert Schäffle (1831-1903): the legacy of an underestimated economist 
(Hanau: Haag + Herchen; 2010) 129-152. As per his earlier advocacy of a Mitteleuropean union, Schäffle was not 
insistent that linguistic and national unity was absolutely necessary within the social body, and argued that a 
decentralised, federative system could also secure a ‘happy, free and peaceful political life’ (Schäffle, Bau und 
Leben des Soziale Körpers, I, 317) 
572 Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 29 
573 Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 26 
574 ‘Statt dessen hat man sich in enge Nationalitätstendenzen verrannt, welche in den tatsächlichen Verhältnissen gar 
keinen Anhalt mehr finden, wo vielmehr die so erstaunlich gesteigerten Kommunikationsmittel, und der daraus 
entsprungene Waren- und Personenverkehr, nebst der Zirkulation der Kapitalien und der Gedanken, wie von selbst 
zu allgemeiner Vereinigung und zum Zusammenwirken auffordern. … — da soll dieses Deutschland, im 
offenbarsten Widerspruch zu den realen Entwicklungsbedingungen unsres Zeitalters’ (C. Frantz, "Offener Brief an 
Richard Wagner", Bayreuther Blätter 1.6 (June) (1878) 149-170, 161) 
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railway network, and Frantz drew out the spatial implication: ‘the railways make the individual 
European countries ever smaller’.575 Therefore, he argued, 
‘in order to develop a truly German political science, instead of coming up with with theories 
about the state [Staatstheorien], we must look back to the example of the Holy Roman Empire, 
which is the only way to understand that Germany should be recognised as a supra-state 
[überstaatliches] and supra-national [übernationales] entity.’576 
Frantz proposed a federal system of unique states that would retain their individual character, but be 
economically and militarily united into a mitteleuropäische Bund. Together, they would constitute an 
‘occidental community of nations’ [abendlandischen Völkergemeinschaft], reuniting the Christian 
churches, though Frantz envisaged this union as being culturally Germanic, as well as being riven 
with an explicit antisemitism.577 
After 1871, such a scheme was no longer part of the political conversation, but Frantz was 
most influential in the way he shifted discussion onto a different plane: he was arguing for a federal 
system, but he was also arguing for a political theory in which such a federal system became self-
evident. In his own terms, he argued for ‘a metapolitics [Metapolitik], which stands in a similar 
relation to common school-politics as metaphysics does to physics’.578 What differentiated meta-
politics from Bismarckian realpolitik (the clear target of the ‘school-politics’ jibe) was not that it 
escaped a German parochialism: Frantz’s was self-professedly still a German standpoint. Rather, it 
was in part a matter of theoretical abstraction (focusing on the game rather than the players), and in 
part a matter of scale. In the latter regard, Frantz was also notable for enlarging the canvas upon which 
                                               
575 ‘Machen also die Eisenbahnen die einzelnen europäischen Länder immer kleiner’ (C. Frantz, Die Weltpolitik unter 
besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland, III vols., vol. I (Chemnitz: Ernst Schmeitzner; 1882), 127) 
576 ‘Damit sich also eine wirklich deutsche politische Wissenschaft entwickle, müssen wir, statt uns in Staatstheorien 
zu versuchen, vielmehr auf das Vorbild des heiligen römischen Reiches zurückblicken, welches eben nur dadurch 
an verstehen ist, dass Deutschland als ein überstaatliches und übernationales Wesen erkannt wird.’ (Frantz, 
"Offener Brief an Richard Wagner", 168-169) 
577 On Frantz’s antisemitism, see P.L. Rose, German Question/Jewish Question: Revolutionary Antisemitism from Kant 
to Wagner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; 1990), Ch. 19, “The Chosen Race and the Revolution: 
Constantin Frantz’s Revolutionary Christian Federalism”, 341-357 
578 ‘Sie muss sich zur Metapolitik erheben, als welche sich zur gemeinen Schulpolitik ähnlich verhält, wie zur Physik 
die Metaphysik’ (Frantz, "Offener Brief an Richard Wagner", 169) 
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international relations were discussed, upscaling the frame of analysis from Europe to the world, from 
the national politics of yesterday to the Weltpolitik (i.e. world-politics) of today.579 Orthodox political 
maxims were no longer relevant, Frantz claimed, and his new Weltpolitik was needed to analyse the 
ever-more interconnected present:580 
‘The combinations multiply, the spheres of action expand; everything goes to a massive scale, 
and the world powers [Weltmächte] rise above the so-called great powers [Großmächte].’581 
The ‘world powers’ in question were the US and Russia, whose large territorial bases set them apart 
from the ‘artificial’, and therefore impermanent, world power of Britain.582 They constituted an 
existential threat to Europe, thus providing an external imperative to match Frantz’s internal 
imperatives for Europe to unite. Thus, wrote Frantz, ‘Weltpolitik and federalism are merely two sides 
of the same coin’.583 In this two-sided rhetorical framework, and in the dynamic sense of history that 
underpinned each side, there is much that would be later echoed by Pan-Europeans, though equally 
Frantz’s Germanocentrism and antisemitism also offered much consonant with National Socialist 
doctrine. While Frantz would thus prove a contested figure, the concept of Weltpolitik soon escaped 
his own definition, instead entering the popular lexicon as a byword for Wilhelmine expansionism.584 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, then, many of the shared building blocks of Pan-
Europeanism and geopolitics had been developed. Though they drew on both the universalist theories 
of the eighteenth-century philosophes and the revolutionary nationalism of the nineteenth century, the 
language and arguments that we have traced trod a line in between these poles, rejecting both the 
                                               
579 Weitzmann notes that Weltpolitik was this was ‘a term he [Frantz] did not create but which he developed more fully 
than any one had before.’ (W.R. Weitzmann, "Constantin Frantz, Germany and Central Europe: An Ambiguous 
Legacy", in Peter M.R. Stirk (ed.), Mitteleuropa: History and Prospects (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; 
1994) 36-60, 51; citing H. Gollwitzer, Geschichte des weltpolitischen Denkens, II vols., vol. I: Vom Zeitalter der 
Entdeckungen bis zum Beginn des Imperialismus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; 1972), 472-483) 
580 Frantz, 1882-83, Die Weltpolitik unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland (III vols) 
581 ‘Die Combinationen vervielfältigen sich, die Wirkungsphären erweitern sich; alles geht in das Massenhafte, und 
über die bisher sogenannten Großmächte erheben sich die Weltmächte.’ (Frantz, Weltpolitik, I, iv) 
582 Frantz, Weltpolitik, I, Ch. IV: “Die neue Welt und Rußland”, 71-101; Weitzmann, "Constantin Frantz, Germany and 
Central Europe", 51; S. Neitzel, Weltmacht oder Untergang: die Weltreichslehre im Zeitalter des Imperialismus 
(Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh; 2000), 50 
583 ‘Weltpolitik und Föderalismus nur zwei Seiten der einen und selben Sache’ (C. Frantz, Die Weltpolitik unter 
besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland, III vols., vol. III (Chemnitz: Ernst Schmeitzner; 1883), 221) 
584 Weitzmann, "Constantin Frantz, Germany and Central Europe", 55-56 
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former’s abstract cosmopolitanism and the latter’s restrictive idealisation of the nation-state. The 
former was a front for British interests, the latter a front for French interests; neither served German 
interests. Rather, these writers promoted regionalist ideas for a Mitteleuropean or großdeutsch union, 
schemes which invoked different logics, and thus conjured a different conception of the spatiality of 
politics. Namely: (i) an abstract sense of political space, in particular the notion of ‘centrality’ in 
determining Germany’s political role (for List and von Stein) and even its national character (for 
Kapp); (ii) a concern for the influence of physical geography upon politics, whether that be List’s 
imperial-colonial differentiation between temperate and torrid zones, Kohl’s idealisation of the unity 
of the Danube basin, or Stein’s more general obsession with how landscape determined political 
development; (iii) an upscaling of the scope of political analysis from Europe to the globe, starting 
with Schäffle’s vision of Europe facing off against a Russian superpower, and climaxing with Frantz’s 
notion of Weltpolitik; (iv) use of the metaphor of an organism for the political-economic unit, based 
upon List’s insistence on a sharp inside/outside bounding of the national economy, moving through 
Kapp’s early treatment of the state as an organism rather than a machine, to Kapp and Schäffle’s 
respective justification and examination of this metaphor; and (v) a dynamic view of politics as 
evolutionary rather than static, with particular regard to the technological innovation of the railroad 
that was compressing space and enabling polities to unite and grow larger. Though the notion of a 
Mitteleuropean union remained a political fantasy, these developments in political theory were deeply 
intertwined with real-world change: notably, the unification of Germany and Italy into integral, 
‘modern’ states; the emergence of the United States as a potential superpower; the European 
emigration to the United States [Auswanderung] that raised concerns about Europe’s populousness 
and offered firsthand witnesses to the pace and scale of American political life; the extension of 
European colonial structures across the globe (especially following the ‘scramble for Africa’); and 
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the attendant ‘closure’ of political space.585 It was from these building blocks, these spatio-temporal 
logics and realities, that both geopolitics and Pan-Europeanism would be constructed.586  
 
Geopolitik 
The emergence of geopolitics in the work of Ratzel, Mackinder and Kjellén, the latter of whom would 
coin the term in 1899,587 has been thoroughly documented by geographers.588 Without wishing to 
retread the links between these figures and interwar geopolitik, it is necessary to draw out some of 
the links between their work and Pan-Europeanism, as well as linking each of these schools of thought 
to the early-twentieth-century renewal of the idea of a political Mitteleuropa. 
 For all the context we have reviewed, Friedrich Ratzel’s role is not to be underplayed. He 
synthesised and clarified a geopolitical way of thinking, and established it within the discipline of 
geography, at a point at which geography was veering away from human topics. Ratzel had himself 
been trained as a zoologist, but began applying biological models to the study of people during a 
formative spell travelling around North America from 1873 to 1875 as a correspondent for the 
Kölnische Zeitung.589 Like List, Kohl, Fröbel and Kapp before him, Ratzel was profoundly struck by 
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the accelerated processes of urbanisation and economic development that he saw in the US, fuelled 
by the rapid expansion of commerce and transportantion infrastructure.590 Having left a natural 
scientist, Ratzel returned to Europe a geographer,591 and set about constructing a scientifically law-
seeking human geography that fused an emphasis on man’s connection with the land with an organic 
model of the nation-state. 
 Ratzel’s most infamous concept, that of Lebensraum (‘living space’),592 was most fully 
developed in a 1901 paper for a Festgabe in honour of Albert Schäffle.593 In this paper, Ratzel 
interpreted international relations in social-Darwinist fashion as a perpetual fight for space among the 
state-organisms that Schäffle had described, with the strongest organisms naturally winning the 
largest territories. Territory was both abstract, quantified by its areal size, and real, since a stronger 
‘grip on the land’ would mean greater productivity, thereby reciprocally strengthening the Volk.594 
There was also a colonial dimension, as Lebensraum was subdivided into ‘living space’ [Wohnraum] 
and the much larger ‘feeding space’ [Ernährungsraum], to be sought in temperate colonies.595 
Ratzel’s paper devoted a great deal of attention the borders that separted state-organisms, which he 
argued were neither fixed nor linear, but were rather dynamic ‘fringes’, ‘regions’ or ‘seams’, of which 
                                               
and Political Geography of Germany and the United States", in Henk Van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch, and Wolfgang 
Zierhofer (eds.), B/ordering Space (Aldershot: Ashgate; 2005) 171-186; Bassin, "Imperialism and the nation state in 
Ratzel", 489n11 
590 Natter, "Friedrich Ratzel’s Spatial Turn"  
591 Natter, "Friedrich Ratzel’s Spatial Turn", 176; citing K. Hassert, "Friedrich Ratzel. Sein Leben und Wirken", 
Geographische Zeitschrift 11.6-7 (1905) 305-325, 361-380 
592 Though he did not invent it, Ratzel certainly popularised this term. On the specific genealogy of Lebernsraum, see 
W.D. Smith, The ideological origins of Nazi imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press; 1986); 
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593 F. Ratzel, "Der Lebensraum. Eine biogeographische Studie", in Karl BüCher et al. (eds.), Festgaben für Albert 
Schäffle zur siebenzigsten Wiederkehr seines Geburtstages am 24. Februar 1901 (Tübingen: H. Laupp'schen 
Buchhandlung; 1901) 101-89 
594 Thus, Ratzel reasoned, the North American Indians lost out because they had ‘but a weak grip on the soil’. (‘nur 
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a line on a map was merely a spatial abstraction and temporal snapshot.596 Where in previous 
theorisations of the state as organism, the border functioned merely as skin, for Ratzel the border was 
an organ, as well as the battlefield in the fight for space. 
 If Ratzel’s view of the fight for space proposed a dynamic view of political geography, he 
accompanied this with a dynamic view of political history. Like Kapp, Schäffle and Frantz, he saw a 
historical tendency towards a world divided into fewer and larger political spaces, or großräumige 
Politik (‘large-area politics’). Thus, he wrote in 1896 that: 
‘The most remarkable trait in the present-day division of the earth—the powerful size of some 
few states—is a characteristic which has arisen in the last centuries and has been further 
developed and strengthened in our own time.’597 
Specifically, he noted that ‘The British Empire (and within it Canada and Australia in their own right), 
the Asiatic-European empire of Russia, the United States of America, China, and Brazil, are states of 
a heretofore unprecedented size’.598 Ratzel used these empirical observations to hypothesise ‘the laws 
of the spatial growth of states’,599 for which the explanation he offered was twofold: on one hand, he 
theorised that the area of the state grows with its culture and level of civilisation,600  on the other, that 
the expansion of communication technologies and commerce were responsible for the tendency 
toward ‘enlargement’ of political space. (This latter circulatory logic was further developed by Arthur 
Dix, who emphasised the role of means of communication in determining the direction of 
expansion.)601 The implications of Ratzel’s ‘laws’ of political geography were clear, particularly with 
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regard to the fate of Europe: 
‘the drive toward the building of continually larger states continues throughout the entirety of 
history. We see it active in the present where, in continental Europe, the conviction of the 
necessity of joining together, at least economically, against the giants of Russia, North 
America, and the British Empire is awakening.’602 
As this passage hints, despite his links to the Pan-German movement,603 Ratzel ultimately moved 
towards supporting the idea of a Mitteleuropean federation. 
In a 1901 article for the conservative-nationalist journal Die Grenzboten, written from the 
perspective of a returnee to Europe from America, Ratzel argued that Germany’s central position 
within Europe burdened it with three pressing tasks in order to survive. The first two, maintainance 
of its position of power and retention of the German people, both required absolute defence of the 
borders of nation [Volksgrenze] and state [Staatsgrenzen]. However, Ratzel warned, the third task 
potentially ran counter to these imperatives, since Germany also needed to ‘put all her energies into 
the unification of the Mitteleuropean powers that lie between the world-powers of England, Russia 
and North America’.604 He struck a rather melancholy tone: 
‘My old eyes, which have become accustomed to American dimensions, can no longer see the 
purported contrasts between peoples in Europe as being that significant … At the risk of being 
denied the character of a realpolitiker, if one tenth the ink that had been spilled on sentimental, 
boorish enthusiasm had instead been devoted to a mitteleuropäischen Zollverein, I would 
consider it a tremendously propitious national investment.’605 
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We see here Ratzel’s scalar logic outweighing the organic unity of the state-Volk-territory; in his own 
terms, großräumige Politik trumped Nationalitätenpolitik.606 Indeed, the nature of the Volk itself was 
ambivalent in Ratzel’s work, with the reader sometimes invited to see it biologically as a breed or 
species that needed to avoid intermixing with other groups,607 and sometimes told that the biological 
racism of Gobineau and H.S. Chamberlain was erroneous608 and the Volk was defined by a shared 
connection to the land rather than shared blood.609 While many of Ratzel’s followers would 
enthusiastically apply his theories to the imperial nation-state, Ratzel himself was clear that the 
nation-state was retrograde, and that a new form of political organisation was necessary; this 
reasoning was taken up equally enthusiastically by Pan-Europeans. 
 The German treatment of the spatial and geographical logics that underpinned world politics 
first appeared in Anglophone literature in the American naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer 
Mahan’s 1890 text The Influence of Sea Power upon History, which asserted the importance of naval 
dominance in world-politics (and argued that the US needed to usurp Britain’s role controlling the 
seas). Mahan’s ideas were swiftly re-imported back to Germany, influencing both Ratzel’s 1900 Das 
Meer als Quelle der Völkergrösse (‘The Sea as Source of National Greatness’) and the naval advocacy 
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of the secretary of state of the German Imperial Naval Office, Alfred von Tirpitz.610 
In Britain, the geographer Halford Mackinder saw an opportunity (or, in his eyes, necessity) 
to analyse these forces in a continental setting: 
‘Neither in London nor in New York were International Politics commonly discussed in the 
way in which they are discussed in the cafés of Continental Europe. In order, therefore, to 
appreciate the Continental view we must remove our standpoint from without to within the 
great ring of the Coasts.’611 
Mackinder’s vision was first, and most influentially, laid out in his January 1904 address to the Royal 
Geographical Society, entitled ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’.612 Consciously drawing upon the 
teachings of ‘Captain Mahan’,613 and perhaps unconsciously upon the aquatic-civilisational 
arguments of Kapp (Carl Schmitt would later explicitly bring together Kapp and Mackinder’s 
theories),614 Mackinder emphasised that the ‘Columbian epoch’ of the expansion of maritime 
European powers across the globe was at its end, and that a new phase of political history was thus 
beginning: 
‘From the present time forth, in the post-Columbian age, we shall again have to deal with a 
closed political system, and none the less that it will be one of world-wide scope. Every 
explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown 
space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak 
elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in 
consequence.’615 
The chief implications for this newly closed system was that Mahan’s sea power, so crucial in the age 
of exploration, was about to be eclipsed in importance by land power, aided by the development of 
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railways (see fig. 18, the continentalist successor to List’s imagined national railway depicted in 
fig. 17).616 In the new continental era, the ‘pivot region’ at the centre of the Eurasian landmass was 
transformed from being an inaccessible, landlocked irrelevance to an invulnerable heartland from 
which to control the entire continent. 
 In his 1904 paper, Mackinder was driven by the fear that if Russia forged enough alliances, it 
would become the preeminent world power; in this, he was echoing the Russophobia of political 
economists like Frantz and Schäffle, and Pan-Germanists like Lagarde. By 1919, Mackinder was far 
more interested in the fate of Central Europe, which now fell inside an expanded ‘Heartland’ area; 
instead of worrying that Germany would play kingmaker, he now worried it would seize the throne 
itself if it had the chance. He certainly had a keen interest in Mitteleuropean aspirations, and in 1903 
had commissioned Joseph Partsch (who, upon Ratzel’s death in 1904, would succeed him as professor 
of geography at Leipzig) to write the ‘Central Europe’ volume of Mackinder’s Regions of the World 
series. Though Partsch restricted himself to largely apolitical discussion of the natural, cultural and 
economic unity of the region,617 he described a Mitteleuropa that stretched from the Low Countries 
to the Black Sea.618 This work firmly established Mitteleuropa as a geographical category,619 and Karl 
Haushofer for one believed that the credit was Mackinder’s rather than Partsch’s.620 Curiously, in 
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1919 Mackinder chose to speak of an ‘East Europe’ that stretched from Germany to Moscow, though 
he left no doubt of its geo-strategic significance is his famous epigram:  
‘Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: 
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: 
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.’621 
Well aware that in the post-war negotiations the political geography of Europe was ‘fluid’,622 
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Figure 18: Halford Mackinder's imagined continental railway system, 1919. Source: H.J. Mackinder, 
Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (London: Constable and 
Company; 1919), p.144-5 
165 
 
Mackinder argued that war could not be legislated away, and that a solution needed to be etched into 
Europe’s political geography.623 However, Mackinder was as unabashedly partisan as Frantz had 
been, and despite expounding a political philosophy of Great Power politics, he advocated for a 
solution that would neutralize German aspirations, insisting that delegates at the Paris Peace 
Conference ‘reduce the German people to its proper position in the world’ by dividing East Europe 
‘like West Europe’ into ‘self-contained nations’, thus inserting ‘a tier of independent States between 
Germany and Russia’.624 
 Mackinder’s fears of the potential power of a German-controlled heartland, ‘under modern 
railway conditions’ no less,625 had been stoked by a surge in German literature during WWI that had 
advocated for precisely such a political Mitteleuropa. It was a particularly popular topic amongst 
geographers,626 who had responded to Alfred Hettner’s wartime call to follow Ratzel’s lead and 
embrace political geography so that German foreign policy might be able to call upon its insights.627 
Perhaps the most significant interventions were made by Hugo Hassinger, who rooted an expanding 
Mitteleuropa in landschaft geography,628 and Albrecht Penck, whose ‘Zwischeneuropa’ extended 
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Mitteleuropa as far north as Scandinavia and as far south as Greece, and which Penck believed would 
pave the way for a United States of Europe.629 
However, among the general public, by far the most popular of these works was the journalist 
(and erstwhile Lutheran pastor) Friedrich Naumann’s bestselling 1915 book entitled simply 
Mitteleuropa.630 In his introduction to the 1916 English translation of Naumann’s work (as Central 
Europe), the British economic historian William Ashley offered a rather double-edged assessment of 
its influence: 
‘If, as I believe to be the case, the idea of an organised and close-knit Central Europe as one 
of the world-Powers of the future has by this time come to be the dominating thought in 
German politics, Naumann’s book has undoubtedly done much for its diffusion. … [What] 
makes his book all the more worthy of serious attention in this country […is that…] it is so 
largely the formulation of current German thought, and so little, in essence, original’.631 
Though Ashley’s apparent ungenerousness owes much to the wartime hysteria, his last point was 
largely accurate: Naumann’s originality lay in his accessible style, and in his foregrounding of the 
Mitteleuropa plans that had not been exposed to mainstream political discussion since unification.632 
Naumann began with the now-familiar argument that politics was being scaled up: 
‘All the allies in the Great War feel without argument that neither now nor in the future can 
small or even moderate-sized Powers play any large part in the world. Our conceptions of size 
have entirely changed. … The spirit of large-scale industry and of super-national 
[überstaatlichen] organisation has seized politics. People think, as Cecil Rhodes once 
expressed it, “in Continents”.’633 
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Naumann proceeded to describe a ‘new super-national structure’ in which there were three great world 
powers – the British Empire, the US and Russia.634 He believed that the present war would determine 
whether Mitteleuropa could function as a (mostly) self-reliant fourth world power, or whether 
European nations would be fated to become mere ‘satellite States’ of the three established world 
powers. Again, this process was seen as driven by time-space compression, with Naumann asking 
rhetorically: ‘What is a territory of half a million square kilometres to-day? It has become a single 
day’s journey’.635 The force of these logics was, for Naumann, unstoppable: the day of individual 
states was past, their continued sovereignty illusory at best. Mitteleuropa was not merely 
advantageous, it was necessary.636 
Naumann described the nature of this new Mitteleuropa as an Oberstaat (Christabel 
Meredith’s contemporary translation was ‘super-State’),637 which he saw ‘as a brotherhood of many 
members, as a defensive alliance, as a single economic district’.638 It would begin with the nucleus of 
a union of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and then welcome accession from Romania, Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Greece, perhaps the Netherlands and Switzerland, perhaps even eventually France and Italy.639 
However, Naumann was extremely wary of Mitteleuropa being perceived as merely a greater 
Germany, acknowledging that past projects had been ‘almost always conceived from a one-sided 
German standpoint’, and that such arrogance had harmed their chances of success.640  By contrast, 
Naumann was at pains to point out that in his project, accession would be voluntary, and that while 
Mitteleuropa would naturally take German as its language, it ‘must from the outset display toleration 
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and flexibility in regard to all the neighbouring languages that are associated with it’.641 Indeed, 
judged on its content, Naumann’s book was far more conciliatory towards other nationalities that its 
predecessors had been; reviewing it in The Geographical Teacher, G.C. Chisholm admitted that ‘one 
may even find in Naumann’s book much that is consonant with the proposals that have been put 
forward for the formation of a League of Nations’.642 However, Naumann’s book rarely was judged 
on its content, and instead it became widely understood simply as an example of the Pan-German 
militarist desire to dominate Central Europe, and establish an enlarged German state there.643 
 This was the case even among those who spoke in support of Naumann’s plans, including the 
Swedish political scientist and politician Rudolf Kjellén. Though he coined the name ‘geopolitics’ in 
a Swedish-language article in 1899, and had expanded on these ideas in his 1905 book Stormakterna 
(‘The Great Powers’),644 it wasn’t until 1914 that Kjellén’s Ratzel-inspired political geography began 
to reach a wider audience. This breakthrough began with the translation of an updated edition of this 
book (retitled Samtidens stormakter, or ‘The Great Powers of Today’) into German as Die 
Großmächte der Gegenwart, published a month after the outbreak of war.645 Kjellén’s most important 
book in terms of offering a complete theorisation of geopolitics, Staten som lifsform (‘The State as a 
                                               
641 Naumann, Central Europe, 108 
642 Chisholm, "Central Europe as an economic unit", 129 
643 Stirk, "The Idea of Mitteleuropa", 14; Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action; G. Parker, "French 
geopolitical thought in the interwar years and the emergence of the European idea", Political Geography Quarterly 
6.2 (1987) 145-150, 145. Masaryk and R.W. Seton-Watson’s The New Europe journal was set up in part as a 
counter-offensive to Mitteleuropean thinking. 
644 Kjellén, "Studier öfver Sveriges politiska gränser"; R. Kjellén, Stormakterna. Konturer kring samtidens storpolitik 
(Stockholm: Hugo Grebers förlag; 1905). Stormakterna was republished in revised and expanded edition in 4 parts 
1911-1913. See also G. Kiss, "Political Geography into Geopolitics: Recent Trends in Germany", Geographical 
Review 32.4 (1942) 632-645, 638n12; citing R. Sieger, "Rudolf Kjellén", Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 1 (1924) 339-
346 
645 R. Kjellén, Samtidens stormakter, Politiska handböcker (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers förlag; 1914); R. Kjellén, Die 
Großmächte der Gegenwart, trans. C. Koch (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner; 1915 [1914]). Meyer goes so far as to say that 
the popularity of Kjellén’s book outside of academia meant that it was ‘through this Swedish political scientist 
[that] Germans outside of intimate geographic circles first became acquainted with Ritter, Ratzel, Deckert, 
Haushofer, Dix and others.’ (Meyer, "Mitteleuropa in German Political Geography", 185; citing W. Vogel, 
"Politische Geographie und Geopolitik (1909–1934)", Geograpisches Jahrbuch 49 (1934) 79-304) 
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Living Form’), was published in Sweden just two year later,646 with the German translation (as Der 
Staat als Lebensform) being released the following year, 1917.647 Though it repeated many of the 
ideas about the influence of real-world geography (‘general geopolitics’) and abstract space (‘special 
geopolitics’) that had been assembled by Ratzel,648 Kjellén departed from Ratzel et al by pushing the 
self-contained nature of the state-as-organism to an extreme. He developed a taxonomy of the various 
dimensions of life that state borders ought to contain and control: that of a territorial realm 
(geopolitik), a Volk (etno- or demopolitik), an economy (ekopolitik),649 a society (sociopolitik), and a 
governmental-constitutional power (kratopolitik).650 Kjellén’s innovation, no doubt at least partially 
influenced by the wartime context in which he wrote, was his advocacy of autarky (i.e. economic 
self-sufficiency) as the politico-economic ideal that the state must aspire to.651 As Karl Wittfogel 
caustically noted in 1929, Kjellén displayed ‘a fine sense for the most recent and forceful 
monopolistic tendencies of modern imperialism’.652 Regarding race, Kjellén believed that the rise of 
racialised pan- movements indicated that in the future politics would be organised at the scale of race 
rather than nation, but that in the present such theories were ‘still in the land of mere dreams, or at 
most at the amorphous, hazy stage’.653 
That said, the scale of politics was certainly increasing: ‘The more the earth is organized, the 
larger the space claimed by great states’.654 Applying this logic to Germany, Kjellén argued that while 
                                               
646 R. Kjellén, Staten som Lifsform (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers förlag; 1916) 
647 R. Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform, trans. Margarethe Langfeldt (Leipzig: S. Hirzel; 1917) 
648 Kjellén, Staat als Lebensform, 80. Writing in 1916, Kjellén may have been influenced by Einstein’s paper the same 
year postulating the theory of ‘general relativity’ in contradistinction to his 1904 theorisation of ‘special relativity’ 
(A. Einstein, "Die Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie", Annalen der Physik 354.7 (1916) 769-822, 769) 
649 Wirtschaftspolitik in German. 
650 Herrschaftpolitik in German. Kjellén, Staat als Lebensform, 43. Kjellén’s taxonomies were often further subdivided 
in his writing, and are not wholly consistent. See Holdar, "The ideal state and the power of geography", 311-312 
651 Kjellén, Staat als Lebensform, 76 
652 Wittfogel, "Geopolitics, Geographical Materialism and Marxism", 28 
653 ‘das befindet sich noch im Lande der bloßen Träume oder doch höchstens im formlosen dämmerhaften Stadium des 
Chaos’ (Kjellén, Staat als Lebensform, 148) 
654 ‘Je mehr die Erde organisiert wird, desto mehr muß der weite Raum sich in Form großer Staaten geltend machen’ 
(Kjellén, Staat als Lebensform, 81) 
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Frederick the Great’s Prussia was able to function in the eighteenth century, Bismarck’s Germany 
was needed in the nineteenth, and in the twentieth century nothing short of Naumann’s Mitteleuropa 
would suffice.655 ‘Only through unification’, Kjellén wrote, ‘can the present European states preserve 
their strength against rapidly growing adversaries’.656 Despite being a non-German himself, Kjellén 
displayed none of Naumann’s tact, and was unambiguous that Germany’s natural position was to be 
‘leader of a federated Central Europe’.657 He repeated sounded the death-knell for small states, writing 
that ‘Small states seem to have the same fate in store for them in the world of politics as primitive 
peoples have in the world of culture; they are pushed to the periphery, maintained in marginal areas 
and border zones, or they disappear’.658 
Kjellén died in 1922, but through the interwar period his legacy was taken up by geographers: 
first by Alexander Supan in his Leitlinien der allgemeinen politischen Geographie,659 and then by the 
German general-turned-geography professor Karl Haushofer, who enthusiastically adopted the term 
‘geopolitics’ as the name for what he claimed was a new integrative discipline.660 He used it too as 
the title for the journal he established with the publisher Kurt Vowinckel in 1924, by which he would 
                                               
655 Kjellén, Staat als Lebensform, 82 
656 ‘Nur durch Zusammenschluß können die heutigen europäischen Staaten ihre Widerstandskraft gegenüber schneller 
wachsenden Gegnern bewahren.’ (Kjellén, Großmächte der Gegenwart, 204; trans informed by trans in P. Hansen 
and S. Jonsson, Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism (London & New York: 
Bloomsbury; 2014), 42) 
657 ‘als Oberhaupt eines föderierten Zentraleuropa’ (Kjellén, Großmächte der Gegenwart, 204) 
658 ‘Den kleinen Staaten ist allem Anschein nach in der Politik dasselbe Schicksal beschieden, das die Naturvölker in 
der Kulturgeschichte haben - sie werden an die peripherie hinausgedrängt oder in Grenzdistrikten erhalten, oder 
müssen untergehen.’ (Kjellén, Staat als Lebensform, 89-90; quoted in & translated by Kiss, "Political Geography 
into Geopolitics", 639) 
659 Supan, Leitlinien der allgemeinen politischen Geographie. This work is notable for developing Ratzel’s idea that 
Lebensraum was made up of both living space and colonial ‘feeding space’, and formulating the ‘colonial quotient’ 
by which this could be quantified. 
660 Haushofer bemoaned the atomisation of academic knowledge in Germany, and admired the integral nature of 
Anglo-Saxon ‘political science’, and the École libre des sciences politiques in Paris. (K. Haushofer, "Grundlagen, 
Wesen und Ziele der Geopolitik", in Karl Haushofer et al. (eds.), Bausteine zur Geopolitik (Berlin: Kurt Vowinckel; 
1928) 29-48, 30; citing as examples A.T. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future 
(London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co.; 1897); Mackinder, "Geographical Pivot of History"; J. Fairgrieve, 
Geography and World Power (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company; 1917); A. Chéradame, L’Europe et la question 
d’Autriche au seuil du XXe siècle (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie; 1901)) 
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organise and publicise this new discipline: the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik (ZfG).661 (In 1927 it 
incorporated Arthur Dix’s Zeitschrift Weltpolitik & Weltwirtschaft, and was thus given a longer – 
though rarely used – title: Zeitschrift für Geopolitik verbunden mit der Zeitschrift Weltpolitik & 
Weltwirtschaft.)662 
Haushofer and Kjellén’s lives and work were entangled in a number of ways. They both had 
formative experiences in Japan just before the war: Haushofer from 1908 to 1910, and Kjellén in 
1909, both returning via the Trans-Siberian railway.663 During the war itself, while at the front 
Haushofer studied (and was impressed by) Kjellén’s work. The same year that the ZfG was launched, 
1924, Vowinckel published a new translation of Kjellén’s Der Staat als Lebensform.664 Six years later, 
an update of Die Großmächte der Gegenwart was published, with authorship attributed to ‘Kjellén-
Haushofer’ (with additional input acknowledged from the leading geopolitikers Hugo Hassinger, Otto 
Maull and Erich Obst); in 1933 this was repackaged as the first volume of Haushofer’s geopolitical 
compendium Macht und Erde.665 
Haushofer was not shy in claiming influences, and was equally enthusiastic about the 
intellectual contributions of Ratzel (whom he had known as a child, since Ratzel was a friend of 
                                               
661 Haushofer would become editor-in-chief in 1931. On the ZfG, see W. Natter, "Geopolitics in Germany, 1919-45: 
Karl Haushofer, and the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik", in John A. Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell, and Gerard Toal (eds.), 
A Companion to Political Geography (Oxford: Blackwell; 2003) 187-203, 192-199; L.W. Hepple, "Dudley Stamp 
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Geopolitik’ 1924–1944", PhD thesis (Christian-Albrechts-Universität, 1963) 
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Oldenbourg. On the significance of this merger in expanding the remit of the ZfG, see Hepple, "Dudley Stamp and 
the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik", 387-388 
663 H.H. Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum", Journal of Strategic Studies 22.2-3 (1999) 218-241, 
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664 R. Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform, trans. J. Sandmeier, 4th edn. (Berlin-Grunewald: Kurt Vowinckel; 1924) 
665 Kjellén-Haushofer, Die Grossmächte vor und nach dem Weltkriege, ed. Karl Haushofer (Leipzig & Berlin: B.G. 
Teubner; 1930); R. Kjellén, Macht und Erde, eds Karl Haushofer et al., III vols., vol. I: Die Großmächte vor und 
nach dem Weltkriege (Lepizig & Berlin: B.G. Teubner; 1933); see C.O. Sauer, "Review: Macht und Erde. By Karl 
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Haushofer’s father),666 especially the notions of Lebensraum and dynamic borders; Mahan for 
introducing a Weltpolitik spatial consciousness to the US;667 Mackinder, especially the idea of a 
dynamic balance between continental and oceanic powers; and Mackinder’s student, the British 
geographer James Fairgrieve. Karl’s wife Martha Haushofer translated Fairgrieve’s 1917 work of 
resource-focused environmental determinism Geography and World Power into German, which was 
published by Vowinckel in 1925 with a foreword by Karl and a new subtitle: ‘An introduction to 
geopolitics’.668 Finally, Haushofer promoted an organicism that combined the studiously biological 
analogies of Kapp, Schäffle, Ratzel and Kjellén with a vaguer, more metaphysical analogy of the state 
as embodying the personality, spirit or will of the Volk, an intellectual tradition that stemmed from 
Fichte and Hegel, via idealist historians like Ranke and Treitschke, and attributed the growth of the 
state not to any underlying law, but instead saw it as an expression of the enduring strength of its 
population. This combination had been expressed by Arthur Dix in 1912: ‘We [i.e. Germany] have 
only one choice: to grow or to atrophy!’669 
Haushofer succeeded in attracting a number of prominent geographers and political scientists, 
many of whom were already publishing work in the same vein, to buy in to the ‘new’ discipline of 
geopolitics, including Dix, Otto Maull, Erich Obst, Hermann Lautensach, Franz Termer, Hugo 
Hassinger, Richard Hennig, Robert Sieger, Norbert Krebs, Adolf Grabowsky and the historian 
Walther Vogel. Their mobilization of the conceptual arsenal that had been developed over the previous 
century (and systematised and popularised by Ratzel, Mackinder and Kjellén) in the service of 
                                               
666 ‘A colleague of Karl Haushofer’s father, Max, at Munich Polytechnical University, Ratzel tested his theories during 
long walks with both Haushofers along the banks of the Isar River.’ (Herwig, "Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and 
Lebensraum", 220) 
667 See K. Haushofer, Grenzen, in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung, 2nd edn. (Heidelberg, Berlin & 
Magdeburg: Kurt Vowinckel; 1939), 44 
668 Fairgrieve, Geography and World Power; J. Fairgrieve, Geographie und Weltmacht. Eine Einführung in die 
Geopolitik, trans. Marta Haushofer (Berlin-Grunewald: Kurt Vowinckel; 1925) 
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interwar German imperialist ambitions is a story that is rightly familiar, a disciplinary reckoning that 
began while the geopolitikers were still active, and which even today political geography continues 
to grapple with.670 It is not a story that I intend to retell here. Instead, in the following section I explore 
the various practical ways in which the Pan-European movement intersected with the school of 
geopolitik, before moving on to an analysis of the theoretical consonances and dissonances between 
each group’s conception of political space. 
 
 
Pan-Europe and Geopolitics 
We have already seen how Haushofer used Coudenhove-Kalergi’s famous world map, a tacit 
endorsement that speaks both to an overlap in their world-views and an overlap in their styles of 
argumentation. However, it is important to first sketch the relationship between these two interwar 
movements, which followed paths that were in some ways parallel, in others inverted. They both 
revolved around monthly journals, Paneuropa and the ZfG, each founded in 1924 and each broadly 
operating as an organ for curating, policing and disseminating their political agendas. In both cases, 
the journal was merely the central element of a spectrum that ran from more academic tomes to 
popular journalism and radio broadcasts. They were each unambiguously led by a single figure: 
Coudenhove-Kalergi edited Paneuropa and exerted full control of the Central Bureau of the Pan-
European Union; and while Haushofer was merely a co-editor of the ZfG until a shake-up in 1931 left 
him as sole editor-in-chief, there was no doubt that he was the central personality within the new 
discipline of geopolitik. 
Despite Haushofer’s closeness to Hitler (via Rudolf Hess, Haushofer’s student and Hitler’s 
                                               
670 See, for example, A.B. Murphy et al., "Is there a politics to geopolitics?", Progress in Human Geography 28.5 
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acolyte), he and Coudenhove-Kalergi were on visiting terms with one another,671 the Japanophile 
Haushofer and the half-Japanese Coudenhove-Kalergi finding plenty of common ground. Indeed, if 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own account is to be believed, he challenged Haushofer on his closeness to 
Hess: 
‘“If Hess is really such a nice man,” I said, “how is it that he became a Nazi?” Haushofer was 
not stuck for an answer: “He just happened to meet Hitler—so he became a Nazi. If he had 
met you, he would have become a supporter of Pan-Europe.”’672 
Haushofer attended the launch of the Munich Pan-European Group in 1929, where he was seated for 
dinner next to Thomas Mann and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s wife Ida Roland,673 and in 1931 appeared as 
a guest lecturer at one of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-European conferences, delivering a talk that 
Coudenhove-Kalergi published in Paneuropa.674 Coudenhove-Kalergi even invited Haushofer to be 
on the honorary committee of PEU-Deutschland, an invitation that Haushofer politely declined, but 
nevertheless marked to be kept in his files.675  
Strikingly, the pair maintained friendly relations even after Hitler’s 1933 banning of the PEU-
Deutschland and burning of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s books had rendered him persona non grata in 
Germany. In 1943, as Haushofer was at the height of his infamy as the leader of a notorious (though 
fictional) ‘Institute for Geopolitics’ at University of Munich and the purported éminence grise behind 
                                               
671 For instance, Haushofer’s diary for 22nd Dec 1927 records: «Aussprache mit Graf Coudenhove (Probleme 
Paneuropas)», while in his own memoirs Coudenhove-Kalergi recalled a house visit shortly after the Reichstag fire 
of 27 February 1933 (Saint-Gille, La «Paneurope», 289n184; Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 
184) 
672 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 185 
673 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 156; Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 184-185 
674 Hauhofer spoke on 8 Jan 1931 in Vienna; the lecture was published as K. Haushofer, "Paneuropa im Lichte der 
panasiatischen und panpazifischen Bewegung. Vortrag, gesprochen über Einladung der Paneuropa-Union in Wien 
am 8. Januar 1931", Paneuropa 7.1 (1931) 19-32. See also Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 156 
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Hitler’s geostrategy,676 Coudenhove-Kalergi defended Haushofer in his English-language auto-
biography, claiming that the General-Professor was a private critic of the Nazi movement.677 
Furthermore, he considered Haushofer to be ‘a man of rare knowledge and culture, [who] had nothing 
of the usual arrogance of a Prussian officer, everything of the polite and courteous type of a Bavarian 
gentleman’.678 The authenticity of this sentiment might be judged by the fact that at this point, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s association with Haushofer was costing him allies. Writing in 1943, Thomas 
Mann looked back in horror upon his dinner with Haushofer as evidence of the essential moral 
ambivalence of Pan-Europe, and therefore as an explanation for Mann’s decision not to participate in 
the 1943 Pan-European Congress in New York.679 Coudenhove-Kalergi replied robustly, arguing: 
‘With the same right, you could accuse Churchill of sitting at a table with Mussolini to win 
Italy for the Allied cause. I tried to do the same with Haushofer as long as he still wavered 
between Pan-Germanism and Pan-Europeanism, and my only regret is that I did not succeed 
in pulling Haushofer into our camp.’680 
Haushofer’s clearest statements reciprocating this respect came after the war, when 
interviewed by Edmund Walsh in August 1945 to determine his complicity in the Nazi regime. 
Needless to say, he had a clear incentive to emphasise his links to the prominently anti-Nazi 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, and accordingly boasted of ‘My collaboration with Count Coudenhove, in 
whose pan-European circles in Vienna, Prague, and so on I spoke before 1932, when I was also his 
                                               
676 This infamy was fuelled by four texts published in the US in 1942: A. Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer: 
Geopolitics in Action (Port Washington, NY: Farrar and Rinehart; 1942); J. Mattern, Geopolitik: Doctrine of 
National Self-Sufficiency and Empire (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; 1942); H. Weigert, 
Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press; 1942); Whittlesey, 
German Strategy of World Conquest. See also two 1943 US short propaganda films: the Oscar-nominated Plan for 
Destruction (dir. Edward Cahn), and Why We Fight #2: The Nazis Strike (dir. Frank Capra & Anatole Litvak), pp. 
3:47 to 6:52. For analysis of how Haushofer gained this reputation in the war, see Murphy, "Hitler's Geostrategist". 
Writing from his wartime exile in the US, Coudenhove-Kalergi repeated the legend of Haushofer’s ‘Geopolitical 
Institute in Munich’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 155) 
677 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 155-156 
678 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 155 
679 ‘In Munich we even sat at a table with General Professor Haushofer,- a war geographer, who supplied German 
imperialism’s pseudo-scientific armour, and whose name is so closely associated with the world-conquest-
enterprise of the Nazis that, if it came time to punish the guilty after this war, he would have to be the first one of all 
to be shot’ (Mann to Coudenhove-Kalergi (24 Feb 1943), p.1, ACV, PP 1000/3/6). 
680 Coudenhove-Kalergi to Mann (8 Mar 1943), p.1-2 ACV, PP 1000/3/6 
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guest in Vienna’.681 After the war, and Haushofer’s suicide in 1946, and amidst the general process 
of denazification that saw geopolitics expurged from German geography, Coudenhove-Kalergi was 
one of the few to defend Haushofer, writing in 1949: 
‘We [Coudenhove-Kalergi and his wife, Ida Roland] had known him [Haushofer] for years. 
In his Zeitschrift für Geopolitik he had always found room for a friendly word about Pan-
Europe, which seemed to him to accord with his own idea of Großraum. 
…In spite of his Großraumpolitik, Haushofer remained a Bavarian monarchist. He 
regarded the Third Reich very critically and described Hitler, whom he knew personally, as a 
typical product of half-education’682 
Coudenhove-Kalergi and Haushofer’s association was not just personal, but professional. 
Haushofer advertised the ZfG in the pages of Paneuropa, with the tagline ‘Whoever wants Europe – 
does not forget the world’ (fig. 19), a reminder both of their shared audience, their shared civilizational 
appeal to defend the interests of Europe, and of their shared belief in tackling politics at the global 
scale. Likewise, Coudenhove-Kalergi advertised both Paneuropa the book and Paneuropa the journal 
in the pages of the ZfG, claiming that the PEU was ‘fighting for the unification of Europe on the basis 
of equality, security and customs union’.683 After Hitler’s 1933 banning of the German PEU had 
curtailed any further such formal cooperation, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote to Haushofer, asking him 
to speak to Rudolf Hess about preventing the ban of the Paneuropa journal in Germany.684 Although 
in this instance Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plea went unanswered,685 as we shall see, Haushofer did not 
consider the ban to prevent him sharing his geographical opinion with Coudenhove-Kalergi in what 
he considered to be a private capacity. 
                                               
681 ‘Meine Zusammenarbeit mit Graf Coudenhove, in dessen Pan-Europa-Kreisen in Wien, Prag, u.s.w. ich vor 1932 
sprach, wie ich auch sein Gast in Wien war’ (H.-A. Jacobsen, Karl Haushofer: Leben und Werk, 2 vols. (Boppard: 
Harald Boldt Verlag; 1979), 337; quoted in Saint-Gille, La «Paneurope», 290n190) 
682 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Kampf um Europa: aus meinem Leben (Zurich: Atlantis Verlag; 1949), 179; informed by 
translation in Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 184-185 
683 ‘kämpf für die Einigung Europas auf der Grundlage der Gleichberechtigung , Sicherheit und Zollunion’: ZfG 2(9) 
(September, 1925), end matter. He also advertised Held oder Heiliger (1927) in ZfG 5(1) (January 1928) 
684 Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Botschafter Europas, 236-237; Orluc, "Europe between Past and Future", 313n235; both 
citing Coudenhove-Kalergi to Haushofer (19 December 1933), RGVA, 554k/4/369, 217 
685 Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Botschafter Europas, 237 
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The links between Pan-Europeanism and geopolitik also extended beyond Haushofer and 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s friendship. Take, for instance, Adolf Grabowsky, a political scientist whose 
1928 book Staat und Raum was to prove a central text of geopolitics.686 From the 1926/27 academic 
year, Grabowsky led the ‘Geopolitical Seminar with World Political Exercises’ at the Deutschen 
Hochschule für Politik (DHfP) in Berlin, a liberal-democratic-leaning elite academy for politicians 
and journalists, set up with impetus from Friedrich Naumann, and funds from the PEU donor Robert 
                                               
686 A. Grabowsky, Staat und Raum. Grundlagen räumlichen Denkens in der Weltpolitik (Berlin: Zentralverlag; 1928) 
 
Figure 19: Advert for the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik: 'Whoever 
wants Europe – does not forget the world' (1926). Printed in 
Paneuropa 2.6/7, p.63 
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Bosch.687 In the winter of 1927-28, the Geopolitical Seminar organized a lecture cycle specifically on 
‘the Pan-European problem’,688 which included lectures by both friends and critics of Pan-Europe. 
The former included the German publicist, author and politician Georg Cleinow, who led the 
‘Eurasian Seminar’ at the DHfP, while the latter included Grabowsky himself, who lectured on ‘Pan-
Europe and Russia’.689 In this lecture, and a 1928 article on the same theme,690 Grabowsky offered a 
sharp criticism of Pan-European thinking, but one that both took its target very seriously, and took 
care to praise both his colleagues like Cleinow who supported the movement, and the ‘humane, very 
likeable character of Count Coudenhove’.691 Grabowsky appreciated him as ‘an excellent speaker and 
a brilliant writer [whose] speeches and books have form and precision, which is rare in Germany’,692 
noting furthermore: 
‘Even sceptics felt that here a sincere, true believer was at work, a man who, without ulterior 
motives, committed himself to a cause.’693 
Though we will deal with the detail of Grabowsky’s criticisms later, broadly speaking they were that 
the PEU was inorganic, reactionary (in that it valorised political stasis), overly capitalistic, favoured 
the French, and drove a wedge between Central Europe and Russia. It is worth noting that after 
Grabowsky was dismissed from the DHfP in 1933 (a Jewish-convert, Grabowsky fled to Switzerland 
in 1934),694 the Geopolitical Seminar was taken over by Karl’s son Albrecht Haushofer, a prominent 
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Fachdisziplin in Forschung und Lehre der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (1920–1933)", Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift 30.3 (1989) 443-465, 454 
688 A. Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", Zeitschrift für Politik 17 (1928) 673-704, 700 
689 A. Grabowsky, “Paneuropa und Russland”, lecture given at Deutschen Hochschule für Politik on 25 Jan 1928. 
HAEU, PAN/EU 27, 771/1/191, 195-202 
690 Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa" 
691 ‘Dazu trat als Attraktion die menschlich sehr sympathische Persönlichkeit des Grafen Coudenhove.’ (Grabowsky, 
"Das Problem Paneuropa", 673) 
692 ‘Er ist ein ausgezeichneter Redner und ein brillanter Schriftsteller. Seine Reden und Bücher haben, was in 
Deutschland selten ist, Form und Präzision’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 673-674) 
693 ‘Auch Widerstrebende spürten, daß hier ein lauterer, wahrhaft gläubiger Charakter am Werke war, ein Mensch, der 
sich ohne Hintergedanken für eine Sache einsetzt’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 673) 
694 Murphy, Heroic Earth, 106; Saint-Gille, La «Paneurope», 291n197. Grabowsky also broke with Haushofer’s circle 
of his own accord around this time, arguing for a more ‘scientific’ rather than applied geopolitics, in which it would 
be acknowledged as merely one method for interpreting the world, among many (A. Grabowsky, "Das Problem der 
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geopolitiker in his own right.695 David Thomas Murphy has suggested, albeit cautiously, that this 
Seminar – Grabowsky sometimes referred to it as an ‘Institut’ in the 1930s – may have been one of 
the sources for the legend of an Institut für Geopolitik in Munich run by Karl Haushofer.696 
 Pan-Europe and geopolitics were joined not by one or two links, but by a constellation of 
overlapping networks. Their literatures intersected, with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s works invariably 
appearing in geopolitical bibliographies and vice versa.697 Erich Obst reviewed many of Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s works in the ZfG,698 and Obst’s own England, Europa und die Welt was reviewed in 
Paneuropa.699 There was crossover in participation in each of these spheres too. For instance, the 
Danish archaeologist, cultural geographer and geopolitiker Gudmund Hatt, while on one hand a Nazi 
collaborator,700 on the other hand attended the 1935 fourth Pan-European Congress in Vienna, where 
he participated in discussion in Commission XI, on unemployment and colonial matters (see 
chapter IV), arguing for the importance of retaining Anglo-Danish trade links in any economic bloc 
that excluded Britain.701 Ultimately, Pan-Europeanists and geopolitikers were appealing to the same 
audience, both in terms of men of influence that they might persuade, and the general public that they 
hoped to educate. Moreover, they were doing it in the same language, one that put faith in the 
                                               
Geopolitik", Zeitschrift für Politik 22 (1933) 765-802; E. Thermaenius, "Geopolitics and political geography", 
Baltic and Scandinavian Countries 4.2 (1938) 165-177; Murphy, Heroic Earth, 102) 
695 On Albrecht Haushofer, see U. Laack-Michel, Albrecht Haushofer und der Nationalsozialismus. Ein Beitrag zur 
Zeitgeschichte (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett; 1974); E. Haiger, A. Ihering, and C.F. von Weizsäcker (eds.), Albrecht 
Haushofer (Ebenhausen: Langewiesche-Brandt; 2002); T.J. Barnes and C. Abrahamsson, "Tangled complicities and 
moral struggles: the Haushofers, father and son, and the spaces of Nazi geopolitics", Journal of Historical 
Geography 47 (2015) 64-73 
696 Murphy, "Hitler's Geostrategist", 12 
697 See, for example, “Schrifttum-Nachweise zur Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen”, in Haushofer, Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen, 
92-95, which lists Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa (1923), Kampf um Pan-Europa (1925), and the Paneuropa 
journal. On the other side, see “Paneuropa Literatur” (HAEU, PAN/EU 12, 554/4/380, 5-8), which lists Obst’s 
England, Europa und die Welt (1927). 
698 E. Obst, "Zeitschrift Pan-Europa", Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 2.1 (1925) 68; E. Obst, "Paneuropa. Die europäische 
Seele", Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 6.4 (1929) 343; E. Obst and H.-J. Rust, "Kampf um Paneuropa", Zeitschrift für 
Geopolitik 6.11 (1929) 1014; E. Obst and H.-J. Rust, "Literaturbericht aus Europa und Afrika", Zeitschrift für 
Geopolitik 8.7 (1931) 566 
699 For instance, see review of Obst, England, Europa und die Welt in Paneuropa 3(6):28 
700 See H.G. Larsen, "Geopolitics on trial: politics and science in the wartime geopolitics of Gudmund Hatt", Journal 
of Historical Geography 47 (2015) 29-39 
701 "Kommissions-Beratungen: Kommission XI", Paneuropa 11.6/8 (1935) 190-192, 192. More generally, as Larsen 
notes, Hatt ‘showed sympathy for Coudenhove-Kalergi’s “Pan-Europe” vision’ (Larsen, "Geopolitics on trial", 33). 
180 
 
expansion of politico-economic space, and railed against both the nationalism that was ‘artificially’ 
balkanising these spaces, and the abstract universalism that paid no regard to the specificity of 
geography.  
 
 
Geopolitics of Pan-Europe  
Borders 
Mention of the connection between Pan-Europe and geopolitics tends to assume the toxicity of the 
latter, such that analysis of this relationship becomes a matter of measuring the level of guilt-by-
association that ought to be attributed to the PEU. However, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s interest in spatial 
reasoning was immediate and undeniable. Thus, Saint-Gille argues that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plans 
were distinguished from other interwar proposals to unite Europe precisely because of their spatiality, 
in particular their inclusion of the notion of the frontier and the partitioning of the globe into 
continental blocs.702 Having staked out a non-determinist picture of the origins of geopolitical 
thought, we are now in a position from which to take a nuanced view of the way in which Pan-Europe 
itself used geopolitical arguments, sketching out a picture of global political geography that made its 
own plans look not only sensible, but necessary. That is, expanding on the pioneering work of Yannick 
Muet, we must view Coudenhove-Kalergi as one who did geopolitics without necessarily being a 
geographer – though, as we shall see, he actively pursued connections with geographers.703 The 
                                               
702 ‘Les idées paneuropéennes se distinguaient d’autres propositions européistes, qui se bornaient à envisager la 
coopération économique et diplomatique, par une réflexion sur la dimension géographique, incluant la notion de 
frontière et celle de la partition du globe en grands ensembles.’ (Saint-Gille, La «Paneurope», 287) 
703 ‘Qu’ils aient été philosophes, journalistes, économistes, romanciers ou poètes, ces intellectuels pro-européens ont 
“fait de la géopolitique” sans pour autant être géographes’ (Y. Muet, Les géographes et l’Europe: L’idée 
européenne dans la pensée géopolitique française de 1919 à 1939 (Geneva: Institut européen de l’Université de 
Genève; 1996), 25). See also p.2 concerning ‘géopolitologues’ 
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strongest justification for taking such a stance is that the geopolitikers themselves took Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s ideas very seriously, believing that ‘Pan-Europe is a problem of geopolitics’.704 
Accordingly, their criticisms were made within a geopolitical frame of reference in which just as 
many assumption about the nature of politics, history and geography were shared as were contested. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I analyse the geopolitics of Pan-Europe, both as it was proposed and 
as it was critiqued, in terms of two key elements of political space: borders and scale. 
 For Coudenhove-Kalergi, the definition of Europe was simultaneously and inseparably a 
geographical and ideological issue. Thus the questions of what Europe was and where its borders lay 
were intrinsically connected in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s writings, and essays he wrote upon either one 
of these topics would invariably also deal with the other.705 We can see this in his frequent attempts 
to build consensus on the Eastern border of Europe, which were both influenced by and sought to 
engage with contemporary political geographers. However, far from being the idiosyncratic theme 
that it may at first seem, his interest in defining the Eastern border was in fact a reaction to a specific 
political dilemma posed by the establishment of the body that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s campaign with 
Briand (see chapter I) had helped bring about: the League’s Commission of Enquiry for European 
Union (CEUE).706 
 The dilemma was whether the CEUE, already comprised of the twenty-seven European 
member states of the League of Nations, ought to invite non-member European states to take part in 
the Commission’s activities. After a cursory first session in September 1930, at which Aristide Briand 
was appointed chairman and Eric Drummond secretary, the issue dominated the full second session, 
                                               
704 R. Pommrich, "Paneuropa", Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft 12 (1926) 453-458; quoted in Schöberl, „Es gibt ein 
großes und herrliches Land...“, 110 
705 For instance, compare the substantively-similar “Europe – Idea and Fact” (ACV, PP 1000/72/6) and “Wo endet 
Europa?” (‘Where does Europe end?’) (ACV, PP 1000/75/5) 
706 I use the acronym used at the time for this body, which derives from its French title, Commission d’Étude Union 
Européenne. 
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which ran from 16-21 January 1931. This question was doubly thorny: firstly, it re-kindled the 
smouldering issue of the position of the regionalist CEUE within the universalist League, with the 
British foreign minister Arthur Henderson even arguing for the inclusion of whichsoever non-
European states might want to participate, whether members of the league or not, on the basis that 
‘the ideal and the spirit of the League is to include everybody’.707 And secondly, while most European 
states were already League members, the non-member states in question were those whose status as 
‘European’ was most debatable: namely, Turkey and the USSR.708 Thus issues of League politics 
were overlain onto an issue of geography. The statesmen present at the meeting were understandably 
cautious at approaching the latter directly, with the Romanian Nicolae Titulesco warning that ‘We 
have not to define Europe, because that would lead us into a controversy from which we should never 
escape’.709 Nevertheless, the nature of the geography invoked was hinted at by Andreas Michalako-
poulos, who in relaying the official Greek position that ‘from the economic and even from the 
geographical point of view, Turkey belongs to Europe rather than Asia’, outlined that states might ‘be 
considered as belonging to the European structure because of their history, their relations with Europe, 
or their economic systems’.710 Following a resolution where it was agreed that Turkey and the USSR 
(along with Iceland and the Free City of Danzig) were to send representatives to the CEUE for the 
discussion of economic questions only, at the third session of the CEUE the Russian Maxim Litvinoff 
wryly noted that ‘My presence here will, I am sure, greatly rejoice the hearts of all the geographers 
of the world, for it confirms, if only partially, the hypothesis that the territory of the former Russian 
                                               
707 Arthur Henderson, in LoN CEUE, “Minutes of the Second Session of the Commission. Held at Geneva from 
January 16th to 21st, 1931”, Official No. C.144.M.45.1931.VII. [C.E.U.E./2nd Session/P.V.], Series of League of 
Nations Publications VII. POLITICAL 1931.VII.1. (16 February 1931); LoN, CEUE, 1st-7th Session Minutes, 
p.21. Briand’s rejoinder was that since ‘The only limit to [the CEUE’s] enquiry is a geographical one’, its very 
essence precluded such a possibility (in LoN CEUE, “Minutes of the Second Session of the Commission”, p.25) 
708 The other territories in this position, Iceland and the Free City of Danzig, were barely mentioned during the session. 
709 LoN CEUE, “Minutes of the Second Session of the Commission”, p.20 
710 Andreas Michalakopoulos, in LoN CEUE, “Minutes of the Second Session of the Commission”, p.22 
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Empire is still to be found in Europe’.711 
 Coudenhove-Kalergi enthusiastically welcomed the convening of the CEUE, claiming that it 
amounted to a ‘European Senate’, and was ‘no more and no less than the European replica of the Pan-
American Union’.712 By asserting that the CEUE was the very political organ that the PEU had been 
campaigning for, he thus laid claim to it, and proceeded to treat it as Pan-Europe embodied. The so-
called Europa-Konferenz (i.e. the January 1931 second session of the CEUE) was given top billing in 
Paneuropa, where Coudenhove-Kalergi’s conference report was featured as the lead article. He noted 
the geographical discussions at the meeting, writing that: 
‘a provisional but reasonable solution has been found to the question of the European eastern 
border [Ostgrenze]: Russia and Turkey are invited to European economic discussions, without 
being politically affiliated with Pan-Europe’.713 
Furthermore, he used this attention as a springboard to develop this theme in the following two articles 
in the issue, “The Soviet Union and us” and “Turkey and us”.714 Here he again framed the issue 
geographically, asking  
‘The first, fateful question to be passionately contested in the European Senate was that of the 
eastern border of Europe. 
Should Europe stretch as far as the Dniester and the Maritza, or as far as the Pacific 
Ocean and the Euphrates?’715 
On the Soviet question, he argued – as he had done consistently since launching the movement – that 
Russia was a threat that Europe had to defend itself against, rather than consider incorporating. He 
                                               
711 LoN CEUE, “Minutes of the Third Session of the Commission. Held at Geneva from May 15th to 21st, 1931”, 
Official No. C.395.M.158.1931.VII. [C.E.U.E./3rd Session/P.V.], Series of League of Nations Publications VII. 
POLITICAL 1931.VII.7. (25 June 1931); LoN, CEUE, 1st-7th Session Minutes; p.30 
712 ‘Denn was sich „Studienkommission für die Europäische Union” nennt, ist nicht mehr und nicht weniger als die 
europäische Nachbildung der Panamerikanischen Union.’ (R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europa-Konferenz", 
Paneuropa 7.1 (1931) 1-5, 1) 
713 ‘Die Frage nach der europäischen Ostgrenze fand eine provisorische, aber vernünftige Lösung: Rußland und die 
Türkei werden zu den europäischen Wirtschaftsbesprechungen eingeladen, ohne daß über ihre politische 
Zugehörigkeit zu Paneuropa entschieden wird.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europa-Konferenz", 4) 
714 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die Sowjetunion und Wir", Paneuropa 7.1 (1931) 7-12; R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
"Die Türkei und Wir", Paneuropa 7.1 (1931) 13-14 
715 ‘Die erste Schicksalsfrage, die im Europäischen Senat leidenschaftlich umkämpft wurde, war die europäiche 
Ostgrenze. Soll Europa bis zum Dnjester und der Maritza reichen oder bis zum Stillen Ozean und zum Euphrat?’ 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Sowjetunion und Wir", 7) 
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argued firstly that Russia would unbalance Pan-Europe, and secondly that Bolshevism was alien to 
European culture. That is, the inclusion of a Russian element with Pan-Europe would be both 
unworkable and toxic; in short, it would be political suicide. In his words, ‘nothing would be more 
senseless and dangerous than the inclusion of this mortal enemy of European culture in the European 
federation of states’.716 
 By contrast, he wrote, ‘as Soviet Russia is continually de-Europeanised, Turkey Europeanises 
at the same pace’.717 He wrote in glowing terms of Mustafa Kemal’s ‘European path’ toward 
establishing secular democracy in Turkey, describing Kemal as ‘a great leader fighting on Asian soil 
for European ideas’.718 Meanwhile, the advantages to Europe of a free sea route to the Black Sea 
meant that such an embrace would be mutually beneficial.719 However, Coudenhove-Kalergi sounded 
a note of caution too, warning that ‘all these advantages for Europe would be invalid if one day Turkey 
renounces European culture and, like Arabia, wants to pursue its own Islamic path of national 
renewal’.720 The cases of both the Soviet Union and Turkey show that for Coudenhove-Kalergi, the 
borders of Europe were, if not fluid, at the very least highly contingent. What they were contingent 
upon was rather diffuse, encompassing political systems, economic systems, religion and a vaguely-
defined sense of culture, and well as a dose of realist geostrategy, but there was no doubt that the 
delimitation of Europe’s borders was a matter of social rather than natural science.  
 
                                               
716 ‘Darum wäre nichts sinnloser und gefährlicher als die Aufnahme dieses Todfeindes der europäischen Kultur in den 
europäischen Staatenbund.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Sowjetunion und Wir", 12) 
717 ‘Während im letzten Jahrzehnt Sowjetrußland sich ständig enteuropäisiert - europäisiert sich in gleichem Tempo die 
Türkei.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Türkei und Wir", 13) 
718 ‘Hier kämpft ein großer Führer auf asiatischem Boden für europäische Ideen.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Türkei und 
Wir", 13) 
719 As he put it, ‘Europe could only gain from a union with Turkey’. (‘Europa könnte durch den Anschluß der Türkei 
nur gewinnen.’ Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Türkei und Wir", 13) 
720 ‘Alle diese Vorteile für Europa wären aber hinfällig, wenn eines Tages die Türkei sich von der europäischen Kultur 
lossagt und, wie Arabien, eigene islamitische Wege der nationalen Erneuerung gehen will.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
"Türkei und Wir", 14) 
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 
 
For the League, the definition of Europe’s borders was a short-lived problem, firstly since Germany’s 
withdrawal in 1933 and Turkey and the USSR’s accession to the League in 1932 and 1934 
respectively meant that Germany was now the only European non-member, fundamentally changing 
the complexion of the problem from semi-geographical to wholly political; and secondly because the 
CEUE itself had been effectively mothballed in 1932.721 However, for Coudenhove-Kalergi the issue 
remained at the forefront of his mind, and in 1935 he returned to it, this time seeking to engage a new 
constituency: academic geographers.722 ‘Since the professors of political geography,’ he explained, 
‘are primarily responsible for the question of a possible revision of the European eastern frontier, I 
have addressed a survey to those very people, which reads as follows: 
Where, in your opinion, does the eastern border of Europe lie? 
I. On the Ural Border? 
 On the Russian-European border? 
 On the Russian-Chinese border? 
II. In the Sea of Marmara? 
 On the Bulgarian-Turkish border? 
 On the Turkish-Persian border? 
III. Any other limits?’723 
                                               
721 See K. Williams to W.R. Bisschop (15 February 1938), LoN 50/8133/5928 
722 The topic of what constituted a continent, and therefore where one drew the borders of Europe, had of course long 
occupied geographers. In its modern form it might be traced back to a seminal 1893 paper by Alfred Hettner (A. 
Hettner, "Über den Begriff der Erdteile und seine geographische Bedeutung", in Georg Kollm (ed.), Verhandlungen 
des zehnten Deutschen Geographentages zu Stuttgart am 5., 6. und 7. April 1893 (Berlin: Reimer; 1893) 188-198). 
For a commentary focusing on the liminal cases of Turkey and Russia, see H.-D. Schultz, "Europa, Russland und 
die Türkei in der “klassischen” deutschen Geographie", in Paul Reuber, Anke Strüver, and Günter Wolkersdorfer 
(eds.), Politische Geographien Europas: Annäherungen an ein umstrittenes Konstrukt (Münster: LIT Verlag; 2005) 
25-54 
723 ‘Da in erster Linie die Professoren der politischen Geographie zuständig sind für die Frage einer eventuellen 
Revision der europäischen Ostgrenze, habe ich eine Rundfrage an dieselben gerichtet, die folgenden Wortlaut hatte: 
„Wo liegt nach Ihrer Meinung die Ostgrenze Europas? 
An der Uralgrenze? 
An der russisch-europäischen Grenze? 
An der russisch-chinesischen Grenze? 
Am Marmarameer? 
An der bulgarisch-türkischen Grenze? 
An der türkisch-persischen Grenze? 
Eventuelle andere Grenzen?’ 
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These surveys were sent out in April 1935 to Europe’s biggest names in political geography, 
most of whom responded to these questions. Strikingly, this included political geographers and 
geopolitikers based in Germany, two years after Hitler’s banning of the PEU. These included the 
leading historical geopolitiker Walther Vogel of the University of Berlin724 and the founding co-editor 
of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik Franz Termer of the University of Würzburg, and other leading 
geographers including Walter Behrmann (at Goethe University Frankfurt), Robert Gradmann (at the 
University of Erlangen), Alfred Hettner (professor emeritus at Heidelberg University), Otto Schlüter 
(at the University of Halle), Carl Uhlig (at the University of Tübingen), Wilhelm Ule (professor 
emeritus at the University of Rostock) and Georg Wegemann (at the University of Kiel), as well as 
Alfred Philippson, who as a Jew had been banned from teaching in 1933 but who remained based in 
Bonn.725 Outside of Germany, leading geopolitikers surveyed included Termer’s replacement as 
editor at the ZfG, Otto Maull (at the University of Graz), Hugo Hassinger (at the University of Vienna) 
and Gudmund Hatt (at the University of Copenhagen), while other political geographers across the 
continent were also surveyed.726 
In the article reporting his results, Coudenhove-Kalergi began by reiterating that political 
borders – or at least the Ostgrenze – were human constructs, not naturally given, writing: 
‘Over the course of the millennium, the European eastern border has constantly shifted. For it 
was not geography but politics that defined this frontier.’727 
He noted that since the Duc de Sully, those attempting to unite Europe have debated this problem, 
and that since the western orientation of Peter the Great and Catharine the Great, Russia had generally 
                                               
(R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Wo liegt die Ostgrenze Europas?", Paneuropa 11.10 (1935) 318-322, 319) 
724 Vogel to Coudenhove-Kalergi (30 Apr 1935), PAN/EU 21, 554/4/285, 4-4ob 
725 Philippson was ultimately sent to a concentration camp, but survived the war and returned to lecture at the 
University of Bonn (Troll, "Geographic Science in Germany", 107n4) 
726 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Wo liegt die Ostgrenze Europas" 
727 ‘Im Laufe der Jahrtausende hat sich die europäische Ostgrenze ständig verschoben. Denn es war nicht die 
Geographie, sondern die Politik, die diese Grenze bestimmt hat.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Wo liegt die Ostgrenze 
Europas", 318) 
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been deemed as part of Europe, up to the Ural mountains. However, the World War and Russian 
Revolution had, he suggested, called this consensus into question. He then printed a table that reduced 
the lengthy and complex responses he had received into simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to the survey 
questions. Some alternate answers were summarised, while responses that were more indeterminate 
or criticised the question were occluded, and marked down as dashes in the table.728 The results of 
the survey suggested general disagreement as to where Europe’s eastern border lay, which 
Coudenhove-Kalergi interpreted as proof that ‘it is by no means possible today to keep firmly to the 
old frontier’, and that ‘the question of the affiliation of Russia and Turkey to Europe is at least 
problematic’.729  
 
 
 
In 1937, Coudenhove-Kalergi renewed his attempt to build consensus on the location of Europe’s 
Ostgrenze as part of a wider survey of geographers, historians and cultural historians. This survey 
was itself conducted as preparation for the Pan-European School Conference, or to give it its full title, 
the First Pan-European Conference on the Teaching of European Geography and History, to be held 
from 25-27 November in Vienna.730 Originally intended as merely one element of a larger event, what 
would have been the fifth Pan-European Conference,731 the other elements of the agenda were soon 
                                               
728 For the responses, see PAN/EU 21, 554/4/285: Walther Vogel (4-4ob), Fritz Jäger (97-97ob), Otto Maull (129-131), 
Karl Kogutowicz (104), Francesco Porro de Somenzi (175-179), August Tammekann (210-211); for the write-up, 
see Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Wo liegt die Ostgrenze Europas". 
729 ‘Daß es also heute auf keinen Fall möglich ist, an der alten Grenzziehung eindeutig festzuhalten, sondern daß die 
Frage der Zugehörigkeit Rußlands und der Türkei zu Europa mindestens problematisch ist.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
"Wo liegt die Ostgrenze Europas", 319) 
730 ‘Die erste Paneuropa-Konferenz für europäischen Geographie und Geschichtsunterricht’. See Paneuropa: 
Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.3 
731 After Vienna 1926, Berlin 1930, Basel 1932 and Vienna 1935. The fifth edition did not happen until New York 
1943. For the plans as originally advertised in July 1937, see Paneuropa 13(6) 
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either dropped732 or postponed,733 leaving the event to be devoted to matters of geography, history 
and pedagogy. The first day, Thursday 25th, was to be devoted to the education of geography in 
schools, the second day to history, and the third day to cultural history. However, in the event the first 
of these, geography, was clearly prioritised, with a full day of discussion, while Friday and Saturday’s 
programmes were limited to half-days. 
This tripartite structure was reproduced in the pre-conference survey sent out to Europe’s 
leading geographers and historians, who were asked to submit their responses, whether or not they 
were able to attend the conference itself. The questionnaire comprised five questions under the 
heading ‘Geography’, seven under ‘History’ and four under ‘Cultural History’. Of the geographical 
questions, two pertained to Europe’s eastern border, one implicitly and one explicitly. First, 
Question 1 asked whether to retain the ‘official’ classification of the world into five continents,734 or 
whether to recognise Eurasia as a single continent subdivided into five sub-continents (namely, 
Europe, the Middle East, India, East Asia and the Sarmatian plains (i.e. Russia)).735 As well as tapping 
into the established geographical debate over whether (and how) to re-divide the earth’s surface into 
continents – certainly, the geopolitikers had ‘no doubt that the old scholastic classification of the 
continents is outdated’736 – Coudenhove-Kalergi was gesturing towards the specific argument of the 
geographers Alexander Supan and Ewald Banse (both of whom would go on to write key geopolitical 
texts).737 Supan had in 1913 argued that Eurasia formed a continental whole, and if Europe might be 
                                               
732 As in the case of the sessions on on the press, agriculture and the PEU’s own AGM. 
733 As in the case of the section devoted to the ‘Economic Centre’, which was re-packaged as a Conference on Natural 
Resources [Rohstoffkonferenz] and rearranged for 16-19 March 1938. However, the Germany invaded Austria on 12 
March 1938, just days before the conference was due to start, ultimately forced the cancellation of this conference. 
(For conference planning, see Paneuropa 14(1):24-28; 14(2):52-54; 14(3):85-92. For notification of its 
postponement, see Centre Économique Paneuropéen/Paneuropäische Wirtschaftszentrale, circular to the 
membership (12 March 1938), received at LoN 15 March 1938, LoN, 10A/25880/22798) 
734 i.e. Europe, Asia, Africa, America and Australia. Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.9 
735 The equivalence of ‘Sarmatian plains’ and ‘Russia’ was indicated by brackets in the original: ‘Sarmatische Ebene 
(Rußland)’ Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.9 
736 ‘Es ist kein Zweifel, daß die alte schulmäßige Einteilung der Kontinente überholt ist’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem 
Paneuropa", 692) 
737 Supan, Leitlinien der allgemeinen politischen Geographie; Ewald Banse’s 1932 Raum und Volk im Weltkriege. 
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described as a subcontinental peninsula, that certainly did not include Russia, which was part of the 
Asian ‘trunk’.738 Banse, meanwhile, had in 1912 reorganised the earth’s surface into fourteen 
continents739 (see fig. 20), with Russia similarly removed from Europe and allotted its own continent 
of ‘Great-Siberia’.740 One can also see the influence of Mackinder’s notion of a united ‘Euro-Asia’, 
divided into a (Russian) ‘heartland’ and four appendages: peninsular Europe, the ‘Nearer East’, China 
and India.741 Question 2 addressed the Russian question head-on, essentially repeating the 1935 
survey by asking the location of Europe’s eastern border, and (pointedly) whether after the ‘upheaval’ 
of the world war and Russian revolution, it should still be drawn in the Urals.742 
Certainly, the questions were leading, and if their wording left any room for ambiguity over 
the PEU’s stance, this was clarified by their most famous propaganda tool: the Pan-European World 
Map. But if it is perhaps obvious what Coudenhove-Kalergi was trying to prove by asking his 
questions, then how successful was the survey at fulfilling those aims? The first thing to note about 
the survey responses is that their very breadth suggests a kind of performative Pan-Europeanism, the 
organisation itself contributing to the European cooperation, community and consensus it sought to 
reveal, albeit with certain conspicuous (and telling) lacunae. As in 1935, he received a wealth of 
responses from prominent figures across the continent, including Michel Lhéritier,743 Marc Bloch,744 
                                               
Gedanken über eine nationale Wehrlehre, translated as E. Banse, Germany Prepares for War: A Nazi Theory of 
“National Defense”, trans. Alan Harris (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company; 1934)  
738 A. Supan, "Die europäische Halbinsel", Die Naturwissenschaften 1.29 (1913) 688–689. Supan did, however, allow 
that while ‘Europe’ was not a geographical concept, it was a concept of cultural history or human geography 
[anthropogeographie], which in fact stretched further east than the Urals. 
739 Both Supan and Banse discussed the differences between the terms Erdteil and Kontinent, a distinction obscured by 
the single English term ‘continent’ (Supan, "Die europäische Halbinsel", 688; E. Banse, "Geographie", Petermanns 
Geographische Mitteilungen 58 (1912) 1-4, 69-74, 128-131, Tafel 1, 2, column 2, n1). For present purposes, it will 
suffice to note that the Pan-European survey used the term Kontinent (Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, 
ACV, PP 1000/219; p.9) 
740 Banse, "Geographie". Banse’s schema differed from that suggested in the survey question in that Banse allotted the 
Middle-East to an ‘Orient’ that encompassed North Africa, and created a separate ‘Mongolia’ continent. 
741 Mackinder, "Geographical Pivot of History", 431 
742 Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.9 
743 Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.41-42 
744 PAN/EU 21, 554/4/286; 31 
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Henri Hauser,745 Oskar Halecki,746 and émigré Germans like Fritz Jäger,747 Adolf Grabowsky748 and 
Hugo Hassinger.749 However, British figures were not surveyed, a marker of another of Europe’s 
borders not asked in the survey but asserted in its methodology. This elective absence was 
overshadowed by a more significant absence that Coudenhove-Kalergi had less control over: unlike 
1935, this time he received only two responses from academics based in Germany. The first of these 
was again Willi Ule, the 76 year old emeritus professor at the University of Rostock.750 The second, 
more significantly, was none other than Karl Haushofer himself.751 Unfortunately for Coudenhove-
Kalergi, for whom a response from Haushofer would have been quite a coup for the survey, Haushofer 
wrote again a couple of weeks later to ask for his response to be suppressed; this wish was respected, 
                                               
745 PAN/EU 21, 554/4/286; 44 
746 Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.26 
747 PAN/EU 21, 554/4/286; 48 
748 Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.22-23 
749 PAN/EU 21, 554/4/286; 43 
750 Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.64 
751 Haushofer to PEU (received 25 Nov 1937); HAEU, PAN/EU 21, 554/4/284, 166-167 
 
Figure 20: Ewald Banse, 'The geographical structure of the earth's surface' (1912). Source: E. Banse, 
"Geographie", Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen 58:1-4, 69-74, 128- 131; Tafel 1 
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and his answers were not printed alongside the other responses in the otherwise comprehensive 
conference report.752 
As before, the content of the responses was mixed. Regarding the European Ostgrenze, the 
weight of opinion was that political borders were indeed changeable, being responsive to both politics 
(specifically, Russia’s political alienation from the West) and the ebb and flow of cultural influence 
as imprinted in the landscape. Reasoning thus, most agreed that Russia had been de-Europeanised, 
and that the Ostgrenze was now the Western border of the Soviet Union, though Hassinger cautiously 
argued that Russia was culturally if not politically an agent of the white ‘Europeanisation of the 
earth’.753 Grabowsky, previously so critical of the alienation of Russia, now did not dispute Bolshevik 
Russia was ‘anti-European’, but sardonically suggested that Nazi Germany was equally anti-
European, and that therefore the Ostgrenze could be drawn between France and Germany.754 Even 
those who argued for the border to remain at the Urals did not lay any claim on their constituting a 
‘natural’ border, instead reasoning that as long as Siberia functioned as a colony to which people were 
deported this border retained meaning,755 or the vagueness of the Urals better suited the fact that the 
border between Europe and Asia had never been ‘sharp’.756 Haushofer’s unpublished response was 
representative of many in asserting that ‘The Ural border was always an administrative and scholarly 
fiction’.757 In short, by and large the responses were compatible on one hand with both contemporary 
geopolitics which held that borders were dynamic rather than fixed and contemporary landscape 
                                               
752 Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Botschafter Europas, 338; citing Haushofer to Coudenhove-Kalergi (received 15 Dec 
1937), RGVA, 554k/4/284, 165. Haushofer’s name was similarly omitted from the index of participants in the 
conference report (Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219) 
753 Hassinger, PAN/EU 21, 554/4/286; 43 
754 Adolf Grabowsky, in Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.22-23; 22. 
755 ‘Solange Sibirien als Land der Deportation benützt wird, ist wohl die Urallinie als Europas Ostgrenze anzusehen.’ 
Alfred Meissner, a headmaster in Freudenthal/Bruntál, Czechoslovakia. Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, 
ACV, PP 1000/219; p.44 
756 Ule, Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.64 
757 ‘Die Uralgrenze war immer eine adimistrative [sic] und Gelehrten-Fiktion.’, Karl Haushofer, “Fragebogen zum 
beiliegender Programm der Schulknoferenz” (received 25 Nov 1937), HAEU, PAN/EU554/4/284, 166 
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geography which laid more emphasis upon man’s influence on the land (the ‘cultural landscape’ first 
developed by Otto Schlüter)758 than the land’s influence on man, and on the other hand with 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s overarching argument that the Soviet Union was no longer part of Europe. 
However, while these responses were printed in full in the conference report, their influence 
was confined to these pages. The debate at the conference itself was more focused on pedagogy, and 
was chiefly attended not by the academic survey respondents, but by a mixture of teachers, 
administrators in the field of education, and representatives of various sections of the Pan-European 
Union. When it came to collating the survey respondents’ advice on what should be taught, the three 
conference conclusions (as publicly published)759 were split between acknowledged Pan-European 
doctrine and vague platitudes: 
1. that although in a physical sense Europe and Asia form one continent, Europe’s unity 
of culture and civilisation makes it act as a continent in its own right. 
2. that in an economic and cultural sense the USSR acts as its own unit, and that therefore 
we can no longer place the border of Europe at the Urals 
3. that European unity is not only based on cultural factors, but also on historical and 
geographical factors.760 
While these conclusions ought not to surprise anyone familiar with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s work from 
the 1923 Pan-Europe onward, they were clearly carefully crafted so as to be broadly compatible with 
the academic opinions that were received. If one might question his readiness to veer from his starting 
assumptions, the Ostgrenze and School Conference surveys show that he both sought out and prized 
the imprimatur of academic geography. While Coudenhove-Kalergi’s preoccupation with Europe’s 
eastern border was certainly indicative of a predilection for thinking his schemes through 
geographically, it also needs to be read as a response to a specific set of political circumstances that 
had originally raised the question, and to contemporary geopolitical academic debates about the 
                                               
758 This school of thought analysed the landscape as bearing the visible imprint of the cultural group that resided in it. 
See O. Schlüter, Die Ziele der Geographie des Menschen (Munich & Berlin: Oldenbourg; 1906); C.O. Sauer, 
"Recent Developments in Cultural Geography", in Edward Cary Hayes (ed.), Recent Developments in the Social 
Sciences (Philadelphia and London: J.B. Lippincott Company; 1927) 154-212, 186-190 
759 In both the December 1937 issue of Paneuropa and the hefty Conference Report Paneuropa: Geographie und 
Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219 
760 Paneuropa: Geographie und Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219; p.3 
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nature of borders. 
 
 
 
Where Coudenhove-Kalergi departed from the geopolitical consensus was in refusing to see borders 
as a political problem in and of themselves, and therefore also refusing to see their revision as a 
panacea. Rather, the PEU position from its inception was that the redrawing of borders was both 
inescapably incendiary, since ‘whoever tampers with those frontiers [laid down at Versailles] tampers 
with the peace of Europe’,761 and in any case futile: 
‘if the frontiers were changed in Central Europe there would not be justice instead of injustice 
but new injustices would probably be created in the place of the old ones. Therefore the only 
way to get out of the difficulty in this part of Europe is to make the frontiers invisible, to create 
a federation of States resembling the structure in Switzerland.’762 
In short, Coudenhove-Kalergi and the geopolitikers agreed with the Ratzellian idea that borders were 
to some degree a political fiction,763 but disagreed that revising them would create any happier an 
outcome. ‘Europeans’, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘must come to realize the truth that the demand 
for justly drawn frontiers cannot be satisfied’.764 Naturally, this stance attracted strong criticism 
among geopolitikers, with Adolf Grabowsky criticising Coudenhove-Kalergi for advocating a 
reactionary political ‘stasis’ that did not reflect the changing political realities: 
‘The disregard of the European border problem practically means the perpetuation of unjust 
boundaries of the peace treaties. A worse attack on the dynamic of history is unthinkable.’765 
                                               
761 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 125 
762 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1938, “A Central European View of the European Situation”; speech at Chatham House; 
ACV, PP 1000/72/1, 1438, p.8. On Switzerland as a model for Europe, see the following section; on the ‘invisible’ 
borders between Swiss cantons, see Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europe Must Unite, 47 
763 This understanding extended to the géopolitique of Jacques Ancel, who though critical of German geopolitik, 
similarly described borders ‘less as being some category of “natural” phenomena as rather “political isobars” 
indicating the pressures of power at any given time and of necessity changing as the balance of power itself 
changed.’ (Parker, "Ratzel, the French School and the birth of Alternative Geopolitics", 960; citing J. Ancel, 
Géographie des frontières (Paris: Gallimard; 1938)) 
764 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 169 
765 ‘Die Nichtachtung des europäischen Grenzproblems bedeutet praktisch die Verewigung der ungerechten 
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Haushofer echoed this precisely, criticising Pan-Europe for its ‘antidynamic’ acceptance of the status 
quo.766 By preserving in aspic the perceived injustices of Versailles, the defeated powers would 
remain wronged and resentful, which Grabowsky described as an ‘unpacifistic result of the 
supposedly pacifist Pan-European thought’.767 
However, the argument over revision was merely a symptom of a deeper disagreement, which 
ranged Coudenhove-Kalergi against not only geopolitics, but also the Wilsonian doctrine of self-
determination. Namely, that rather than accepting the organicist model of the state and its normative 
spatial congruence between state and nation, Coudenhove-Kalergi advocated a divorce of nation from 
state, or to adopt an analogy with religion, a national ‘secularisation’ of the state.768 There was no 
reason, he argued, to accept the ‘dogma’769 that the nation has a blood tie to the state, for ‘nations … 
are not communities of blood, but communities of spirit’.770 The geographical implications were 
clear: while states were intrinsically territorial, nations were not, since ‘the nation is a realm of the 
spirit and cannot be delimited by frontier-lines’; rather, ‘it moves on a different plane’.771 Such talk 
was anathema to the geopolitikers. As Grabowsky outlined in his critique, 
‘Coudenhove racks his brains over what a nation is, and declares that it is certainly not a 
blood-communion. Well, no reasonable person denies that racial purity is not present is any 
nation today; they are all more or less mixed. But for every nation, a certain type of mixture 
is characteristic … The whole thing is best known as Volkstum. It is based on blood [Blut], 
coalesced with a defined soil [Boden], and looks back on a common historical and cultural 
fate. When Coudenhove calls the nation merely a realm of the spirit, above all he 
underestimates the deep attachment to the land. Coudenhove judges purely as an intellectual 
                                               
Grenzziehungen der Friedensverträge. Ein schlimmeres Attentat gegen die Dynamik der Geschichte ist nicht 
denkbar.’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 687) 
766 Haushofer, Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen, 80 
767 ‘ein unpazifistisches Ergebnis des angeblich so pazifistischen paneuropäischen Gedankens.’ (Grabowsky, "Das 
Problem Paneuropa", 687) 
768 He ran with this metaphor, writing: ‘It is incumbent on every cultured individual to bring it about that, as religion is 
today, so tomorrow nationality shall be the private concern of every human being. The future separation between 
Nation and State will be a cultural deed as great as was the separation between Church and State. The concept of a 
“State People” will be an anachronistic as great as the concept of a State Church, and will give way to the principle: 
a Free Nation in a Free State.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 167) 
769 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 152 
770 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 154 
771 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 167-168 
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and therefore remains on the surface.’772 
Grabowsky proceeded to criticise Pan-European thinking for promoting the ‘blurring’ of national 
sovereignty as the borders between nations dissolve, warning that ‘Blurred states can only give rise 
to similarly blurred entities’.773 In his recognition of the difference between geopolitical and Pan-
European thinking, Grabowsky was correct: Coudenhove-Kalergi was indeed arguing for a 
deterritorialisation of the nation from the rigid geography of state space. However, as his obsession 
with Europe’s Ostgrenze would amply demonstrate, he was emphatically not arguing for the 
deterritorialisation of politics in general: while drawing the limits of the nation was seen as both 
inflammatory and impossible, drawing the limits of Europe was for Coudenhove-Kalergi clearly a 
necessity. Put in more theoretical terms, what was being argued for was an up-scaling of the 
territoriality of the body politic. 
 
 
Scale 
There were three key rhetorical strategies Coudenhove-Kalergi employed to argue that politics was 
being upscaled from the state- to the European-level: first, the assertion that the true, basal 
interconnections of social solidarity and shared culture were not those of the nation but rather those 
of European civilisation; second, that a number of the controversial elements of a Pan-European polity 
(including, most notably, the feasibility of a multi-national state) had already proved their efficacy in 
two states that functioned almost as metonyms for Pan-Europe; and third, the hitching of scale to a 
                                               
772 ‘Coudenhove zerbricht sich den Kopf darüber, was eine Nation sei und erklärt, sie sei jedenfalls keine 
Blutsgemeinschaft. Nun, kein Vernünftiger leugnet mehr, daß Reinrassigkeit heute bei keiner Nation vorhanden ist, 
sie sind alle mehr oder weniger gemischt. Aber für jede Nation ist doch ein bestimmter Mischtypus 
charakteristisch … Das ganze nennt man am besten Volkstum. Es besteht auf der Grundlage des Bluts, verschmilzt 
mit einem bestimmten Boden und sieht auf ein gemeinsames historisches und kulturelles Schicksal zurück. Wenn 
Coudenhove die Nation lediglich ein Reich des Geistes nennt, so ist hierbei vor allem die tiefe Schollenbindung 
verkannt. Coudenhove urteilt rein als Intellektueller und bleibt deshalb an der Oberfläche’ (Grabowsky, "Das 
Problem Paneuropa", 678) 
773 ‘Aus verwaschenen Staaten kann auch nur wieder ein verwaschenes Gebilde werden’ (Grabowsky, "Das Problem 
Paneuropa", 698) 
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progressivist notion of history such that the ‘upscaling of politics’ became reified as a fundamental 
law of political geography that had to be adhered to if Europeans wanted to retain a leading position 
in world affairs. Each of these strategies invoked different logics, and were underpinned by different 
(and occasionally contradictory) notions of time and space, so they must be analysed separately in 
order to build a complete picture of the role of scale in Pan-European thought. 
 The first, then, was the assertion of a European nation, though in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
reasoning this was less an attachment of the accoutrements of nationhood to the fabric of 
Europeanism, and more a recognition that the commonalities of European nations had always been 
stronger and more significant than their differences. Thus, he wished to respect both the emotive 
attachment between people and polity, and the specific power of nationalism, but sought to argue for 
a complementary, supra-national attachment that might harness this power for a Pan-European Union. 
Indeed, he acknowledged the necessity of such an attachment at the outset of his campaign, in the 
1923 Pan-Europe: 
‘Before it can start its existence on the political map, Pan-Europe must first take root in the 
hearts and minds of Europeans. … The Pan-European sense of solidarity, the European sense 
of patriotism, must establish itself as the crown and complement of the national sentiment.’774 
Indeed, he proceeded to argue that this task was the only thing preventing Pan-Europe, writing that 
‘Psychological, and no longer political, obstacles stand in the way of its federation today’.775 
 However, crucially, Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that this sense of European patriotism was 
not something new that had to be forged, but something latent within Europeans that had to be 
uncovered. He reasoned, 
‘The cultural unity of the Occident gives us the right to speak of a European nation, which is 
linguistically and politically divided into a variety of groups. If that Pan-European cultural 
sense succeeds in asserting itself, then every good German, Frenchman, Pole, and Italian will 
also be a good European.’776 
                                               
774 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 190-191 
775 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 121 
776 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 163 
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The problem was one of education, specifically the division of European culture into national 
literatures since the abandonment of Latin as a common European language, which resulted in a 
partial view since ‘the nationalist comes to know and to love only the works of his own literature, 
only the thoughts and deeds of his own heroes’.777 This partiality needed to be corrected: 
‘the peoples of Europe must learn to know, as well as their own, the intellectual leaders of 
their neighbors, and to estimate how much they owe, or might owe, to them. … In the hearts 
of Europeans the national pantheon is to be widened till it becomes a European pantheon, in 
which Goethe would take his place beside Shakespeare, Voltaire beside Nietzsche, Hus beside 
Spinoza.’778 
Practically, Coudenhove-Kalergi had a number of prescient suggestions as to how this might be 
accomplished, which from the outset included ‘linguistic attainments [i.e. education] and the 
production of numerous translations’779 and ‘An inter-European exchange of teachers, students, and 
children’.780 These ideas would continue to be developed and fleshed out in the decades that followed. 
Indeed, if we return to the 1937 Pan-European School Conference, but focus not on the survey but 
instead on the conference itself, we see precisely these issues being discussed. The ‘conference 
suggestions’ that made it into the final report included a variety of interesting ideas, including 
recommendations to expand the teaching of European Economic and Cultural Geography, to teach 
cross-European intellectual and social movements, to promote the idea that the national and European 
ideas were mutually enriching, to encourage the use of universal history timelines and maps to enliven 
these lessons,781 and the expansion of international students’ correspondence and the cross-border 
exchange of educational films. In short, the teaching of history and geography was to be the primary 
site of the inculcation of a sense of pan-European nationalism. 
                                               
777 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 159 
778 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 161-162 
779 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 161 
780 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 171 
781 Including specifically ‘map lessons to contrast shattered Europe with the large economic areas [wirtschaftliche 
Großräume] of the British Empire, USSR, North- and South America and East Asia’ (Paneuropa: Geographie und 
Geschichte, ACV, PP 1000/219, 3) 
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It is important to point out that Coudenhove-Kalergi was at pains to say that this European 
identity needed to be more than mere cosmopolitanism: 
‘National chauvinism cannot be overcome by an abstract internationalism; it can be overcome 
only by deepening and broadening national cultures into a general European culture; by 
spreading the truth that all national cultures in Europe are closely interwoven parts of a great 
and homogeneous European culture.’782 
Nevertheless, the assertion that bonds of belonging could be formed with any other political scale 
than that of the state was sure to be denounced by the geopolitikers. They saw such claims as 
emblematic of the artificiality of the Pan-European aspirations, which seemed to them ridiculous 
when juxtaposed with the vaunted ‘organic’ nature of nationalism. ‘The Pan-European man,’ wrote 
Grabowsky, ‘is but a caricature of European man’.783 However, behind these accusations of 
abstraction and artifice, a somewhat darker insinuation lay; namely, that Pan-Europeanism was a 
vessel for Jewish internationalism. This was this line of Karl Christian von Loesch’s 1932 critique of 
Pan-Europe: 
‘Only mongrels and people not firmly anchored in a Volkstum wish to create a corresponding 
European nation, a goal which is neither attainable nor worthwhile’.784 
This ad hominem attack sought to lump Pan-Europeanism in with other forms of internationalism 
deemed dangerous to the state, whether Jewish, socialist or capitalist, while reminding readers of 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s mixed race background and his Jewish wife. While the venom of this attack 
is certainly indicative of the antisemitism that underlay suspicion of Coudenhove-Kalergi, it speaks 
also to sensitivity regarding the need to distantiate Pan-European claims of a European nation from 
the general issue of European cultural unity, which had widespread support from both liberals and 
conservatives. 
 
                                               
782 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 161 
783 ‘der Paneuropäer … ist nur eine Karikatur des europäischen Menschen’, (Grabowsky, "Das Problem Paneuropa", 
704) 
784 K.C.v. Loesch, "Die grösseren Zusammenschlüsse. Paneuropa", in Karl Haushofer (ed.), Macht und Erde, III vols., 
vol. II: Jenseits der Grossmächte (Leipzig & Berlin: B.G. Teubner; 1932), 393n; quoted in Murphy, Heroic Earth, 
234 
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The second way in which Coudenhove-Kalergi employed scale was by identifying places that, he 
claimed, metonymically stood for Europe, or at least the Europe envisaged by the PEU. Of course, in 
the interwar years, the ‘spirit of Locarno’ entered popular discourse, while ‘Geneva’ became indelibly 
associated with its tenant organisation, the League of Nations. However, in the case of the PEU, two 
places in particular – Austria and Switzerland – were adopted in a more rigorously analytical fashion, 
and held not only as representative of a certain political ideal, but as proof positive of the viability of 
this ideal: each was the subject of dedicated pamphlets extolling their ‘European mission’.785 In these 
examples, scale functioned fractal-like, with microcosm and macrocosm mirroring each other: Europe 
was seen through the lens of its constituent state, while this state was seen through the lens of its 
capacity to act as a model to follow. 
 Given Coudenhove-Kalergi’s heritage as an Austrian aristocrat, and upbringing in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, the positioning of Austria as a model for Europe was entirely in keeping with his 
general tendency to see the future of Europe in his own vanished past. Certainly, his sense of nostalgia 
for the past and patriotism in the present coloured the judgement somewhat, as it did in his private 
wartime plea to Churchill to restore South Tyrol ‘to its Austrian homeland after years of cruel 
oppression’ by Italy,786 or in the postwar speech he gave at his alma mater, the Theresianum Academy 
in Vienna, on “Austria and Europe”.787 However, what elevated the significance of Austria beyond 
mere partiality were Coudenhove-Kalergi’s interwar efforts to more rigorously analyse why it served 
                                               
785 ‘Die Sendung der Schweiz heißt: Europa’ (R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 
1000/219, p.5, emphasis in original); Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 
1000/219 
786 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to W.S. Churchill (17 Oct 1944) ACV, PP 1000/3/7. This contrasted with his carefully 
reasoned and highly detailed public memorandum suggesting the partition and subsequent plebiscite on South 
Tyrol, to be organised by neutral observers. See “Memorandum: Solution of the problem of the Southern Tyrol or 
Alto Adige and Trentino” (n.d.), ACV, PP 1000/71/12 
787 “Oesterreich und Europa”, speech given at Theresianischen Akademie (21 Apr 1964), ACV, PP 1000/72/7 
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as a model; how, in his words, ‘History, geography and culture determine Austria to be the standard-
bearer of the European idea; the focus of European culture; the centre of the European community’.788 
 In fact, the argument for Austria as a model for Europe to follow was made in two different 
registers. The first of these was a more technical analysis of Austrian political innovations that could 
prove useful precedents. For example, in 1929 he looked back to the agreements upon which the dual 
monarchy of Austria-Hungary was established in 1867, noting that the ‘minimum communion’ 
between the polities entailed the setting up of three joint ministries: a joint Treasury, a joint Ministry 
of War and a joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the implication, of course, was that these were also 
the minimum first steps for a Pan-European state.789 A more common touchstone was the 
multinationalism of the Habsburg state, and its citizens: 
‘This European landscape has shaped European people. People with open hearts and open 
eyes; free from nationalist one-sidedness. For innumerable races and peoples have mixed to 
create the Austrian people.’790 
In Coudenhove-Kalergi’s eyes, the Habsburg Empire managed ‘to connect all these great and small 
nations through a common, supranational [übernationalen] patriotism’,791 of the sort that he wished 
to replicate in his European nation. He even argued that this apparent acceptance of multinationalism 
meant that an ‘Austrian solution’ to the unification of all-deutschland was not the ethnically 
homogenous state that (German-based) Pan-Germans envisaged, but one that respected all nations, 
and could guarantee equal rights and security to minority nations; he called this ‘the German mission 
                                               
788 ‘Geschichte, Geographie und Kultur bestimmen Österreich zum Bannerträger des europäischen Gedankens; zum 
Brennpunkt der europäischen Kultur; zum Mittelpunkt der europäischen Gemeinschaft.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, p.3) 
789 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die Schweiz als Vorbild", Paneuropa 5.10 (1929) 1-5, 4 
790 ‘Diese europäische Landschaft hat europäische Menschen gestaltet. Menschen mit offenen Herzen und offenen 
Augen; frei von nationalistischer Einseitigkeit. Denn unzählige Rassen und Völker haben sich gemischt, um den 
österreichischen Menschen zu schaffen.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 
1000/219, 5; emph in orig) 
791 ‘all diese großen und kleinen Nationen zu verbinden durch einen gemeinsamen, übernationalen Patriotismus.’ 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 5) 
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of Austria’.792 Quite aside from the fact that this outlook was (as we have seen) not borne out by the 
rabidly antisemitic and ultra-nationalistic tenor of Austrian Pan-Germanism, the Austria of 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s imagination was clearly set against an Anschluss that would merely 
incorporate Austria into an enlarged German state. Rather, he offered his own take on the concept, 
arguing that in fact 
‘Pan-Europe means Anschluss: not only to Germany, but also to the Danube states, to Italy, to 
Switzerland. Anschluss all round.’793 
Austrians would choose such a path, he reasoned, not only because they were acculturated to multi-
nationalism, but because it would upgrade Austria’s own standing and field of influence. Having been 
rendered a minor regional power at Versailles, Austria’s options were to become a peripheral province 
under a German Anschluss, a significant regional power leading a multinational Mitteleuropa that 
excluded Germany, or a European power broker within Pan-Europe. The choice was clear: as he wrote 
in 1930, ‘Austria’s future is now no longer Mitteleuropean but Pan-European’.794 
 This rationalist discussion of Austria’s contribution to developing ‘European’ multi-national 
politics, past and present, was accompanied by a more emotionally charged, almost spiritual register, 
one which was yet clearer in its debt to the concepts and terminology of geopolitics. For instance, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 1933 article began: 
‘Each state has a life-giving idea that animates its political form. A historic mission. 
The mission of Austria is called: Europe.’795 
This register too invoked history and geography, though in much broader strokes. Geographically, the 
                                               
792 Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 12 
793 ‘Paneuropa bedeutet Anschluß: nicht nur an Deutschland, sondern auch an die Donaustaaten, an Italien, an die 
Schweiz. Anschluß all round’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 
13) 
794 ‘Österreichs Zukunft ist heute nicht mehr mitteleuropäisch, sondern paneuropäisch.’ (R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
"Mitteleuropa", Paneuropa 6.3 (1930) 85-91, 87) 
795 ‘Jeder Staat hat eine lebenspendende Idee, die seine politischen Formen beseelt. Eine historische Sendung. Diese 
Sendung Österreichs heißt: Europa.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 
1000/219, 3; emph in orig) 
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argument ran that Austria lay at the centre of Europe, the crossing point of its great natural and man-
made thoroughfares: 
‘On the path of the Danube, the most powerful river in Europe; on the massif of the Alps, the 
central high mountain range of Europe. 
At the crossroads of the European roads leading from west to east and from north to 
south; from Scandinavia and Germany to Italy, and from France and Spain to the Orient.’796 
In other words, Austria’s centrality heightened the stakes of her mission, forcing her to ‘choose either 
to become the battlefield of a new world war - or the centre of the European cultural community’.797 
However, paradoxically, this argument about Austria’s role at the centre of Europe was complemented 
by an argument that she had for centuries fulfilled a role at the border of Europe. Historically, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi claimed, Austria had acted as a bulwark against the various ‘barbarians’ of the 
East: the Avars, the Mongols, the Turks, Islam, and now Bolshevism. He called this Austria’s 
‘thousand-year fight for Europe’, thus adapting both the Nazis’ claims of a ‘thousand-year Reich’, 
and the Christian millennialism that influenced it.798 This marginality was cause for suspicion among 
critics of Pan-Europe, who agreed that Austria metonymically stood for Pan-Europe, but saw this 
negatively. In Hitler’s Zweites Buch, part of his direct criticism of Pan-Europe was precisely 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s attachment to Austria, and its capital in particular: ‘It is the rootless spirit of 
the old Reich capital of Vienna – that hybrid city of Orient and Occident – that speaks to us in this 
way’.799 In a way, Hitler’s argument was the same as Coudenhove-Kalergi’s: each agreed that multi-
national Vienna lay at the margins of a Europe of insular nation-states, and at the heart of a 
                                               
796 ‘An der Straße der Donau, des mächtigsten Stromes Europas; an dem Massiv der Alpen, dem zentralen 
Hochgebirge Europas. [//] An der Kreuzung der europäischen Wege, die von Westen nach Osten führen und von 
Norden nach Süden; von Skandinavien und Deutschland nach Italien und von Frankreich und Spanien nach dem 
Orient’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 5; emph in orig) 
797 ‘Es kann wählen: entweder Kriegsschauplatz zu werden eines neuen Weltkrieges - oder Mittelpunkt der 
europäischen Kulturgemeinschaft.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 
1000/219, 13-14; emph in orig) 
798 Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 4 
799 A. Hitler, Hitler's Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf, ed. Gerhard L. Weinberg, trans. Krista 
Smith (New York: Enigma Books; 2006), 118 
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cosmopolitan Pan-Europe. 
 However, Austria was not the only model for Pan-Europe, and was indeed eclipsed in this 
regard by Switzerland. The connections between Switzerland and internationalism are well 
established, and in the interwar period the League’s Geneva base made this association inescapable.800 
That said, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s reasoning for citing Switzerland as a model to follow in numerous 
pamphlets,801 articles802 and chapters,803 and the attention he devoted to canvassing opinion there, ran 
along somewhat different lines, and did not touch upon its significance as a residence of international 
organisations. For Coudenhove-Kalergi, the essence of Switzerland was not international, but 
European.804 
Like Austria, Switzerland was invoked in two different registers: one more technical, and one 
more abstract. Writing in the first register, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that ‘all the problems facing 
Pan-Europe on a large scale are to be found in microcosm in Switzerland, and Switzerland has solved 
all these problems in ingenious ways’.805 The first of these problems was that of multinationalism. 
‘Switzerland,’ Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘daily delivers by its mere existence proof that the 
European national hatred is artificial and unnecessary; that the three greatest nations of the continent, 
German, French and Italian, can live together peacefully in full equality and work together in an 
                                               
800 See, for example, R. de Traz, The spirit of Geneva, trans. Fried-Ann Kindler (London: Oxford University Press; 
1935); M. Herren, "Geneva, 1919–1945: The Spatialities of Public Internationalism and Global Networks", in 
Heike Jöns, Peter Meusburger, and Michael Heffernan (eds.), Mobilities of Knowledge (Cham, Switzerland: 
Springer; 2017) 211-226 
801 Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 1000/219; Schweizer National- und Ständeräte 
zum Programm der Paneuropa-Union / L’opinion de Conseillers Nationaux et de Conseillers des Etats sur le 
programme de l’Union Paneuropéenne (Zurich/Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag; c.1937) (ACV, PP1000, 219) 
802 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild"; R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die europäische Schweiz", Paneuropa 
13.7 (1937) 187-189 
803 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, Ch. 15: “Switzerland: Pan-Europe in Miniature”, 139-147; M. 
Heyman, "Switzerland as a Model for Europe", in Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (ed.), Postwar European 
Federation (New York: New York University; 1943) 27-38 
804 These arguments, of course, were not unique to Coudenhove-Kalergi: see, for example, D.d. Rougemont and C.T. 
Muret, The Heart of Europe: Switzerland (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce; 1941) 
805 ‘Denn alle Probleme, denen Paneuropa im großen gegenübersteht, finden sich im kleinen in der Schweiz; und alle 
diese Probleme hat die Schweiz in genialer Weise gelöst.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 1) 
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organized polity’.806 The pertinence of this lesson, he argued, meant that a federal Europe needed to 
take its cues not from the USA, whose linguistic unity made its circumstances incomparable,807 or 
the 1815 German Confederation [Deutscher Bund], which had proved ineffective,808 but rather from 
the Swiss Confederation [Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft].809 Switzerland had ‘shown the way to 
make boundaries between states and even between national units invisible, to respect national and 
religious minorities, to find a sound compromise between the independence of federated states and 
the benefits of a political and economic union’. In short, ‘To find peace and union, Europe would 
only have to copy large parts of the Swiss constitution and adapt a number of Swiss principles and 
institutions to its wider problems’.810 In addition to these constitutional lessons, Coudenhove-Kalergi 
also wished to ape its policy of neutrality, its ability to stand above the squabbles of nations, which 
had survived the ‘acid test’ of WWI.811 He wrote admiringly that ‘Switzerland has performed the 
miracle of preserving its neutrality and inner peace, while Germans, French, Italians, and Austrians 
fought at its borders’.812 In deed and in thought, Switzerland was nothing less than the vanguard of 
Pan-European politics; ‘the realization of Pan-Europa’, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘means the moral 
conquest of Europe by Switzerland’.813 
                                               
806 ‘die Schweiz liefert täglich durch ihr bloßes Dasein den Beweis, daß der europäische Nationalhaß künstlich und 
überflüssig ist. Daß die drei größten Nationen des Kontinents: Deutsche, Franzosen und Italiener friedlich in voller 
Gleichberechtigung und gemeinsamer Arbeit in einem organisierten Staatswesen zusammenleben können.’ 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 1000/219, p.5 
807 See, for example, Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1933, Österreichs europäische Sendung; ACV, PP 1000/219, 9 
808 He called the German Confederation a ‘monstrosity’ [Mißgeburt]; see Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 
4 
809 Though generally inconsistent on whether the PEU should be federal or confederal, when referring to Switzerland 
he often spoke of a ‘European Eidgenossenschaft’ to emphasise the point that it should look to the Swiss rather than 
the German example (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 4; Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz 
in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 1000/219, p.10) 
810 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 143 
811 ‘Feuerprobe’, Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 3 
812 ‘Die Schweiz hat das Wunder vollbracht, ihre Neutralität und ihren inneren Frieden zu wahren, während an ihren 
Grenzen Deutsche und Franzosen, Italiener und Österreicher miteinander kämpften.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
"Schweiz als Vorbild", 3) 
813 ‘die Verwirklichung Paneuropas bedeutet die moralische Eroberung Europas durch die Schweiz’, Coudenhove-
Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 1; see also Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 
1000/219, p.10 
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From 1933, Coudenhove-Kalergi began to strike a different tone, maintaining that Pan-Europe 
needed to aspire to the Swiss model, but arguing that the Swiss now themselves equally needed Pan-
Europe to be its guarantor, in order to survive in its current form. Switzerland, he argued, faced an 
existential dilemma of Shakespearean proportions: to be or not to be.814 Militarily, in a world of Great 
Powers and modern warfare, Switzerland needed a powerful backer lest it suffer the same fate as 
Belgium in 1914.815 Socio-politically, Switzerland needed Europe to buy into the notion political 
multinationalism, lest it too fall to the ideology that held the borders of state, nation and language to 
be normatively congruent.816 As Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, 
‘if the belief prevails that nation and linguistic community are identical, if extreme 
nationalism prevails in Europe, Switzerland cannot hold firm against the three great nations 
that surround it. Only a renewal of the European idea ensures the future of Switzerland’817 
In other words, the Swiss example and the Pan-Europe that would be built in its image were mutually 
reinforcing. This attempt not only to portray Switzerland as showing the way to Pan-Europe, but to 
convince the Swiss that they needed to actively lead Europe there, may be seen in two surveys 
designed to canvass the opinion of Swiss politicians. In 1926, the PEU co-organised with the 
‘Schweizerischen Vereinigung für eine europäische Staaten-Union’ (Swiss Association for a 
                                               
814  ‘Sein oder Nichtsein’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 1000/219, p.3). August 
Schlegel’s famous 1798 German translation of Hamlet had rendered ‘To be, or not to be’ as ‘Sein oder Nichtsein’ 
(W. Shakespeare, "Shakspeare’s dramatische Werke", trans. August Wilhelm Schlegel, IX vols., vol. III: Der Sturm. 
Hamlet, Prinz von Dänemark (Berlin: Johann Friedrich Unger; 1798), Act III Sc. I, 232) 
815 ‘The European peace program is now more urgent for Switzerland than in former times because of the high 
probability that in any future world war Switzerland’s neutrality will be no more respected than was the neutrality 
of Belgium in the past: lest Switzerland become not only an area of transit, but a theatre of war.’ (‘Das europäische 
Friedensprogramm ist heute für die Schweiz dringender als in früheren Zeiten, weil die große Wahrscheinlichkeit 
besteht, daß in einem künftigen Weltkrieg die Neutralität der Schweiz ebensowenig respektiert wird, wie im 
vergangenen die Neutralität Belgiens: daß also die Schweiz nicht nur Durchmarschgebiet wird, sondern 
Kriegsschauplatz.’ Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die europäische Schweiz", 188) 
816 ‘If the extreme nationalism in Europe triumphs, … the state borders will be adjusted to the linguistic borders.’ 
(‘Siegt der extreme Nationalismus in Europa, … die Staatsgrenzen werden den Sprachgrenzen angeglichen 
werden’; Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 1000/219, 3) 
817 ‘wenn der Glaube sich durchsetzt, daß Nation und Sprachgemeinschaft identisch sind, wenn der extreme 
Nationalismus in Europa siegt, kann die Schweiz sich gegen die drei großen Nationen, die sie umgeben, nicht 
halten. Nur eine Erneuerung der europäischen Idee sichert die Zukunft der Schweiz’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die 
europäische Schweiz", 188) 
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European Union) the distribution of a survey among the members of the Swiss National Council (i.e. 
lower house) and Council of States (i.e. upper house), asking 3 questions: 
‘1. Do you think the creation of the United States of Europe is desirable? 
2. Do you think the creation of the United States of Europe is possible? 
3. Do you believe that Switzerland could and should take the initiative in some way?’818 
Despite the PEU’s involvement, the survey was deliberately not couched in Pan-European terms, so 
as to allow the respondents to reply in the general rather than on the specifics of Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s scheme.819 The response rate was low (61 out of 300), but the responses themselves were 
broadly positive on all three questions. Some respondents, like National Councilor Hans Oprecht, 
even took the same line that Coudenhove-Kalergi would, writing that ‘The Swiss Confederation 
constitutes a political model for the United States of Europe’.820 A decade later, in 1937, the PEU 
decided to repeat the exercise, again surveying the members of the Swiss Councils, but this time 
asking which of nine listed Pan-European policies they supported.821 The 108 respondents who agreed 
for their submissions to be made public were collated in a booklet listing their responses. Even now 
that the survey was specifically and explicitly tied to the political programme of the PEU, the 
                                               
818 ‘1. Halten Sie die Schaffung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa für wünschenswert? 
2. Halten Sie die Schaffung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa für möglich? 
3. Glauben Sie, daß die Schweiz in irgend einer Weise initiativ vorgehen könnte und sollte?’ (W. Schmid, "Vereinigte 
Staaten von Europa. Das Ergebnis einer Rundfrage", Schweizerische Monatshefte für Politik und Kultur 7 (1927) 
195-206, 195-196) 
819 As Werner Schmid said in an article reporting the results, ‘The description of the problem of the United States of 
Europe in any one way, such as the Coudenhoven pan-European program, was deliberately avoided. Every 
respondent should be given the opportunity to imagine for themselves, as he sees fit, to think of its emergence 
however he wanted to’ (‘Dabei wurde absichtlich vermieden, das Problem der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa in 
irgend einer Weise, etwa im Sinne des Coudenhoveschen paneuropäischen Programms, zu umschreiben. Jeder 
Befragte sollte die Möglichkeit haben, sich dieselben vorzustellen, wie es ihm Paßte, ihre Entstehung sich zu 
denken, wie er wollte.’, Schmid, "Vereinigte Staaten von Europa", 196) 
820 ‘Die schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft bildet staatspolitisches Vorbild der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa.’, 
Schmid, "Vereinigte Staaten von Europa", 200 
821 Briefly, these were the establishment of a European: 1) federation, 2) federal court. 3) military alliance, 4) customs 
union, 5) collective colonial system, 6) currency, as well as 7) respect for national culture as the foundation of 
European cultural community, 8) protection of national and religious minorities, and 9) the collaboratation of 
Europe with other groups of states within a universal League of Nations. (Schweizer National- und Ständeräte zum 
Programm der Paneuropa-Union / L’opinion de Conseillers Nationaux et de Conseillers des Etats sur le 
programme de l’Union Paneuropéenne (Zurich/Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag; c.1937) (ACV, PP1000, 219; p.5) These 
were the nine policies that had been publicised in 1933 in Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; 
ACV, PP 1000/219; pp.11-19 
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responses were still broadly positive on every count, ranging from near unanimity on the protection 
of minorities, the creation of a European federal court, and collaboration with other continental 
groupings within the framework of the League of Nations, to a slim majority on the contentious issues 
of a European military alliance and common colonial system (see chapter IV).822 The prevailing tone 
of the accompanying comments was sober rather than enthusiastic; as Markus Kutter has observed, 
‘sympathy for the demands of the Pan-European Union was accompanied by a cautious, sometimes 
rather melancholic scepticism of their realisation’.823 Nevertheless, the former won out. After a 
decade that had seen the worrying resurgence of atavistic politics, Swiss politicians were more than 
receptive to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s message that a Pan-Europe constructed in their image might be 
necessary for Switzerland to survive. 
 Like Austria, the invocation of Switzerland as a model for Pan-Europe also rested on a specific 
geographical imaginary of Switzerland as the ‘heart of Europe’.824 Like Austria, it was held to lie at 
the centre of Europe; indeed, the fact that it was (like Austria) landlocked was used as evidence that 
a continued intensification of autarkic politics across Europe would prove disastrous, as it would be 
cut off from the world-ocean, and thus also the world-market.825 Like Austria, Coudenhove-Kalergi 
promised that the creation of Pan-Europe would ‘turn its central position in the heart of the continent, 
which is now a disadvantage, into its greatest advantage’,826 by embracing its ‘natural’ role as a 
‘mediator’.827 Where Switzerland stood apart was its height, which was used to connote a ‘natural’ 
                                               
822 See Schweizer National- und Ständeräte zum Programm der Paneuropa-Union / L’opinion de Conseillers 
Nationaux et de Conseillers des Etats sur le programme de l’Union Paneuropéenne (Zurich/Vienna: Paneuropa-
Verlag; c.1937) (ACV, PP1000, 219; p.5); M. Kutter, "Vereinigte Staaten von Europa – was Schweizer Politiker 
dazu sagen", Anmerkungen zu Europa (1992) (accessed 23 Jul 2017) 
823 ‘war die Sympathie für die Forderungen der Paneuropa Union begleitet von einer vorsichtigen, manchmal eher 
melancholischen Skepsis der Verwirklichung gegenüber’, Kutter, "Vereinigte Staaten von Europa", 4-5 
824 ‘Kern Europas’, Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 1 
825 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die europäische Schweiz", 188 
826 ‘verwandelt sich ihre zentrale Lage im Herzen des Kontinents, die heute ein Nachteil ist, in den größten Vorteil.’ 
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Die europäische Schweiz", 188) 
827 Coudenhove-Kalergi, [c.1933] Die Schweiz in Gefahr!; ACV, PP 1000/219, p.5 
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impartiality. As Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote: 
‘From the heights of the Bernese mountains, I had the feeling of overlooking Europe’s petty 
conflicts and visualizing the moral problems of our civilization’.828 
This sense of altitude was not merely a device that added colour to such personal reminisces, a gesture 
to the Alpine sublime of the Romantics;829 rather, it was an integral part of the glory of Switzerland: 
‘In the midst of our dismembered continent, protected by high mountains, stands this citadel 
of liberty. A lighthouse directing the course of Europe through the nights and storms of our 
era toward brighter shores and a peaceful future.’830 
Switzerland was both a beacon and a conductor for enlightened supranationalism, thanks to their 
position literally above the fray. It was through Switzerland that the people of Europe could claim to 
be ‘closest to heaven’, and it would be through it that Europe could reach political salvation.831  
 
 
 
The third way in which scale was invoked in Pan-European thought was as a dynamic force, an 
underlying political law of time and space, of history and geography. Contra the geopolitikers’ 
accusation, based on Coudenhove-Kalergi’s refusal to countenance revising the Versailles borders, 
that Pan-European thinking was damned by its reactionary acceptance of political stasis, it was in fact 
premised upon a foundational dynamism. This dynamism can be seen front and centre, if a little 
vaguely, in the choice of title for his first autobiography: Europa erwacht!, or ‘Europe awakes!’.832 
As we have already seen (chapter II), a progressivist understanding of history was a fundamental part 
                                               
828 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 140. Coudenhove-Kalergi was referring to his philosophical works, 
which he would write in his Swiss summer house near Gstaad. 
829 See, for example, R. Macfarlane, Mountains of the Mind: A History of a Fascination (London: Granta Books; 
2003); S. Ireton and C. Schaumann (eds.), Heights of Reflection: Mountains in the German Imagination from the 
Middle Ages to the Twenty-First Century (Rochester, NY: Camden House; 2012); C. Duffy, The Landscapes of the 
Sublime 1700-1830: Classic Ground (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; 2013)  
830 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe, 147 
831 ‘The people of Europe, who are closest to heaven, invented the form which can unite our continent: Switzerland.’ 
‘Das Volk Europas, das dem Himmel am nächsten ist, hat die Form erfunden, die unseren Erdteil einigen kann: die 
Schweiz.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Schweiz als Vorbild", 1) 
832 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa erwacht 
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of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s argument for Pan-Europe. However, what we must now add is that this 
progressivism had a foundational spatial aspect, which understood ‘scale’ as not fixed, but dynamic. 
That is, rather than the state being assumed to be the ‘natural’, ahistorical scale of politics, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that politics was continually being up-scaled. From a wide angle, this 
took on the appearance of a natural law of politics: 
 ‘The path from men to the universe leads through concentric circles: men build families, 
families communes, communes cantons, cantons states, states continents, continents the 
planets, the planets the solar system, solar systems the universe … The federalist system 
corresponds to this natural world order.’833  
This schema was not wholly original: it had been hinted at by progressivist thinkers since Turgot, 
Condorcet and Kant,834 further developed (as we have seen) by Kapp and Ratzel, and spelled out 
clearly by Fried.835 Indeed, it is mostly implicit in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s writing, where the scope of 
analysis was more typically narrowed to include the nineteenth-century unifications of Germany and 
Italy, and the twentieth-century contention that the age of the state was in the process of being 
superseded by a new age, which would be definied by larger-scale political units. Occasionally, it 
gestured too to a future utopia of truly global governance: 
‘Just as the successive unifications of Germany, Italy, and Poland were necessary stages on 
the road to a united Europe, so the unification of Europe will be a necessary stage on the road 
                                               
833 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, The Totalitarian State Against Man, trans. Andrew Mcfadyean (London: Frederick 
Muller; 1938), 190 
834 Turgot had in 1750 written of how ‘manners are softened, the human mind becomes more enlightened, and separate 
nations are brought closer to one another. Finally commercial and political ties unite all parts of the globe, and the 
whole human race, through alternate periods of rest and unrest, of weal and woe, goes on advancing, although at a 
slow pace, towards greater perfection.’ (A.-R.-J. Turgot, "A philosophical review of the successive advances of the 
human mind", in Ronald L. Meek (ed.), Turgot on progress, sociology and economics, trans. Ronald L. Meek 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1973) 41-60, 41. In the 1780s and 1790s, Condorcet and Kant were 
among the first to write of a the formation of (con)federations not as diplomatic agreements, but as a natural 
product of peoples being ‘drawn into closer intimacy’ as part of the process of civilisation; see M.-J.-A.-N.C. 
Condorcet, Marquis de, Outlines of an historical view of the progress of the human mind, being a posthumous work 
of the late M. de Condorcet (Philadelphia: Lang & Ustick; 1796), 281; I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a 
cosmopolitical point of view", in W. Hastie (ed.), Kant’s principles of politics, including his essay on Perpetual 
peace. A contribution to political science, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; 1891) 1-29 
835  Fried had written of ‘the fact that the whole course of world-history is a process of constantly increasing 
organization, that an uninterrupted line of progress leads from isolated primitive man up to modern Pan-
Americanism. … [T]his evolution of the human race in history is simply the expression of a universal natural law 
that leads from chaos to world-organization as from cell to Homo Sapiens.’ (Fried, Restoration of Europe, 27, 
emphasis in original) 
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to a united humanity.’836 
As White notes, Coudenhove-Kalergi ‘was deeply convinced that … history was passing, perhaps 
had passed, out of the age of the local national state’.837 Thus, when Coudenhove-Kalergi warned of 
dis-united European states being out-competed militarily and/or economically by rival continental 
organisations, he consistently portrayed this threat in terms of the small-scale polity being left behind, 
while the large-scale polities led the way forward. 
 The engine for this progressivism was technologically driven time-space compression. As 
Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, ‘Every day the world grows smaller; through the progress of science as 
applied to communications, cities and countries are ever being brought more closely together’.838 He 
cited Friedrich List’s argument that the railroad necessitated the creation of a German Customs Union, 
and argued that the aeroplane now necessitated the creation of a Pan-European Union;839 if proof 
were needed of the desirability of large integrated economic markets, one need only look to the 
success of the US. Militarily too, new technology like the aeroplane had radically altered the concept 
of a battlefront.840 The fact that politics had not kept pace with these developments was, Coudenhove-
Kalergi argued (again, following Fried),841 the source of siginificant tension: 
‘If the science of politics fails to adapt itself to the science of communications, the resulting 
tension must inevitably lead to terrible catastrophes. The spatio-temporal rapprochement of 
neighboring peoples must be followed by a political rapprochement, … else [Europe] will be 
in danger of blindly staggering into another war and of suffocating in a very sea of gas-
                                               
836 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 94 
837 White, "The Europeanism of Coudenhove-Kalergi", 29 
838 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 9; see also Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europe Must Unite, 43; c.f. S. Kern, The 
Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1983) 
839 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europe Must Unite, 45 
840 It thus engendered even more complex spatialites than those of scale, since the aeroplane introduced a vertical 
dimension to the battlefield. Coudenhove-Kalergi warned that ‘The War of the Future will be waged, across the line 
of battle, against the rear; above all, against the enemy capitals. … No distinction will be made between front and 
rear, or between combatants and non-combatants.’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 109-110) 
841 Fried had argued that ‘the political relations of nations and the spirit in which they are conducted have not kept pace 
with this mighty force … [W]hile the conditions of actual life have presented a picture of ever-increasing 
coöperation, order and organization, international relations have been conducted according to principles preserved 
from the era of complete isolation and self-sufficiency. … Friction occurred because of insufficient adjustment to 
the new conditions of life; it might have been removed by heeding the world-demand for organization.’ (Fried, 
Restoration of Europe, 12-14) 
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bombs.’842 
The matter of reconstructing politics at the supranational scale was thereby presented not as a ground-
breaking invention, but as a consolidation that would merely bring politics into line with the up-
scaling of life that had already occurred in other spheres. Technology was the driver behind the time-
space compression that demanded that politics be up-scaled, but it also threatened a war both 
imminent and exponentially more destructive if these prompts were ignored. 
 The most significant role that this dynamic sense of scale played in Pan-European thought 
was to contest the primacy of the nation-state. The argument that the state was obsolete as a political 
form was amplified by recourse to an analogy that cast it as downright primitive: that of the State as 
Man in a Hobbesian state of nature, that is, a condition of anarchy.843 Fleshing out this analogy, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi described the situation of Europe: 
‘Within a narrow space there live twenty-six human beings … They wish on no account to 
forego their ill-conceived freedom; and hence they prefer a condition of absolute anarchy to 
any form of association. Hence, too, they are determined to settle their conflicts of interest 
and their differences of opinion by means of duels and free-for-all fights.’844 
The implications were clear: just as people had formed commonwealths so as not to live in anarchy, 
so states needed to form their own commonwealth in order to escape ‘world anarchy’.845 In making 
this argument, he drew on two political thinkers who during the First World War had blamed the 
outbreak of that war not on the actions of any particular person, state or event, but rather on the 
‘international anarchy’ of the prevailing state-system. Like Mackinder, they saw that the path to 
lasting peace necessitated a transformation of Europe’s political geography, though their solution was 
radically different. The first of these thinkers, Alfred Fried, had argued in his 1915 book The 
                                               
842 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 10-11 
843 The analogy of states being as men in a state of nature, as well as the description of this as anarchy, was Hobbes’ 
own. As Hedley Bull argued, ‘we are entitled to infer that all of what Hobbes says about the life of individual men 
in the state of nature may be read as a description of the condition of states in relation to one another’ (H. Bull, 
"Hobbes and the International Anarchy", Social Research 48.4 (1981) 717-738, 720-721) 
844 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 105-106 
845 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 94 
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Restoration of Europe that ‘The present war is the logical outcome of the kind of “peace” which 
preceded it’, which was better described as ‘latent war’.846 Likewise, the British political scientist 
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson had argued in his 1916 book The European Anarchy that 
‘responsibility [for the outbreak of WWI] is embedded in and conditioned by a responsibility deeper 
and more general—the responsibility of all the Powers alike for the European anarchy’.847 The idea 
that the sovereign state was the natural scale of politics, let alone Ratzel and Kjellén’s reification of 
the state as a naturally expansionist organism or ‘super-personality’, was held to be inherently violent 
and unstable.848 Both Fried and Dickinson had demanded that the end of the war needed to bring not 
just a cessation of hostilities, but fundamental political change;849 for Fried this was the establishment 
of a Pan-European Union, for Dickinson a League of Nations.850 Coudenhove-Kalergi, writing five 
years after the end of the war, said that this demand had not been met: 
‘The World War changed only the political map of Europe, not its political system. Now, as 
before, international anarchy, oppression of the weaker by the stronger, latent war, economic 
disunion, and political intrigue prevail everywhere. European politics of today resemble those 
of yesterday more than those of tomorrow.’851 
The persistence of the scale of the state as the locus of politics was thus doubly backwards. Not only 
did it represent a stalling, a failure to keep pace with the progressive up-scaling of politics, it also 
returned the state to the primitive and inherently violent condition of anarchy.  
 Not only had the Versailles settlement failed to resolve the pre-war ‘international anarchy’, 
                                               
846 Fried, Restoration of Europe, 10, 16 
847 G.L. Dickinson, The European Anarchy (London: George Allen & Unwin; 1916), 136. Though Dickinson cited 
Fried as being representative of a pacifist strain of German thought opposed to imperialistic Pan-Germanism, he did 
not credit him further, and any lines of mutual influence are unclear. 
848 Dickinson took strong issue with Kjellén, specifically with the idea that ‘The “State” … is a Being, that must grow 
like other beings’, as it naturalised inter-state conflict (G.L. Dickinson, The Choice Before Us (London: George 
Allen & Unwin; 1917), 95) 
849 ‘Whatever be the issue of this war, one thing is certain: it will bring no lasting peace to Europe unless it brings a 
radical change both in the spirit and in the organization of international politics.’ (Dickinson, European Anarchy, 
136-137). Fried used the analogy of restoration, arguing that ‘No mere recovering of shattered roofs, no mere re-
erecting and repainting of façades, will be enough. The foundation was rotten, and that was what caused the 
catastrophe.’ (Fried, Restoration of Europe, 3) 
850 Fried, Restoration of Europe, 142; Dickinson, The Choice Before Us, Ch. 10: "A League of Nations", pp.170-190 
851 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, xii 
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Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that it had exacerbated it, in two divergent ways. On one hand, he 
attacked the establishment of a League of Nations (of the kind that Dickinson and others had 
campaigned for) for having violated the natural hierarchy of scale. It did so by being based upon a 
scalar structure that ‘overleaps the Pan-American as well as the Pan-European organization’, jumping 
directly from the scale of the state to that of the globe.852 On this basis, he criticised the League for 
its ‘abstract structure—rendering it impersonal and producing no response in the sentimental life of 
mankind, which, starting from the family, passes by degrees through nations and groups of nations, 
and culminates in the ideal of a world-embracing humanity’.853 This line of attack was thus consonant 
with the geopolitikers’ critique of the League (and indeed of Pan-Europe itself), the only difference 
being what each party considered to be ‘organic’ politics. On the other hand, Coudenhove-Kalergi 
simultaneously attacked the Versailles settlement for its ‘balkanisation’ of Europe according the the 
doctrine of national self-determination, which he saw as actively regressive. In his eyes, Europe was 
not only missing the boat, but heading in the wrong direction: 
‘While in the big world the process of integration goes steadily on, Europe is regressing 
further and further toward atomization. Austria-Hungary, Western Russia, and European 
Turkey have dissolved themselves into a multitude of petty states. Scandinavia has split into 
three realms; likewise in Germany and in Jugo-Slavia very powerful currents are moving 
toward a division of the Empire into separate states.’854 
Again, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s criticism aligned with that of the geopolitikers: self-determination was 
an artificial imposition that ignored the natural order of things. All in all, Versailles had both expanded 
and shrunk the scale of politics, but it had done so not by allowing for dynamic scale, but by 
redoubling its attachment to the scale of the nation-state. With regard to the insistence upon a dynamic 
view of scale, then, Pan-Europeanism was broadly consonant with geopolitics, so much so that the 
geopolitiker Gudmund Hatt’s argument that ‘the division of the world into economic-geographical 
                                               
852 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 89-90 
853 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 89 
854 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 13 
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greater spaces advances with the relentlessness of a law [of] nature’ might equally have served as a 
summary of Pan-European thought on the matter.855 
 The three key scalar arguments used in the promotion of Pan-Europe – the promotion of a 
European body politic, the use of metonymy, and the mobilizing of a dynamic narrative of scale – 
were not entirely congruent, yet they were certainly used in combination, and were often folded into 
one another. Thus, Austria and Switzerland were held not just to represent the best of Europe, but the 
future of Europe. The European nation was not just dormant, but imminent, waiting to burst through 
the shackles of nationalism. The clearest example of this meshing of scalar narratives was 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s retelling of the Piedmont insurrection, which had played a key early role in 
the Risorgimento. Speaking at Chatham House in June 1939, Coudenhove-Kalergi appealed to Britain 
and France to take the lead in bringing about Pan-Europe:  
‘Piedmont, a little Italian State, stood against the great empire of the Habsburgs, against the 
Empire of the Pope, but it won the struggle because it was allied with the future. It was allied 
not with States, but with nations. It was allied with all Italians who desired liberty and union, 
in Venice, in Milan, in Florence, in Naples, and so, by this alliance with the future, Piedmont 
became stronger than all the rest of the States, became stronger than Austria, stronger than the 
Pope, and united and conquered Italy. If Great Britain and France follow this example they 
will have the whole of Europe behind them. It is not a question of the governments following; 
the nations will follow. The nations will be your allies, and not only the little nations in Europe, 
but the great part of the German and Italian nations.’856 
Here we see Coudenhove-Kalergi simultaneously invoking the notions that Europe’s destiny could 
be seen in one of its constituent parts, that politics was being progressively upscaled from province 
to state to continent, and that a European public lay in wait to acclaim and subscribe to a European 
state. What unified these arguments was the sense that real-world politics was being dragged along 
by an undercurrent of natural law, a set of historical-geographical truths that indicated, as H.G. Wells 
put it, the shape of things to come.857 
 
                                               
855 G. Hatt, quoted in Larsen, "Geopolitics on trial", 33 
856 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europe To-Morrow", 628 
857 H.G. Wells, The Shape of Things to Come: the ultimate revolution (London: Hutchinson & Co; 1933) 
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Conclusion 
On the surface, the relationship between Pan-Europeanism and geopolitics was one of open 
antagonism. Geopolitikers criticised the concept of Pan-Europe as being superficial or artificial, by 
which they meant that it was not grounded enough in the ‘realities’ of race, culture, and the attachment 
of the Volk to the ‘land’. By contrast to the supposedly organic nation-state, Pan-Europe was attacked 
as being somehow lifeless, or to use the geopolitiker Walther Wüst’s term, ‘stillborn’.858 However, 
underneath all this bluster, the situation was far more complex, with many significant continuities, 
mutual influences and shared relationships coexisting with genuine points of disagreement, difference 
and outright antipathy. As Gerry Kearns has written, there was ‘continuity rather than a distinction’ 
between geopolitik and other, apparently rival forms of geostrategic thinking.859 
This chapter has analysed three dimensions of the relationship between Pan-Europeanism and 
geopolitics. First, a hitherto unappreciated shared set of influences that contributed to the parallel 
construction of each group’s political-geographical imagination. This included the traditionally 
acknlowledged ‘founding fathers’ of geopolitics – that is, Ratzel, Kjellén and Mackinder – but 
extended also to a much deeper nineteenth-century body of thought that included figures like List, 
Frantz, Kapp, Partsch and Naumann. The importance of making this point is not simply to add depth 
to geopolitical theory. Rather, it is to show that if one replaces the oft-assumed analytical focus on 
Hitlerian notions like Lebensraum with a focus on, say, pan-regions, which was certainly no less 
prominent in the public consciousness of the time, then a new network of influences becomes visible. 
With a quarter-turn of the analytic kaleidoscope, the picture changes dramatically. Moreover, there 
are compelling reasons to concentrate our gaze upon pan-regions, a concept that was explicitly co-
                                               
858 ‘eine Totgeburt’ (W. Wüst, "Raum und Welt-Anschauung", in Karl Haushofer (ed.), Macht und Erde, III vols., vol. 
III: Raumüberwindende Mächte (Leipzig & Berlin: B.G. Teubner; 1934) 140-170, 167) 
859 Kearns, Geopolitics and Empire, 22 
216 
 
opted by both Haushofer and Coudenhove-Kalergi as a central pillar in their respective visions of 
political space. 
 Second, a personal connection existed between Pan-Europeans and geopolitikers, one built 
around the strong relationship between Coudenhove-Kalergi and Haushofer, but which extended to 
the mutual engagement of the wider circles around their movements. Geopolitikers both took an 
active part in Pan-European events, participating in Pan-European conferences and surveys, and 
likewise included a Pan-European element in their own activities, discussing and teaching its 
doctrines in geopolitical seminars and events. Their respective monthly journals, Paneuropa and the 
ZfG, were both launched in the same year, referred to each other’s literatures, and in large part shared 
a common target audience. 
 And third, the theory of Pan-Europeanism was itself highly geopolitical in both content and 
style, while retaining key differences from German geopolitik in the political solutions it 
recommended. Pan-Europeanism shared with geopolitics an obsession with political borders, and 
acknowledgement that they were human constructs contingent upon historical and geographical 
realities rather than eternal natural frontiers. However, this central premise was used to justify 
radically different political positions, mostly starkly opposing positions on the fraught question of 
whether the borders of Versailles ought to be revised. Another shared concern was that of scale. 
Though not novel, the insistence of both Pan-Europeans and geopolitikers upon a progressivist up-
scaling of politics nevertheless retained its radical edge vis-à-vis the orthodox politics of the nation-
state. This organic and dynamic notion of scale was also antithetical to the national-universal scalar 
dualism of League of Nations-style liberal internationalism, in which scale was fixed and nested. The 
chief point of difference between the scalar teleologies theorised in Pan-Europeanism and geopolitics 
was that while the former believed that an up-scaled super-state made the nationality principle 
obsolete, an argument that had great pedigree in Germany where this principle had often been seen 
as an attack on großdeutsch politics that served only French (or British) interests, the latter idealised 
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the connection between Volk and state, ultimately invoking the dynamism of scale to support 
expansionist geostrategy. 
 In terms of the style in which these arguments were made, Pan-Europeanism shared with 
geopolitik a contradictory nature. On one hand, they shared a proudly realist outlook, putting forth 
rational-actor justifications in a manner that bridged realpolitik and later international relations. On 
the other hand, each also shared an almost mystical element, including the use of progressivist, 
dynamic understandings of political space to invoke an essentially pre-destined future in which 
politics would necessarily be organised at the continental scale. This latter form of argumentation 
replaced the quotidian logics of power politics with a new logic that transcended its rules by working 
backwards from an apparently inevitable future. For many academics this embrace of futurist 
elements seemed to lend geopolitical work a cartoonish quality, with Richard Hartshorne writing that 
the purveyor of geopolitics ‘reaches far into the area of political science, where his lack of complete 
training betrays him into fallacious and exaggerated conclusions, to say nothing of gross national 
partisanship’.860 While Pan-Europeanism steadfastly opposed nationalism, its striving for a general 
audience led it toward exactly the type of ‘exaggerated conclusions’ that Hartshorne despaired of. 
Nevertheless, Coudenhove-Kalergi enthusiastically and persistently sought to substantiate Pan-
European ideas by situating them within academic geography. Though undoubtedly subservient to 
Pan-Europe’s ultimate political goals, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s desire to appeal to professional 
geographers offers an insight that might well act as a corrective to present-day evaluations of 
geopolitics, in that it refocuses attention away from the confluence of geopolitics and the Nazi state, 
and towards the place of geopolitics within the academic field of geography. 
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IV. Exploiting Eurafrica (1923-1939) 
 
Europe is the daughter of Asia - the mother of America - but the governess of Africa. 
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1929861 
 
all the plans for Paneuropa will be without a foundation 
if they wish to make of the union of the continent a self-contained structure 
Giuseppe De Michelis, 1934862 
 
the development and colonization of Africa 
means the expansion, enhancement and security of Europe. 
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1929863 
 
 
Introduction 
As we have seen, ‘Pan-Europe’ drew from a deep well of historical schemes for European political 
integration, and was justified by recourse to a logic borrowed and adapted from the new discipline of 
geopolitics. However, the incorporation of African territory as an integral part of a continental-scale 
‘European’ political project, rather than the state-scale enterprise that extant understandings of 
colonialism assumed it to be, was a novelty popularised by the Pan-European Union, as was the 
                                               
861 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", Paneuropa 5.2 (1929) 1-19, 1. Original: ‘Europa ist die Tochter Asiens - die 
Mutter Amerikas - aber die Herrin Afrikas’. Coudenhove-Kalergi himself translated ‘die Herrin Afrikas’ as ‘the 
mistress of Africa’ (R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 
118). However, he clearly did not intend the sexual connotations of ‘mistress’, and elsewhere casts Europe as the 
masculine element responsible for exploiting ‘virginal’ Africa. 
862 G. De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines (London: George Allen & Unwin; 1935), 167 
863 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 8. Original: ‘die Erschliessung und Besiedelung Afrikas bedeutet die Erweiterung, 
Vergrösserung und Sicherung Europas’ 
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theorisation of this new geopolitical entity as ‘Eurafrica’. Indeed, it was the way in which the PEU 
made the colonial aspect of European integration explicit that set it apart from other proponents of a 
European federal link (see fig. 21, juxtaposing the visions of Coudenhove-Kalergi and Briand). By 
engaging with Europe’s colonial present, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and the like-minded writers 
he published in the Paneuropa journal sketched out a distinctive colonial future within his vision of 
the new planetary geopolitics, a third path that fell somewhere between the imperialism embodied by 
the British Empire and the Mandate-based liberal internationalism of the League of Nations. 
Eurafrica was a multi-faceted entity, justified on multiple grounds. First, it offered a share in 
the colonial experience to those European nations who had either had their colonies stripped at 
Versailles (Germany), or through ‘historical accident’ had never had colonies. Second, by doing so it 
promised to rationalise resources and trade in such a way that Europe would gain access to raw 
materials, and Africa would gain access to a market by which it might profit from these riches. And 
third, it also enabled the rationalisation of population pressures, as the overpopulated European states 
could re-settle in underpopulated Africa, undertake infrastructural projects that would help develop 
lands previously thought be inhospitable, and oversee the education of the local population. Each of 
these points was said to underline the ‘natural’ complementarity of Africa and Europe: participation 
in Eurafrica would be mutually beneficial. However, as we shall see, each of these notions was 
underpinned by assumptions of European superiority, and in the end the ultimate motivations for 
Eurafrica were the solution of European, not African problems. By looking more closely at the PEU’s 
plans for Eurafrica, and the arguments deployed to justify them, we can catch in reflection the 
exaggerated outlines of many of the Pan-European project’s internal contradictions. Eurafrica 
contained a connection to biological racism that belied the PEU’s usual refusal to engage with issues 
of race; it was sympathetic to German political arguments, yet its most vocal supporters were largely 
francophone; it was in many ways neo-colonial, yet was ultimately taken up by anti-colonial 
movements; and of all the Pan-European schemes it was at once the most utopian and yet in many 
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ways also the most successful. 
 For the impact made by Eurafrica in a very short space of time was nothing short of 
remarkable. Although the first reference to Eurafrica as a political term only appeared in 1929, just 
five years later the Italian geographer Paolo D’Agostino Orsini di Camerota opened his book, which 
Figure 21: Briand and Coudenhove-Kalergi's competing visions of 
European unity. Source: Schweizer Illustrierte Zeitung, in AVCUS, 2 Z 
19 
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he gave the title Eurafrica, by writing that ‘One finds these days a great deal of talk of Eurafrica’.864 
Even in those five short years, a number of influential books had been published on the topic, 
rendering what had so recently appeared an awkward neologism into a commonplace, found 
everywhere from the textbooks of geopolitics to speculative science-fiction.865 From nowhere, 
‘Eurafrica’ had become ubiquitous, and the ideology behind it had seeped into the popular 
consciousness: as Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson argue, ‘the general idea of an internationalization 
and supranationalization of colonialism in Africa was one of the least controversial and most popular 
foreign policy ideas of the interwar period’.866 Today, the breadth of the term’s use and immediacy of 
its uptake have muddied its provenance somewhat, with credit given to various sources, all of whom 
play a part in the story, including D’Agostino Orsini di Camerota,867 the French Professor of Political 
Economy Eugène Guernier,868 and the German geographers Karl Haushofer869 and Erich Obst.870 
However, at the time attribution was much more clear-cut: the term was believed to have been coined 
by Coudenhove-Kalergi, and the idea was likewise indelibly associated with his Pan-European 
                                               
864 P. D'Agostino Orsini di Camerota, Eurafrica: L'Africa per l'Europa, l'Europa per l'Africa (Rome: Paolo 
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movement.871 Indeed, that first printed reference to Eurafrica was a 1929 article by Coudenhove-
Kalergi in the Paneuropa journal entitled “Africa”, published in both German and French editions.872 
It was with good reason that the French historian Charles-Robert Ageron called Coudenhove-Kalergi 
‘the undisputed inventor of the idea of “Eurafrica”’.873 
 
 
Historical context of ‘Eurafrica’ 
However, this is only half-true. Though Coudenhove-Kalergi was the first to use Eurafrica as a 
political term, its use as a physical term goes back a little further, and sheds light on the some of the 
problematic assumptions that would continue to haunt Eurafrican notions, particularly the ways in 
which they touch on issues of race and physical geography. Likewise, the suggestion that African 
colonies play an integral role in European unification, and plans for their international governance, 
also had important late nineteenth-century precedents. 
 As a term, Eurafrica (later translated into French and German respectively as Eurafrique and 
Eurafrika) first appeared in print in the American ethnologist Daniel Garrison Brinton’s 1890 
collection of his lectures, entitled Races and Peoples.874 A scientific racist, Brinton was attempting to 
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edition of Paneuropa journal, entitled Paneurope, was published intermittently, and tended to consolidate multiple 
issues of the German version of the journal. 
873 C.-R. Ageron, "L'idée d'Eurafrique et le débat colonial franco-allemand de l'entre-deux-guerres", Revue d'histoire 
moderne et contemporaine 22.3 (1975) 446-475, 450. Original: ‘l’incontestable inventeur de l’idée d’«Eurafrique».’ 
874 D.G. Brinton, Races and Peoples: Lectures on the Study of Ethnography (New York: N.D.C. Hodges; 1890) 
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reconcile the idea of an originary (and therefore superior) white, ‘Causasian’ race with new evidence 
apparently suggesting that early man came not from the Caucasus, but from Mediterranean Africa. 
Brinton squared this circle by appealing to the physical geography of the early Quaternary. Citing 
(somewhat misleadingly) Thomas Henry Huxley’s 1877 Physiography, Brinton claimed that the 
primary factor in the development of separate races was a physical geography in which a submerged 
Sahara and land-bridges across the Mediterranean meant that the continental structure at the time of 
early man was better described as a southern ‘Aust-Africa’ and a northern ‘Eurafrica’ (see fig. 22).875 
Each proto-continent, in Brinton’s view, was essentially self-contained, allowing each race 
(Eurafricans, Austafricans, and so on) to develop in relative isolation. In his own words, 
‘At the dawn of history, all the clearly marked subspecies of man bore distinct relations in 
number and distribution to the great continental areas into which the habitable land of the 
globe is divided. Nearly the whole of Europe and its geographical appendix, North Africa, 
were in the possession of the white race’876 
The geopolitical overtones were clear: Eurafrica, where humanity developed first and furthest, 
naturally possessed both a racial and territorial unity. 
 Meanwhile, those pushing for the political unity of Europe were also starting to grapple with 
the issue of how European powers’ rapidly expanding African territories fitted into this scheme. The 
most famous proponent of a United States of Europe, Victor Hugo, was one of the first to address the 
issue of Africa in an 1879 speech at the Restaurant Bonvalet in Paris, at a banquet commemorating 
the 1848 abolition of slavery. Introducing Hugo, the abolitionist writer Victor Schœlcher assured him 
that his speech would encourage the ‘wonderful philanthropic movement that today appears, by 
turning the interest of Europe to the land of black men, to want to repair the harm she did to him 
                                               
875 As intimated, Huxley is rather less clear on the matter than Brinton suggests (T.H. Huxley, Physiography: An 
Introduction to the Study of Nature (London: Macmillan and Co.; 1877), 308). It is pertinent to note here that 
Huxley’s Physiography was hugely influential in the development of a conception of physical geography that 
foregrounded causation as the central principle in understanding the world, a conception that Brinton was very 
much working within. (c.f. D.R. Stoddart, "'That Victorian Science': Huxley's Physiography and Its Impact on 
Geography", Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 66 (1975) 17-40) 
876 Brinton, Races and Peoples, 94 
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there’.877 Hugo accepted this invitation to look forward, and did so in overtly geographical terms: 
‘In the nineteenth century the white has made the black into a man; in the twentieth century 
Europe will make a world out of Africa. (Applause.) To remake a new Africa, to render the 
old Africa amenable to civilisation, this is the problem. Europe will solve it.’878 
In speaking of ‘Europe’, Hugo wasn’t just invoking the abstract notion of European civilisation 
(though he was certainly doing this too); he was also invoking the specific notion of political 
                                               
877 Schœlcher, in V. Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique [1879]", Œuvres complètes de Victor Hugo. Actes et paroles., vol. 
Vol. IV: Depuis l'exil 1876-1885 (Paris: Société d'éditions littéraires et artistiques; 1926) 121-129, 122. Original: 
‘ce magnifique mouvement philanthropique qui semble, en tournant aujourd’hui l’intérêt de l’Europe vers le pays 
des hommes noirs, vouloir y réparer le mal qu’elle lui a fait.’ 
878 Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 128; Ellena and Pasture offer identical translations of this passage (L. Ellena, 
"Political Imagination, Sexuality and Love in the Eurafrican Debate", European Review of History—Revue 
européenne d'Histoire, 11.2 (2004) 241-272, 145; Pasture, Imagining European Unity since 1000 AD, 185). 
Original: ‘au dix-neuvième siècle, le blanc a fait du noir un homme; au vingtième siècle, l’Europe fera de l’Afrique 
un monde. (Applaudissements.) Refaire une Afrique nouvelle, rendre la vielle Afrique maniable à la civilisation, tel 
est le problème. L’Europe le résoudra.’ 
 
Figure 22: Daniel Garrison Brinton's map of Aust- and Eurafrica. Source: D.G. Brinton, Races and 
Peoples: Lectures on the Study of Ethnography (New York: N.D.C. Hodges; 1890), opposite p.88 
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cooperation among European states. In fact, Hugo hoped that this African mission, undertaken at first 
by the Southern European nations of France, Italy and Spain, and possibly Britain, might set an 
example for the authoritarian regimes of North Europe (by which he meant Germany and Russia) to 
follow. This is what he meant when he said that, 
‘the United States of the South will sketch a clear outline of the United States of Europe. 
(Bravos.) No hate, no violence, no anger. It is the great march towards harmony, brotherhood 
and peace.’879 
In other words, the ‘remaking’ of Africa not only depended on European unity, but would itself 
actively contribute to the uniting of Europe. 
In Hugo’s vision, the Mediterranean played a doubled role, as an agent for both connection 
and division. On one hand, it was rendered as a ‘lake of civilisation’, which brought the Latin nations 
of Europe together. On the other, however, Hugo continued, it was ‘certainly not for nothing that the 
Mediterranean borders on one side the old world and on the other the unknown world, that is to say 
on one side all civilization and on the other all barbarity’.880 This speaks to the uncompromising way 
in which he viewed Africa. If the context in which he made this talk allowed for a certain implicit 
understanding that the underdevelopment of Africa was a result of European exploitation, Hugo’s 
bluntness in appraising Africa is still remarkable: ‘This wild Africa,’ he explained, ‘has two aspects: 
peopled, it’s barbarism; deserted, it’s savagery’.881 However, he continued, viewed with a modern, 
European eye, the savagery of the African landscape contained potential: ‘Huge hydraulic systems 
are prepared by nature and waiting for the man; one sees the points where cities germinate; … this 
                                               
879 Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 127. Original: ‘Etats-Unis du Sud s’esquissent ébauche évidente des Etats-Unis 
d’Europe. (Bravos.) Nulle haine, nulle violence, nulle colere. C’est la grande marche tranquille vers l’harmonie, la 
fraternité et la paix.’ 
880 Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 124-125. Original: ‘La Méditerranée est un lac de civilisation; ce n’est certes pas 
pour rien que la Méditerranée a sur l’un de ses bords le vieil univers et sur l’autre l’univers ignoré, c’est-à-dire d’un 
côté toute la civilisation et de l’autre toute la barbarie.’ 
881  Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 126. Original: ‘Cette Afrique farouche n’a que deux aspects: peuplée, c’est la 
barbarie; déserte, c’est la sauvagerie’ 
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universe, which alarmed the Romans, attracts the French’.882 To counteract both Africa’s barbarism 
and her savagery, what was required was European colonisation: to bring civilisation to the people, 
and modern technical expertise to tame the environment. Thus, Hugo’s prediction for Europe’s 
twentieth century: ‘Geographically, …the destiny of men is to the south’;883 followed by his 
prescription: ‘The time has come to tell this illustrious group of nations: Unite! Go south!’884 
 Europe’s licence to do so rested on a patchwork of mutually supporting justifications, 
including the essential emptiness of Africa, the economic obligation to utilise this unused land, the 
humanitarian and Christian obligations to civilise the people, and the needs of Europe, for whom 
African colonisation might offer both an outlet to release pressure from her own social and political 
problems, and a demonstration of the virtues of liberal-internationalist (secular, democratic, pacifist 
and co-operative) governance. Hugo’s rousing conclusion touched on all of these points: 
‘Come on, People! Seize this land. Take it. … God gave the earth to men, God offers Africa 
to Europe. Take it. Where kings bring war, bring harmony. Take it, not for the gun, but for the 
plough; not for the sword, but for trade; not for battle but for industry; not for conquest but 
for brotherhood. (Prolonged applause.) 
Pour your overflow in this Africa, and thereby solve your social issues, change your 
proletarians into proprietors. Go ye! Make roads, make ports, make cities; be fruitful, grow, 
colonize and multiply; so that, on this earth, increasingly liberated from priests and princes, 
the divine Spirit is affirmed by the peace and the human spirit by the freedom!’885 
 In fact, it was the priests and princes who would remain firmly in control of European 
colonialism as the scramble for Africa took hold. Hugo’s civilizational discourses were certainly 
deployed, but by national interests for whom conquest and competition were the name of the game. 
                                               
882 Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 126. Original: ‘De gigantesques appareils hydrauliques sont préparés par la nature 
et attendent l’homme; on voit les points où germeront des villes; … cet univers, qui effrayait les romains, attire les 
français.’ 
883 Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 124. Original: ‘Géographiquement, … la destinée des hommes est au sud.’ 
884 Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 125. Original: ‘Le moment est venu de dire à ce groupe illustre de nations: Unissez-
vous! allez au sud.’ 
885 Hugo, "Discours sur l'Afrique", 128. Original: ‘Allez, Peuples! emparez-vous de cette terre. Prenez-la. … Dieu 
donne la terre aux hommes, Dieu offre l’Afrique à l’Europe. Prenez-la. Où les rois apporteraient la guerre, apportez 
la concorde. Prenez-la, non pour le canon, mais pour la charrue; non pour le sabre, mais pour le commerce; non 
pour la bataille, mais pour l’industrie; non pour la conquête, mais pour la fraternité. (Applaudissements prolongés.) 
[//] Versez votre trop-plein dans cette Afrique, et du même coup résolvez vos questions sociales, changez vos 
prolétaires en propriétaires. Allez, faites! faites des routes, faites des ports, faites des villes; croissez, cultivez, 
colonisez, multipliez; et que, sur cette terre, de plus en plus dégagée des prêtres et des princes, l’Esprit divin 
s’affirme par la paix et l’Esprit humain par la liberté!’ 
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This was never clearer than at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, at once the apogee and the great 
negation of Hugo’s plans. On one hand, it did indeed see the European powers working in concert to 
‘remake a new Africa’, principally by asserting a European model of sovereignty on African space 
(and formally subordinating native claims to sovereignty). Perhaps the most interesting concession to 
internationalism agreed at Berlin was the establishment of ‘free navigation’ (i.e. shared European 
sovereignty) on the Congo and Niger rivers, and free trade in the ‘neutral’ territory of the basin and 
mouth of the Congo. However, these schemes were of limited success, with de facto national 
sovereignty soon being exerted in these special territories.886 Indeed, the supposedly internationalist 
Congo Free State was not only subject to de facto Belgian rule, but earned infamy as a site of notorious 
and appalling European misrule, the experiment finally ending with Belgian annexation in 1908.887 
In more general terms, the greater legacy of the Berlin Conference was to confirm that such 
internationalism was the exception rather than the rule, the rule in question being the division of 
African space into separate imperial spheres of influence. In short, while the Berlin Conference 
symbolised European cooperation in the conquest of Africa, it confirmed that this conquest would 
ultimately divide rather than unite European powers, that African territory would (in the main) be 
split rather than shared. 
 The idea of colonialism being anything other than a national-imperial project was not raised 
again until the First World War, with the question of what to do with German colonies in the case of 
an Allied victory. Both Vladimir Lenin’s November 1917 ‘Decree on Peace’, giving notice of 
Russia’s withdrawal from the War, and Woodrow Wilson’s January 1918 ‘Fourteen Points’, declaring 
the principles upon which peace negotiations would take place, agreed that nations had a right to self-
                                               
886 M. Craven, "Between law and history: the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 and the logic of free trade", London 
Review of International Law 3.1 (2015) 31-59 
887 See H.R. Fox Bourne, Civilisation in Congoland: A Story of International Wrong-Doing (London: P.S. King & Son; 
1903); E.D. Morel, King Leopold's Rule in Africa (London: William Heinemann; 1904)  
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determination. While Lenin advocated an end to unwelcome imperialism tout court, European 
socialist parties instead leaned towards Wilson’s insistence on impartial adjustment of colonial 
claims, based on the interests of the population concerned, by a supra-national League of Nations.888 
However, these socialist parties combined this with their pre-existing advocacy of a United States of 
Europe quite alien to Wilson’s universalism. The results were often quite original suggestions that 
combined the internationalist ambition and principles that had guided the 1885 establishment of the 
Congo Free State with an enlarged regionalist scope, as in the February 1918 Inter-Allied Labour and 
Socialist Conference’s ‘Memorandum on War Aims’: 
‘As regards more especially the colonies of all the belligerents in Tropical Africa, from sea to 
sea, including the whole of the region north of the Zambesi and south of the Sahara, … the 
Conference declares in favour of a system of control, established by international agreement 
under the League of Nations and maintained by its guarantee, which, whilst respecting 
national sovereignty, would be alike inspired by broad conceptions of economic freedom and 
concerned to safeguard the rights of the natives under the best conditions possible for them’889 
However, in the end it was decided at Versailles that Wilson’s promise of an ‘impartial 
adjustment of colonial claims’ was to be interpreted as the preservation of the integrity of Allied 
overseas territory and the stripping of the overseas territory of the defeated powers,890 to be given 
over to a new ‘Mandate’ system primarily devised by the South African-British military leader Jan 
Smuts. Each Mandate was to be held ‘in trust’ by one of the Allied powers until such time as they 
might be capable of self-government, and the whole system overseen by the new League of Nations. 
                                               
888 V.I. Lenin, "Decree on Peace" (8 November 1917); Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, "Memorandum 
on War Aims Agreed Upon at the Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, Central Hall, Westminster, London, 
S.W., February 20-24, 1918", in Paul U. Kellogg and Arthur Gleason (eds.), British Labor and the War: 
Reconstructors for a New World (New York: Boni and Liveright; 1919 [1918]) 352-366, 355 
889 Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, "Memorandum on War Aims", 361. The Memorandum quoted the 14 
February 1915 Declaration of the Conference of the Socialist and Labour Parties of the Allied Nations in order to 
reaffirm that ‘The victory of the Allied Powers must be a victory for popular liberty, for unity, independence, and 
autonomy of the nations in the peaceful Federation of the United States of Europe and the world.’  (p.353) For more 
on wartime plans for united European action in Africa, see Ellena, "Political Imagination, Sexuality and Love in the 
Eurafrican Debate", 245; and especially Ageron, "L'idée d'Eurafrique" 
890 Article 119 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles stated that ‘Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.’ 
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The ‘trust’ invoked was the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ specified in Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, and Germany’s exclusion from this system was justified on the grounds that its 
pre-war colonial negligence had broken this trust. This ‘Colonial Guilt Lie’ (die koloniale 
Schuldlüge), as the last Governor of German East Africa (and future president of the German Colonial 
Society) Heinrich Schnee would later term it,891 was perhaps best encapsulated in the Allied and 
Associated Powers’ 16 June 1919 reply to German protests regarding the prospective Versailles 
settlement: 
‘Germany’s dereliction in the sphere of colonial civilization has been revealed too completely 
to admit of the Allied and Associated Powers consenting to make a second experiment and of 
their assuming the responsibility of again abandoning thirteen or fourteen millions of natives 
to a fate from which the war has delivered them.’892 
Thus the traditional narrative of Europe’s mission civilisatrice, or the ‘White Man’s Burden’, which 
had been successfully deployed to justify the rapid advance of European sovereignty over Africa over 
the previous half-century, was re-deployed in two contrasting ways. First, it was placed at the heart 
of the League’s Mandate system, thereby raising the scale of judgement (if not direct sovereignty) 
from that of the imperial state to that of the League. And second, it was used as a weapon between 
European states: rather than a shared European endeavour, the development of Africa was rendered 
an inter-state competition. 
This rather uncomfortable mixture of vague internationalist sentiment with nationalist boasts 
about colonial development would mark early-1920s analyses of colonialism by the future Pan-
Europeans Albert Sarraut and Joseph Caillaux.893 For all of Wilson’s idealism, and the momentum 
                                               
891 Heinrich Schnee’s 1924 Die koloniale Schuldlüge, published in English as H. Schnee, German Colonization Past 
and Future: The Truth About the German Colonies (London: George Allen & Unwin; 1926). See W.W. Schmokel, 
Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919-1945 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press; 1964) 
892 "Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of 
Peace, June 16, 1919", Sessional Papers, Volume 1: Third Session of the Thirteenth Parliament of the Dominion of 
Canada, Special Session 1919, Volume LV Sessional Paper Number 41d (1919), 14 
893 A. Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises (Paris: Payot; 1923); J. Caillaux, Devant L'Histoire: Mes 
Prisons, 2nd edn. (Paris: Éditions de la Sirène; 1920), 346. Interestingly, Sarraut’s engagement with 
internationalism was based on the circulation of natural resources, which would become a theme of later Pan-
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that seemed to be behind his principles of self-determination and an international structure of 
governance, the Mandate system brought neither principle to Africa in any significant way, while both 
reinforcing racist assumptions of a European mission civilisatrice in Africa and corrupting its 
internationalist underpinnings by a tacit reassertion of the ultimate supremacy of the imperial state. 
Nevertheless, from Brinton to Hugo, from Berlin to Versailles, almost all of the building blocks of 
Eurafrica had been developed. From Brinton we have the suggestion of a natural unity of Europe and 
Africa, literally fused together to form Eurafrica (the diminution of the Mediterranean pseudo-
scientifically validating Hugo’s reference to it as a mere lake), and its association with a system of 
racial essentialism and inequality. From Hugo we have the rendering of Africa as empty and wild, 
requiring massive European projects and infrastructure to make it habitable, but whose colonisation 
might both solve European social problems and promote European unity. From the Berlin Conference 
we have the promotion of the idea of a supra-national free trade area as an integral part of continental 
development, and the solidification of the idea that such development required (and legitimated) 
European agency and ultimate sovereignty. And from Versailles we have the theoretical upscaling of 
authority over African territory to an international organisation, in theory at least a new geography of 
political sovereignty, responsive to socialist critiques of the moral failures and exploitativeness of 
state-scale imperialism. 
 
 
                                               
European writings. He reasoned that aside from the ‘generous altruism’ that motivated internationalist interventions 
on issues like slavery, alcoholism or opiate addiction, there was an economic motive: ‘there is the expression of a 
universal economic interest which, stimulated by the growing needs of the world for raw materials, turns to the 
virgin territories where vast unused resources lie and expects the masters of these areas to finally deliver this wealth 
to the global circulation’ (Sarraut, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises, 29). Original: ‘il y a l’expression 
d’un intérêt économique universel qui, stimulé par les besoins grandissants du monde en matières premières, se 
tourne vers les vierges territoires où reposent d’immenses ressources inutilisées et attend que les maîtres de ces 
domaines livrent enfin ces richesses à la circulation mondiale.’  
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Eurafrica and the Pan-European Union 
Eurafrica as idea, 1923-1928 
Although the Pan-European Union did not employ the specific term Eurafrica until 1929, as an idea 
it was immediately obvious in the PEU’s most influential and widespread piece of propaganda: the 
Pan-European World Map (see fig. 2). As we have seen, it arrestingly depicted Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
description of a ‘Pan-Europe’ that straddled the Mediterranean, bounded to the east by a line running 
south from Petsamo (on the Finno-Russian border) to Katanga (the south-easternmost province of 
Belgian Congo) and to the west by the Atlantic Ocean (excluding the British Isles), thus forming ‘a 
clear-cut geographical unit…based on a common civilization, a common history and common 
traditions’.894 Coloured black and unsullied by internal state borders, this block stood proud of the 
various forms of hatching that marked the other four global power-blocs. It was, in short, the clearest 
possible visual statement of the unity of Europe with its African colonies in a supra-national, Pan-
European whole. 
 Coudenhove-Kalergi was clear from the outset that Europe’s colonies were to form an integral 
part of his vision of European unification: 
‘the European territories of the Pan-European state-group form but a fraction of its power-
complex. In order rightly to estimate the future possibilities of Pan-Europe, its colonies must 
also be taken into account.’895 
He furthered distinguished between ‘Pan-Europe’s continuous empire in Africa’ and ‘Pan-Europe’s 
scattered colonies’, implicitly prioritising the former. Indeed, the weight placed on ‘continuous 
empire’ is made clear by suggestions for a rationalisation of territories, which included ‘Colonial 
readjustment in Africa by an exchange of England’s West African colonies for equally valuable East 
African colonies belonging to Europe’, and the selling off of Pan-Europe’s ‘scattered’ American 
                                               
894 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 81 
895 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 32-33 
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colonies (i.e. French Guiana & Suriname).896 
If Pan-Europe’s ‘power-complex’ was measured in population and area, these measures were 
also seen as proxies for potential resources and capacity to extract them. Old Europe’s small area, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi argued, meant that it lacked raw materials, and was therefore reliant on 
importing resources. However, 
‘By unifying its organization and rationally opening up its African colonial empire, which is 
very nearly equal to Asiatic Russia in extent, Pan-Europe could itself produce all the raw 
materials and foodstuffs it requires, and thus also become independent in a material way.’897 
This said, in order to make use of African land and resources and ‘convert it into the future granary 
and source of raw materials for Europe’,898 its wildness had first to be tamed. Coudenhove-Kalergi 
listed ‘two main tasks [that] would have to be accomplished: First, the partial transformation of the 
Sahara Desert into agricultural land; Second, the extirpation from Central Africa of sleeping-sickness, 
which renders cattle-breeding and colonization impossible in the most fertile districts’.899 The echo 
of Hugo is strong here, with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s modern European eye (ahead of the modern 
European bodies of physical colonists) able to ‘render the old Africa amenable to civilisation’. 
 The attractiveness of African land and resources was mirrored by the unsustainability of the 
status quo. Without Pan-Europe, European states would soon be caught between the external danger 
of expansionist superpowers in a closed world, and the internal danger of intra-European political 
tension between colony-owning and non-colony-owning states. With Pan-Europe, both these dangers 
would be averted, to the advantage of all European states: 
‘To the European colonial Powers would be guaranteed the possession of their colonies, 
which, in isolation, they would sooner or later be bound to lose to World Powers. 
 On the other hand, those European peoples who, as the result of their geographical 
position and historical destiny, did not receive fair treatment at the time when the extra-
European world was divided up—such as Germans, Poles, Czechs, Scandinavians, and 
                                               
896 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 48-49 
897 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 34 
898 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 179 
899 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 179-180 
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Balkan peoples—would find, in the great African colonial empire, a field for the release of 
their economic energies.’900 
In short, from the very start of the Pan-European movement, Europe’s shared African colonies were 
simply integral. They gave Pan-Europe the territory to form a rough balance of power with competing 
continental blocs, the land and resources to be economically self-sufficient, and the means to resolve 
the internal grievances and demographic pressures of European states. 
 
 
Adoption of ‘Eurafrica’, 1929-1939 
This vision of Europe united with its African empire was given the name ‘Eurafrica’ in Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s lead article to the February 1929 edition of Paneuropa, entitled “Africa”. This was the 
journal’s first article to take the issue as its sole focus, and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s awareness of its 
significance is indicated by the simultaneous distribution of edited versions of this article as a press 
release, in German, French and English.901 In the article, Coudenhove-Kalergi began with a series of 
geographical metaphors: 
‘Africa is our South America. 
Africa is the tropical Europe. Gibraltar is our Panama. Politically, West Africa is the 
southern continuation of Europe beyond these straits.  
Europe is a house with many apartments and many tenants – but Africa is its garden. 
Whereas the Soviet Union separates us from Asia, and the Atlantic Ocean separates us from 
America – the Mediterranean connects Europe and Africa more than it separates them. So 
Africa has become our closest neighbour and its destiny a part of our own destiny. 
From this perspective Pan-Europe is enlarged to Eurafrica – the small Pan-Europe to 
a large political continent, stretching from Lapland to Angola, comprising 21 million km2 and 
360 million people. In the foreseeable future it will be possible to cross this continent under 
the Straits of Gibraltar with the railroad. 
…Europe is the head of Eurafrica – Africa its body. The future of Africa depends on 
                                               
900 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe, 178-179 
901 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika"; R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Afrika”, Paneuropa Korrespondenz/Correspondance 
Paneuropéenne (i.e. ‘Pan-European Correspondence’, the official news service of the PEU) (n.d.), HAEU, PAN/EU 
28, 771/3/14 , 20,21,22 (n.b. this dela is dated in the RGVA opisi as 29 Aug 1929-18 Feb 1930); R.N. Coudenhove-
Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126. This latter English-language version 
was likely self-translated, and was never published. 
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what Europe knows to make of it.’902 
We see here Coudenhove-Kalergi embracing the concept he had earlier merely danced around, 
picking up its logical threads and running with them. 
His destination was at once more specific and more open-ended than it had been previously. 
While concluding in general terms that securing German and Italian participation in Europe’s 
colonisation of Africa was critical both for African development and for European peace, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi offered three possibilities by which this might take place. These were: first, the 
redistribution of colonial mandates (namely, those of Cameroon and Togo, which could be shared 
between Germany and Italy); second, the outsourcing of colonisation to ‘chartered companies’, 
including those from non-colony-owning states;903 and third, ‘the personal and economic equality of 
all European colonists and pioneers on African soil, regardless of native language and citizenship’.904 
This third solution was clearly Coudenhove-Kalergi’s preference. By declaring that ‘This [third] 
solution is within the spirit of the General Act of the Berlin Conference and, among all the proposals, 
most within the spirit of Pan-Europe’,905 he aligned the PEU and the 1884-85 Berlin Conference on 
                                               
902 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 3; original: 
‘Afrika…unser Südamerika. 
Afrika ist das tropische Europa. Gibraltar ist unser Panama. Politisch ist Westafrika die südliche Fortsetzung Europas 
jenseits dieser Meerenge. 
Europa ist ein Haus mit vielen Wohnungen und vielen Parteien – aber Afrika ist sein Garten. Während die Sowjetunion 
uns von Asien, der Atlantische Ozean von Amerika trennt – verbindet das Mittelmeer Europa und Afrika mehr, als 
es Sie trennt. So ist Afrika unser nächster Nachbar geworden und sein Schicksal ein Teil unseres eigenen 
Schicksals. 
Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt erweitert sich Paneuropa zu Eurafrika – das kleine Paneuropa zu einem großen politischen 
Kontinent, der von Lappland bis Angola reicht, 21 Millionen m2 und 360 Millionen Menschen umfaßt. In 
absehbarer Zeit wird es möglich sein, diesen Kontinent unter der Straße von Gibraltar mit der Eisenbahn zu 
durchqueren. 
…Europa ist der Kopf Eurafrikas – Afrika dessen Körper. Die Zukunft Afrikas hängt davon ab, was Europa daraus zu 
machen weiß.’ 
903 Coudenhove-Kalergi uses the English term ‘chartered company’, a nod to the role of such companies in the 
development of the British Empire. He cites the President of the German Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht as a 
supporter of this plan. 
904 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 16-17, quotation is from p.17. Original: ‘die persönliche und wirtschaftliche 
Gleichberechtigung aller europäischen Kolonisten und Pioniere auf afrikanischem Boden, ohne Rücksicht auf 
Muttersprache und Staatsbürgerschaft.’ See also R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), 
RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 124 
905 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 17; original: ‘Diese Lösung liegt im Sinne der Kongoakte und, unter allen 
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the same historical trajectory. Indeed, the next step suggested by Coudenhove-Kalergi was the 
convocation of a new ‘Africa Conference’, brokered by Britain, at which these options could be 
frankly discussed, and a ‘common colonisation programme’ worked out.906 
In the following section, I will begin unpacking some of the issues that these assertions raise, 
and take a closer look at the ideological framework that supported Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plans for 
Eurafrica. First, though, I wish to track its role within the Pan-European movement from this moment 
until the outbreak of war. The first question we must ask is why, if the idea of Eurafrica was such an 
obvious component of a future Pan-European Union, it was only addressed in February 1929? After 
all, Coudenhove-Kalergi was about to declare an alliance with Aristide Briand’s campaign to create 
a United States of Europe, and Briand had avoided the colonial question – so why did Coudenhove-
Kalergi seize this moment to address it, potentially flagging up their differences? 
Coudenhove-Kalergi was not the first to see a consonance between on one hand Pan-European 
plans for European unity in the development and colonisation of Africa, and on the other German 
demands for the return of her African colonies. The latter was a popular position within Germany, 
encapsulated by Hans Grimm’s wildly successful 1926 colonial novel Volk ohne Raum (‘A People 
Without Space’), in which Germany’s African colonies were represented as giving the German people 
the space they need to reach their mental and cultural potential, and alleviate social problems at 
home.907 Both the formulation Volk ohne Raum and the message of the book were sympathetic to both 
mainstream German foreign policy (Gustav Stresemann had in fact used the phrase at the 1925 Berlin 
Colonial Week and Exhibition),908 and the work of the geopolitikers (though Grimm doesn’t use the 
                                               
Vorschlägen, am meisten im Sinne Paneuropas.’ See also R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. 
[c.1929]), RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 124 
906 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 17. See also R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), 
RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 124 
907 W.D. Smith, "The Colonial Novel as Political Propaganda: Hans Grimm's "Volk Ohne Raum"", German Studies 
Review 6.2 (1983) 215-235; c.f. H. Grimm, Volk ohne Raum, 2 vols. (Munich: Albert Langen Verlag; 1926) 
908 R. Heynen, Degeneration and Revolution: Radical Cultural Politics and the Body in Weimar Germany (Leiden & 
Boston: Brill; 2015), 476 
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term, his book did more than any other to popularise the concept of Lebensraum, and was thus 
championed by Karl Haushofer).909 1926 also saw the publication of a special issue of the Zeitschrift 
für Geopolitik on the theme of colonialism, featuring a lead article by Erich Obst entitled “We are 
reclaiming our colonies”, arguing that this claim ought to be pursued in Africa rather than Asia.910 
The compatibility of this with Pan-European plans was highlighted by the German diplomat Alfred 
Zintgraff (son of the African explorer Eugen Zintgraff) in a 1928 lecture at the General Meeting of 
the German Colonial Society (Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, or DKG) in Stuttgart, entitled 
‘Pan-Europe and the colonial question’.911 Zintgraff argued that since the German entry to the League 
of Nations in 1926 and the supposed unmasking of the ‘Colonial Guilt Lie’, she had an 
‘incontrovertible legal right’ to the return of her colonies, but that a Pan-European common plan for 
the development of Africa with the ‘active co-operation’ of Germans would solve this problem.912 
Coudenhove-Kalergi certainly knew of Zintgraff’s views, and his endorsement (at least in general 
terms) can be deduced from his publication of an article by Zintgraff on ‘The Colonizability of Africa’ 
in the December 1929 issue of Paneuropa.913 It does not seem too much of a stretch to surmise that 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own February 1929 article on Eurafrica was partially prompted by Zintgraff’s 
lecture, whether to capitalise on the sentiment that Zintgraff represented, or to clarify what the Pan-
European position was on these issues that were fast gaining traction in Germany. 
                                               
909 Smith, "The Colonial Novel as Political Propaganda", 234; citing Jacobsen, Karl Haushofer: Leben und Werk, 1: 
pp.538-539; 2: pp. 77, 142-143 
910 E. Obst, "Wir fordern unsere Kolonien zurück", Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 3.3 (1926) 151-160. Obst’s stated logic 
was that Asian lands had reached a stage of development that merited self-government, whereas those in Africa 
(and the South Seas) still required a German ‘friend and teacher’ (Obst, "Wir fordern unsere Kolonien zurück", 
153). In addition to Obst’s Eurafrican reasoning, there was a clear political motive for supporting self-determination 
for French and British colonies in the Middle East and Asia. See Wittfogel, "Geopolitics, Geographical Materialism 
and Marxism", 30 
911 Alfred Zintgraff, “Paneuropa und die koloniale Frage”, lecture held at General Meeting of the DKG (June 2, 1928), 
Der Kolonialfreund 6, no. 7/8 (1928); HAEU, PAN/EU 27, 771/1/194 
912 Alfred Zintgraff, “Paneuropa und die koloniale Frage”; c.f. Schnee, German Colonization Past and Future 
913 A. Zintgraff, "Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Afrikas", Paneuropa 5.10 (1929) 24-36. The neologism 
‘Besiedlungsfähigkeit’  had been coined in A. Leue, Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Deutsch-Ostafrikas, ein Beitrag zur 
Auswanderungsfrage (Leipzig: Wilhelm Weicher; 1904) 
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This is not to suggest that Coudenhove-Kalergi’s alliance with Briand was incidental. Indeed, 
the May 1930 edition of Paneuropa – timed to coincide with both the second Pan-European Congress 
in Berlin, and the release of Briand’s “Memorandum on the Organisation of a System of European 
Federal Union”914 – contained a ‘sketch’ of a European Pact, a ‘basis for discussion’ upon which 
negotiation of such as European Federal Union might proceed. Article 13 of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
proposal for a Pact specified that: 
‘All European citizens enjoy economic equality in the tropical colonies of European states in 
Africa. In the other colonies of the states they enjoy at least most-favoured-nation treatment 
as against citizens of states that do not belong to the alliance.’915 
In its care to respect State sovereignty, to work within (and hence be subordinate to) the League of 
Nations, to be compatible with the mandate system, and to prioritise the economic over the political, 
Article 13 clearly represented a version of Pan-European colonial policy carefully tailored to mesh 
with Briand’s Memorandum. And yet, in its very mention of Europe’s African colonies it markedly 
diverged from the Memorandum’s deliberate silence on this issue. This silence was part of a larger 
strategy on the part of the Memorandum’s authors, Aristide Briand and Alexis Leger, to limit the 
scope of the proposal, ‘in order to increase the prospects of unanimous acceptance of an initial 
concrete proposal capable of reconciling all the interests and special conditions involved’.916 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s gamble, his justification for diverging from Briand at this critical time, was 
that he believed that the colonial question was better solved than ignored, and that the solution he 
offered had the potential to ‘transform the colonial question from a divisive to a unifying element for 
                                               
914 Briand’s Memorandum (“Memorandum on the Organisation of a System of European Federal Union”, in League of 
Nations, Documents Relating to the Organisation of a System of European Federal Union, A. 46. 1930.VII. (15 Sep 
1930), pp.9-14; League of Nations Archives, Commission d’Étude Union Européenne, Box ‘Political’, European 
Union. 1) Origin of the question; hereafter, Briand-Leger Memorandum) was dated 1 May 1930, and officially sent 
to all European governments on 17 May 1930 
915 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Entwurf für einen paneuropäischen Pakt", Paneuropa 6.5 (1930) 149-158, 152. 
Original: ‘Alle europäischen Bürger genießen in den tropischen Kolonien europäischer Bundesstaaten in Afrika 
wirtschaftliche Gleichberechtigung. In den übrigen Kolonien der Bundesstaaten genießen sie mindestens 
Meistbegünstigung gegenüber Bürgern von Staaten, die dem Bunde nicht angehören.’ 
916 Briand-Leger Memorandum, 14 
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Europe’.917 Certainly, Briand’s tactic of avoidance did not pay dividends, for the colonial problem 
would prove to be a common objection in the State responses to the Memorandum.918 
Coudenhove-Kalergi made one last attempt to secure Eurafrica through the League in his 
December 1933 ‘Plan for a Reform of the League of Nations’, which suggested an overhaul of the 
mandate system. Under this new Plan, Class A-mandates (i.e. the former Ottoman territories in the 
Middle East) would be turned into protectorates, and Class B and C mandates turned into colonies of 
the mandatory powers, with the added tweak that Germany and Italy would receive (unspecified) 
colonial compensation.919 Turning back to the Pan-European Union after the League ignored his 
suggestions, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued in his 1934 book Europa erwacht! ‘that the European 
colonial empire would give the continent “a new sense, a new mission”’,920 arguments echoed by the 
influential French advocate of Eurafrica Eugène Guernier both in his own books and in a January 
1935 article in Paneuropa.921 
 In May 1935, Eurafrica was one of the topics of discussion at the fourth Pan-European 
Congress in Vienna. The Congress was organised into eleven Commissions, of which the last of these, 
Commission XI, was dedicated to ‘Europäische Arbeitslosigkeit, Kolonial-, Bevölkerungs- und 
Siedlungsprobleme’ (‘European unemployment, colonial, population and settlement problems’).922 
As the title suggests, the discussion eschewed overtly political arguments, instead discussing 
                                               
917 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Kommentar zum paneuropäischen Paktentwurf", Paneuropa 6.5 (1930) 158-165, 161. 
Original: ‘die koloniale Frage für Europa aus einem trennenden in ein einigendes Element verwandeln.’ 
918 Aristide Briand, “Report on the Results of the Enquiry in Connection with the Organisation of a System of 
European Federal Union”, in League of Nations, Documents Relating to the Organisation of a System of European 
Federal Union, A. 46. 1930.VII. (15 Sep 1930), pp.68-77, 71; League of Nations Archives, Commission d’Étude 
Union Européenne, Box ‘Political’, European Union. 1) Origin of the question 
919 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Plan for a Reform of the League of Nations”, Pan-European Union, Hofburg, Vienna 
(December 1933), received by the League 6 February 1934; LoN 50/8258/8258, Jacket 1; p.7 
920 Orluc, "Europe between Past and Future", 69; quoting Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa erwacht, 198 
921 Guernier, L'Afrique, Champ d'Expansion de l'Europe; E.-L. Guernier, Le Destin des continents: Trois Continents, 
Trois Civilisations, Trois Destins (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan; 1936); E.-L. Guernier, "Afrika als 
Kolonisationsland", Paneuropa 11.1 (1935) 7-11 
922 "IV. Paneuropa-Kongress, Wien, 16. bis 19. Mai 1935", Paneuropa 11.6/8 (1935) 157-276; see especially "Die 
Resolutionen: Kommission XI", Paneuropa 11.6/8 (1935) 175; "Kommissions-Beratungen: Kommission XI" 
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Eurafrica in economic and demographic terms, with the issue of African colonisation folded into the 
issue of European unemployment. The commission proceedings show much discussion and support 
for a rational organisation of a (Pan-)European colonisation programme, with the German-Jewish 
historian Alfred Stern calling for the establishment of a ‘Pan-European colonial mandate’ 
(paneuropäischen Kolonialmandats). However, as a means to alleviate unemployment, the idea of a 
forty-hour working week found more favour,923 and Commission XI’s eventual Resolution effectively 
sidestepped any firm statement on colonial issues, instead recommending the setting up of a 
‘permanent commission’ so that the issues could be studied further.924 
 As the Vienna congress was meeting to discuss the economic necessity of Eurafrica, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s gloomy warnings about its political necessity were coming to pass. The 
Abyssinian crisis was exactly the sort of European rift that he had predicted, and the League proved 
unable to broker an agreement between Abyssinia and Italy. Coudenhove-Kalergi attempted to 
intervene, pleading again for an ‘Africa Conference’ that would at least defuse tensions between 
European states, if not placate the Abyssinians.925 However, as his intervention was going to press, 
Italy finally invaded Abyssinia, prompting the League to impose (limited) sanctions. Germany, which 
by this point had withdrawn from the League, chose to remain silent, and imposed no sanctions, thus 
signalling its tacit support of Italy’s actions. On one hand, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s vision of an intra-
European war between colony-owning and non-colony-owning states was proving correct, as was his 
prediction that it would have an African spark. However, on the other hand, Coudenhove-Kalergi had 
always been receptive to the idea that Abyssinia was part of Italy’s ‘natural’ sphere of influence in 
Africa, and he viewed Italy’s eventual seizure of sovereignty there as something of an inevitability.926 
                                               
923 "Kommissions-Beratungen: Kommission XI" 
924 "Die Resolutionen: Kommission XI", 175 
925 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Der abessinische Konflikt", Paneuropa 11.9 (1935) 277-281; Orluc, "Europe between 
Past and Future", 302 
926 See, for example, R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", Paneuropa 8.1 (1932) 7-11, 11 
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Meeting with Benito Mussolini just two days after the capture of Addis Ababa in May 1936, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi tried to persuade him into an alliance with France (and Austria) rather than 
Germany by promising him that such an alliance ‘would have the further advantage of opening North 
Africa to Italian colonization’.927 European influence over Africa was complete (aside from the 
American-backed Liberia), but rather than uniting Europe, it had divided her to the point of 
catastrophe. 
Although Coudenhove-Kalergi’s negotiations with Mussolini ended in failure, ironically his 
notion of Eurafrica was given a new lease of life in Italy, part of a wider trend post-Abyssinia, as 
Eurafrica became more loosely tied to the PEU and its support, previously markedly francophone, 
became more diffuse. While D’Agostino Orsini di Camerota and De Michelis had long advocated 
Eurafrica, renewed Italian interest was sparked (and Mussolini’s imprimatur given) by the 1938 Volta 
Conference organised by the Italian Royal Academy in Rome. The theme for this conference was 
‘Africa’, and it attracted prestigious delegates, including Bronisław Malinowski, Louis Bertrand, 
Albert Demangeon and Karl Haushofer.928 As at the 1932 Volta Conference, the idea of European 
unity was embraced,929 though it was of course a particular version (what we might today call Axis 
or fascist internationalism),930 which existed in an ambivalent relationship with Pan-Europe. 
                                               
927 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 206. Coudenhove-Kalergi believed than ‘A Franco-Italian 
alliance would include automatically Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Balkan bloc, and Belgium. Backed by 
Britain and eventually by Russia, it might evolve into a European federation’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for 
Pan-Europe, 169) 
928 Ellena, "Political Imagination, Sexuality and Love in the Eurafrican Debate", 254-255 
929 The 1932 Volta Conference had featured the British historian of European unity Christopher Dawson (Ellena, 
"Political Imagination, Sexuality and Love in the Eurafrican Debate", 251-252; citing C. Dawson, "Interracial 
Cooperation as a Factor in European Culture", Convegno di Scienze morali e storiche, 14-20 novembre 1932-XI. 
Tema: L'Europa, vol. Vol. 1 (Rome: Reale Accademia d'Italia; 1933)) 
930 D. Brydan, "Axis Internationalism: Spanish Health Experts and the Nazi ‘New Europe’, 1939–1945", 
Contemporary European History 25.2 (2016) 291-311; J. Steffek, "Fascist Internationalism", Millennium - Journal 
of International Studies 44.1 (September 1, 2015 2015) 3-22; A. Antic, J. Conterio, and D. Vargha, "Conclusion: 
Beyond Liberal Internationalism", Contemporary European History 25.2 (2016) 359-371; A. Bauerkämper, 
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German Historical Institute London Bulletin 29.2 (2007) 43-67; A. Bauerkämper, "Interwar Fascism in Europe and 
Beyond: Toward a Transnational Radical Right", in Martin Durham and Margaret Power (eds.), New Perspectives 
on the Transnational Right (Basingstoke: Palgrave; 2011) 39-66; M. Mazower, Governing the World: The History 
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Nevertheless, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s term Eurafrica was enthusiastically appropriated by the new 
Italian monthly journal Geopolitica, launched in January 1939, which embraced it ‘as being 
squisitamente geopolitiche (exquisitely geopolitical)’,931 while Haushofer himself eventually 
contributed to the discussion with a 1938 article entitled ‘Eurafrika?’932 
One of the last articles on Eurafrica in the Paneuropa journal was a 1936 piece by the Sudeten-
German Anton Gall suggesting the creation of a series of giant inland lakes in the Sahara in order to 
develop the land there (see fig. 23).933 While these plans appear fanciful today, Gall was by no means 
alone in suggesting them, and in fact these mega-engineering projects were a notable recurring 
element of German plans for Eurafrica, especially in the Nazi period.934 Their connection to Pan-
Europe can be surmised from the name of the first such project, the German architect Herman Sörgel’s 
‘Panropa Project’, first published in a 1929 pamphlet outlining Sörgel’s plan to erect a series of dams 
(most notably across the Straits of Gibraltar) that would enable the lowering of the Mediterranean 
(thus creating new land to settle and cultivate), to irrigate the Sahara, and to create a Eurafrican 
political union.935 In 1932, Sörgel repackaged this idea in a Nazi-friendly science fiction novel, with 
Panropa now going by the name Atlantropa, the title of the novel.936 Sörgel attempted to copy 
                                               
of an Idea (London: Penguin; 2012) 
931 Atkinson, "Geopolitics and the Geographical Imagination in Fascist Italy", 197 
932 K. Haushofer, "Eurafrika?", Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 15 (1938) 888 
933 A. Gall, "Europas Zukunft", Paneuropa 12.10 (1936) 226-232 
934 On ideas of drainage in German thought in both European and African contexts, see (respectively) D. Blackbourn, 
The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany (New York: W.W. Norton; 2006); 
P.N. Lehmann, "Infinite Power to Change the World: Hydroelectricity and Engineered Climate Change in the 
Atlantropa Project", American Historical Review 121.1 (2016) 70-100  
935 Sörgel, Mittelmeer-Senkung, Sahara-Bewässerung, Panropaprojekt (‘Lowering the Mediterranean, Irrigating the 
Sahara: the Panropa Project’). On Sörgel’s scheme in general, see Lehmann, "Infinite Power to Change the World"; 
K. Muller, "An Imagined National Socialist Colonial Adventure", in Stephan Atzert and Andrew G. Bonnell (eds.), 
Europe's pasts and presents: proceedings of the Fourteenth Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for 
European History (Brisbane, Australia, 7-11 July 2003) (Unley: Australian Humanities Press; 2004) 141-160; M. 
Spiering, "Engineering Europe: The European Idea in Interbellum Literature, The Case of Panropa", in Menno 
Spiering and Michael Wintle (eds.), Ideas of Europe since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War (Basingstoke & 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2002) 177-199; A. Gall, Das Atlantropa-Projekt. Die Geschichte einer 
gescheiterten Vision. Herman Sörgel und die Absenkung des Mittelmeers (Frankfurt & New York: Campus; 1998); 
W. Voigt, Atlantropa: Weltbauen am Mittelmeer. Ein Architektentraum der Moderne (Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz 
Verlag; 1998) 
936 Sörgel, Atlantropa; c.f. Muller, "An Imagined National Socialist Colonial Adventure" 
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Coudenhove-Kalergi’s strategy as a publicist, starting his own Atlantropa organisation, while his 
1938 book Die drei grossen “A”: Amerika, Atlantropa, Asien was an attempt to develop a vision of 
global politics that was transparently indebted to Coudenhove-Kalergi and the geopolitikers.937 
Meanwhile, a whole raft of other authors also wrote novels premised upon Sörgel’s geoengineering 
plans: this new genre of Eurafrican-science-fiction-thriller-cum-propaganda-tract included Georg 
Güntsche’s 1930 Panropa, Wolfgang Lindroder’s 1936 Die Brücke des Schicksals (‘The Bridge of 
Destiny’), Walther Kegel’s 1937 Dämme im Mittelmeer (‘Dams of the Mediterranean’), Titus 
Taeschner’s 1935 Atlantropa and 1938 Eurofrika, die Macht der Zukunft (‘Eurofrica, the Power of 
the Future’), and the Swiss author John Knittel’s 1939 Power for Sale.938 
                                               
937 H. Sörgel, Die drei grossen “A”: Amerika, Atlantropa, Asien – Grossdeutschland und italienisches Imperium, die 
Pfeiler Atlantropas (Munich: Piloty & Loehle; 1938) 
938 Güntsche, Panropa; W. Lindroder, Die Brücke des Schicksals (Leipzig: A. H. Payne Verlag; 1936); W. Kegel, 
Dämme im Mittelmeer (Berlin: Buchwarte-Verlag; 1937); T. Taeschner, Atlantropa (Bern/Leipzig/Wien: Wilhelm 
Goldmann Verlag; 1935); T. Taeschner, Eurofrika, die Macht der Zukunft (Berlin: Buchwarte-Verlag; 1938); J. 
 
Figure 23: Anton Gall's 'Transformation of the Sahara' (1936). Source: A. Gall (1936) "Europas 
Zukunft", Paneuropa 12.10 p.227 
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The third direction in which Eurafrica was turned at the end of the interwar period, with 
similarly ambivalent ties to the Pan-European movement, was its appearance in Britain. It garnered 
heavyweight support on both sides of the aisle, in the figures of the Conservative MP Leo Amery and 
the Labour MP Ernest Bevin. Amery was a long-time supporter of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s, and while 
he was utterly opposed to the restitution of German colonies, he believed a colonial Pan-Europe, built 
along the lines of (and existing parallel to) the British Commonwealth, would satisfy German 
demands for colonial access.939 Bevin too supported this position, though his interpretation was 
notable for including Britain and her colonies; Bevin’s ‘Euro-Africa’ would thus embrace the entire 
African continent.940 
If each of these ways in which Eurafrica was picked up in the last years of the interwar period 
– namely, the geopolitics of axis imperialism, politically charged science fiction and the hitching of 
Pan-Europe to the coattails of the British Commonwealth – departed from Pan-European doctrine and 
organisational control, they each also shared core elements with Coudenhove-Kalergi’s vision. These 
elements in turn often derived from the late-nineteenth century notions that we began with. In order 
to unpack the discursive power that made Eurafrica so appealing so quickly to so many disparate 
groups (both ideologically and geographically), in the final section I pick out three broad pillars that 
supported and justified it: an argument about political justice in a world in which justice was no longer 
meant to be political, an economic argument about resources that naturalised neomercantilist notions 
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of autarky, and an demographic argument based on racist underpinnings that rendered Africa empty. 
 
 
The theorisation of Eurafrica 
International justice 
Though Schnee’s apparent debunking of the ‘Colonial Guilt Lie’ was certainly most popular in 
Germany, where it served to mend nationalist pride, stoked feelings of victimisation, and rhymed 
conceptually with the ‘War Guilt Lie’, it found sympathetic ears elsewhere too. The US Secretary of 
State and Commissioner to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference, Robert Lansing, admitted 
in his 1921 account of the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles that few believed that the stripping 
of Germany’s colonies was the result of an ‘impartial’ assessment of her prior mismanagement of 
them: 
‘If the advocates of the [mandate] system intended to avoid through its operation the 
appearance of taking enemy territory as the spoils of war, it was a subterfuge which deceived 
no one.’941 
Even Leo Amery, who in 1937 defended the seizure of German colonies as ‘nothing beyond the 
ordinary verdict of history … of a war which after all did not start with a Belgian invasion of 
Germany’, regretted the ‘unctuous rectitude’ of justifying it by reference to Germany’s record of 
colonial administration.942 As the historian Wolfe Schmokel would later argue, ‘there is no doubt that 
the Allied statesmen at Versailles, by their needlessly vindictive and insulting language and their 
continued use of wartime propaganda as facts, had supplied the German colonial revisionists with 
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their strongest arguments’.943 
 They were certainly arguments that the PEU was receptive to. Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote in 
1932 that: 
‘Germany has not forgotten that it lost its colonies by a breach of trust of the Allied Powers. 
That it surrendered in 1918 after the Allies had recognized Wilson’s Fourteen Points as the 
basis for peace.’944 
He continued by quoting Wilson’s Fifth Point, concerning the impartial arbitration of colonial claims, 
noting that this Point was breached in Versailles, and that the pretext of German mistreatment of 
natives ‘has long been refuted by impeccable testimonies of expert witnesses from Allied and neutral 
nations’.945 This state of affairs, he concluded, 
‘embittered the German patriot more than the loss of the colonies itself. So they demand 
colonies not so much for the colonies sake, but as an expression of their equal footing as a 
great power and in the name of international justice.’946 
On the issue of whether to accede to this demand for the restitution of German colonies, Coudenhove-
Kalergi was more equivocal. In the main, he was keen to stress that the solution should not be state-
level transferral of territory, but rather some form of supranational cooperation that would diminish 
the significance of state sovereignty, if not transcend it absolutely. However, in the early 1930s, he 
did advance the idea of transferring the mandates for Cameroon and Togo to Germany, perhaps to be 
shared with Italy,947 reasoning that ‘They would redress a large part of the injustice that Germany 
                                               
943 Schmokel, Dream of Empire, 66 
944 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", 9. Original: ‘Deutschland hat nicht vergessen, daß es seine 
Kolonien durch einen Vertrauensbruch der alliierten Mächte verloren hat. Daß es 1918 kapituliert hat, nachdem 
sämtliche Alliierten die vierzehn Punkte Wilsons als Friedensgrundlage anerkannt hatten.’ 
945 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", 9. Original: ‘ist längst durch einwandfreie Zeugnisse von 
Sachverständigen aus alliierten und neutralen Nationen widerlegt.’ 
946 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", 9. Original: ‘Dieser Tatbestand erbittert die deutschen 
Patrioten mehr als der Verlust der Kolonien an sich. So fordern sie Kolonien nicht so sehr um der Kolonien willen, 
sondern als Ausdruck ihrer gleichberechtigten Großmachtstellung und im Namen internationaler Gerechtigkeit.’ See 
also a 1939 speech in which Coudenhove-Kalergi, channelling the voice of the ‘typical’ German for an English 
audience, reported the belief that: ‘Germany must be given equality in Europe. If Germany again surrendered and 
changed her regime, she must know that she would not be treated as she had been at Versailles, where she had not 
been treated equally or honourably, where she had been not only impoverished but dishonoured.’ (Coudenhove-
Kalergi, "Europe To-Morrow", 640) 
947 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “Plan for a Reform of the League of Nations”, Pan-European Union, Hofburg, Vienna 
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suffered in Versailles, and thus be a decisive step towards European reconciliation’.948 Though he 
would later row back from this, saying in 1939 that ‘it would be a danger to give [Germany’s former 
colonies] back to her’,949 he never shied away from sympathising with the injustice of their seizure, 
thus laying himself open to accusations of appeasing German expansionism. 
However, this charge falls flat on two counts. First, the pursuit of African colonies was not an 
official concern of the German government, either in Weimar or Nazi administrations, until the late 
1930s.950 This was despite the popularity of the colonial movement among the German public, as 
evidenced, for example, by the activity of the Kolonialgesellschaft, the popularity of books by writers 
like Schnee and Grimm, or the memorialisation of German colonialism in monuments like the striking 
brick elephant in Bremen, built in 1931 to a design by the famous Berlin sculptor Fritz Behn (see 
fig. 24).951 Even Hitler’s policy of expansionism was in the first years of Nazi rule confined to 
European soil. Hitler made his disdain for African colonialism clear in Mein Kampf (1925-1926), 
dismissing the clamour for the recovery of German colonies as ‘the quite unrealizable, purely fantastic 
babble of windy parlor patriots and Babbitty coffee-house politicians’,952 and criticising the very 
concept of colonialism as geographically unbalanced: 
‘Many European States today are comparable to pyramids standing on their points. Their 
European territory is ridiculously small as compared with their burden of colonies’953 
Indeed, he wrote in horror of France’s African empire as tending towards a 
‘European-African mulatto State. A mighty self-contained area of settlement from the Rhine 
to the Congo filled with an inferior race developing out of continual hybridization.’954 
                                               
(December 1933), received by the League 6 February 1934; LoN 50/8258/8258, Jacket 1, 1544, p.6 
948 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", 10 Original: ‘Sie wäre die Wiedergutmachung eines großen 
Teiles des Unrechtes, das Deutschland in Versailles erlitten hat, und damit eine entscheidende Etappe zur 
europäischen Versöhnung.’  
949 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europe To-Morrow", 640 
950 M.E. Townsend, "The German colonies and the Third Reich", Poltical Science Quarterly 53.2 (1938) 186-206 As 
Townsend notes, the exception to this rule was Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, whose case for 
Eurafrican/German colonialism was economic. 
951 Officially called the Reichskolonialehrendenkmal, this monument still stands today, though with the inscription to 
‘our colonies’ removed and since 1989 re-dedicated as an anti-colonial monument (Antikolonialdenkmal). 
952 A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. John Chamberlain et al. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock; 1939), 924 
953 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 180 
954 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 937-938 
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For the Hitler of Mein Kampf, Eurafrica was not a dream but a nightmare. While the Nazis would 
(from around 1934) gradually come to embrace the colonial movement, which after all shared with 
Nazi foreign policy the chief goal of revising the Versailles Treaty, it was the Nazi ideology that had 
to bend to incorporate colonial thinking rather than vice versa. 
 The second count on which the charge of appeasement fails is that the Pan-European solution 
was not only about the specific political injustice of the stripping of German colonies under rationalist 
pretences (itself just one part of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s frustration at what he saw as the betrayal of 
Wilson’s ideals at Versailles), but also about the broader historical injustices that meant that countries 
like Czechoslovakia and Poland did not have access to colonies. This broader injustice found 
expression in the fear of a future European civil war between a Western-European bloc of colony-
owning states, supported by London, and an Eastern bloc of non-colony-owning states, supported by 
Moscow. Coudenhove-Kalergi used the analogy of the American Civil War, casting the Western group 
as the slave-owning Confederates, unwilling to give up their economic advantage, and the Eastern 
Figure 24: Fritz Behn's colonial monument, Bremen, erected 1931. Photograph by Joachim Zeller 
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group as the Unionists, acting in their own economic interests though under an idealist banner of 
freedom.955 In this case, the freedom in question was anti-colonial national liberation, though 
Coudenhove-Kalergi warned that ‘the slogan of the right of self determination of coloured people … 
would only be a pretext for Eastern Europe to drive out the Western powers and to take their place’.956 
In other words, the fact that some European states had access to colonies while others did not had 
created a political tinderbox. Speaking of Djibouti, a French exclave newly surrounded by European 
powers since the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that ‘it may be that this 
African spark could ignite a European fire that could scorch the whole culture of the West’.957 The 
way to defuse this situation (and therefore avoid European civil war) was not to revisit the injustices 
of the past, but to look to a cooperative future in which such national injustices lost their meaning and 
melted away. For Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-Europeans, Eurafrica was this future. 
 
 
Natural resources 
If mentions of international justice drew attention to political debates around sovereignty, and used 
landmass and population as proxies for power and prestige, they were comprehensively outweighed 
by a second level of analysis which focused instead on economic debates, which used landmass and 
population as proxies for natural resources and markets. Such debates summoned alternative 
geographies of Eurafrica, based not on the political boundaries of states, but on the physical 
geography of resource distribution, or the supra-state economic geography by which those resources 
could (and should) circulate. 
                                               
955 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 8-10; R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), RGVA, 
554/5/53, 118-126, 121 
956 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 121 
957 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Djibuti", Paneuropa 13.4 (1937) 93-97, 95. Original: ‘es kann sein, daß sich an diesem 
afrikanischen Funken ein europäischer Brand entzündet, der die ganze Kultur des Abendlandes versengt.’ 
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 The presence of natural resources in Pan-European arguments for Eurafrica was often vague 
and drawn in exceedingly broad strokes, yet was almost inevitably present in some capacity. Since 
William Stanley Jevons’ 1865 The Coal Question, natural resources had slowly begun to be 
interpreted as a political driver, a hidden cause of political intrigues and foreign policy, and a reliable 
and quantifiable guide to future political developments.958 In the interwar period, this understanding 
had hit the mainstream: in Quincy Howe’s introduction to Frank Hanighen and Anton Zischka’s 1935 
book The Secret War: The War for Oil (Zischka would later become a prominent proponent of 
Eurafrica), Howe criticised luminaries like Walter Lippmann and Arthur Salter for basing their 
commentaries on ‘confused emotions and interests’ instead of the ‘accurate prophesy’ that Hanighen 
and Zischka’s focus on oil allowed.959 This interest in resources was reflected in the pages of the 
Paneuropa journal, with articles by the exiled German journalist Richard Lewinsohn on “Europe’s 
New Oil-Basis” and by Franz Zrzavý on “The European Resource Problem”.960 A ‘Pan-European 
Resource Conference’ [Paneuropäische Rohstoffkonferenz] was organised to be held in Vienna from 
16-19 March 1938, only for the German invasion on 12 March to force the conference’s 
cancellation.961 Land itself was also treated as a resource, as in Zrzavý’s PEU working paper on “The 
European Agricultural Capacity”.962 The common theme is each of these articles was that Europe’s 
resources were limited, and that steps had to be taken to secure their supply from outside of Europe. 
Curiously, although resources were often quantified, they were rarely mapped; this geographical 
                                               
958 W.S. Jevons, The Coal Question; An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the Nation, and the Probable Exhaustion 
of Our Coal Mines (London and Cambridge: Macmillan and Co.; 1865) 
959 F.C. Hanighen and A. Zischka, The Secret War: The War for Oil (London: George Routledge & Sons; 1935). For 
Zischka’s later explicit championing of Eurafricanism, see A. Zischka, Afrika, Europas Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Nr. 1 
(Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling Verlag; 1951) 
960 R. Lewinsohn, "Europas neue Oelbasis", Paneuropa 11.3 (1935) 72-75; F.J. Zrzavý, "Das europäische 
Rohstoffproblem", Paneuropa 13.6 (1937) 162-167 
961 See Paneuropa 14(1):24-28; 14(2):52-54; 14(3):85-92. For notification of the postponement of the conference, see 
Centre Économique Paneuropéenne/Paneuropäosche Wirtschaftszentrale to League of Nations (12 March 1938), 
LoN, 10A/25880/22798, 29 
962 F.J. Zrzavý, Die europäische Agrarkapazität (Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag; 1934) 
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vagueness was perhaps influenced by German colonial propagandists who got around the fact that 
the African mandated territories were relatively mineral-poor by appealing to ‘the theories of the 
geographer Adolf Wagner, according to whom minerals were distributed more or less evenly over the 
earth’s surface’.963 
 Where a careful reading of African geography did come in to play was in the development of 
the mega-engineering projects necessary to tame the African landscape, still thought of (as it was by 
Hugo) in terms of its savagery and massive scale. Coudenhove-Kalergi described it as ‘a battle of 
human fantasy and technique against an allpowerful [sic] tropical nature’.964 The most massive and 
most savage landscape of all, the Sahara, was the subject of Anton Gall’s ambitious plans. He wrote 
that while modern navigation had conquered the empty spaces of the Atlantic and Pacific, ‘we still 
await the plan for a trans-Saharan railway, let alone its execution’.965 However, his ambition was not 
only to make the Sahara navigable, but to render its land usable; that is, ‘the “economic conquest of 
the Sahara desert”’.966 As we have seen, Gall’s plans, echoing those of Sörgel, were to divert the 
waters of the Nile and the Niger in order to create ‘8 to 10 huge inland lakes, each approximately the 
size of Lake Chad (about one third of Bohemia)’ (see fig. 23).967 This ‘development’ of African space 
was crucial not just for its boosting of Eurafrican agricultural capacity, but for its connection of 
Europe and African into a contiguous geographical region in all senses of the term. As Gall wrote, 
the aim was the creation of ‘a vast cultural and economic territory of the first rank, a Europe coupled 
on an economic, geological and geopolitical basis, eternally upgradeable, with a resource, sales and 
settlement area comprising the entire neighbouring continent’.968 Furthermore, even the act of 
                                               
963 Schmokel, Dream of Empire, 60; citing P. Leutwein, Die Deutsche Kolonialfrage (Berlin: Safari-Verlag; 1937), 47 
964 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 123 
965 Gall, "Europas Zukunft", 229. Original: ‘harrt der Plan einer Transsaharabahn noch seiner Ausführung’ 
966 Gall, "Europas Zukunft", 232. Original: ‘die „wirtschaftliche Eroberung der Wüste Sahara”’ 
967 Gall, "Europas Zukunft", 229. Original: ‘8 bis 10 gewaltige Binnenseen, jeder in dem ungefähren Ausmaß des 
Tsadsees (zirka ein Drittel Böhmens)’ 
968 Gall, "Europas Zukunft", 232. Original: ‘ein gewaltiges Kultur- und Wirtschaftsgebiet allerersten Ranges, eine 
Europa verbindende wirtschaftsgeologische und geopolitische Basis, ausbaufähig für alle Zeiten, ein Rohstoff-, 
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undertaking such grand projects would bring about a sense of communality. As Coudenhove-Kalergi 
wrote, in terms that recall Grimm’s romanticisation of the wide African vistas in which Europeans 
could reach their own inner potential,969 
‘This common task would employ and unite them [sic] the best forces of Europe. It would 
widen the horizon of Europe and raise it above the petty trifles of the mothercountry.’970 
Indeed, casting an eye further east, Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested elsewhere that ‘The joint 
development of Africa could become a major task for the European nations: fantastic and captivating 
as the Russian Five-Year Plan’.971 
 Africa had the space and resources, and Europe had the technical know-how to develop them; 
Africa had surplus materials, and Europe was a market hungry for them. Even if the Sahara presented 
a challenge to Eurafrican contiguity, Pan-European arguments played heavily upon this supposedly 
natural complementarity between the two continents. As one (unnamed) proponent of Eurafrica put 
it, 
‘The symbiosis of Europe and Africa is controlled by a very simple reality. The African soil 
is too poor for Africa to be able to do without Europe. The African subsoil is too rich for 
Europe to be able to do without Africa.’972 
Or, in the more technical language of De Michelis, who admitted that he was ‘largely following 
Coudenhove-Kalergi in his useful articles in Paneuropa’,973 
‘Africa today is the continent already predestined and predisposed for a new organisation 
which will serve to develop, together with the lands and the mineral wealth, the forces of the 
native populations themselves in such a way as to supply Europe the raw materials and the 
foodstuffs of which it will have need for the increase of its factories and for the well-being of 
                                               
Absatz- und Siedlungsgebiet, umfassend den ganzen benachbarten Kontinent.’ 
969 Smith, "The Colonial Novel as Political Propaganda", 220; citing Grimm, Volk ohne Raum, 384-385 
970 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 125-6 
971 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", 11. Original: ‘Die gemeinsame Erschließung Afrikas könnte zu 
einer großen Aufgabe für die europäischen Nationen werden: phantastisch und hinreißend wie der russische 
Fünfjahrplan.’ 
972 Liniger-Goumaz, L'eurafrique: utopie ou réalité?, 26-27. Original: ‘La symbiose de l’Europe et de l’Afrique est 
commandée par des réalité fort simples. Le sol africain est trop pauvre que l’Afrique puisse se passer de l’Europe. 
Le sous-sol africain est trop riche pour que l’Europe puisse se passer de l’Afrique.’ This translation based on G. 
Martin, "Africa and the Ideology of Eurafrica: Neo-Colonialism or Pan-Africanism?", The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 20.2 (1982) 221-238, 226 
973 De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines, 171n* 
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its population; and will serve also to raise the purchasing capacity and the level of civilisation 
of the non-European races and thereby provide assured outlets for the increased industrial 
activity of Europe and set up an intense exchange of goods and services between the two 
continents. 
…Africa is – and cannot fail to be – considered and recognised as strictly 
complementary to Europe, from which it is separated by a great lake, the Mediterranean, 
which once before had the glorious mission of uniting the two continents in economic and 
political life.’974 
In the Pan-European literature, this notion of complementarity was both explicit and explicitly 
imbalanced, with Coudenhove-Kalergi referring to Africa as the ‘natural and ideal supplement 
[Ergänzung] of Europe’, 975 and Gall calling it Europe’s ‘second continent’.976 
 The notion that Europe needed such a complement rested on one of the most influential 
political discourses in the interwar period: that of autarky, which held that states ought to be 
economically self-sufficient, and not beholden to imports. Thus Europe’s lack of natural resources 
(either at the state scale or collectively), when seen through the lens of autarky, was an enormous 
problem. This problem was equally acute whether one saw autarky as a positive ideal to be striven 
for, or as a reluctant necessity imposed by the post-Versailles political system and the tendency 
towards rising trade barriers. At the national scale, autarky lay at the heart of Hjalmar Schacht’s 
influential economic argument for the return of Germany’s colonies, first deployed at the spring 1929 
Young Conference in Paris, when Schacht presented a memorandum claiming that Germany’s 
inability to pay her reparations stemmed in part from the loss of her colonies, which were an ‘essential 
condition for her [Germany’s] economic survival’ since they (allegedly) constituted her supply of raw 
                                               
974 De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines, 170-174; emphasis in original 
975 This is how the phrase is rendered in the slightly awkwardly translated “The African Problem” (RGVA, 554/5/53, 
118-126, 118); the original is ‘die natürliche und ideale Ergänzung Europas’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 3). 
See also the proceedings of the 1935 Kommission XI, which reaffirmed Africa’s status as ‘a supplement of the 
European continent, which Europe assists by maintaining its secular mission as a pioneer of civilization.’ 
(“Kommissions-Beratungen: Kommission XI”, Paneuropa 11, no. 6/8, 191. Original: ‘eine Ergänzung des 
europäischen Kontinents…, Europa behilflich zu sein, seine säkulare Mission eines Wegbereiters der Zivilisation 
aufrechtzuerhalten.’) 
976 Gall, "Europas Zukunft", 228 
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materials.977 Though this argument was dismissed out of hand by Schacht’s negotiating partners – he 
later reported being ‘laughed at’ – it was taken up wholeheartedly by Coudenhove-Kalergi, who 
devoted an entire Paneuropa article to developing this point, explicitly and approvingly referring to 
Schacht’s argument in Paris.978 Schacht and Coudenhove-Kalergi agreed that the political problem of 
European peace depended on the economic problem of Germany’s viability as a such-sufficient 
economy, which in turn depended on German access to African colonies.979 Or, to reduce this formula 
to a maxim, as formulated by Schacht, ‘a nation which is cut off from the essential necessities of life 
must be a source of unrest in the world’.980 
 However, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s support for this line of reasoning must be weighed against 
his larger argument, which was that the national scale was too small for autarky to ever be achieved, 
and that we ought instead to think of autarky on a continental scale. While national autarky 
encouraged trade barriers and hence inhibited the circulation of raw materials, preventing the market 
from functioning as a means of resource allocation, continental autarky allowed for such a market-
driven circulation to take place internally. In this respect, Eurafrican plans were modelled after the 
British Empire and the system of Imperial Preference, as championed by Leo Amery, who described 
its logic as ‘mutual trade, preferential against the world outside, between countries whose products 
are essentially complementary to each other; and countries so numerous and with resources so varied 
as to afford all the market and the resources for large-scale production and large-scale selling’.981 In 
turn, Amery supported Pan-European plans for ‘getting the countries of Europe as a whole, with their 
                                               
977 H. Schacht, "Germany's colonial demands", Foreign Affairs 15.2 (1937) 223-234, 233; H. Schacht, My First 
Seventy-Six Years, trans. Diana Pyke (London: Allan Wingate; 1955), 240-241 
978 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien", 8. This was despite Schacht’s hostility to the PEU, specifically 
its reluctance to negotiate the Versailles borders, in H. Schacht, The End of Reparations, trans. Lewis Gannett (New 
York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith; 1931) (c.f. H. Taylor, "Book review: The End of Reparations", Political 
Science Quarterly 46.3 (1931) 438-441, 440) 
979 Schacht, The End of Reparations; H. Schacht, "German trade and German debts", Foreign Affairs 13.1 (1934) 1-5; 
Schacht, "Germany's colonial demands"; Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Reparationen und Kolonien" 
980 Schacht, "Germany's colonial demands", 228 
981 Amery, "The Problem of the Cession of Mandated Territories in Relation to the World Situation", 15 
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colonies, to come together to form a system parallel to that which we are building up in the British 
Empire’.982 The ‘natural’ complementarity of Europe and Africa, combining Africa’s wealth of 
resources (both land and minerals) with Europe’s ability to develop and provide a market for them, 
made Eurafrica the self-sufficient economic unit par excellence. 
 
 
Colonisation 
The circulation of goods throughout the Eurafrican bloc was to be accompanied, and indeed enabled, 
by the circulation of people. However, this circulation was almost exclusively considered not in terms 
of African immigration to Europe, but rather the reverse: the colonisation of Africa by white 
Europeans.983 As Coudenhove-Kalergi made clear, ‘In order to develop Africa, Europe must not only 
control but also colonize it’.984 Europe was overpopulated, with surplus labour visible in high 
unemployment rates, while Africa had surplus land; this element of Eurafrican complementarity led 
naturally in Pan-European arguments to the need for population transfer. However, as we shall see, 
these arguments were at best casually imperialistic, assuming an essentially empty Africa to be 
parcelled out by and for Europeans, and at worst explicitly racist. 
 Like the rationalisation of resources, the rationalisation of population was based on an (albeit 
sketchy) understanding of physical geography. This was most fully developed in Alfred Zintgraff’s 
mapping of the ‘colonizability’ of Africa, published in Paneuropa in 1929. Zintgraff drew on ‘the 
                                               
982 Amery, "The Problem of the Cession of Mandated Territories in Relation to the World Situation", 15-16  
983 I have found only one mention of African immigration into Europe in Pan-European literature. However, this 
mention was unambiguously racist, with Coudenhove-Kalergi writing that Europe ‘must prevent black workers and 
soldiers from immigrating in large numbers to Europe’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 5, original: ‘Es [Europa] 
muß verhindern, daß schwarze Arbeiter und Soldaten in größerer Zahl nach Europa einwandern’). C.f. R.C. 
Reinders, "Racialism on the Left: E.D. Morel and the “Black Horror on the Rhine”", International Review of Social 
History 13.1 (1968) 1-28 
984 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 7. Original: ‘Um Afrika zu erschließen, muß es Europa nicht nur beherrschen, 
sondern auch besiedeln.’ 
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famous Geographer’ Fritz Jäger’s map of the basins and uplands (Becken und Schwellen) of Africa, 
published the previous year (see fig. 25).985 Zintgraff combined Jäger’s topographical mapping with 
his own argument that the highlands of Africa (i.e. Jäger’s Schwellen) would offer the most favourable 
conditions for permanent European settlement.986 Zintgraff’s conviction that this colonisation should 
be organised in a purely technical manner led him to dissent from Coudenhove-Kalergi’s division of 
the continent into British and Pan-European halves, though he admitted that this stance was 
influenced by the fact that majority of the potential settlement areas he identified lay in British 
Africa.987 For his part, Coudenhove-Kalergi was more sceptical about such environmentally 
determinist notions, arguing that ‘This fight against the tropical heat will be no more difficult than 
the more-than-millennial struggle of Europeans against the northern cold’, and that the problems of 
climate would be countered by the development of technical solutions like central cooling systems, 
underground houses and cities, ointments to protect against the sun, and so on.988 
 The idea of population transfer as a technical matter had mainstream acceptance; it was after 
all only in 1923 that the League had overseen a population exchange agreement between Greece and 
Turkey. The Director General of the International Labour Office (ILO), Albert Thomas, agreed that 
migration was a problem of economics (and vice versa), and that undertaking improvement works in 
Africa might help solve Europe’s unemployment crisis.989 Giuseppe De Michelis, who had equally 
impeccable credentials as an international civil servant – he was the Italian representative to the ILO 
and the director of the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) – was clearer still, arguing that ‘to 
relieve the congestion in overcrowded countries by transferring their surplus to unpopulated areas, 
                                               
985 Zintgraff, "Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Afrikas", 25; citing F.R. Jaeger, Afrika, 3rd edn., Allgemeine Länderkunde / 
begründet von Wilhelm Sievers (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut A.G.; 1928), 38 
986 Zintgraff, "Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Afrikas", 24-25 
987 Zintgraff, "Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Afrikas", 33-34 
988 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 8. Original: ‘Dieser Kampf gegen die tropische Hitze wird nicht schwieriger sein 
als der mehrtausendjährige Kampf des Europäers gegen die nordische Kälte.’ 
989 De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines, 62; Hansen and Jonsson, Eurafrica, 53 
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would open the way to the full exploitation and consummation of the economic potentialities of the 
world’.990 In his view, colonization was merely the least inhumane, and most rational (since it was 
guided by ‘a spirit of enquiry and progress’) of a long history of economically motivated movements 
                                               
990 G. De Michelis, "A World Programme of Organic Economic Reconstruction", International Labour Review 24.5 
(1931) 495-505, 497-498 
 
Figure 25: Fritz Jäger, map of the basins and uplands of Africa (1928). Source: F.R. Jäger, 
Afrika, 3rd edition (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut A.G.; 1928), p.38. Reproduced in A. 
Zintgraff (1929) "Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Afrikas", Paneuropa 5.10, p.25 
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of people, from slavery, through indentured labour and the settlement of penal colonies.991 
De Michelis was namechecked in support of the economic necessity of the coordinated 
European colonization of Africa at “Commission XI” of the 4th PEU Congress in Vienna in May 
1935.992 The Commission saw speeches by Max Grunwald, a retired Chief Rabbi and historian who 
argued that emigration to African could give Europe’s unemployed a ‘refuge’ in which to make 
themselves useful, and Artur Biber, the Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Chamber of 
Engineers for Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland, who gave a detailed breakdown of the numbers 
that such a scheme might run to (300 000 per year, over ten years, for a decadal total of 3 million 
European settlers in Africa), and how it was to be financed.993 Eugène Guernier was more optimistic 
still, writing in Paneuropa that: 
‘a primed Africa will be able to digest a European immigration of approximately 15 to 20 
million individuals. With a migration rhythm [Wanderungsrhythmus] of 500,000 souls per 
year such a flow of men can ensure Europe 30 to 50 years of tranquillity, prosperity and 
peace.’994 
How exactly this was to be organised was generally elided, though Biber did offer that ‘The [African] 
colony should be a mirror image of Europe’, by which he meant that like the PEU’s plans for its 
European territory, it ought to be split into national divisions under a supranational [übernational] 
federal authority.995 More typical was some sort of deferral, like Coudenhove-Kalergi’s assurance 
that a ‘common colonization program’ would be worked out at an Africa Conference, to be brokered 
by Britain.996 
                                               
991 De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines, 65 
992 "Kommissions-Beratungen: Kommission XI". De Michelis’s 1934 book had made similar arguments, and as we 
have seen was itself explicitly indebted to Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own work (De Michelis, World Reorganisation on 
Corporative Lines). For more on De Michelis and the consonances of corporativism and Eurafrican thinking, see 
Steffek, "Fascist Internationalism"; Steffek and Antonini, "Towards Eurafrica" 
993 M. Grunwald, "Afrika und das Emigrantenproblem", Paneuropa 11.6/8 (1935) 230-232; A. Biber, "Die 
Bekämpfung der technologischen Arbeitslosigkeit durch Kolonisation", Paneuropa 11.6/8 (1935) 232-233 
994 Guernier, "Afrika als Kolonisationsland", 10. Original: ‘ein vorbereitetes Afrika wird imstande sein, eine 
europäische Immigration von ungefähr 15 bis 20 Millionen Individuen zu verdauen. Bei einem 
Wanderungsrhythmus von 500.000 Seelen pro Jahr kann eine solche Menschenbewegung Europa 30 bis 50 Jahre 
Ruhe, Wohlstand und Frieden sichern.’ 
995 Biber, "Die Bekämpfung der technologischen Arbeitslosigkeit durch Kolonisation", 232. Original: ‘Die Kolonie soll 
ein Spiegelbild von Europa sein’ 
996 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 17 
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However, behind all the talk of technical rationisations and common action, this colonisation 
was envisaged as primarily German- (and, to a lesser degree, Italian-) led. As the argument ran, it was 
Germany in which the problems of unemployment (interpreted as a symptom of ‘overpopulation’) 
were starkest, so an apolitical solution to this economic problem was naturally to ‘manage’ the 
settlement of Germans in Europe’s African territories. Even without executive action to manage these 
flows, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued that since none of the extant colonial powers (apart from Belgium) 
were overpopulated, their populations had no incentive to emigrate to the colonies, so Europe relied 
upon German population pressure to drive its colonisation programme.997 We see here the tacit 
acknowledgement of the logic of Lebensraum, perhaps most explicit in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
rallying call that for inhabitants of overpopulated nations, ‘it is possible to build a second and greater 
Europe, where millions and millions of Europeans might find a new homeland, Europeans for whom 
their fatherland now is too narrow’.998 However, the Pan-European understanding of Lebensraum 
differed from the Nazis’, in two key respects. First, as we have seen, Nazi ideology only endorsed the 
expansion of German Lebensraum in continental Europe; even after the shift to a Kolonialpolitik in 
the late 1930s, African colonies were seen as spaces from which to extract raw materials rather than 
spaces of settlement.999 And second, Pan-European Lebensraum was up-scaled from the nation to the 
continent, such that ‘Africa is … the living space of Europe’.1000 As Coudenhove-Kalergi argued, 
‘one … ought to say to them [Germany]: You speak of Lebensraum. What Lebensraum do 
you want? If they then answer that they want two or three colonies and Central and Eastern 
Europe between Russia and Germany, they should be told: We offer to you a much larger 
Lebensraum.  We offer you the whole of Europe and a great part of Africa if you really only 
want living space, a space where you can be free in your commerce, in your life; but if you 
want living space for domination, then you will not have anything; but if we construct a 
federated Europe, then the whole of Europe will be your living space, and then you will have 
                                               
997 This is why ‘The development and conquest of Africa is only possible with the participation of the Germans and 
Italians.’ 
998 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, L’Europa s’è desta [Europa erwacht!], trans. Riccardi Curiel (Rome: Edizioni Fauno; 
1945), 146; quoted in Ellena, "Political Imagination, Sexuality and Love in the Eurafrican Debate", 246 
999 Schmokel, Dream of Empire, 49-50 
1000 P. D'Agostino Orsini di Camerota, "Note geo-economiche sull'Eurafrica", Geopolitica 3.2 (1941) 90-96, 94; quoted 
in Atkinson, "Geopolitics and the Geographical Imagination in Fascist Italy", 199 
 
259 
 
much more than if you conquer one or two countries.’1001 
Thus, by re-scaling Lebensraum Coudenhove-Kalergi attempted to negotiate a compromise between 
admitting the vital force of population pressure and sidestepping the cynical (ab)use of this idea by 
nationalists; between allowing for a German-dominated colonisation and obtaining the consent of the 
Western-European colonial powers; between the demands of Realpolitik and the façade of technical, 
economistic justifications. 
 Of course, by using economistic rhetorics to justify the European colonisation of African land, 
Coudenhove-Kalergi was also up-scaling the cynicism of the nationalists to the continental level. 
However, while intra-European tensions were papered over with a veneer of apolitical 
rationalisations, when it came to justifying European imperialism in Africa per se, the Pan-European 
reasoning tended to fall back on the more traditional notions of the European mission civilisatrice. 
Accordingly, stress was placed on Europe’s Christian duty of care for native populations in Africa, 
with its attendant assumptions of African primitivism. Indeed, a common touchstone was the French 
colonial administrator Marshal Hubert Lyautey, held up as an exemplar of good colonial development 
for his belief that ‘The object of colonising penetration is not to dispossess or to assimilate the native, 
but to associate with him, equipping him in a modern way’.1002 However, there was also a recognition 
that Europe’s colonial legacy in Africa was not unblemished, with Coudenhove-Kalergi admitting 
that ‘The Europeans did not come to Africa as an older brother, nor as a guardian, nor as a teacher 
and guide – but mostly as a despot and oppressor’.1003 Instead, Coudenhove-Kalergi argued, the role 
Europe ought to take was that of Africa’s liberator: by acting as her saviour – medically, theologically 
and developmentally – Europe could ‘pay’ for all that Africa gave her.1004 These lines of reasoning, 
along with the vague promises of an eventual time when European guardianship of Africa might come 
                                               
1001 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Europe To-Morrow", 630 
1002 Quoted in De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines, 75 
1003 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 5-6. Original: ‘Der Europäer kam nicht als älterer Bruder, nicht als Vormund, nicht 
als Lehrer und Führer nach Afrika - sondern meist als Despot und Unterdrücker.’ 
1004 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 5 
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to an end, struck a similar tone to the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ invoked by the League’s mandates; 
like the League, the PEU had to work hard to repair confidence in international colonial governance 
after the infamy of the Congo Free State. 
 The final element in the Pan-European justification of colonisation was its explicit treatment 
of race. Indeed, for Coudenhove-Kalergi the colonial question introduced the notion of race to 
Europe: 
‘The possession of Africa unfurls for Europe the question of race, which it has otherwise been 
spared, since Eurafrica combines the most civilised people [Kulturvölker] of the white race 
with the most primitive peoples [Naturvölkern] of the black.’1005 
In so doing, he brought the racial primitivism that underpinned the Pan-European treatment of Africa 
to the surface. However, beyond this there were even more sinister racial prejudices. First, references 
to ‘the question of race’ effectively framed the co-existence of human races as inherently problematic, 
a framing made unambiguous in the English-language edited version of the same article, in which 
Coudenhove-Kalergi looked in fright at multiracial America, arguing that ‘Europe must from the very 
beginning take into consideration the importance of the nigger question which represents to-day the 
heaviest burden of the American future’.1006 Second, Pan-Europeans treated the establishment of 
white colonial elites as a valuable resource, if not an outright precondition for ‘development’. Thus, 
both Coudenhove-Kalergi and Grunwald argued that a significant advantage France might gain from 
allowing German colonisation in its colonial territory would be the formation of a white elite.1007 
                                               
1005 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 4. Original: ‘Der Besitz Afrikas rollt für Europa die Rassenfrage auf, von der es 
sonst verschont ist. Denn Eurafrika vereinigt die höchsten Kulturvölker der weißen Rasse mit den primitivsten 
Naturvölkern der schwarzen.’ 
1006 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 119 
1007 Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote that ‘a developed colony with a white elite, with railways, roads, factories, plantations 
and ports, is more valuable and profitable for the motherland than the possession of uninhabited steppes, swamps 
and jungles’ (Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 15. Original: ‘eine erschlossene Kolonie mit einer weissen 
Oberschicht, mit Eisenbahnen, Strassen, Fabriken, Plantagen und Häfen für das Mutterland wertvoller und 
einträglicher ist als der Besitz unbewohnter Steppen, Sümpfe und Urwälder.’), while Grunwald claimed that 
German colonisation would provide ‘Replenishment by whites, where the French form a significant minority’ 
(Grunwald, "Afrika und das Emigrantenproblem", 231. Original: ‘Auffüllung durch Weiße, wo die Franzosen eine 
erhebliche Minderheit bilden.’) 
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Third (and most fundamentally), this was justified by reference to an explicit statement of racial 
inequality: 
‘Its [Europe’s] relationship to black Africa in the decades to come cannot be built on equality, 
but on dominion, education and guidance. 
 This requirement, which contradicts the principle of self-determination, corresponds 
to the fact of the inequality of human races.’1008 
Coudenhove-Kalergi attempted to turn this racist argument to directly support European unity, 
arguing that ‘the solidarity of race precedes the solidarity of citizenship’: that is, that Europeans had 
to realise that they shared more with each other than with their black subjects.1009 Like Daniel 
Garrison Brinton’s initial invention of Eurafrica, then, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Eurafrica was 
explicitly racist. It is true, as Liliana Ellena points out, that in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s writings ‘the 
term “race” appears only in connection with the comparison of non-Europeans as marked and 
raced’.1010 Certainly, this use of race in Eurafrican arguments stands in stark contrast to Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s refusal to countenance biological racism in intra-European contexts. However, this contrast 
simply adds to the weight of evidence that for Pan-Europeans, when it came to Africa, different rules 
applied. Eurafrica represented not only an essential unity of the continents of Europe and Africa, but 
also an essential division between them. 
 
 
Conclusion 
For Pan-Europeans, Eurafrica was a stable entity that could nevertheless be seen from multiple 
viewpoints, and sold on multiple grounds (political, economic, demographic) depending on the 
                                               
1008 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 5. Original: ‘Seine Beziehung zum schwarzen Afrika kann in den kommenden 
Jahrzehnten nicht auf Gleichberechtigung aufgebaut sein, sondern auf Herrschaft, Erziehung und Führung. Diese 
Forderung, die dem Prinzip des Selbstbestimmungsrechtes widerspricht, entspricht der Tatsache der Ungleichheit 
der Menschenrassen.’ Translation informed by R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, “The African Problem” (n.d. [c.1929]), 
RGVA, 554/5/53, 118-126, 119 
1009 Coudenhove-Kalergi, "Afrika", 5. Original: ‘die Solidarität der Rasse der Solidarität der Staatsbürgerschaft 
vorangeht.’ 
1010 Ellena, "Political Imagination, Sexuality and Love in the Eurafrican Debate", 249 
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context. Taking a step back, we can identify three key insights that these arguments for Eurafrica 
reveal about the implicit geographies upon which they were mounted, geographies whose impressions 
could be detected far beyond the limits of the PEU. 
 First, it rested on a peculiarly doubled vision of African space, which flipped in meaning 
depending on which scale one looked at. At the state scale African space was seen as ‘closed’ (i.e. 
fully carved up by European states), and therefore threatening, since disputes over African territory 
could easily reflect violence back into Europe, while the imbalance of colony ownership stoked 
European tension. This connection between the ‘closure’ of political space and a fragile or precarious 
political situation was shared widely, and perhaps best expressed by Halford Mackinder: 
‘Do you realise that we have now made the circuit of the world, and that every system is now 
a closed system, and that you can now alter nothing without altering the balance of 
everything’1011 
However, when seen at the supranational (or ‘Pan-European’) scale, African space was marked not 
by its fullness, but by its emptiness, wherein lay its great promise.1012 At this scale, Africa was not a 
‘spark’, but a valve through which spatially-rendered ‘pressures’ (political, economic or 
demographic) could be released. It emptiness was an invitation: it was as if the old Crusading 
justification of extra-European terra nullius, as evoked by Victor Hugo in his 1879 exhortation for 
Europe to ‘take’ Africa, though exhausted at the state level, could be resurrected at the Pan-European 
level, re-imagined as Pan-European terra communis. 
 Second, Africa was seen as a crucible in which a united Europe, or at the very least European 
solidarity, could be forged. If the colonies had long been sites of experimentation in new technologies 
of governance by imperial powers, here Africa was to be the site of experimentation for a whole new 
                                               
1011 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, 260. For more on the discourse of closed space in this period, see 
Kearns, "Closed space and political practice" 
1012 As Atkinson writes of Italian conceptions of Eurafrica, ‘The one constant factor in these arguments was the way in 
which Africa was considered as little more than a resource or commodity, an expanse of empty resource-laden 
space which was to be contested and controlled by various of the European colonial powers.’ (Atkinson, 
"Geopolitics and the Geographical Imagination in Fascist Italy", 186) 
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scale of governance. In this, the General Act of the Berlin Conference loomed large, both as a 
precedent for this sort of ambition, and as a failure that had to be overcome. European co-operation 
in Africa, it was hoped, would both performatively create and prove the efficacy of supranational 
governance, so that it could be introduced in Europe itself. As Carlo Sforza wrote, 
‘Simultaneously, and despite the parochialism of the Governments at home, a sort of 
international solidarity was slowly evolving in the colonies. … Out of interest if not out of 
good will, an embryonic European understanding had at last been found in Africa. We could 
hate one another in Europe, but we felt that between two neighbouring colonies the interest in 
common was as great as between two white men meeting in the desert.’1013 
This notion of Europe finding itself in Africa attained quasi-mystical overtones, as in the talk of Africa 
‘widening the horizon of Europe’; Africa was represented as Europe’s mission, quest or destiny in 
ways that served to reflect the focus squarely back on Europe. As Grunwald put it in his pithy maxim, 
‘Save Africa for Europe means: save Europe through Africa’.1014 All of which, as Ellena notes, 
‘overturns the common belief that Europe is the source rather than the result of colonialism’.1015 
 Third, if Eurafrica was framed as an attempt to fix colonialism, it again did so in a doubled 
sense, balancing two competing motives. On one hand, it was an attempt to fix colonialism in the 
sense that it was try to rectify what was by then seen as an outmoded form of politics. On the other 
hand, it was so in the sense that it was attempting to retain the fundamental power structures of 
colonialism, fixed in place. This balancing act, at once preserving and superseding the familiar 
spatiality of colonialism, led to two secondary contradictions, or differences of opinion, regarding 
a) the achievability, and b) the advisability of Eurafrica. 
On the former, from a certain light, Eurafrica seemed consonant enough with established 
                                               
1013 C. Sforza, Europe and Europeans: A Study in Historical Psychology and International Politics (London: George G. 
Harrap & Co.; 1936), 202-203. Sforza was referring to the pre-1914 situation, though as can be deduced from his 
nostalgic tone, he too was arguing for ‘a sort of European Consortium’ through which to administer African 
colonies. (Sforza, Europe and Europeans, 215) 
1014 Grunwald, "Afrika und das Emigrantenproblem", 231. Original: ‘Afrika für Europa retten, heißt: Europa retten 
durch Afrika.’ 
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interests to be feasible, with De Michelis writing that ‘The construction of what has aptly been called 
Eurafrica is, on the other hand, a problem of which the solution is not so difficult nor so remote’.1016 
The traction that Eurafrica gained in a short stretch of time across a range of different audiences 
suggests that such a scheme certainly had a significant constituency. Yet from the embrace of mega-
engineering schemes to the fanciful plans for mass migration, the Pan-European plans for Eurafrica 
seemed unable to avoid straying into patent utopianism; as Yannick Muet argues, of all the Pan-
European projects to be given this epithet, Eurafrica was the one that most deserved it.1017 
On the issue of the advisability of Eurafrica, meanwhile, it was attacked from both sides. 
Those who thought the idea of voluntarily ceding direct sovereignty of colonies to a supranational 
authority utopian were naturally inclined to believe that it was overly radical, that it had swung too 
far from either conventional colonialism or the structures of the League to be worth considering. 
However, for those sympathetic to the growing tide of anti-colonialism, and specifically the Pan-
Africanism that had been visibly growing in strength since the First Pan-African Conference in 
London in 1900, Eurafrica was not only insufficiently radical, it was downright reactionary. This was 
perhaps most forcefully expressed by the German journalist and pacifist Carl von Ossietzky in a 1930 
article in the leftist magazine he edited, Die Weltbühne: 
‘Coudenhove’s Europe proclaims for itself the right to oppress and loot that part of humanity 
which has not yet learned to defend itself. Does Coudenhove not know that for a long time 
there has been a movement: “Africa for the Africans”? Today it is time to cleanse the blood 
from European hands, to abolish colonial imperialism, and not to declare the current situation, 
shaken and rotten to the core, as sacrosanct.’1018 
For all its support, Eurafrica was in the interwar years simply too radical for colonials, and not radical 
                                               
1016 De Michelis, World Reorganisation on Corporative Lines, 173 
1017 ‘Most of the ideas developed by the author of Pan-Europe, contrary to what many of his contemporaries believed, 
were far from utopian. However, this one was.’ (Muet, Les géographes et l’Europe, 69). Original: ‘La plupart des 
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1018 C.v. Ossietzky, "Coudenhove und Briand", Die Weltbühne 26.22 (27 May 1930 1930) 783-785, in HAEU, PAN/EU 
1, 500/1/683, 86-87, 784-785 [86ob-87]. Translation informed by Orluc, "Europe between Past and Future", 71 
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enough for anti-colonials. 
 The irony is that following WWII, Eurafrica re-emerged as a powerful political imaginary – 
a journal was even founded in 1951 under the name Eurafrique1019 – and it did so precisely because, 
as Hansen & Jonsson argue, Eurafrica possessed the ‘ability to encompass contradictory historical 
tendencies and satisfy opposing political interests’, such that it was able to ‘appeal to colonialists and 
anti-colonialist alike’.1020 It was thus under the banner of Eurafrica that the transition was finally 
made in the reconfiguration of Europe’s relationship with African, ‘between colonial and 
postcolonial, pre- and post- European integration, white supremacy and “partnership”, “colonial 
exploitation” and “development”, “civilizing mission” and “third-world aid”’.1021 In short, once the 
notion of Eurafrica had been liberated from the organisational control of (and ideological association 
with) the PEU, the balancing act that had previously been blamed for its failure was converted into 
the key to its success. 
Hansen & Jonsson adopt Fredric Jameson’s notion of a ‘vanishing mediator’ to describe the 
way in which ‘Eurafrica produced the preconditions for its own disappearance’, by creating the 
conditions in which the narratives of decolonisation and European integration could take hold, each 
of which purported to be ‘new beginnings’ and therefore ensure the erasure of Eurafrica’s role in this 
history.1022 Post-war residual colonial ambitions and enthusiasm, they argue, should not be seen as 
having slowed the development of integration/decolonisation: on the contrary, by ushering in the 
‘vanishing mediator’ of Eurafrica, they contributed to it. One might equally, it seems, view the PEU 
as itself a vanishing mediator at the previous stage in this history. By bringing together a melange of 
                                               
1019 ‘It [Eurafrique] was founded in 1951 in Algiers, as a part of the association Amis du Sahara (Friends of the Sahara), 
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"France, Empire, Europe: Out of Africa?", Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 26.2 
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1022 Hansen and Jonsson, Eurafrica, 252-258; citing F. Jameson, "The vanishing mediator; or, Max Weber as 
storyteller", The Ideologies of Theory: Essays 1971-1986. Vol 2: The Syntax of History, 2 vols. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press; 1988) 3-34 
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disparate influences into the coherent entity of Eurafrica, Pan-Europeans were certainly responsible 
for its creation. And equally, the success of Eurafrica required the disappearance of the PEU from the 
stage. Though their idiosyncratic, neo-colonial vision of Eurafrica was subsequently softened, its 
racist and more overtly exploitative aspects hidden from view or simply forgotten, there is no 
doubting the crucial role of the PEU in the development of this geography. 
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Conclusion 
 
The time and space of Pan-Europe 
On 14 September 1946, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi departed his Swiss summer house in Gstaad 
and made the short journey to Bursinel on Lake Geneva, where Winston Churchill was summering at 
Villa Choisi. It had been a meeting that both men had been keen to set up ever since Coudenhove-
Kalergi had returned to Europe in June, in order to discuss their respective ideas for the post-war 
reconstruction of Europe’s political geography.1023 Over lunch, the two men talked of Churchill’s 
upcoming lecture at Zurich University, which he planned to use to launch his campaign for the 
unification of Europe. 
While at Choisi, Churchill had been spending his time painting, and after lunch he showed 
Coudenhove-Kalergi the fruits of his labours (fig. 26): 
‘After lunch he took me to see his latest canvas. … He was busy painting a large landscape of 
the Lake of Geneva with an old cedar tree in the foreground. His paintings are in keeping with 
his character and literary style: bold and large, with strong impressive contours and brilliant 
colours, but without much attention to detail.’1024 
These are the faculties that Churchill called upon five days later in expressing his vision of ‘a kind of 
United States of Europe’ in Zurich.1025 Coudenhove-Kalergi, listening to the speech on the radio, was 
delighted to hear Churchill explicitly pay tribute to him and his organisation, immediately 
telegramming his appreciation and writing to tell Churchill that ‘your speech made me one of the 
                                               
1023 Churchill had sent Coudenhove-Kalergi a radio-telegram to this effect while the latter was still sailing across the 
Atlantic (W.S. Churchill to R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi (15 Jun 1946), ACV, PP 1000/4/1; c.f. Coudenhove-Kalergi, 
An Idea Conquers The World, 262). Coudenhove-Kalergi was equally enthusiastic, writing that ‘I should feel very 
sorry not to see the man I admire most among my contemporaries while only a few miles separate us’ (R.N. 
Coudenhove-Kalergi to W.S. Churchill (4 Sep 1946), ACV, PP 1000/4/2) 
1024 Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 267-268 
1025 Churchill, "Speech at Zurich University"; Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 268 
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happiest men on earth – I cannot express my feelings of gratitude for all it meant for Europe, for the 
Pan European Movement and for me!’1026 While Churchill’s tribute may have been politic, there is 
no doubt that it was also genuine. From the assumption of a world still structured in a colonial manner, 
to the equivalence drawn between a united Europe and the British Empire, to an essential ambivalence 
regarding the precise nature of these relations, Churchill’s credentials as a Europeanist were from the 
start tied to Pan-Europeanism; today’s debates over Churchill’s credentials as a Europeanist would 
profit from remembering this.1027 
 Coudenhove-Kalergi was a skilled writer, and his description of Churchill’s painting style – 
published in his 1953 autobiography An Idea Conquers the World – was a clear allusion both to the 
specific character of the Zurich speech and to Churchill’s politics more generally. However, in picking 
out the traits he most admired in Churchill, we can also detect an unconscious admission of 
                                               
1026 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi to W.S. Churchill (23 Sep 1946), ACV, PP 1000/4/2, p.1. Telegram in same file. 
1027 For the outlines of the debate, contrast B. Johnson, The Churchill Factor: How One Man Made History (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton; 2014); F. Klos, Churchill on Europe: The Untold Story of Churchill's European Project 
(London & New York: I.B. Tauris; 2016) 
Figure 26: Churchill painting in the garden of Villa Choisi, Bursinel, Lake Geneva (1946). Source: SIK-
ISEA, Schweizerisches Kunstarchiv, HNA 25: Nachlass Charles Montag 
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Coudenhove-Kalergi’s own views concerning the desirable characteristics of a political leader, the 
qualities that he aspired to himself. Certainly, the mention of impressive contours and bold colours 
echo two descriptions of Coudenhove-Kalergi that he chose to include in An Idea Conquers the World. 
First, that of Churchill himself, whose 1930 article on a ‘United States of Europe’ was re-edited to 
constitute the introduction to the volume, and featured the line: ‘The form of Count Kalergi’s theme 
may be crude, erroneous and impracticable, but the impulse and the inspiration are true’.1028 And 
second, that of Benito Mussolini, another leader Coudenhove-Kalergi tried to win over, who was 
quoted as having told Coudenhove-Kalergi that:  
‘Your policy is, as it were, geometrical. It has the merit of perfect logic, but is in my opinion 
quite impracticable.’1029 
Each of these might generously be called backhanded compliments; in highlighting the supposed 
impracticability of Pan-Europe, they were subscribing to the common criticism that it was a utopian 
idea that was simply too radical to be realised. (While in many ways such critics were proved correct, 
it should be said in defence that this accusation overlooks the flexibility and pragmatism with which 
the campaign for Pan-Europe adapted to the changing political situation.)1030 Despite their critical 
edge, Coudenhove-Kalergi took pride in Churchill and Mussolini’s remarks, not just because they 
placed him shoulder-to-shoulder with the century’s great political figures, but because they located 
the merits of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plans in the contours of the Count’s vision, the boldness of his 
brushstrokes. 
 
 
                                               
1028 Churchill, United States of Europe, CAC, CHAR 8/303, 4-12, 8; Churchill, "Introduction" 
1029 Quoted in Coudenhove-Kalergi, An Idea Conquers The World, 206 
1030 This view might be attested to by the British Conservative politician and diplomat Duff Cooper, who previously 
‘had vaguely classed this movement [Pan-Europe] in my mind with the various other idealistic and impractical 
schemes for ensuring international peace’. After speaking with Coudenhove-Kalergi however, Cooper was left 
‘much impressed by the views that he expressed, by his grasp of the European situation and by the practical 
character of his programme’ (A.D. Cooper, The Second World War, First Phase (New York: Charles Scribner's 
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This thesis has therefore attempted to do justice to Pan-Europeanism by focusing the lens of analysis 
at precisely this level, reading the specifics for what they tell us about the outline. It has concentrated 
upon the sense of spacetime invoked by Pan-Europeanism: the ways in which it contorted the 
geometry of political space, and attached historiographic ballast and momentum to the idea of a 
politically united Europe. 
Regarding the former, I have analysed the role of space in Pan-Europe by developing the 
intellectual genealogy of an ‘alternative geopolitics’ that is centred not on the geostrategy of Hitler’s 
Germany, but on Pan-European thought. The implications of such a shift are significant, importing 
certain literatures that have until now been absent from historical and political geography, and 
re-reading others that we might think of as more familiar, but doing so from an unfamiliar angle. A 
host of nineteenth-century political economists and geographers, who are habitually left out of 
conventional histories of geopolitics (and largely from geography as a whole), can been seen from 
this new perspective to have profoundly influenced the way in which political space was 
conceptualised. Likewise, the intersecting history of pan-movements, whether in the primary texts of 
the key figures or in the circulating political campaigns and academic secondary literature on pan-
movements that was so abundant in the first part of the twentieth century, demands to be seen not as 
a curiosity but as a crucial way in which politics was re-envisioned in this period. This constituted 
nothing less than a new way of seeing politics, and ought to inform the recent wave of work on the 
simultaneous, competing ascent of globality as a structuring ideal of political space in the theory and 
practice of international politics.1031 
                                               
1031 See, for example, O. Rosenboim, The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United 
States, 1939-1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 2017); Mazower, Governing the World; K. Postel-
Vinay, "European Power and the Mapping of Global Order", in Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Berny Sèbe, and Gabrielle 
Maas (eds.), Echoes of Empire: Identity, Memory and Colonial Legacies (London & New York: I.B. Tauris; 2015) 
321-334 
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Meanwhile, a re-orienting of analytic focus to Pan-Europeanism also forces us to re-evaluate 
those commonly held to be the progenitors of geopolitics – Ratzel, Mackinder and Kjellén – and by 
doing so to see new sides to their respective lives, works and legacies.1032 Finally, by bringing 
geopolitik itself into communication with Pan-European texts and contexts, this work too is 
defamiliarised, with each side of the conversation asking new questions of the other. Reorienting 
geopolitik away from the Haushofer-Hitler axis is not a matter of recuperating it from its Nazi 
associations,1033 but rather of on one hand showing it to be multi-dimensional, and on the other hand 
of answering Hannah Arendt’s question of the extent to which pan-movements too are implicated in 
the development of imperialist geostrategy in the interwar period and beyond.1034 
Regarding the role of time in Pan-Europeanism, we have seen that Coudenhove-Kalergi 
offered a progressivist and historicist treatment of time, in an intellectual climate in which neither 
were in favour. That is to say, Pan-Europe rested on the idea that history was underpinned by certain 
logics and progressed in certain directions; and that one needed to pay attention to the lessons of 
history (that is, to uncover its logics) in order to make political decisions in the present. His primary 
claim, one woven through Pan-European events, imagery and literature, was that the lesson offered 
by the canon of European peace leagues was above all else one of European unity. 
These statements require considerable context to fully understand and appreciate which 
elements were borrowed and which were novel to Pan-Europeanism. To begin with, in order to make 
sense of the interwar situation in which a strong anti-historicist attitude pervaded political writing, 
and thereby appreciate the unorthodoxy of cleaving to a historicist approach that holds the past to be 
relevant to the politics of the present, it has been necessary to engage with both the interwar political 
                                               
1032 In this respect, on Mackinder, see also Kearns, Geopolitics and Empire; on Ratzel, see also J. Verne, "The neglected 
“gift” of Ratzel for/from the Indian Ocean:  thoughts on mobilities, materialities and relational spaces", 
Geographica Helvetica 72.1 (2017) 85–92; “Geo- and biopolitics in historical perspective”, St John’s College, 
University of Oxford (25-26 May 2017), special issue with the Journal of Historical Geography forthcoming. 
1033 C.f. the ongoing debate over Haushofer’s influence upon Hitler: Herwig, The Demon of Geopolitics; Murphy, 
"Hitler's Geostrategist" 
1034 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 222 
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and historical literatures, and the more recent theorists on the nature of time and historicity. Likewise, 
in order to unpick the contribution of Pan-Europeanism to the construction of a defined historical 
literature on European integration, we have had to examine the way in which these texts coalesced 
into a literature, and the ways in which the essential meaning of this literature shifted. 
The clearest message we can draw from these investigations is that the literature of the history 
of the idea of European unity itself needs to be historicised. It too often suffers both from complacency 
borne of over-familiarity and from the Whiggish imposition of a narrative of the march toward 
European unity; the symptoms of these ills are a flattening of texts that are starved of sufficient 
contextual depth, and a reluctance to read them differently.1035 Indeed, we have seen how the curation 
of a canon of federal schemes for supra-national political union and its interpretation as specifically 
‘European’ is a twentieth-century innovation, a result of the careful folding together of the nineteenth-
century literatures of pacifism and international law. While the responsibility for this re-branding does 
not lie exclusively with Coudenhove-Kalergi, his Pan-European writings were perhaps most 
enthusiastic in imputing a European essence to this literature, and curating it accordingly. Beyond the 
specific need to rethink the literature of the history of the idea of European unity, however, there is 
also a more subtle but more general implication regarding ‘canonicity’, or how canons are made and 
remade.1036 The present study has shone light on the complex set of processes through which canons 
are made, and moreover shown that these processes themselves have a historical geography. The 
shifting ways in which citation was performed and texts refracted through one another, the shifting 
meanings and motives of such practices, the shifting functions of (re-)publishing, circulation and 
translation, all played a key role in the accumulation of a recognisable ‘canon’, and all radically 
                                               
1035 In the most recent contribution to this literature, Pasture agrees that it suffers from a fondness for Whiggish, linear 
narratives, yet his own work does not always succeed in escaping from these problems (Pasture, Imagining 
European Unity since 1000 AD) 
1036 C.f. I.M. Keighren, C. Abrahamsson, and V. della Dora, "On canonical geographies", Dialogues in Human 
Geography 2.3 (2012) 296-312; Mayhew, "Enlightening choices: a century of Anglophone canons of the 
geographical tradition" 
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challenge the very categories (texts, authorship, citation) through which we think through these 
questions. 
The innovativeness and influence of the Pan-European conception of political spacetime is 
demonstrated by the speed with which ‘Eurafrica’ became part of interwar political discourse. 
Eurafrica was the clearest example of the way in which the geometry of politics described by Pan-
Europeanism differed from that of the League of Nations or the British Empire. There would be no 
distinction drawn between Allied colonies and the Mandates stripped from the Central Powers; rather, 
there would be collectively managed Pan-European colonies that did not discriminate between 
European nationals. Three broad arguments were put forward in favour of this system: that it would 
salve tensions between colony-owning and non-colony-owning European states by putting them on 
an equal footing, that it would grant Europe a necessary resource-base in order for it to compete 
effectively with the giant and resource-rich territories of Pan-America and the Soviet Union, and that 
it would offer an outlet for the ‘population pressure’ afflicting certain European states, thereby also 
providing the manpower and expertise needed to exploit African resources. Quite aside from the 
implicit racism of a paternalist mentality that African views need not be sought on the matter, Pan-
European writings on Eurafrica often betrayed an explicit racism that held the inequality of ‘black’ 
and ‘white’ races to be self-evident. 
The idea of Eurafrica proved extremely popular, and while it continued to be associated with 
Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-European movement, it quickly spun beyond their control, gaining 
traction in both Franco-British imperialism and Germano-Italian fascist imperialism, while also 
informing a sub-genre of politically charged science fiction. Indeed, its influence continued to be felt 
in the post-war period, especially in France where it offered a means by which to participate in both 
Europeanism and colonialism.1037 In some ways, the breadth and depth of purchase that the idea of 
Eurafrica possessed indicates that Pan-Europeanism had a far larger role in shaping political discourse 
                                               
1037 Hansen and Jonsson, Eurafrica 
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than it is commonly granted. If so, however, it also constitutes a dual warning: on one hand, that if 
we are willing to see influence, we must also contend with the idea that Pan-Europeanism was 
complicit in creating and bolstering a political imagination that was deeply racialised; and on the 
other hand that it is impossible to see European history in isolation, and that the European politics of 
today cannot easily be detached from the colonialism that was until relatively recently a defining 
feature. 
 
 
Afterlives 
Notwithstanding the minor swell of academic attention that Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Pan-
European movement have received since the millennium (see chapter I), outside of this literature 
Coudenhove-Kalergi remains a mostly forgotten figure. His public memorials are few and far 
between: on the outskirts of Vienna, one may find the ‘Europa-Platz Coudenhove-Kalergi’ in 
Klosterneuburg, featuring a bust by the Austrian sculptor Thomas Kosma, and ‘Coudenhove-Kalergi-
Park’ in Hietzing. In Paris there is a ‘Place Richard-de-Coudenhove-Kalergi’ in the 16th 
arrondissement. Meanwhile, the history of the PEU is recalled by a new PEU: the ‘Pan-European 
University’, a private university in Bratislava established in 2004, which adopted its present name in 
2010 in honour of the Pan-European movement, but in whose promotional material any deeper 
connection to the movement is conspicuous by its absence.1038 
However, for two specific constituencies, the posthumous presence of Coudenhove-Kalergi 
looms large. Firstly, within the Pan-European Union itself, which survives to this day, in broadly the 
                                               
1038 Paneurópska vysoká škola (PEVŠ) in Slovak, though the English name and acronym is also officially used. See 
https://www.paneurouni.com/en/about-us/information/ (last accessed 31 March 2018). The university does possess 
a plaque with a bust of Coudenhove-Kalergi alongside a map of Europe, unveiled in 2014 (P. Fischer, "The Pan-
European University in Bratislava remembers Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi", European Letters of the European 
Society Coudenhove-Kalergi (3 December 2014)) 
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same form in which it was established in 1923: a central, international organisation, with affiliated 
national chapters across Europe. Coudenhove-Kalergi had continued to preside over the organisation 
until his death in 1972, whereupon control passed over to another Austrian aristocrat: Otto von 
Habsburg, the longtime heir apparent to the House of Habsburg. Under Otto, the organisation was re-
oriented towards a conception of Europe both Catholic and catholic, lobbying for a larger Europe 
than the Western version represented by the EEC. Both aspects aided in the latter-day organisation’s 
most prominent accomplishment: the ‘Pan-European Picnic’ on the Austrian-Hungarian border in 
August 1989, a pivotal flashpoint in the fall of the Iron Curtain. Otto also oversaw the association of 
the PEU with the European Parliament, and from the very first direct elections to the Parliament in 
1979 the PEU has maintained a presence among its MEPs (which included Otto himself from 1979 
to 1999). Today, the ‘Pan-Europa Parliamentary Group’ in the European Parliament boasts over 120 
members, encompassing nearly all member states, and meets regularly during the sessions of the 
Parliament in Strasbourg. In 2004, aged 92, Otto retired from the presidency of the PEU, and was 
succeeded in the role by the French politician (and former MEP) Alain Terrenoire. Terrenoire remains 
in the position today, though the Habsburg involvement is continued by Otto’s son Karl (another 
former MEP) who has presided over the Austrian branch of the PEU since 1986, and has been a vice-
president of the central PEU since 2015. 
 Alongside the PEU, a parallel organisation has sought to keep the memory of Coudenhove-
Kalergi alive: the ‘Coudenhove-Kalergi Foundation’, established in 1978, and since 2008 renamed 
the ‘European Society Coudenhove-Kalergi’ (ES-CK).1039 This group, whose membership overlaps 
with the PEU, focuses on preserving the interwar history of Pan-Europeanism via the commemoration 
of Coudenhove-Kalergi through public and private memorials (including those already mentioned), 
                                               
1039 See http://www.coudenhove-kalergi-society.eu/ (last accessed 31 March 2018) 
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the republication of his works,1040 and the production and distribution of ‘European Letters’ that 
feature short commentaries upon Pan-Europe’s past, present and future.1041 The ES-CK has also 
played a significant role in ensuring the Coudenhove-Kalergi archives are open to researchers, first 
in Geneva and now in Lausanne, as well as lobbying for the restitution of the central PEU archives 
from Moscow. Lastly, it also organises the biennial ‘European Prize Coudenhove-Kalergi’, most 
recently awarded to the British politician Kenneth Clarke in 2016.1042  
 
 
 
However, there is another constituency for whom Coudenhove-Kalergi is by no means a marginalised 
figured who ought to be dusted off and reinterpreted; they believe that his history has not been 
‘forgotten’, but covered up. This group speak of a ‘Kalergi Plan’, which they say remains at the heart 
of the EU today. This secret plan is, they allege, for the European elite to retain political power by 
encouraging mass non-white immigration into Europe in order to engineer a multiracial, submissive 
population. They call this a ‘white genocide’. 
 The evidence for this is a mixture of antisemitic insinuation based on Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
associations with prominent Jewish bankers, and a decontextualised (and often mis-translated) 
reading of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s philosophical works in which he discussed his ideas about race and 
leadership.1043 This radical reinterpretation of Coudenhove-Kalergi began with the Austrian convicted 
                                               
1040 They have edited two volumes, attributed to the German-language name of the organisation: Coudenhove-Kalergi 
Stiftung (ed.), Ausgewählte Schriften zu Europa (Vienna/Graz: neuer wissenschaftlicher Verlag; 2006); 
Europagesellschaft Coudenhove-Kalergi (ed.), Leben und Wirken (Vienna/Graz: neuer wissenschaftlicher Verlag; 
2010)  
1041 See http://www.coudenhove-kalergi-society.eu/Europaeische-Briefe (last accessed 31 March 2018) 
1042 For a list of winners, see http://www.coudenhove-kalergi-society.eu/Europapreistraeger (last accessed 31 March 
2018) 
1043 In fact, the quotations used are almost exclusively drawn from one source: R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Praktischer 
Idealismus (Vienna/Leipzig: Paneuropa Verlag; 1925) 
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Holocaust-denier Gerd Honsik,1044 who in 2005 published from his Spanish exile a book entitled 
‘Goodbye, Europe: the Kalergi Plan: a legal racism’, in which he argued that the real goal of European 
union, masterminded by Coudenhove-Kalergi, was that ‘through ethnic mixing, the white race must 
be replaced by an easily controllable mestizo race’.1045 
 This theory starting getting wider traction from the end of 2012, when Honsik’s theory of a 
‘Kalergi Plan’ started appearing in blogposts online, juxtaposed with commentaries attacking the 
present-day European policies by which this Plan was supposedly being put into action: namely, EU 
policies for integration, the protection of minorities, and the alleged encouragement of mass non-
white immigration.1046 This theory has since been shared across a range of far right and neo-nazi 
networks, along the way being translated into and through many languages, building a corpus of self-
citing knowledge while still balanced upon the same small external evidence base. It has even been 
aired within the European Parliament, in a speech given by the British National Party MEP Nick 
Griffin during a session on asylum. Griffin introduced Coudenhove-Kalergi as the ‘godfather of the 
European Union’, and spoke about the Count’s alleged plan for the ‘biggest genocide in human 
history’, the ‘breeding-out’ of ‘indigenous Europeans’ via ‘the encouragement of mass non-white 
immigration’.1047 Asylum, Griffin claimed, was merely the latest disguise under which this Plan was 
                                               
1044 Honsik was convicted (to 18 months jail) of spreading Nazi propaganda in 1992 (he fled to Spain until extradited – 
under the new (pan-)European arrest warrant – in 2007), and again of racism, incitement to racial hatred, and Nazi 
propaganda in 2009 (to 5 years, reduced to 4 on appeal, of which 2 were served before early release due to 
advanced age and his social integration in Spain in 2011) 
1045 Original: ‘mediante el cruzamiento étnico, la raza blanca debe ser sustituída por una raza mestiza cómodamente 
dominable.’ (G. Honsik, Adiós, Europa: el plan Kalergi: un racismo legal: las 28 tesis para acabar con nuestros 
pueblos (Barcelona: Bright-Rainbow; 2005), 20) 
1046 The first such example was an Italian blog post on 11 December 2012 by Riccardo Percivaldi on the website 
Identità.com: http://xn--identit-fwa.com/blog/2012/12/11/il-piano-kalergi-il-genocidio-dei-popoli-europei/ (last 
accessed 31 March 2018) 
1047 All of these terms and ideas are simply lifted from various far right blogposts. For official records of his speech, 
and response to a question asked by the Portuguese MEP Ana Gomes, see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20140312+ITEM-
014+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-872-000; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20140312+ITEM-
014+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en&query=INTERV&detail=3-874-000 (both last accessed 31 March 2018) 
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being implemented. Similar sentiments have since been aired by other prominent figures of the 
European New Right, including the Czech former prime minister and president Václav Klaus, and 
the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán.1048 The weight of the imprimatur of such figures is clear 
from the conclusion of a blog post gleefully reporting their comments, which asks: ‘Are you now 
beginning to see that the Coudenhove-Kalergi [Plan] is a lot more real than some “right wing 
conspiracy theory”?’1049 
 Why Coudenhove-Kalergi? Perhaps because he occupies a significant enough role in the well-
worn story of European integration to be plausibly implicated in its alleged inner workings, but is 
also obscure enough for his part in the story to be moulded according to the teller’s desires (or fears). 
On one hand, his obscurity is interpreted as intrigue: it is alleged that his books are today banned in 
Germany (they aren’t), that the ‘Europe Prize Coudenhove-Kalergi’ is a secret honour (it is entirely 
public), and that the present-day Pan-European Union and the EU are complicit in suppressing the 
‘white genocide’ at the heart of their Plan. On the other hand, the few commemorations of 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, such as the Place Richard-de-Coudenhove-Kalergi in Paris, are interpreted as 
a marker of the EU’s outrageous hubris. Given the new enthusiasm for taking down statues of General 
Lee and Christopher Columbus, the French right-wing commentator Bruno Riondel sardonically asks, 
shouldn’t we also re-name the Place Coudenhove-Kalergi?1050 
These theories are troubling for the ease with which deeply racist and antisemitic politics has 
slipped back into the political consciousness, and the worrying consequences are clear to see both in 
the electoral successes of the new Right and in the rise of nativist and racist rhetoric in the public 
                                               
1048 See, for example, ČTK [Czech News Agency], "Former president Václav Klaus says immigration crisis is 
calculated means to united Europe", Prague Daily Monitor, 4 January 2016; Viktor Orbán (15 March 2016); in 
“Orbán’s historic speech puts Hungary on war footing”, uploaded by ‘Vlad Tepesblog’, 2:00-2.45, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbINrdyAXlE (last accessed 5 September 2017) 
1049 Red Green Alliance, “The ‘Refugee Crisis’ And The Theories That Drive It” (12 March 2016); 
https://redgreenalliance.com/2016/03/12/the-refugee-crisis-and-the-theories-that-drive-it/ (last accessed 4 
September 2017) 
1050 B. Riondel, "Faut-il débaptiser la place Richard-de-Coudenhove-Kalergi?", Boulevard Voltaire (5 September 2017) 
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sphere, particularly in relation to immigration and asylum.1051 In relation to this thesis, however, they 
are troubling because they raise a difficult set of questions about the role of biography in disentangling 
a life from the myths that emanate from it. What is biography if not the very creation of a myth, the 
rounding of a life into a coherent story? As Virginia Woolf said, the biographer’s task is to arrange 
the facts of a life, ‘shaping the whole so that we perceive the outline’.1052 As we have seen, until 
recently Coudenhove-Kalergi himself had had great success in shaping his own life and afterlife, 
cultivating his own mythology and thereby controlling his own narrative. The ‘Kalergi Plan’ seizes 
upon the discussion of race that Coudenhove-Kalergi left out of his own account, and uses it to 
propagate its own inverted mythology, metamorphosing hero into demon. 
Yet there is also a degree to which the ‘Kalergi Plan’ narrative is a consequence of 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s linear arrangement of the facts of his life: it is dependent both on the active 
authorial presence that Coudenhove-Kalergi attributed himself, and on the idea that the European 
project itself is a comprehensible, rational plan. The seductiveness of the ‘Kalergi Plan’ is not only 
that it aligns with extant forms of nationalism, antisemitism and racism, but that it offers a simple, 
intelligible and internally coherent account of the European elites’ motives and strategy, and a single 
human to whom the European project can be traced. In this respect, the far-right demonisation of Pan-
Europe is not wholly dissimilar either to the institutional celebration of the ‘fathers’ and ‘grandfathers’ 
of Europe, which prizes a simple, coherent, Whiggish narrative over contextualism and 
complexity.1053 While it is tempting to complain that both the memory of Coudenhove-Kalergi and 
the very art of biography are being outraged by the spectre of the ‘Kalergi Plan’, perhaps this spectre 
should alert us to the beguiling danger of a coherent self and story that lies at the heart of biography.  
 
                                               
1051 See, for example, the special issue: “Mediatization and Politicization of Refugee Crisis in Europe” in Journal of 
Immigrant & Refugee Studies 16.1-2 (2018) 
1052 Woolf, "The Art of Biography", 126 
1053 Gilbert, "Narrating the Process"; K.K. Patel, "Provincialising European union: Co-operation and Integration in 
Europe in a Historical Perspective", Contemporary European History 22.4 (2013) 649-673 
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European Futures 
At his lowest ebb, shortly before his death in 1972, Coudenhove-Kalergi seemed to transfer his 
previously unshakeable confidence in himself to his organisation, writing: 
‘Every political movement has periods of flood and periods of ebb. 
The last twenty years have been a period of ebb for Pan-Europe. 
The time is ripe for a new flood: under new leaders, in a new spirit.’1054 
Perhaps in this muted concession of personal defeat in the name of collective victory, there is a lesson 
for the apparent defeat of the spirit of Pan-Europeanism constituted by the UK’s decision to leave the 
EU. Now, as then, the historical arc that points toward a united Europe seems bowed to breaking 
point. For Eurosceptics, the breaking of this arc is something to celebrate. In his Valentine’s Day 
statement speech on Brexit, the British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson criticised the ‘expressly 
teleological’ character of the EU for prioritising the political goal of a European state, at the expense 
(in Johnson’s eyes) of British interests.1055 The argument Johnson was trying to make was that Brexit 
represented not a rejection of European culture or civilisation, but merely the rejection of the political 
narrative of European integration. His preferred political teleology, it seems, is either nationalist, 
globalist, or perhaps – given his nostalgic enthusiasm for the Commonwealth – imperialist.1056 The 
new spirit of pan-Europeanism that Johnson advocated was by contrast decidedly apolitical: one of 
continued trade links, stag parties and Spanish retirements, but without (or at least outside of) political 
union. 
 However, this is not the only way to read the present moment. For Europhiles, Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s words carry a different meaning. They suggest that Brexit is a setback rather than a defeat, 
                                               
1054 R.N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Weltmacht Europa, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag; 1972), 183 
1055 B. Johnson, "Uniting for a Great Brexit: Foreign Secretary's speech" (14 February 2018) 
1056 The speech contained contradictory remarks both celebrating nationalist ‘desire for self-government of the people, 
by the people, for the people’ (a reference to Lincoln’s 1863 Gettysburg Address, a Civil War analogy that belied 
Johnson’s conciliatory intentions), and expressing the ambition that ‘Brexit is about re-engaging this country with 
its global identity’ (Johnson, "Uniting for a Great Brexit") 
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and that now might be the time to relieve the old leaders, to rethink the old spirit, and thereby to bring 
about a renaissance that would reinvigorate the European movement. Certainly, the example of the 
PEU reminds us that history did not start in 1945, and that if it really does have an arc, it is neither 
linear nor unbroken. What we so easily refer to as the European project has suffered far more grievous 
blows in the past, and if it is true that democracy is central to the European project, then a democratic 
decision to leave the EU perhaps ought not to be interpreted as an anti-European step. 
Second, and rather more fundamentally, it invites us to complicate our understanding of time, 
and futurity in particular. Here I want to return to the artist whose intervention I started with, Tacita 
Dean. Although her artwork for the referendum campaign (see Introduction, fig. 1) seems to buy 
wholeheartedly into the notion of Europe-as-future, somewhat ironically, Dean’s wider body of work 
offers some of the best examples of the ways in which a linear view of history can be undercut by 
contemplating past futures, raising issues of nostalgia, ruin and obsolescence. 
Take, for instance, Dean’s 2005 work ‘Palast’, in which we see reflections of the cupolas of 
Berlin Cathedral (Berliner Dom), a turn-of-the-century landmark of the Wilhelmine German Empire 
built in a Neo-Rennaissance style, in the windows of the derelict Palace of the Republic (Palast der 
Republik), a 1970s landmark of East Germany (fig. 27). However, the distorted forms of these 
reflections are suggestive too of the nearby TV Tower (Fernsehturm), a futurist monument 
constructed in 1960s East Germany whose popularity and symbolic prominence today is as great as 
(if not greater than) that of the Cathedral. Thus what we are seeing is one past literally reflected in 
another, but the reflection is uncertain, such that we cannot tell whether it is the historicist or the 
futurist past-future that is being referenced. Moreover, the mirror in which we are looking is itself a 
reminder of a forgotten future, a past-future that was disposed of. This contemplation of multiple 
past-futures, or retro-futurisms, destabilises any simple notions of an arc of history. 
Likewise, the historical geography of the Pan-European Union scrambles the simplicity of the 
narrative of ever-greater union, a narrative that it was responsible for carving into the political 
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imagination. At the most fundamental level, it is evidence that the story of European integration 
encompasses failures as well as successes. If we allow for more complexity, we can read the lesson 
as being that success and failure are rather one-dimensional criteria, which are always liable to 
revision. If we are to judge the PEU in terms of the imminence of Pan-Europe as a political entity, 
then its zenith was undoubtedly Briand’s call for a united Europe at the 10th Assembly of the League 
of Nations in 1929, widely understood to have been planned in concert with Coudenhove-Kalergi. 
However, the short-term consequences of this event were the drafting of the Briand-Leger 
memorandum, which met only a lukewarm response, and the establishment of the CEUE, which 
proved to be a huge disappointment, in the words of Arnold Zurcher ‘scarcely a shadow of what had 
originally been intended’.1057 Such is the chain of thought by which Coudenhove-Kalergi and the 
                                               
1057 A.J. Zurcher, The Struggle to Unite Europe, 1940-1958: An historical account of the development of the 
contemporary European Movement from its origin in the Pan-European Union to the drafting of the treaties for 
Euratom and the European Common Market (New York: New York University Press; 1958), 8 
Figure 27: Tacita Dean, Palast IV (2005). Photogravure. Source: Government Art Collection 18204/4 
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PEU have earned their glib epitaph, commonplace in the scholarship on interwar politics and 
European integration: that it was a failure, perhaps a noble failure, perhaps ahead of its time, but 
ultimately a failure nonetheless. 
This conclusion is profoundly unsatisfactory. To whom were Coudenhove-Kalergi and the 
PEU a failure? The very term implies the worst sort of presentism, the scrutiny of the past according 
to the values of today, and such analysis has in recent years been rightly shunned in scholarship on 
the League of Nations.1058 Coudenhove-Kalergi himself never tired of claiming successes, even when 
they strained credibility. Even after becoming marginalised from the European institutions established 
after World War II, he never failed to see their establishment as a personal vindication and a fillip for 
Pan-Europe, which made his late confession of a ‘period of ebb’ all the more shocking. Clearly, to 
speak of success and failure is necessarily to invite questions of the criteria by which we are to judge 
such things. At a time in which the moral certainty that a politically united Europe is indeed part of 
our future is fast evaporating, such criteria cannot help but be politically compromised. 
Taking a cue from Dean’s Palast, this thesis has shifted the angle from which we view the 
historical geography of Pan-Europe, and taken note of how its reflection has altered. The past-future 
of Pan-Europe is in some ways not such a bad likeness to our present. First and foremost, we live in 
a time of European Union, an idea that for so long was dismissed as a utopian fantasy. The doctrine 
of ‘ever-closer union’, which has been at the heart of the European project’s mission statement for 
over 60 years, was built on the foundation of a narrative of the progressive upscaling of politics that 
was heavily promoted by Pan-Europeanism.1059 ‘Fortress Europe’ is built upon the simultaneous 
erasure of Europe’s internal borders and hardening of its external borders, while admitting that the 
                                               
1058 C.f. S. Pedersen, "Back to the League of Nations", The American Historical Review 112.4 (2007) 1091-1117 
1059 ‘Ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ was spelled out as a foundational aim in the first line of the 
preamble to the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
(http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf, last accessed 31 March 2018). For 
further analysis of its continuing presence in EU treaties, see V. Miller, ""Ever Closer Union" in the EU Treaties and 
Court of Justice case law", House of Commons Library Briefing Paper 07230 (16 November 2015) 
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latter are politically contingent and liable to change; the PEU was advocating much the same thing. 
We might also think of the insistence that the European project be consistently branded, accompanied 
by its own flag, not to mention the strains of the final movement of Beethoven’s 9th. Or, pertinently 
for the present moment, we might think of a foreign policy most fully fleshed out in relation to the 
two ambiguously European powers: a distrustful verging on hostile relationship with Russia, and a 
friendly if slightly distant relationship with Britain. 
And yet, if we look from another angle, the reflection begins to look quite alien. Pan-Europe’s 
association with Eurafrica may remind us of an element of the post-war story of European integration 
that has been papered over, but today such colonial attitudes are an ugly reminder of dramatically 
changed mores, their assumptions of European supremacy rightly castigated as racist and ignorant.1060 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s strong-armed presidency of his organisation, and attempts to weave his own 
life story into his organisation’s politics, seem at odds with his professed commitment to democracy 
and are instead reminiscent of the type of personality cult encouraged by authoritarian and populist 
regimes that today’s European institutions habitually dissociate themselves from.1061 And the close 
association of Pan-Europe with geopolitik, which for so long was repudiated by human geography as 
‘intellectual poison’, cannot help but invite suspicion and political scrutiny today, as geographers 
continue to wrestle with the toxic legacy of geopolitics.1062 
Pan-Europe thus encompasses both the past-future that has guided European politics in the 
intervening decades, one admittedly stuttering now, and the past-futures that have been discarded, 
                                               
1060 While it is true that Bruce Gilley’s 2017 article “The Case for Colonialism” (in Third World Quarterly) may 
indicate a growing confidence to air unashamedly pro-colonial views, I take my lead instead from the wholesale 
rejection of these views that the article provoked, eventually (though indirectly) leading to the article’s withdrawal. 
See N.J. Robinson, "A quick reminder of why colonialism was bad", Current Affairs,  (2017) 
1061 On the contemporary EU’s ability and willingness to offer ‘a liberal pushback in an increasingly illiberal world’, 
see (amongst others) K.E. Smith, "The European Union in an Illiberal World", Current History 116.788 (2017) 83-
87, quotation from p.83 
1062 C.f. Hartshorne, "Political geography", 176. On the continuing debates, see for example G. Ó Tuathail, "Foreword: 
Arguing about geopolitics", in Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus, and Joanne Sharp (eds.), The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Critical Geopolitics (Farnham & Burlington, VT: Ashgate; 2013); I.M. Keighren, "History and 
philosophy of geography II: The excluded, the evil, and the anarchic", Progress in Human Geography  (2017) 
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forgotten, or submerged along the way. Its reflection, like that of the Palast, is at once familiar and 
strange. Let us welcome this ambivalence, both as a comment upon the history that we have traced, 
and upon the act of tracing by which we come to terms with it. It alerts us to a more complex 
conception of time, not one of harbingers and precursors but of multiple, competing narratives each 
jostling to put in place their preferred vision, each rearranging the plot points of history to suit their 
own ends. And in the present moment, it offers the European project the means to incorporate a richer 
variety of pasts into its past, and hence open itself to a richer selection of futures. 
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Saint-Simon (London: Oxford University Press; 1976) 83-98. 
Saint-Yves d'Alveydre, Alexandre, Mission actuelle des souverains  par l'un d'eux, 3rd edn. (Paris: 
E. Dentu; 1882). 
Salter, Arthur, The United States of Europe and other papers, ed. W. Arnold-Foster (New York: 
Reynal and Hitchcock; 1933). 
Sandner, Gerhard, "The Germania triumphans syndrome and Passarge’s Erdkundliche 
Weltanschauung: The roots and effects of German political geography beyond Geopolitik", 
Political Geography Quarterly 8.4 (1989) 341-351. 
Sarraut, Albert, La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Françaises (Paris: Payot; 1923). 
——, Grandeur et servitude colonials (Paris: Editions du Sagittaire; 1931). 
Sauer, Carl Ortwin, "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography", in Edward Cary Hayes (ed.), 
Recent Developments in the Social Sciences (Philadelphia and London: J.B. Lippincott 
Company; 1927) 154-212. 
——, "Review: Macht und Erde. By Karl Haushofer and collaborators", Political Science Quarterly 
50.3 (1935) 449-452. 
Scelle, Georges, "Essai relatif à l'Union européenne", Revue générale de droit international public 
38.5 (1931) 521-563. 
Schacht, Hjalmar, The End of Reparations, trans. Lewis Gannett (New York: Jonathan Cape and 
Harrison Smith; 1931). 
——, "German trade and German debts", Foreign Affairs 13.1 (1934) 1-5. 
——, "Germany's colonial demands", Foreign Affairs 15.2 (1937) 223-234. 
——, My First Seventy-Six Years, trans. Diana Pyke (London: Allan Wingate; 1955). 
Schäffle, Albert E.F., Bau und Leben des Soziale Körpers, IV vols. (Tübingen: H. Laupp'schen; 
1875-1878). 
Scharf, Edwin E., "‘Freethinkers’ Of the Early Texas Hill Country", Freethought Today (April 
1998). 
Schlüter, Otto, Die Ziele der Geographie des Menschen (Munich & Berlin: Oldenbourg; 1906). 
Schmid, Werner, "Vereinigte Staaten von Europa. Das Ergebnis einer Rundfrage", Schweizerische 
321 
 
Monatshefte für Politik und Kultur 7 (1927) 195-206. 
Schmitt, Carl, Land und Meer. Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung (Leipzig: Verlag von Philipp 
Reclam; 1942). 
——, Land and Sea: A World-Historical Meditation, eds Russell A. Berman and Samuel Garrett 
Zeitlin, trans. Samuel Garrett Zeitlin (Candor, NY: Telos; 2015). 
Schmitz, Norbert, Alfred Stern (1846 - 1936); ein europäischer Historiker gegen den Strom der 
nationalen Geschichtsschreibung (Hannover: Wehrhahn; 2009). 
Schmokel, Wolfe W., Dream of Empire: German Colonialism, 1919-1945 (New Haven & London: 
Yale University Press; 1964). 
Schnee, Heinrich, German Colonization Past and Future: The Truth About the German Colonies 
(London: George Allen & Unwin; 1926). 
Schöberl, Verena, „Es gibt ein großes und herrliches Land, das sich selbst nicht kenn… Es heißt 
Europa.“ Die Diskussion um die Paneuropaidee in Deutschland, Frankreich und 
Großbritannien 1922–1933, Gesellschaftspolitische Schriftenreihe der Begabtenförderung der 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Münster / Hamburg / Berlin / London: LIT; 2008). 
Schöller, Peter, "Wege und Irrwege der Politischen Geographie und Geopolitik", Erdkunde 11.1 
(1957) 1-20. 
Schöttler, Peter, "Marc Bloch as a critic of historiographical nationalism in the interwar years", in 
Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore (eds.), Writing National Histories. Western 
Europe since 1800, trans. Laura Deiulio and Stefan Berger (London: Routledge; 1999) 125-
136. 
Schou, August, Histoire de l’internationalisme, III: du Congrès de Vienne , jusqu’à la première 
guerre mondiale (1914) vols., vol. II: de la Paix de Westphalie jusqu’au Congrès de Vienne 
(1815) (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co.; 1963). 
Schücking, Walther, "Die Organisation der Welt", in Wilhelm Van Calker (ed.), Staatsrechtliche 
Abhandlungen, Festgabe für Paul Laband zum 50. Jahre der Doktorpromotion, II vols., vol. I 
(Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck); 1908) 533-614. 
——, "L’organisation internationale", Revue Générale de Droit International Public 15 (1908) 5-
23. 
Schultz, Hans-Dietrich, "Fantasies of Mitte: Mittellage and Mitteleuropa in German geographical 
discussion in the 19th and 20th centuries", Political Geography Quarterly 8.4 (1989) 315-339. 
——, "Europa, Russland und die Türkei in der “klassischen” deutschen Geographie", in Paul 
Reuber, Anke Strüver, and Günter Wolkersdorfer (eds.), Politische Geographien Europas: 
Annäherungen an ein umstrittenes Konstrukt (Münster: LIT Verlag; 2005) 25-54. 
Schultz, Hans-Dietrich and Natter, Wolfgang, "Imagining Mitteleuropa: Conceptualisations of ‘Its’ 
Space In and Outside German Geography", European Review of History—Revue européenne 
d'Histoire, 10.2 (2003) 273-292. 
322 
 
Seeley, John Robert, "United States of Europe: a lecture delivered before the Peace Society", 
Macmillan's Magazine 23 (1871 1871) 436-448. 
Semple, Ellen Churchill, "Two Works on Political Geography", Geographical Review 14.4 (1924) 
665-667. 
Seton-Watson, Hugh and Seton-Watson, Christopher, The Making of a New Europe: R.W. Seton-
Watson and the last years of Austria-Hungary (London: Methuen; 1981). 
Sforza, Carlo, Europe and Europeans: A Study in Historical Psychology and International Politics 
(London: George G. Harrap & Co.; 1936). 
Shakespeare, William, "Shakspeare’s dramatische Werke", trans. August Wilhelm Schlegel, IX 
vols., vol. III: Der Sturm. Hamlet, Prinz von Dänemark (Berlin: Johann Friedrich Unger; 
1798). 
Shepperson, George, "Pan-Africanism and "Pan-Africanism": Some Historical Notes", Phylon 23.4 
(1962) 346-358. 
Sherwood, Marika, Origins of Pan-Africanism: Henry Sylvester Williams, Africa, and the African 
Diaspora (New York & London: Routledge; 2011). 
Shriver, Rebecca R., "Women, Pacifism, and the Pan-European Union: Searching for Support in 
Weimar Political Culture", in Isabel Valente (ed.), Pela Paz! Pour la Paix! For Peace! 
(Brussels: Peter Lang; 2014) 289-306. 
Sidaway, James, "Geopolitics: Twentieth Century Spectre", Geography 86.3 (2001) 225-234. 
Sieger, Robert, "Geographische Voraussetzungen des Weltkrieges", Österreichische Rundschau 
42.Jan-Mar (1915) 249-263. 
——, "Rudolf Kjellén", Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 1 (1924) 339-346. 
Sieger, Robert and Penck, Albrecht, "Zwischeneuropa?", Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde 
zu Berlin (unnumbered).3 (1916) 177-180. 
Sinnhuber, Karl A., "Central Europe – Mitteleuropa – Europe Centrale: An Analysis of a 
Geographical Term", Transactions and Papers (Institute of British Geographers) 20.15-39 
(1954). 
Siri, Vittorio, Memorie Recondite, Dall' Anno 1601 sino al 1640, VIII vols., vol. I (Ronco; 1677). 
Smith, Karen E., "The European Union in an Illiberal World", Current History 116.788 (2017) 83-
87. 
Smith, Neil, American empire: Roosevelt's geographer and the prelude to globalization, California 
Studies in Critical Human Geography (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California 
Press; 2003). 
Smith, Woodruff D., "Friedrich Ratzel and the Origins of Lebensraum", German Studies Review 3.1 
(1980) 51-68. 
——, "The Colonial Novel as Political Propaganda: Hans Grimm's "Volk Ohne Raum"", German 
323 
 
Studies Review 6.2 (1983) 215-235. 
——, The ideological origins of Nazi imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press; 1986). 
Snyder, Louis L., Macro-nationalisms: A History of the Pan-movements (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press; 1984). 
Sorel, Albert, L’Europe et la révolution française, VIII vols., vol. VIII: La coalition, les traités de 
1815, 1812-1815 (Paris: Librairie Plon; 1904). 
Sörgel, Herman, Mittelmeer-Senkung, Sahara-Bewässerung, Panropaprojekt (Leipzig: Gebhardt; 
1929). 
——, Atlantropa (Munich: Piloty & Loehle; 1932). 
——, Die drei grossen “A”: Amerika, Atlantropa, Asien – Grossdeutschland und italienisches 
Imperium, die Pfeiler Atlantropas (Munich: Piloty & Loehle; 1938). 
Sorrels, Katharine, Cosmopolitan Outsiders: Imperial Inclusion, National Exclusion, and the Pan-
European Idea, 1900-1930 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2016). 
Sosoe, Lukas K., "Leibniz and European cosmopolitanism", Re-Thinking Europe 2 (2015) 4-22. 
Spencer, Herbert, "The Social Organism [1860]", Essays: scientific, political, and speculative 
(Second series) (London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate; 1863) 143-184. 
Spengler, Oswald, The Decline of the West, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson, II vols., vol. I: Form 
and actuality (New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1926). 
——, The Decline of the West, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson, II vols., vol. II: Perspectives of 
world history (New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1928). 
Spiering, Menno, "Engineering Europe: The European Idea in Interbellum Literature, The Case of 
Panropa", in Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle (eds.), Ideas of Europe since 1914: The 
Legacy of the First World War (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2002) 177-199. 
Spoltore, Franco, "Charles Lemonnier", The Federalist: a political review 45.2 (2003) 114-126. 
Spykman, Nicholas John, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance 
of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co; 1942). 
Stanley, Liz, The auto/biographical I (Manchester: Manchester University Press; 1992). 
Stawell, Florence Melian, The Growth of International Thought, The Home University Library of 
Modern Knowledge (London: Thornton Butterworth; 1929). 
Steffek, Jens, "Fascist Internationalism", Millennium - Journal of International Studies 44.1 
(September 1, 2015 2015) 3-22. 
Steffek, Jens and Antonini, Francesca, "Towards Eurafrica! Fascism, Corporativism and Italy’s 
Colonial Expansion", in Ian Hall (ed.), Radicals and Reactionaries in Twentieth-Century 
International Thought (New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2015) 145-169. 
324 
 
Stein, Lorenz von, Die Grundlagen und Aufgaben des künftigen Friedens (Vienna: Verlag von 
Eduard Hügel; 1856). 
——, Oesterreich und der Frieden (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller; 1856). 
Stern-Rubarth, Edgar, Three Men Tried...: Austen Chamberlain, Stresemann, Briand and Their 
Fight for a New Europe (London: Duckworth; 1939). 
Stirk, Peter M.R., "The Idea of Mitteleuropa", in Peter M.R. Stirk (ed.), Mitteleuropa: History and 
Prospects (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; 1994) 1-35. 
——, A History of European Integration Since 1914 (London: Pinter; 1996). 
Stoddart, David R., "'That Victorian Science': Huxley's Physiography and Its Impact on 
Geography", Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 66 (1975) 17-40. 
Strachey, Lytton, Eminent Victorians: Cardinal Manning, Florence Nightingale, Dr. Arnold, 
General Gordon (London: Chatto and Windus; 1918). 
Stråth, Bo, "Mitteleuropa: From List to Naumann", European Journal of Social Theory 11.2 (2008) 
171–183. 
Strausz-Hupé, Robert, Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons; 1943). 
Štúr, Ľudovít, Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft (Bratislava: Učená společnost Šafaříkova 
v Bratislavě; 1931 [c.1853]). 
Sully, Maximilien de Béthune, Duc de, Memoirs of Maximilian de Bethune, Duke of Sully, Prime 
Minister to Henry the Great. Containing The History of the Life and Reign of that Monarch, 
And his own Administration under Him. Translated from the French. To which is added, The 
Tryal of Ravaillac for the Murder of Henry the Great, III vols., vol. III (London: Charlotte 
Lennox; 1756 [1638/1662]). 
——, Sully's Grand Design of Henry IV. From the Memoirs of Maximilien de Béthune duc de Sully 
(1559-1641), The Grotius Society Publications: Texts for Students of International Relations 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell; 1921). 
Sully, Maximilien de Béthune, Duc de and Hale, Edward Everett, The great design of Henry IV 
from the memoirs of the Duke of Sully and The united states of Europe, ed. Edwin D. Mead 
(Boston, Massachusetts: Ginn and Company, for the International School of Peace; 1909). 
Supan, Alexander, "Die europäische Halbinsel", Die Naturwissenschaften 1.29 (1913) 688–689. 
——, Leitlinien der allgemeinen politischen Geographie (Leipzig: Veit & comp.; 1918). 
Taeschner, Titus, Atlantropa (Bern/Leipzig/Wien: Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag; 1935). 
——, Eurofrika, die Macht der Zukunft (Berlin: Buchwarte-Verlag; 1938). 
Taylor, Horace, "Book review: The End of Reparations", Political Science Quarterly 46.3 (1931) 
438-441. 
325 
 
Taylor, O.R., "Voltaire’s apprenticeship as a historian: La Henriade", in W.H. Barber, J.H. Brumfitt, 
R.A. Leigh, R. Shackleton, and S.S.B. Taylor (eds.), The Age of the Enlightenment: Studies 
presented to Theodore Besterman (Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd; 1967) 1-14. 
ter Meulen, Jacob, Der Gedanke der internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung, II vols., 
vol. I: 1300-1800 (1917); vol. II, pt. I: 1789-1867 (1929); vol. II, pt. II: 1867-1889 (1940) (The 
Hague: M. Nijhoff; 1917-1940). 
The Advocate of Peace, "William Penn’s Essay towards the Peace of Europe" (58 1896), 245–246. 
The Nobel Foundation, "Alfred Fried – Biographical", in Frederick W. Haberman (ed.), Nobel 
Lectures, Peace 1901-1925 (Amsterdam: Elsevier; 1972). 
The Weekly Kansas Chief, "Some Fizzles, Ancient and Modern" (XXIII; Troy, KS 31 July 1879), 1. 
Thermaenius, Edvard, "Geopolitics and political geography", Baltic and Scandinavian Countries 
4.2 (1938) 165-177. 
Thrift, Nigel J., "On the determination of social action in space and time", Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 1.1 (1983) 23-57. 
Tikhonov, Vladimir, "Korea’s First Encounters with Pan-Asianism Ideology in the Early 1880s", 
The Review of Korean Studies 5.2 (2002) 195–232. 
Townsend, Mary E., "The German colonies and the Third Reich", Poltical Science Quarterly 53.2 
(1938) 186-206. 
Troll, Carl, "Geographic Science in Germany during the Period 1933-1945: A Critique and 
Justification", Annals of the Association of American Geographers 39.2 (1949) 99-137. 
Turgot, Anne-Robert-Jacques, "A philosophical review of the successive advances of the human 
mind", in Ronald L. Meek (ed.), Turgot on progress, sociology and economics, trans. Ronald L. 
Meek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1973) 41-60. 
Valois, George, Note sur l'Afrique, chantier de l'Europe [Procès-verbal de la réunion du conseil 
économique de l'Institut d'économie européenne, le 17 novembre 1932.] (Brussels: Institut 
d'économie européenne; 1932). 
Verne, Julia, "The neglected “gift” of Ratzel for/from the Indian Ocean:  thoughts on mobilities, 
materialities and relational spaces", Geographica Helvetica 72.1 (2017) 85–92. 
Vogel, Walther, Das neue Europa und seine historisch-geographischen grundlagen, 2 vols. (Bonn & 
Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder; 1921). 
——, "Politische Geographie und Geopolitik (1909–1934)", Geograpisches Jahrbuch 49 (1934) 79-
304. 
Voigt, Wolfgang, Atlantropa: Weltbauen am Mittelmeer. Ein Architektentraum der Moderne 
(Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz Verlag; 1998). 
Voltaire, De la paix perpétuelle, par le Docteur Goodheart ([Amsterdam]: [M.-M. Rey.]; 1769). 
——, The Henriade, An Epic Poem, in Ten Cantos (London: Burton and Co.; 1797). 
326 
 
——, "Rescrit de l'empereur de la Chine, à l'occasion du Projet de paix perpétuelle", in Adrien-
Jean-Quentin Beuchot (ed.), Œuvres de Voltaire, LXXII vols., vol. XL (Paris: Firmin Didot 
frères & Werdet et Lequien fils; 1830 [1761]) 307-311. 
——, "Rescript of the Emperor of China on the Occasion of the Plan for Perpetual Peace [1761]", 
in Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Christopher Kelly (eds.), The Plan for Perpetual Peace, On the 
Government of Poland, and Other Writings on History and Politics, trans. Christopher Kelly 
and Judith Bush (Hanover, New Hampshire: Dartmouth College Press; 2005) 57-58. 
Voyenne, Bernard, Petite histoire de l'idée européenne (Paris: Éditions de la Campagne européenne 
de la jeunesse; 1952). 
——, Histoire de l'idée européenne (Paris: Payot; 1964). 
Walsh, Edmund A., Total Power: A Footnote to History (New York: Doubleday; 1948). 
Warner, Marina, Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
2013 [1981]). 
Wege, Carl, "Das Neue Europa" 1933-1945: German Thought Patterns about Europe (Stuttgart: 
Edition Axel Menges; 2016). 
Weigert, Hans, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (New York: Oxford 
University Press; 1942). 
Weiss, Louise, Mémoires d'une européenne, Tome II (1919-1934) (Paris: Payot; 1969). 
Weitzmann, Walter R., "Constantin Frantz, Germany and Central Europe: An Ambiguous Legacy", 
in Peter M.R. Stirk (ed.), Mitteleuropa: History and Prospects (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press; 1994) 36-60. 
Wells, H.G., The Shape of Things to Come: the ultimate revolution (London: Hutchinson & Co; 
1933). 
Westlake, John, Études sur les principes du droit international, trans. Ernest Nys (Brussels: A. 
Castaigne; 1895). 
Wheaton, Henry, Elements of International Law; with a sketch of the history of the science, 2 vols. 
(London: B. Fellowes; 1836). 
——, Histoire du progrès des gens en Europe depuis la paix de Westphalie jusqu'au congres de 
Vienne, avec un précis historique du droit des gens européens avant la paix de Westphalie 
(Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus; 1841). 
——, History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America; from the earliest times to the Treaty of 
Washington, 1842 (New York: Gould, Banks & Co.; 1845). 
White, Hayden V., "The Burden of History", History and Theory 5.2 (1966) 111-134. 
White, Ralph, "The Europeanism of Coudenhove-Kalergi", in Peter M.R. Stirk (ed.), European 
Unity in Context: The Interwar Period (London & New York: Pinter; 1989) 23-40. 
Whiteman, Kaye, "The Rise and Fall of Eurafrique: From the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 to 
327 
 
the Tripoli EU-Africa Summit of 2010", in Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whiteman (eds.), The 
EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa (London: Hurst & Company; 2012) 23-43. 
Whiteside, Andrew G., The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-
Germanism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press; 1975). 
Whittlesey, Derwent, German Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Farrar and Rinehart; 1942). 
Wiedemer, Patricia, "The Idea Behind Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Union", History of 
European Ideas 16.4-6 (1993) 827-833. 
Wilgus, A. Curtis, "James G. Blaine and the Pan American Movement", The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 5.4 (1922) 662-708. 
Winkler, Karen J., "The New Biographers", The Chronicle of Higher Education 40.10 (27 October 
1993) A6. 
Wittfogel, Karl A., "Geopolitics, Geographical Materialism and Marxism", Antipode 17.1 (1985) 
21-72. 
Woolf, Stuart, "Reading Federico Chabod's Storia dell'idea d'Europa half a century later", Journal of 
Modern Italian Studies 7.2 (2002) 269-292. 
Woolf, Virginia, "The Art of Biography", The Death of the Moth, and Other Essays (London: 
Hogarth Press; 1942) 119-126. 
Woytinsky, Wladimir Savelievich, Die vereinigten staaten von Europa (Berlin: J.W.W. Dietz; 1926). 
Wright, Quincy, "Pan-Europe. By Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi", Poltical Science Quarterly 
42.4 (1927) 633-636. 
Wüst, Walther, "Raum und Welt-Anschauung", in Karl Haushofer (ed.), Macht und Erde, III vols., 
vol. III: Raumüberwindende Mächte (Leipzig & Berlin: B.G. Teubner; 1934) 140-170. 
York, Elizabeth, Leagues of Nations: Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern (London: The Swarthmore 
Press; 1919). 
Young, George, "Pan-Islamism", in Edwin R.A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (eds.), Encyclopaedia 
of the social sciences, XV vols., vol. XI (New York: Macmillan; 1933) 542-544. 
Young, Hugo, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan; 
1998). 
Younis, Musab, "‘United by blood’: race and transnationalism during the Belle Époque", Nations 
and Nationalism 23.3 (2017) 484–504. 
Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, Anita, Botschafter Europas. Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi und 
die Paneuropa-Bewegung in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag; 
2004). 
Zimmern, Alfred Eckhard, Learning and leadership: a study of the needs and possibilities of 
international intellectual co-operation, 2nd edn. (London: Humphrey Milford/Oxford 
University Press; 1930). 
328 
 
Zintgraff, Alfred, "Die Besiedlungsfähigkeit Afrikas", Paneuropa 5.10 (1929) 24-36. 
Zischka, Anton, Afrika, Europas Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Nr. 1 (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling Verlag; 
1951). 
Zrzavý, Franz J., Die europäische Agrarkapazität (Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag; 1934). 
——, "Das europäische Rohstoffproblem", Paneuropa 13.6 (1937) 162-167. 
Zurcher, Arnold J., The Struggle to Unite Europe, 1940-1958: An historical account of the 
development of the contemporary European Movement from its origin in the Pan-European 
Union to the drafting of the treaties for Euratom and the European Common Market (New 
York: New York University Press; 1958). 
 
